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This thesis examines publicity exploitation in practice and the possible legal response 
of Scots law to that exploitation.  It argues that the common law in Scotland is not 
capable of providing a coherent and principled right of publicity for individuals, and 
that a statutory right is instead required.  By examining the nature of publicity 
exploitation and the activities that constitute publicity, it becomes clear that there are 
a number of different methods by which an individual’s “persona” – name, image, 
identity and reputation – can be used to enhance the goods and services of others, 
and that this enhancement is something for which other parties are willing to pay.  
The first part of this thesis explores publicity in practice, in order to derive a 
framework and vocabulary on which to build the subsequent legal analysis.  One 
conclusion reached here is that, whereas much case law and academic commentary 
focuses on the unauthorised use of persona, authorised exploitation is more common 
and more lucrative for the individual.  Both authorised and unauthorised use 
therefore need to be represented in a publicity right.  The second part explores 
justifications for establishing a legal right to regulate the exploitation of publicity and 
to enable the control of such exploitation by the individual in question.  These 
justifications reflect the dual interests at stake in publicity rights, being dignitarian 
interests in the use and control of one’s persona, and economic interests in the 
financial value of such use.  The third part of the thesis draws upon the findings of 
the first two parts in order to assess the most appropriate legal classification of a right 
of publicity.  The conclusion reached is that publicity cannot be sufficiently protected 
through established real rights or personal rights.  Instead, the hybrid nature of 
publicity, comprising dignitarian and economic interests, should most appropriately 
be protected through a right in the nature of exclusive privilege (a concept already 
known in Scots law).  This right is capable of enabling the necessary control of 
persona for the individual, subject to appropriate limitations to recognise the 
competing interests of other parties.  These limits include freedom of expression and 
cultural communication.  The final conclusion is that such a statutory right of 
exclusive privilege would be best placed to give principled and coherent effect to a 
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A NOTE ON CASE CITATIONS 
 
Case citations in footnotes have been given with reference to the official Law 
Reports where possible.  The neutral citation (if one exists) for these cases has also 
been included in the bibliography.   
 
Other cases have been cited by the relevant volume of law reports, such as FSR, or 
by their neutral citation, where available.   
 
Unreported cases have been cited by neutral citation. 
 
In all instances, the first citation listed in the bibliography is the one that has been 
used in footnotes. 
 
Several recent cases (including, notably, Douglas v Hello! and Irvine v Talksport) 
have raised different issues on appeal from the issues debated in, and decided by, the 
lower courts.  For accuracy, the case citation given on each occasion will refer to the 
case report for the relevant issue under discussion, rather than the case report for the 
highest court involved in the litigation.  By way of example, Douglas v Hello! raised 
issues of privacy when it was heard in the Court of Appeal and issues of commercial 
confidence in the House of Lords.  The Court of Appeal citation will therefore 
typically be used when referring to the privacy elements of the case, while the House 
of Lords citation will be used when referring to the commercial aspects of the 
litigation.   
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Jeeves: It has been my experience, sir, that the normal person enjoys seeing his or 
her name in print, irrespective of what is said about them.  I have an aunt, sir, who a 
few years ago was a martyr to swollen limbs.  She tried Walkinshaw’s Supreme 
Ointment and obtained considerable relief – so much so that she sent them an 
unsolicited testimonial.  Her pride at seeing her photograph in the daily papers in 
connexion with descriptions of her lower limbs before taking, which were nothing 
less than revolting, was so intense that it led me to believe that publicity, of whatever 
sort, is what nearly everyone desires. 
 
From Carry On, Jeeves by PG Wodehouse.  First published 1925, this edition 
published by Penguin Books, London, 1999, page 23. 
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The celebrity image is a cultural lode of multiple meanings, mined for its 
symbolic resonances and, simultaneously, a floating signifier, invested with 




The image of any individual in general – and of celebrities in particular – can be a 
powerful instrument, whether used to add to our shared cultural experience, to pass 
political comment, to raise awareness of social issues, to promote goods or services, 
or simply to illustrate the latest gossip and tittle-tattle.  One consequence of the social 
use and versatility of personal image is the price that it can command:  Catherine 
Zeta Jones and Michael Douglas sold their wedding photographs to OK! magazine 
for £1 million in 2000,
2
 while David Beckham was allegedly paid $20 million in 
2007 for his Emporio Armani advertising deal.
3
  The market for personal images – or 
indeed, for any signifiers of the individual – can be referred to as publicity practice.  
                                                 
1
 RJ Coombe, “Author/izing the celebrity:  Publicity rights, postmodern politics, and unauthorized 
genders” (1991-1992) 10 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 365 (henceforth Coombe, “Author/izing the 
celebrity”), at 365. 
2
 Douglas v Hello! [2008] 1 AC 1. 
3
 Evidence of such deals can be hard to come by:  online articles and blogs give this figure for the 
Emporio Armani deal.  (http://www.adpunch.org/entry/david-beckham-signs-underwear-deal-for-
giorgio-armani/) (accessed 4 November 2008).  For a more general comment on the commercial value 
of such deals, see D Westfall and D Landau, “Publicity Rights as Property Rights” (2005-2006) 23 
Cardozo Arts and Ent. LJ 71 (henceforth Westfall and Landau, “Publicity Rights as Property Rights”), 
at 73, note 3. 
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In turn, the practice of publicity leads to the desire for legal control over use of 
image.    
 
Courts and legal commentators, however, have struggled to identify and agree a 
common legal response to publicity.  Confusion ranges from terminology to 
taxonomy.  How should we refer to the practice of “buying” and “selling” image or 
reputation or gossip?  How should we analyse the rights or assets in question?  Do 
breaches raise issues of publicity, privacy,
4





property rights – or nothing at all?  Should legal development be influenced by 
concerns for personal dignity and autonomy
7
 or economic considerations,
8
 or both?   
 
Any review of publicity rights thus comes up against a considerable range of 
problems from the outset.  Yet this does not mean that a coherent legal response 
cannot or should not be sought.  To borrow an observation from MacCormick, made 
in the context of privacy yet nonetheless relevant:  
The [Younger] committee, having rightly noted that there are many rival 
versions of such a right [of privacy], all vying for legislative or judicial 
adoption, concluded that the right was indefinable and thus not a fit topic for 
legislation in and of itself.  This is a good case of deriving false conclusions 
from true premises.  That there are disputes between rival conceptions of such 
a right is actually a reason for seeking to give it definite import by intelligent 
legislation based on some coherent conception of the right, not a reason for 
rejecting it as indefinable.
9
   
 
This thesis aims to assess the practice and theory of publicity to draw out, if possible, 
a coherent conception of the right of publicity, and thereafter to assess the 
appropriate legal regulation, if any, of such a right. 
 
                                                 
4
 Douglas v Hello! [2006] QB 125; Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 457. 
5
 Douglas v Hello! [2006] QB 125. 
6
 Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2003] 2 All ER 881. 
7
 As in the Civilian approach – see Chapter 2 and, for example, H Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, 
Property and Personality, 2005, (henceforth Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and 
Personality), chapters 4 and 5. 
8
 As in the American right of publicity – see Chapter 2 and, for example, O Goodenough, “The price 
of fame:  The development of the right of publicity in the United States: Part 1 and Part 2” [1992] 
EIPR 55 and [1992] EIPR 90 (henceforth Goodenough, “The price of fame, Part 1” or “The price of 
fame, Part 2”); Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, chapter 3. 
9
 N MacCormick, Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia Reissue “General Legal Concepts”, 2008, 
(henceforth MacCormick, SME Reissue “General Legal Concepts”), para 94, footnote omitted.   
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2. TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLICITY PRACTICE 
 
It is helpful to start this assessment by considering briefly the development of the 
practice of exploitation of publicity.
10
  A number of factors combined in the UK in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
11
 to create the first mass markets 
and mass marketing.  At least five relevant developments can be identified, as: (i) the 
ability to mass-produce goods, and (ii) a newly-emerging middle class with 
disposable income to buy them, together with (iii) the coming of the railways which 
provided increased and improved communications, thereby assisting (iv) the growth 
of an increasingly national press, all of which combined to create (v) the need for, 
and importance of, advertising.  Goods could be produced in sufficient quantities in 
Edinburgh to be distributed for sale not merely in the immediate vicinity but 
throughout the whole of the United Kingdom, and the railways which enabled rapid 
transportation of those goods also carried the national newspapers which could 
advertise those same goods. 
 
Personal endorsement becomes an added boon to businesses attempting to market a 
product throughout the country, when the supplier’s local reputation can no longer be 
relied upon to do the job:  “[a]s mass market products become functionally 
indistinguishable, manufacturers must increasingly sell them by symbolically 
                                                 
10
 Other writers who have considered this include M Madow, “Private ownership of public image:  
Popular culture and publicity rights” (1993) 81 Cal L Rev 125 (henceforth Madow, “Private 
ownership of public image”), at 156-158; H Beverley-Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of 
Personality, 2002, (henceforth Beverley-Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of Personality), at 3-
4; GM Armstrong, “The reification of celebrity:  Persona as property” (1990-1991) 51 La L Rev 443 
(henceforth Armstrong, “The reification of celebrity”), at 452; O Goodenough, “Retheorising privacy 
and publicity” [1997] IPQ 37 (henceforth Goodenough, “Retheorising privacy and publicity”), at 38-
39; VM de Grandpre “Understanding the market for celebrity:  An economic analysis of the right of 
publicity” (2001-2002) 12 Fordham Intell Prop Media and Ent LJ 73 (henceforth de Grandpre, 
“Understanding the market for celebrity) , at 82; and M Richardson and L Hitchens, “Celebrity 
Privacy and Benefits of Simple History”, in A Kenyon and M Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in 
Privacy Law, 2006, (henceforth Richardson and Hitchens, “Celebrity Privacy”), at 256 and 266-267.  
The following summary is drawn from all these sources. 
11
 For an excellent (if controversial) survey of the development of Western society through the 
Industrial revolution see E Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution 1789-1848 (1977), The Age of Capital 
1848-1875 (1997), and The Age of Empire 1875-1914 (1994). 
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associating them with the aura of celebrity – which may be the quickest way to 
establish a share of the market.”
12
   
 
Evidence of personal endorsements can be detected in “Champagne Charlie”, a 
persona George Leybourne maintained not only in Victorian music halls but also 
offstage, under a contractual obligation to do so,
13
 and in a number of cases emerging 
from the courts throughout the nineteenth century.  These included Byron v 
Johnston
14
 – use of the poet Byron’s name on a publication of poems (allegedly) 
written by another; Wilkie v McCulloch
15
 – use of the name of a designer of ploughs 
on a plough made by another; Clark v Freeman
16
 – use of the name of a leading 
physician on pills dispensed by an unconnected party; and Williams v Hodge
17
 – use 
of the name of another leading physician on a surgical implement manufactured by a 
third party.
18
  The key element in the cases cited is the use of a famous name to 
promote goods.  Even the testimony of unknown individuals had a value to 
manufacturers of goods, as can be seen in the nineteenth century advertisement in 
Appendix C.  These examples of personal endorsements reveal the changing face of 
marketing and promotion of goods and services, and indicate the start of a practice 
that has expanded ever since.  One particularly important development was the 
increased acceptance over time of such practices, overturning earlier notions that 




Press advertising also evolved during this period, with the development of 
photography and by continuing improvements in technology.  The increased role of 
the press during this period, both in printing advertising and in catering to the 
interests of the reading public, is discussed by Warren and Brandeis in their seminal 
                                                 
12
 Coombe, “Author/izing the celebrity”, at 368.  
13
 J Flanders, Consuming Passions: Leisure and Pleasure in Victorian Britain, 2006, at 377. 
14
 (1816) 2 Mer 29. 
15
 1822-1824 2S (SC) 413. 
16
 (1848) 11 Beav 112. 
17
 (1887) 4 TLR 175. 
18
 Although misrepresentative or fraudulent use of, for example, an artist’s name has a longer history 
than this:  see http://www.artcult.fr/EN/_Forgeries/Fiche/art-0-1011646.htm?lang=EN (accessed 18 
June 2008). 
19
 Westfall and Landau, “Publicity Rights as Property Rights”, at 78, note 26; Armstrong, “The 
reification of celebrity”, at 459.  
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article, published in 1890.
20
  Their analysis of the indignities suffered by individuals 
when the press intrudes upon their lives is credited with creating a right of privacy in 
the United States.  Nimmer states their article is “the most famous and certainly the 
most influential law review article ever written” and refers to Roscoe Pound’s claim 
that it added a chapter to US law.
21
  Warren and Brandeis’s description of the 
average contents of the daily papers in 1890 destroys any notion that the celebrity 
gossip we see and hear daily is a modern development: 
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become 
a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery.  To satisfy a 
prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns 
of the daily papers.  To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with 





Over 100 years later, celebrity appearances in gossip columns – both printed and 
online – are pursued with ever more industry and effrontery.  Nor is this an 
exclusively American problem:  the UK’s daily press could easily be described in 
similar terms.
23
  However, although the US and the UK have a largely shared 
experience of advertising culture and fascination with celebrity gossip, there is a 
marked divergence between the legal analyses and responses of the two countries.  A 
right to privacy developed in the US within a matter of years following the 
publication of the Warren and Brandeis article
24
 and this right led in turn, 50 years 
                                                 
20
 SD Warren and LD Brandeis, “The right to privacy” (1890-1891) 4 Harv L Rev 193 (henceforth 
Warren and Brandeis, “The right to privacy”).   
21
 MB Nimmer, “The right of publicity” (1954) 19 Law & Contemp Problems 203 (henceforth 
Nimmer, “The right of publicity”), at 203.  For a rather less flattering appraisal of Warren and 
Brandeis’s contribution to the literature, see D Bedingfield, “Privacy or publicity?  The enduring 
confusion surrounding the American tort of invasion of privacy” (1992) 55 MLR 111.  DL 
Zimmerman assesses the contribution of Warren and Brandeis to American scholarship in “Requiem 
for a heavyweight:  A farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s privacy tort” (1982-1983) 68 Cornell LRev 
291.   
22
 Warren and Brandeis, “The right to privacy”, at 196. 
23
 Examples abound in recent English litigation, and will be considered in Chapter 5.    
24
 The failed attempt in Roberson v Rochester Folding Box Co 171 NY 538 (1902), led to a 1903 
statute in New York to remedy the problem, while the Supreme Court of Georgia recognised a 
common law right in their 1905 decision in Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Co 50 SE 68 
(1905):  see Prosser, “Privacy”, at 384-389; Beverley-Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of 
Personality, at 146; Armstrong, “The reification of celebrity”, at 443 and 453-457; and Nimmer, “The 
right of publicity”.  
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later, to the emergence of a right of publicity based on property in Haelan 
Laboratories v Topps Chewing Gum Inc.
25
   
 
In contrast, law in the UK remains largely uncertain of the appropriate response to 
publicity situations.  This position exposes three distinct groups to legal uncertainty:  
the individuals – usually celebrities – who are willing to market their image and 
identity; the parties who are willing to pay to use this (celebrity) persona; and the 
third parties who are prepared to take a chance on unauthorised use but cannot be 
sure of the legal risks involved.
26
  This is highly unsatisfactory from a legal 
perspective – albeit the very fact of non-regulation may also be regarded as 
empowering by some in the commercial world.   
 
3. THE SCOPE OF THIS THESIS 
 
Legal writing on publicity has tended to fall into one of two camps.  In one, the focus 
falls on the commercial practice of publicity, and less attention is paid to the legal 
and theoretical bases and justifications of the right.  Authors in this tradition tend to 
seek the most pragmatic and readily-available solution for this valuable and 
pervasive practice.  In the other camp, theoretical analyses tend to focus on the 
doctrinal legal basis of publicity rights, while overlooking the commercial reality 
which is driving the practice forward.   
 
Both theory and practice are of equal importance, since any right of publicity would 
operate not in the abstract but in the reality that is Scots law.  This thesis therefore 
seeks to bring both camps together.  Critically, while an analysis of existing legal 
protection (such as it is) is a necessary part of this exercise, the main objective will 
not be to provide a doctrinal review of existing rights, but to focus on finding the 
                                                 
25
 202 F 2d 866 (2
nd
 Cir 1953).  As Nimmer pointed out, “although the concept of privacy which 
Brandeis and Warren evolved fulfilled the demands of Beacon Street in 1890, it may seriously be 
doubted that the application of this concept satisfactorily meets the needs of Broadway and 
Hollywood in 1954.”  Nimmer, “The right of publicity”, at 203.  Beacon Street is a prominent 
thoroughfare in Boston: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beacon_Street (accessed 14 November 2008). 
26
 For example, there is a high probability that Talksport would not have predicted the outcome of 
Irvine’s action against them: Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2003] 2 All ER 881. 
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most appropriate legal taxonomy of future legal development in Scotland.  This 
thesis therefore aims to understand the global practice of publicity and to use this 
understanding in the specific context and framework of Scots law, to enable future 
legal development to accommodate the needs of all interested parties.  One 
consequence is that this thesis is more normative than discursive in its approach, 
seeking to delineate the recommended scope of a future publicity right.   
 
The two primary aims of this study therefore are (i) to provide a review of the 
practice of publicity, grounded in evidence of commercial practice and (ii) to assess 
and identify the most appropriate legal response to this publicity practice for Scots 
law. 
 
In doing so, this review must be understood in the context of the “autonomous mixed 
system”
27
 of Scots law.  Just as Armstrong can observe of capitalism that “we who 
live in capitalist societies are marinated in the market to the extent that our religion, 
friendship, concept of self and understanding of morality are deeply influenced”
28
 by 
the capitalist market, so too is the present interpretation and application of law in the 
context of publicity influenced by this mixed legal tradition, which recognises and 
interacts with both Civilian and Common law
29
 theories of law.  Scots law benefits 
from the systematic structure of its Civilian heritage, while drawing on the influential 
case law tradition of Common law systems.  Both elements are of great importance, 
not least the ability to draw on the significantly larger body of case law in England.
30
  
This mixed background has undoubtedly shaped the approach to publicity rights 
taken in this thesis, not least through reference to key Civilian and Common law 
texts on publicity rights, personality rights and intellectual property rights.  These 
                                                 
27
 In the words of Whitty:  NR Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, in NR 
Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, 
forthcoming 2009 (henceforth Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”), para 3.1.1.    
28
 Armstrong, “The reification of celebrity, at 451. 
29
 Adopting a convention used by Reid, for example, I shall use initial capitals for “Civilian” and 
“Common” law when referring to the Romanistic-European and Anglo-American legal traditions 
respectively.  When used in lower case, civil law can be taken to indicate private law, while common 
law indicates those non-statutory rules of law.  See E Reid, “Protection for rights of personality in 
Scots law:  a comparative evaluation” 2007 EJCL 11.4, para 1.1, footnote 8. 
30
 This is particularly the case in developing areas such as publicity and privacy, as evidenced for 
example by the references by the Court of Session in X v BBC 2005 SLT 796 to the English decision 
of Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 457.  
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 and the comparative material in the SCRIPT Personality Rights 
Database.
37
  In particular, Huw Beverley-Smith’s contribution to the literature has 
been invaluable.  His first major publication, The Commercial Appropriation of 
Personality, appeared in 2002 and remains the starting point for any academic work 
in this area.  In it, Beverley-Smith provides an exhaustive review of the current 
English legal treatment of “personality”, and a comparative study of publicity rights 
in a number of jurisdictions, most notably America, Canada, Australia, France and 
Germany.  It was followed in 2005 by a co-authored text, written by Beverley-Smith, 
Ohly and Lucas-Schloetter on Privacy, Property and Personality, which provides a 
comparative review of the legal treatment of publicity and privacy in England, 
France and Germany.  This thesis does not attempt to repeat Beverley-Smith’s 
analyses, but to use these texts, and others, as an advanced starting point for 
continuing the debate and, where possible, rooting it firmly in commercial reality.   
 
One way in which I sought to anchor this review in commercial reality and an 
understanding of the practice of publicity was by conducting empirical research, to 
determine attitudes and beliefs towards publicity rights.  The questionnaire used in 
                                                 
31
 The Commercial Appropriation of Property, and Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and 
Personality. 
32
 Madow, “Private ownership of public image”. 
33
 Primarily H Carty, “Advertising, publicity rights and English law”, [2004] IPQ 209; “The Common 
law and the quest for the IP effect” [2007] IPQ 237; “Personality Rights and English Law”, in NR 
Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, 
forthcoming 2009.  (Henceforth respectively:  Carty, “Advertising, publicity rights and English law”; 
Carty, “The quest for the IP effect”; and Carty, “Personality Rights and English Law”). 
34
 Primarily “Author/izing the celebrity”; The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship, 
Appropriation, and The Law, 1998, (henceforth Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties); 
and “Critical cultural legal studies” (1998) 10 Yale JL & Human. 463. 
35
 JT McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, 2
nd
 ed, 2000, (henceforth McCarthy, The Rights 
of Publicity and Privacy); “Public personas and private property:  The commercialization of human 
identity” (1989) 79 TMR 681 (henceforth McCarthy, “Public personas and private property”); “The 
human persona as commercial property:  the right of publicity” (1995) 19 Colum-VLA JL & Arts 129 
(henceforth McCarthy, “The human persona as commercial property”). 
36
 J Neethling, “Personality Rights” in JM Smits (ed) Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, 
2006, (henceforth Neethling, “Personality Rights”); and “Personality rights:  a comparative overview” 
(2005) XXXVIII CILSA 210. 
37
 This has been set up as a wiki:  http://personalityrightsdatabase.com/index.php?title=Main_Page 
(accessed 18 November 2008).  An overview and analysis of contributions to this project has been 
provided by C Waelde and NR Whitty, “A Rights of Personality Database”, in NR Whitty and R 
Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, forthcoming 
2009, (henceforth Waelde and Whitty, “A Rights of Personality Database”). 
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this survey can be found in Appendix A, while graphs illustrating the data relied on 
(in Chapter 7) are appended at Appendix B. 
 
The questions addressed in this thesis are: 
1. What should be the subject matter of a right of publicity? 
2. Is there a need for such a right?  Is its creation or recognition justified? 
3. What should be the legal taxonomy of this right?  And what should be its 
scope, its limits and its associated remedies?
38
 
These questions will form the foundation of the following study, and reflect the 
division of my thesis into three parts.   
 
Part I, comprising Chapters 2 and 3, will explore the existing understanding of 
publicity rights in theory and in practice, to attempt to delineate the subject matter of 
publicity.  The thesis starts with a review of the publicity rights literature in Western 
jurisdictions (Chapter 2).  It then examines the practice of publicity, including a 
review of some typical contracts for exploitation of publicity (Chapter 3).  In Part II, 
Chapter 4 starts the cross-over from practice to theory, by considering what 
justifications can be advanced in favour of a legal right in the commercial practice 
outlined in Part I.  In addition to examining the possible justifications that can be 
made for the introduction of such rights, the Chapter attempts to respond to some of 
the criticisms advanced against them.  Part III provides a review of rights in Scots 
law, to determine whether legal protection should best be grounded in the 
jurisprudence of privacy (Chapter 5), or whether publicity should be recognised as an 
independent right (Chapter 6).  Having concluded that such a right could be 
recognised, and explored the nature of this right, Chapter 7 reviews its scope, 
drawing on the conclusions reached in the foregoing chapters to explore a number of 
questions regarding the limit of the right, and the possible remedies for the holder of 
the right.  Chapter 8 concludes the thesis, drawing its findings together.  
 
 
                                                 
38
 These questions can be thought of as “what, why and how?” 





Before any attempt can be made to frame a legal right – or to assess whether or not a 
right is necessary – it is essential to have a clear grasp of the practice that constitutes 
the subject of the right.  This Part is intended to explore the current practice of 
“publicity”, firstly by reviewing juridical responses to publicity rights and secondly 
by setting out the scope of publicity practice.  Thus, Chapter 2 considers the legal 
and academic understanding of publicity in a number of Western jurisdictions.  
Chapter 3 then looks at what individuals and companies do when they exploit 
someone’s publicity:  what is the subject matter and what is the use to which it is 
put? 
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1. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF PUBLICITY RIGHTS  
 
The social practice of publicity exploitation and the subsequent legal recognition of 
publicity rights has generated a vast literature.  Articles and case commentaries 
abound in the Western world, from jurisdictions as far apart as Finland and New 
Zealand, California and Italy.  Despite, or perhaps because of, the quantity of 
literature in this area, it is very difficult to draw together a comprehensive review of 
the theory and practice in this area, and the jurisprudence remains “disturbingly 
unsettled”.
1
  The purpose of this chapter is to identify the key theoretical approaches 
to publicity rights through an analysis of publicity rights across Western 
jurisdictions.   
 
                                                 
1
 JV Muhonen, “Right of publicity in Finland” [1997] Ent LR 103, at 103.  Matters have not changed 
markedly since 1997, at least in the UK. 
A Right of Publicity in Scots Law 
12 
Part I, Chapter 2:  The Theory of Publicity Rights 
Perhaps the only unifying factor in the field of publicity rights is the lack of unity.  In 
contrast, contract law provides an idea of the sort of coherence which can be 
achieved in more established areas of law.
2
  The concepts of agreement and legally 
enforceable duties are present in most legal systems.  Although the Common law 
systems
3
 prefer the promissory analysis which is rejected in most Civilian 
jurisdictions in favour of mutuality and agreement,
4
 this is still a distinction that all 
jurisdictions can understand and discuss.  This common terminology and 
understanding enables analysis and development of the law to take place in a trans-
national and comparative framework.  
 
When one turns to publicity, however, there is seemingly little common ground, 
despite the wealth of literature, academic commentary and case law.  For some, 
publicity is the “commercialisation of popularity”
5
 or the right to control commercial 
use of identity,
6
 while for others it is media exploitation of privacy.
7
  Case law 
reveals a wide range of publicity-type circumstances, from the publication, without 
consent, of an innocent photograph of a young girl taken without her consent,
8
 to the 
interference with a commercial licence for use of a baseball player’s image, arising 
from the defendant’s use of the player’s image with his consent.
9
  The opinions, 
terminology and conclusions resulting from the practice of publicity are far from 
harmonious.   
 
                                                 
2
 For leading definitions from a range of jurisdictions see:  Scotland: WW McBryde, The Law of 
Contract in Scotland, 3
rd
 ed, 2007, para 1-03, quoting from H McGregor “European Code of 
Contract” (2004) 8 Edin LR art 1(1); England: HG Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts, Volume 1 General 
Principles, 29
th
 ed, 2004, para 1-001; Germany: BS Markesinis, H Unberath and A Johnston, The 
German Law of Contract a Comparative Treatise 2
nd
 ed, 2006, at 25; and the United States: The 
American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law, Contracts 2d, para 1. 
3
 Notably England and the United States. 
4
 For example C von Bar, E Clive and H Schulte-Nolke (eds), Draft Common Frame of Reference, 
2008, at II-1:101) and O Lando and HG Beale (eds), Principles of European Contract Law, 2000, Art 
2.101. 
5
 J Klink, “50 years of publicity in the US and the never-ending hassle in Europe” [2003] IPQ 363 
(henceforth Klink, “50 years of publicity in the US”), at 364. 
6
 McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, para 1:3. 
7
 J Morgan, “Privacy, confidence and horizontal effect:  “Hello” trouble” (2003) 62 CLJ 444 
(henceforth Morgan, “Privacy, confidence and horizontal effect”). 
8
 Aubry v Les Editions Vice-Versa (1998) 1 SCR 591. 
9
 Haelan Laboratories v Topps Chewing Gum Inc 202 F 2d 866. 
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Nevertheless, it is possible to construct five broad interpretative categories in which 
to site the academic and judicial material.  These categories attempt to recognise that 
authors are not necessarily tackling exactly the same thing under the umbrella term 
of “publicity rights”.  While it is possible (and desirable) to rationalise their 
approaches, it is not possible to do so within a single scheme.  These categories 
should not be seen as mapping directly on to different jurisdictions, but as reflecting 
higher-level, theoretical understandings which can be illustrated by material from a 
range of Civilian and Common law jurisdictions.   
 
2. FIVE APPROACHES TO PUBLICITY RIGHTS 
 
With the caveat that any reductionist approach risks over-simplification, and with the 
acknowledgment that there will always be overlaps, five approaches
10
 to publicity 
rights can be identified as follows:   
(a) the property approach to publicity rights;  
(b) publicity as a subset of personality rights;  
(c) appropriation of personality;  
(d) character merchandising; and  
(e) privacy and publicity  
 
2.1. The “Publicity as Property” Approach 
The emphasis in the “publicity as property” approach is very much on commercial 
exploitation of identity as a whole and on the commercial interests at stake in 
exploitation of popularity.  The three key unifying factors in this category are (i) the 
treatment of the commercial value in identity as a property right; (ii) the centrality of 
commercial use; and (iii) a tendency to define in wide terms the “asset” being 
exploited, typically “identity”, rather than narrower notions of name or image.  The 
commentators whose work fits into this broad canon are primarily American, and 
certainly Common lawyers.     
                                                 
10
 They will be referred to, interchangeably, as approaches to or categories of publicity rights. 
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This approach can be regarded as the culmination of legal developments since the 
early 1950s, stemming from two critical events at that time: the judgment of Justice 
Frank in Haelan Laboratories v Topps Chewing Gum
11
 in 1953 and the seminal 
article by Nimmer on “The right of publicity”,
12




In 1954, Nimmer recognised that  
although the well known personality does not wish to hide his light under a 
bushel of privacy, neither does he wish to have his name, photograph, and 





Where the only legal rights available to the well-known personality look to privacy 
interests, he is unlikely to achieve the legal protection he seeks.  Nimmer examined 
the doctrines of privacy, unfair competition and contract, and concluded that they 
were all inadequate to protect this publicity interest.
15
  Instead, he argued that the 
right of publicity “must be largely determined by two considerations:  first, the 
economic reality of pecuniary values inherent in publicity and, second, the 
inadequacy of traditional legal theories in protecting such publicity values.”
16
   
 
Comprehensive legal protection for such values had been granted in a judgment of 
the “highly respected Second Circuit”
17
 the year before, Haelan Laboratories v 
Topps Chewing Gum.
18
  The influence of this case has been strongly felt ever since, 
with the words of Justice Frank echoing through much academic work in this area:  
We think that, in addition to and independent of the right of privacy (which in 
New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of 
his photograph… Whether it be labelled a “property” right is immaterial; for 
                                                 
11
 (1953) 202 F.2d 866. 
12
 (1954) 19 Law & Contemp Probs 203.  The importance of Nimmer’s contribution should not be 
underestimated.  Grady says “[h]is great contribution was to provide the first reliable glosses of a new 
and unruly body of case precedent and thereby provide a solid foundation for the whole field.”  MF 
Grady, “A positive economic theory of the right of publicity” (1994) 1 UCLA Ent L Rev 97 
(henceforth Grady, “A positive economic theory of the right of publicity”), at 109. 
13
 See McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, paras 1:26-1:27. 
14
 (1954) 19 Law & Contemp Probs 203, at 204. 
15
 This is to some extent a foregone conclusion, since the heading for each of these sections is 
“Inadequacy of…”  Ibid., at 204, 210 and 214. 
16
 Ibid., at 215. 
17
 Ibid., at 222. 
18
 (1953) 202 F.2d 866. 
A Right of Publicity in Scots Law 
15 
Part I, Chapter 2:  The Theory of Publicity Rights 
here, as often elsewhere, the tag “property” simply symbolizes the fact that 




In the decades since Haelan, the right of publicity has “matured and taken on its own 
distinctive identity as an altogether separate legal category.”
20
  By 2001, McCarthy 
was able to state that “the right of publicity is simply this:  it is the inherent right of 
every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.”
21
  This wide 
concept of “identity”, whereby “certain celebrity identities can be appropriated as 
effectively or even more effectively via other means”
22
 and not merely their name 
and image, is an inherent part of this approach to publicity.  Westfall and Landau 
suggest that the “vague principle initially underlying the right… as expressed in 
Haelan”
23
 has meant that there have been no obvious parameters to the right to guide 
(or limit) judicial or legislative development,
24
 resulting in protection being extended 
to ever-wider elements of identity. 
 
This wide approach to publicity regards it as a “commercial and business right”
25
 
which is properly viewed as a kind of intellectual property right and is very clearly, 
in McCarthy’s view, a property right.
26
  Academic writing in this category is rich in 
the language of property and commodification,
27
 while legislation also reflects this 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., at 868, per Frank CJ. 
20
 McCarthy, “Public personas and private property”, at 685. 
21
 McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, para 1:3. 
22
 Westfall and Landau, “Publicity Rights as Property Rights”, at 94. 
23
 Ibid., at 93. 
24
 Ibid., at 93-96. 
25
 McCarthy, “Public personas and private property”, at 687.  For the centrality of commercial use see 
also, for example, HR Gordon, “A right of property in name, likeness, personality and history” (1960-
1961) 55 Northwestern University Law Rev 553; and DL Zimmerman, “Who put the right in the right 
of publicity?” (1998-1999) 9 DePaul-LCA J Art & Ent L 35 (henceforth Zimmerman, “Who put the 
right in the right of publicity?”), at 36; contra Goodenough, “Retheorising privacy and publicity”, at 
42. 
26
 Ibid., at 687; also McCarthy, “The human persona as commercial property”, at 134.  See also 
Armstrong, who stated in 1990 that persona was not only treated as a property right, but that it was the 
subject of property rights: “[c]elebrity persona has become a heritable, alienable “thing” from which 
the owner may arbitrarily exclude others.  In other words, it has become property.” Armstrong, “The 
reification of celebrity”, at 444. 
27
 As well as McCarthy, see generally: Armstrong, “The reification of celebrity”; Goodenough, “The 
price of fame, Parts 1 and 2”; Westfall and Landau, “Publicity Rights as Property Rights”; Madow, 
“Private ownership of public image”; and Zimmerman, “Who put the right in the right of publicity?”. 
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approach.  In those American states that have passed legislation to regulate publicity 
rights, a number of them have explicitly stated that publicity is a property right.
28
    
 
Coombe has stated that “personality rights” extends  
to encompass the tort of appropriation of personality as it has developed at 
common law, the proprietary right of publicity that has developed in 
American law, and rights to prevent the appropriation of, inter alia, names 
and likenesses that have been enacted in provincial and state statutes as well 




Coombe relies not only on legislation and case law to inform her understanding, but 
also on urban legend and popular perceptions of publicity,
30
 and this is typical of the 
Common law approach in its breadth and practical scope.  One distinction that is 
highlighted by Coombe is the difference between the “right of publicity” per se and 
appropriation of personality.  This distinction is reflected in the American Law 
Institute’s Restatements: the Restatement of Torts deals with appropriation of 
personality (see section 2.3 below), while the Restatement of Unfair Competition 
deals with the publicity right currently under review, focusing on commercial use 
and trade values.
31
   
 
One consequence of the emphasis on commercial use and proprietary interests is 
reflected in the attributes of the publicity right.  In the words of McCarthy, “[a]s 
property, the right of publicity can be licensed and can be devised in a will to 
continue after death.”
32
  The duration, alienability and descendibility of the right, 
together with remedies for breach, are all influenced by this property focus.  This is 
referred to as the “property syllogism” by Westfall and Landau, who argue that the 
recognition of the transferability of publicity imbued it with property status, with the 
result that other attributes of property ownership then followed as a matter of 
                                                 
28
 See for example Illinois’s Right of Publicity Act 765 ILCS 1075/15; Indiana’s Publicity law IC 32-
36.16; Kentucky Statute 391.170(1); Oklahoma Stat. tit 12, para 1448B; Washington Chapter 63.60 
RCW Personality Rights, section 030(1).  For more detail, see McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and 
Privacy, chapter 6, part II. 
29
 Coombe, “Author/izing the celebrity”, at 365, note 2. 
30
 See for example Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties, particularly chapter 2; 
Coombe, “Author/izing the celebrity”. 
31
 American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law, Unfair Competition, 3d, chapter 4, paras 46-49. 
32
 McCarthy, “Public personas and private property”, at 687.  See also Nimmer, “The right of 
publicity”, at 216; HR Gordon, “A right of property in name, likeness, personality and history” (1960-
1961) 55 Northwestern University Law Rev 553. 
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course.
33
  These elements are now accepted features of the right:  for example, most 
(but not all) states in the US provide a statutory publicity right which includes a 
certain post mortem duration, rather than terminating the right on death, thus 
allowing protection and exploitation following the death of the individual.
34
  
Similarly, remedies are available not just for the injured celebrity, but for any 
authorised licensees – a recognition of the proprietary nature of the publicity right.
35
  
Klink is very much in favour of “the construction of the publicity right as a property 
right [which] ensures more effectively the compatibility with business needs by 




It would be a mistake, however, to claim that this is an entirely homogenous 
category.  There are undoubtedly divisions between certain authors on certain points.  
To take one example, although both McCarthy and Goodenough are agreed on the 
core elements of this broad right of publicity, centred on protection through property 
rights for the commercial exploitation of identity, McCarthy claims that publicity 
rights are distinguishable from the four Restatement rights of privacy,
37
 while 
Goodenough believes that “the separation between rights of privacy and publicity is 
largely accidental and artificial.”
38
  Further, not all those who discuss publicity in 
terms of property favour this approach to legal protection, Madow being a key 
example.
39
       
 
                                                 
33
 Westfall and Landau, “Publicity Rights as Property Rights”, at 74 and 83 et seq. 
34
 McCarthy notes that most states which recognise a post mortem right do so with reference to 
copyright law as to the term of this right, per “Public personas and private property”, at 694.  See also 
Klink, who discusses and approves of these measures in California, per “50 years of publicity in the 
US”, at 387.  Goodenough takes a more sceptical view in his discussion of descendibility of publicity 
right in the US, per “The price of fame, Part 2”, at 90-91.  Post mortem protection is discussed in 
more detail below in Chapter 7, section 3.3.   
35
 Haelan Laboratories v Topps Chewing Gum Inc 202 F 2d 866. 
36
 Klink, “50 years of publicity in the US”, at 385. 
37
 McCarthy, “Public personas and private property”, at 684. 
38
 Goodenough, “Re-theorising privacy and publicity”, at 69.  In discussing the development of rights 
in the US, Vaver suggests a middle ground:  acknowledgment that the right of publicity “was 
catapulted into the law on the strings of commercial appropriation” of privacy, but that they were 
separated by the court in Haelan Laboratories v Topps Chewing Gum.  See D Vaver, “What’s mine is 
not yours:  Commercial appropriation of personality under the Privacy Acts of British Columbia, 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan” (1981) 15 U Brit Colum L Rev 241 (henceforth Vaver, “What’s mine is 
not yours”), at 258-259. 
39
 Madow, “Private ownership of public image”. 
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One factor which this approach typically lacks, and which is more prominent in 
Civilian jurisdictions, is an element of protection for the dignitarian or personality-
based interests.
40
  One American writer who advanced quasi-personality rights here 
is Kwall.  She suggests that “a careful look at right of publicity litigation reveals that 
many decisions actually are more concerned with redressing rights of integrity over 
the images of the celebrity”,
41
 and argues that this implicit concern must be made 
explicit.  Her solution is to advance a role for moral rights, in the manner of such 
rights in copyright works, by protecting the “damage to the human spirit”
42
 which 
can arise.  The importance of her work is that it straddles one of the central 
distinctions between the broad publicity as property approach, which focuses 
primarily on the economic interests, and the Civilian “rights of personality 
approach”, considered at section 2.2 below, which places much greater emphasis on 
dignitarian considerations.  Despite Kwall’s attempt to reconcile the two, there 
remains a gap between protection for commercial and dignitarian interests in most 
jurisdictions.  This tension plays a key role in shaping the right and the debate in this 
area, as will be seen throughout this thesis.   
 
2.2. Publicity as a Subset of Personality Rights 
This approach is most closely associated with Civilian jurisdictions, which treat 
personality rights as “a separate category of rights, distinguishable from real, 
personal and immaterial property rights”.
43
  Personality rights are intimately 
connected with the individual, and “recognize a person as a physical and spiritual-
moral being and guarantee his enjoyment of his own sense of existence”.
44
    Thus, 
personality rights in this context are fundamental rights belonging to each individual.  
Personality is a “convenient portmanteau term”
45
 used to refer to, amongst others, 
“the rights to life, physical integrity, bodily freedom, reputation, dignity, privacy, 
                                                 
40
 McCarthy, for example, is very clear that publicity is a commercial right: The Rights of Publicity 
and Privacy, para 1:3. 
41
 RR Kwall, “Preserving personality and reputational interests of constructed personas through moral 
rights:  a blueprint for the twenty-first century” 2001 U Ill L Rev 151, at 158. 
42
 Ibid., 152. 
43
 Neethling, “Personality Rights”, at 535. 
44
 Ibid., at 530. 
45
 E Reid, “Protection for rights of personality in Scots law:  A comparative evaluation” 2007 EJCL 
11.4, para 1.1. 
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identity (including name and image) and feelings.”
46
  As Reiter observes, these are 
the “various attributes of personality that the modern world has erected on this 
premodern foundation”.
47
  The importance of these long-standing personality rights 
in Civilian jurisdictions should not be under-estimated:  German law, for example, 
places the right to dignity at the very heart of its constitutionally protected 
personality rights.
48
  Civilian personality rights have been delineated on a pan-
jurisdictional basis by Neethling,
49
 while a comparative review of French and 
German rights (together with Common law jurisdictions) is provided by Beverley-
Smith et al.
50
  More generally, insight can be drawn from the SCRIPT personality 
rights database.
51
   
 
It is possible to identify common themes that arise from the treatment of publicity 
rights as a subset of personality rights.  The first of these is the emphasis on 
dignitarian rights.  Concepts such as privacy and human dignity are central to any 
legal protection for the individual’s personality rights.  Consequently, the 
commercial significance of infringement in publicity situations may be marginalised.  
In German law, for example, claims for damages for breach of personality rights 
require either evidence of a loss or the calculation of a hypothetical reasonable 
licence fee.
52
  This latter measure would compensate damage to the claimant’s 
commercial interests – yet it will not be available where it can be shown that the 
claimant would never have been prepared to license the use complained of, as in the 
case of “the professor of ecclesiastical law, who had been alleged to propagate the 
ginseng root as a sexual stimulant, [and who] could not recover substantial damages 
                                                 
46
 Neethling, “Personality Rights”, at 530. 
47
 EH Reiter, “Personality and patrimony:  Comparative perspectives on the right to one’s image” 
(2001-2002) 76 Tulane L Rev 673 (henceforth Reiter, “Personality and patrimony”), at 680. 
48
 Neethling, “Personality Rights”, at 563:  “German doctrine thereby accords all human rights the 
same status (apart from human dignity, which is regarded as the most fundamental value)” and this is 
protected by the German Constitution of 1949.   
49
 Neethling provides an excellent summary of personality rights in “Personality Rights”. 
50
 Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality. 
51
 Available at: http://personalityrightsdatabase.com/index.php?title=Main_Page (accessed 18 
November 2008).  See also Waelde and Whitty, “A Rights of Personality Database”. 
52
 Also referred to as the notional licence fee, this is calculated according to the hypothetical sum that 
the pursuer and defender would have agreed upon for the defender’s otherwise unauthorised use.  It 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
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but only a solatium”.
53
  Because the court held he would never have been prepared to 
license his image for this use there was no basis upon which to award him a 
reasonable licence fee.
54
  The end result is that in many cases only solatium will be 
available, and thus “the courts deny adequate compensation in the most serious cases 
of personality right infringement.”
55
   
 
A further consequence of the focus on dignitarian interests in this approach is greater 
controversy about the right continuing post mortem,
56
 in comparison with the broad 
“publicity as property” approach, which does accommodate post mortem protection.  
Difficulties arise because of the tension between the dignitarian and commercial 
interests, such that post mortem protection may be more readily recognised to enable 
surviving relatives to protect their dignitarian interests, but not necessarily the 




Although Civilian jurisdictions as a whole treat publicity within the framework of 
personality rights, the specific treatment of publicity and personality rights in each 
jurisdiction varies.  One possible reason for this is the tension that results from 
protecting a commercial, economic interest within a dignitarian framework of extra-
patrimonial interests.  Reiter notes that “while the attributes of human personality, 
like name, reputation, image, voice, and privacy, have traditionally been seen as 
extrapatrimonial rights without monetary value, today these rights are being 
increasingly patrimonialized and brought into commerce.”
58
  Consequently, the 
courts and commentators have had to reconcile two opposing interests, with the 
result that a “patrimonialized extra-patrimonial right” emerges.
59
  Accommodating 
the divergence between dignitarian rights and commercial interests has produced 
                                                 
53
 Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 143. 
54
 A similar conclusion was reached in the first of the “Caroline” cases, raised by Princess Caroline in 
Germany:  since she would never have consented to the publication of the fictional interview in 
question, her claim for disgorgement of profits failed:  BGHZ 128 – Caroline von Monaco I, as 
discussed by Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 103. 
55
 Ibid., at 143. 
56
 Waelde and Whitty, “A Rights of Personality Database”, para 11.4.3(b). 
57
 See Chapter 7; also Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 124 and 200-205; 
Neethling, “Personality Rights”, at 544-545. 
58
 Reiter, “Personality and patrimony”, at 673. 
59
 Ibid., at 673. 
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various responses in Civilian jurisdictions, often categorised as either “monistic” or 
“dualistic”.
60




 requires two different rights, one (positive) patrimonial and 
one (negative) extra-patrimonial, to protect the interests in exploitation and 
protection of publicity.  As Logeais observes, in the context of the debate in France, 
the  
general analysis is to consider that the right to the image is a “Janus” right 
displaying a negative extra-patrimonial aspect which is in fact absorbed by 
personality rights (mainly the rights to privacy and dignity), and a “positive” 




The distinction made in French law is between the right to one’s image, which is an 
“inherent part of the person”, and the right over one’s image, which is “a commodity 
to be exploited”.
63
  The consequence of this is that “a general personality right does 
not fit into French law.”
64
  Instead, protection is achieved through dual rights 
protecting material and subjective interests respectively.
65
   
 
The monistic approach offers an alternative and is favoured, for example, in 
Germany.
66
  Here, one right, such as the general personality right,
67
 protects both the 
economic and dignitarian interests in publicity.  This was specifically addressed by 
                                                 
60
 For a broad summary of these differences, see Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots 
Law”, para 3.4.9.  
61
 See, for example, Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 11; Neethling, 
“Personality Rights”, at 543; and Whitty, who notes that the American approach can also be regarded 
as dualistic, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, para 3.4.9.  
62
 E Logeais, “The French right to one’s image:  a legal lure?” [1994] Ent LR 163 (henceforth 
Logeais, “The French right to one’s image”), at 165. 
63
 Both quotations from Reiter, “Personality and patrimony”, at 684-685.  Reiter also equates the 
extrapatrimonial right to a negative right, and the patrimonial and commercial right to a positive right, 
at 685.  See also Logeais, “The French right to one’s image”, at 165. 
64
 Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 153. 
65
 Ibid., at 154-157; also Logeais, “The French right to one’s image”, at 165. 
66
 Neethling, “Personality Rights”, at 543.  See also Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and 
Personality, chapter 4; Klink, “50 years of publicity in the US”, at 380; Waelde and Whitty, “A Rights 
of Personality Database”, para 11.4.2. 
67
 This was developed by the judiciary through case law, emanating from the constitutional right to 
dignity.  German law also recognises a number of specific statutory rights which protect aspects of 
personality, such as the right to one’s name (§12 BGB) and to one’s image (§22 KUG).  See 
Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 105-124; Neethling, “Personality Rights”, 
at 530, 539-540.  Beverley-Smith et al also note that the general personality right can act as an 
interstitial right where the specific rights fail (at 110).     
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the Bundesgerichtshof in the Marlene Dietrich case,
68
 brought by her daughter 
against a producer who had sold various items of “Marlene” merchandising.  In 
reaching its decision, the court “stressed the two aspects of the personality right 
which protected not only ideal, but also economic interests.”
69
  Consequently, 
unauthorised use of name, image or reputation could give rise to a claim for damages 
or unjust enrichment,
70
 as well as claims for solatium.     
 
Despite the differing monistic and dualistic responses to publicity in Civilian 
jurisdictions, it is nonetheless possible to group together these responses to publicity, 
derived from the over-arching doctrine of personality rights – a doctrine which is 
“firmly established”
71
 in Civilian jurisdictions.  
 
2.3. Appropriation of Personality 
Arguably the most influential and popular approach taken by English academics is 
the “appropriation of personality” classification.  At the outset, it needs to be 
appreciated that “personality” in this context means the identifying elements of an 
individual, typically their name, likeness and voice.  It is thus akin to the colloquial 
notion of someone’s personality being their character, and must be distinguished 
from the very different meaning accorded to “personality rights” in the Civilian 
approach discussed above. 
 
The three features common to this approach are (i) the notion of (mis)appropriation, 
typically for commercial uses, of personality; (ii) the understanding of personality as 
the identifying elements of the individual; and (iii) a recognition that a number of 
discrete actions, typically torts, are the most appropriate, or at least the most 
practicable, home for publicity actions, rather than a single property or personality 
rights doctrine.  Further, the focus on appropriation gives rise to an implicit, yet 
common, understanding that the use made of personality be unauthorised, rather than 
                                                 
68
 BGHZ 143, 1 December 1999, cited in Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 
104 et seq. 
69




 Neethling, “Personality Rights”, at 530. 
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authorised.  There is thus a risk that exploitation by the individual remains 
unaddressed by this analysis.  
 
Perhaps the origins of this approach can be traced to Prosser’s 1960 article 
“Privacy”,
72
 wherein he attempted to synthesise American judicial decisions and 
writing, starting from Warren and Brandeis’ 1890 article on “The Right to 
Privacy”.
73
  While it would not necessarily be accurate to regard Warren and 
Brandeis’ article as the foundation of this category, since its interest was most 
certainly with the “right to be let alone”, the evolution of publicity practice was such 
that, 70 years later, Prosser could no longer ignore the commercial practice in 
“selling” privacy.  Accordingly, when he formulated his tort of privacy, the four 
limbs he identified covered a range of invasions, concluding with the fourth:  
“Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness”.
74
   
 
This four-part tort protecting privacy was incorporated into the American 
Restatement of Torts, 2d, where the second limb stated:  “The right of privacy is 
invaded by… (b) the appropriation of the other’s name or likeness as stated in para 
652C”.
75
  It is this limb which forms the starting point for this category of publicity 
protection.
76
   
 
A clear lineage of writers in this canon can be traced from Prosser onwards, across 
jurisdictions.  Vaver provides an analysis of the incorporation of this tort in privacy 







contributions form the starting point for any study of publicity rights in English law.   
Quotations from Vaver, Frazer and Beverley-Smith illustrate their common 




 (1890-1891) 4 Harv L Rev 193. 
74
 Prosser, “Privacy”, at 389.  See also McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, paras 1:19-
1:24.  
75
 American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law, Torts, 2d, para 652A. 
76
 Contrast the commercial emphasis of the right of publicity protected by the American Law 
Institute’s Restatement of the Law, Unfair Competition, 3d, which focuses on the appropriation of 
trade values, rather than personality.  Discussed in section 2.1 above. 
77
 Vaver, “What’s mine is not yours”. 
78
 Frazer, “Appropriation of personality – a new tort?” (1983) 99 LQR 281 (henceforth Frazer, 
“Appropriation of personality”). 
79
 Beverley-Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of Personality.   
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approach, and echo Prosser’s earlier formulation.  Thus, Vaver’s 1981 article 
addresses the issue of the “commercial appropriation of personality” and the question 
of “how far an individual may control use of his personality (his name, likeness and 
voice) for commercial purposes, especially advertising.”
80
  Frazer set out to 
“examine the extent to which the law has developed, or ought to develop, to take 
account of one particular form of commercial practice – the use, without consent, of 
the name, likeness or voice of another.”
81
  Beverley-Smith opens his analysis with a 
succinct definition:   
The essence of the problem of appropriation of personality may be put very 
simply: if one person (A) uses in advertising or merchandising the name, 
voice or likeness of another person (B) without his or her consent, to what 





Interestingly, Beverley-Smith’s definition appears at first sight to be narrower than 
the others, being limited to advertising and merchandising uses, but this is not in fact 
the case.  His analysis discloses a wider range of publicity activities, including 
unauthorised media use, such as that in the Douglas v Hello! litigation.
83
    Thus, 
Beverley-Smith’s focus is, as the title of his monograph suggests, on the 




As already noted, the appropriation of personality approach does not rely on a single 
legal doctrine to protect personality.  This is due in no small measure to the fact that 
“unlike both the Continental European and American approaches, the English 
common law has traditionally been mistrustful of generalised rights.”
85
  Instead, a 
pragmatic approach to litigation has seen a range of doctrines employed in the 
                                                 
80
 Vaver, “What’s mine is not yours”, at 241. 
81
 Frazer, “Appropriation of personality”, at 281.  
82
 Beverley-Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of Personality, at 3. 
83
 Although his work predates the substantive judgments in this case, the Court of Appeal ruling on 
the injunction in this case is cited on 16 pages of his text, according to the case list (p.xviii). 
84
 This terminology reflects that of Prosser, Vaver and Frazer, as discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs, and is repeated and rephrased in countless other articles.  See, for example, S Boyd and R 
Jay, “Image rights and the effect of the Data Protection Act 1998” [2004] Ent LR 159; S Bains, 
“Personality rights:  should the UK grant celebrities a proprietary right in their personality?  Parts 1, 2 
and 3” [2007] Ent LR 16, 205 and 237; Carty, “Advertising, publicity rights and English law”; J Hull, 
“The merchandising of real and fictional characters:  an analysis of some recent developments” [1991] 
Ent LR 124; G Scanlan and A McGee, “Phantom intellectual property rights” [2000] IPQ 264; and 
Robinson, “How image conscious is English law?” [2004] Ent LR 151. 
85
 Carty, “Personality Rights and English Law”, para 7.2.1. 
A Right of Publicity in Scots Law 
25 
Part I, Chapter 2:  The Theory of Publicity Rights 
English courts, including passing off,
86





  These actions are used to protect various aspects of the 
individual’s personality where this has been “misappropriated”.
89
  “Personality” is 
broadly seen as the individual’s name, likeness and voice.   
 
However, a number of problems with this category can be identified.  In the first 
place, the use of the term “appropriation” suggests a taking of property, yet the use 
of property in this context in English law is more likely to be metaphorical than 
indicative of the rights in question.
90
  The Second Restatement in the US does state 
that the right so created is “in the nature of a property right”,
91
 but clearly this does 




Secondly, if the wrong done is appropriation, the focus is on the taker, rather than 
the “victim” or individual in question.  This seems to envisage only unauthorised use 
of the individual’s personality by other parties.  Does this mean that there is no right 
for the individual to exploit his own publicity value?  A definition which centres 
round the “appropriation” of personality potentially (although not necessarily
93
) 
excludes an individual’s own exploitation of his personality from its scope.  This is 
perhaps not surprising in Common law jurisdictions, since these systems typically 
draw their rules from the outcomes of decided cases and focus very much on 
remedies rather than rights.  Accordingly, the right of self-exploitation is less of a 
                                                 
86
 Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2003] 2 All ER 881. 
87
 Jane Austen Trade Mark [2000] RPC 879, Elvis Presley Trade Marks [1997] RPC 543, on appeal, 
[1999] RPC 567; see also Carty, “Advertising, publicity rights and English law”, at 210-211. 
88
 Douglas v Hello! [2006] QB 125. 
89
 And Carty notes that the language of misappropriation is “creeping into” the actions for passing off 
and breach of confidence: Carty, “Advertising, publicity rights and English law”, at 242. 
90
 For example, in Douglas v Hello!, it was stated that English law “does not depend on treating 
confidential information as property, although it is often referred to, loosely or metaphorically, in 
those terms”: [2008] 1 AC 1, para 276, per Lord Walker. 
91
 American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law Second, Torts Volume 3, para 652C(a), at 381.  
This can be used to further refute McCarthy’s point, although it is possible that the commercial benefit 
of this could be taken to accrue only to exclusive licensees.    
92
 There is a question mark over whether or not “personality” can be the subject of property rights, and 
this will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
93
 It could be argued that authorised use is unobjectionable, and does not need to be addressed, 
although silence on the point is not entirely satisfactory.  The rights and remedies, if any, of exclusive 
licensees also remain uncertain in this situation. 
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concern for writers in this category than are the remedies for individuals where there 
has been unauthorised (or wrongful) use.       
 
Despite these potential hurdles, the appropriation of personality category offers the 
most comprehensive review of publicity rights in English law to date.  It will play a 
prominent role in the debate to follow. 
 
Although Scots law has not so far produced any case law in this area, both 
MacQueen, Waelde and Laurie’s Contemporary Intellectual Property, and Colston 
and Middleton’s Modern Intellectual Property Law have assessed publicity in 
broadly these terms.  That they have done so indicates the practical impact of English 
law in Scotland, while doctrines such as passing off have developed together north 
and south of the border
94
 and trade mark law is governed by UK-wide legislation.
95
  
Similarly, the English privacy actions have been founded on the Human Rights Act 
1998, which applies equally in Scotland as in England.  Thus, whatever a Scots court 
may ultimately decide, it is almost unimaginable that an advocate would not attempt 
to follow a similar line of argument as has been successfully pursued south of the 
border, thus bringing Scots law within the “appropriation of personality” scheme, 
rather than the categories examined above.   
 
2.4. Character Merchandising 
This category, like the one following, is slightly different from the previous three.  It 
has a narrower focus and can be arguably seen as a product of its time.  It is perhaps 
misleading, therefore, to claim that this is an entirely discrete category.  Rather it 
reflects a series of cases in England in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, which dealt with 
the practice of character merchandising, but which are now gradually becoming, by 
                                                 
94
 The leading English cases (Erven Warnink BV v J Townend [1979] AC 731 and Reckitt & Coleman 
Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] 1 All ER 873) were followed in the leading Scottish case, William 
Grant v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse 2001 SC 901.  Although Reid notes that the doctrinal basis 
of passing off is very different in Scotland and England, she acknowledges that, in Scots law, 
“considerable weight has been accorded to English authority in this field”, especially in modern cases.  
E Reid, “Protection of personality rights in the modern Scots law of delict”, in NR Whitty and R 
Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, forthcoming 
2009 (henceforth Reid, “Personality rights in the modern Scots law of delict”), para 4.4.1.  
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virtue of decisions such as Irvine v Talksport,
96
 subsumed within the broader 
classification of “appropriation of personality” – not least because of the shared 
reliance on tort law in both categories.  
 
Case law in England in the 1970s onwards started to reflect the commercial practices 
of “character” merchandising,
97
 with actions being raised to recover for 
infringements under the tort of passing off
98
 and, later, breach of registered trade 
mark rights.
99
  Writers in the 1980s and 1990s reacted to these cases, and the plethora 
of articles and case notes generated in these two decades reflect this development and 
the reaction to it.
100
  In particular, academics observed the changing commercial 
practice of merchandising and advertising goods using celebrities, and, equally 
importantly, society’s changing understanding of it.  There was therefore a drive to 
interpret and perhaps influence the legal recognition and analysis of the changing 
marketplace.  This understanding of merchandising is thus united round the idea of 
the promotion of goods or services through the use of the name or image of a 
“character”, with or without that character’s endorsement.   
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 [2003] 2 All ER 881. 
97
 Although this examination proceeds on the basis that merchandising featuring individuals can be 
distinguished from merchandising which uses fictional characters and/or actors who have a very 
strong association with a particular character (such as Paul Hogan/Crocodile Dundee and Telly 
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 Lyngstad v Anabas [1977] FSR 62; Wombles Limited v Wombles Skips Limited [1975] FSR 488; 
Taverner Rutledge v Trexapalm Clothing [1977] RPC 275 (featuring a fictional character portrayed by 
an actor); Mirage Studios v Counter-Feat Clothing [1991] FSR 145. 
99
 One of the earliest English trade mark cases was the Holly Hobbie decision, Re American Greetings 
Corporation’s Application [1984] 1 All ER 426, which involved use of a fictional character.  Later 
cases involved real, but deceased, persons: Elvis Presley Trade Marks [1997] RPC 543 and, on 
appeal, [1999] RPC 567; Jane Austen Trade Mark [2000] RPC 879.  See also G Davies, “The cult of 
celebrity and trade marks: the next instalment” (2004) 1:2 SCRIPT-ed 230. 
100
 See for example, SCG Burley, “Passing off and character merchandising:  Should England lean 
towards Australia?” [1991] EIPR 227; J Holyoak, “United Kingdom character rights and 
merchandising rights today” 1993 JBL 444; J Hennigan, “Altered image rights” [2003] Ent LR 161; G 
Scanlan, “Personality, endorsement and everything:  the modern law of passing off and the myth of 
the personality right” [2003] EIPR 563; P Jaffey, “Merchandising and the law of trade marks” [1998] 
IPQ 240; H Porter, “Character merchandising:  Does English law recognise a property right in name 
and likeness?” [1999] Ent LR 180; J Hull, “The merchandising of real and fictional characters:  an 
analysis of some recent developments” [1991] Ent LR 124; SM Maniatis and M Chong, “The Teenage 
Mutant Hero Turtles case” [1991] EIPR 253; M Lewis and M Elmslie, “Passing off and image 
marketing in the UK” [1992] EIPR 270. 
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Since 1991, academics and practitioners have had the advantage of one of the most 
important English judgments in this area, the decision of the Vice Chancellor in the 
passing off action Mirage Studios and Others v Counter-Feat Clothing Company 
Limited and Another.
101
  In this case, the Vice Chancellor accepted that use of 
cartoon characters on clothing could infringe the rights of the copyright holder, not 
necessarily by infringement of copyright (a point which was not decided), but 
through the tort of passing off.  The importance of this decision stems from its 
effective reversal of two earlier passing off cases where a remedy was refused for the 
use of an individual’s image in merchandising.
102
  This was achieved, in part, 
through the Vice Chancellor’s recognition of the fact that “[c]haracter merchandising 
is an industry which has grown in sophistication over the comparatively recent 
past”
103
 together with society’s increasing awareness of that industry.
104
      
 
Such was the prevalence of merchandising in the latter part of the twentieth century 
that the 1995 Congress of the International Association for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property (AIPPI) recognised the role of merchandising as “the use of 
distinctive elements to enhance the promotion or sale of products and services.”
105
  
As Ruijsenaars observes, the AIPPI’s eventual description “could have been more 
precise, [but] problems arise from the diversity of the subject-matter of 
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 [1991] FSR 145 (Ch). 
102
 McCulloch v Lewis A May Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 58 and Lyngstad v Anabas Products [1977] FSR 62. 
103
 [1991] FSR 145 (Ch), at 148. 
104
 Walton J referred to the commercial practice of merchandising in Wombles Limited v Wombles 
Skips Limited [1975] FSR 488 and Tavener Rutledge Limited v Trexapalm Limited [1975] FSR 479, 
and the House of Lords did likewise in In Re American Greeting Corporation’s Application [1984] 1 
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G Scanlan, “Personality, endorsement and everything” [2003] EIPR 563, at 568; SM Maniatis and S 
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that the cycle of negative decisions built around McCulloch’s case may finally have been broken.”  J 
Hull, “The merchandising of real and fictional characters:  an analysis of some recent developments” 
[1991] Ent LR 124, at 129. 
105
 HE Ruijsenaars, “Legal aspects of merchandising: the AIPPI resolution” [1996] EIPR 330, at 330. 
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merchandising, as the large variety of merchandising symbols makes it difficult to 
issue general statements concerning all merchandisable elements.”
106
  This is 
particularly the case when the merchandising symbol is an individual’s image. 
 
One point of terminology which arises here is the difference between “character 
merchandising” and “image” or “personality” merchandising.  In general, “character 
merchandising” can be seen as the use of fictional characters, whereas “image” or 
“personality” merchandising is the use of real individuals on goods.
107
  Although this 
distinction is not universally made, it is a helpful one and will be observed below 
where either term is used.  Since the focus of this thesis is on the use of individuals, 
rather than fictional characters, the term “merchandising” will be used when 
referring to image or personality merchandising, in contrast to character 
merchandising which will signify the use of fictional characters.  
 
The literature which addresses this phenomenon can be distinguished from the 
previous approaches outlined, particularly the “publicity as property” and 
appropriation of personality categories.  The key differences are (i) the more limited 
scope of the publicity activities, being restricted to merchandising and (ii) the 
recognition of the value of the character not just to the unauthorised exploiters, but 
also to the character himself, through licensing and commercial deals, which is often 
absent from accounts of appropriation of personality.  As noted at the outset, 
however, character merchandising is capable of being subsumed (at least in English 
law) within the wider category of appropriation of personality.      
 
2.5. Privacy and Publicity 
This final category of writing has emerged in England and Scotland predominantly 
since 2000
108
 and arises from the analysis of publicity in the context of breach of 




 Hector MacQueen, Charlotte Waelde and Graeme Laurie, Contemporary Intellectual Property et 
al, Contemporary Intellectual Property, 2007 (henceforth MacQueen et al, Contemporary Intellectual 
Property), para 17.30. 
108
 Writers include C Michalos, “Image rights and privacy:  After Douglas v Hello” [2005] EIPR 384, 
and “Douglas v Hello:  The final frontier” [2007] Ent LR 241 (henceforth respectively Michalos, 
“Image rights and privacy” and Michalos, “Douglas v Hello: The final frontier”); D Howarth, 
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confidence and the Article 8 right to privacy under the European Convention on 
Human Rights
109
 (ECHR), and the Human Rights Act 1998.  The privacy protection 
offered by Article 8 of the ECHR has been heavily influenced by Civilian concepts 
of personality, as discussed in section 2.2 above, but now plays an increasingly 




Whereas the focus in the previous category was on character merchandising, the 
activity in question here is intrusive media use of personal information: “[t]he 
gravamen of invasion by the media is non-consensual dissemination of information 
about individuals.”
111
  This invasion of privacy can be viewed as unwanted 
“publicity”, not least because in some cases the individual in question has willingly 
sought the publication of the very same facts where such publication is done in a 
controlled, and lucrative, manner.  While the media intrusion may result in a claim 
for breach of privacy the exploitation is, on one interpretation, really a form of 
publicity.   
 
This was the situation in Douglas v Hello!,
112
 where the claimants recovered for 
invasion of their privacy, yet most commentators are agreed that if we “ask what is 
Douglas v Hello really about?, common sense tells us that it is actually about 
commercial exploitation of image”.
113
  Although the eventual remedy was found in 
breach of confidence and Article 8,
114
 the “dispute is arguably not about privacy at 
all.  It is about the way in which celebrities and others in the public eye are entitled to 
                                                                                                                                          
“Privacy, confidentiality and the cult of celebrity” (2002) 61 CLJ 264; HL MacQueen, “Protecting 
privacy” (2004) 8 Edin LR 248 and 420; R Mulheron, “A potential framework for privacy?  A reply to 
Hello!” (2006) 69 MLR 679; Richardson and Hitchens, “Celebrity Privacy”; Morgan, “Privacy, 
confidence and horizontal effect”; V Jones and A Wilson, “Photographs, privacy and public places” 
[2007] EIPR 357 (henceforth Jones and Wilson, “Photographs, privacy and public places”); J Gibson, 
“A Right to My Public:  Copyright, Human Right or Privacy?” in F MacMillan and K Bowrey (eds), 
New Directions in Copyright Law Volume 3; NA Moreham, “Privacy in public places” (2006) 65 CLJ 
606 (henceforth Moreham, “Privacy in public places”).   
109
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4.XI.1950. 
110
 This is despite fears that the concept of personality “might be thought to be Continental 
psychobabble”, Jones and Wilson, “Photographs, privacy and public places”, at 358. 
111
 Morgan, “Privacy, confidence and horizontal effect”, at 445. 
112
 Douglas v Hello! [2006] QB 125. 
113
 Michalos, “Image rights and privacy”, at 385. 
114
 The role of breach of confidence since 1990 will be considered in detail in Chapter 5. 
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make money by publishing aspects of their private lives.”
115
  Thus, although Douglas 
was argued as a privacy case, it is frequently classed as an example of publicity 
exploitation. 
 
If the appropriation of personality category (in section 2.3) reflects the second limb 
of the American privacy tort in the 2d Restatement, this category can more readily be 
equated to the third limb:  “unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private 
life”.
116
  This category also has closer links with the category of (Civilian) 
personality rights discussed above (section 2.2), raising issues of privacy, identity 
and information.   
 
Data protection law has also contributed in this field, both in case law
117
 and in 
academic commentaries.  For example, Boyd and Jay argue that use of an 
individual’s digital image without his consent will constitute unfair processing 
contrary to data protection principles.
118
  However, the Data Protection Act 1998 
regulates the processing of “personal data” rather than protecting economic or 
personal interests in them, and this focus limits the applicability of data protection in 




The common themes in this canon are media publication, whether authorised or not, 
and the troublesome border between the concepts of privacy and publicity.  Although 
there has been an explosion of privacy litigation in the UK since the Human Rights 
Act 1998 came into force
120
 the exact nature of the privacy right, and its relationship 
                                                 
115
 N Gardner and K Brimstead, “Confidential information – damages” [2005] EIPR N190, at N191. 
116
 American Law Institute, The Restatement of the Law of Torts, 2d, para 652A. 
117
 Successful claims for breach of data protection law were made in Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 
457 and Douglas v Hello! [2006] QB 125. 
118
 S Boyd and R Jay, “Image rights and the effect of the Data Protection Act 1998” [2004] Ent LR 
159, at 162.  This is supported by the use of data protection as one of the heads of claim in some of the 
leading cases, such as Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, Douglas v Hello! [2006] QB 125, and 
Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446. 
119
 Recent cases which have considered the definition of “personal data” include Common Services 
Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner [2008] 1 WLR 1550 and Durant v Financial Services 
Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746.  See also G Black, “Data protection law in light of Durant v 
Financial Services Authority” 2004 JR 295. 
120
 For example, CC v AB [2006] EWHC 3083 (QB); McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73; A v B&C [2002] 
2 All ER 545; X v BBC 2005 SLT 796; Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 457; Mosley v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB); Murray v Big Pictures [2008] EWCA Civ 446.   
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with publicity, remains uncertain.
121
  Nevertheless, the existence of a right to respect 
for one’s private life together with the doctrine of breach of confidence offers a 
pragmatic solution for an individual who wishes to protect the exploitation of his 
image or reputation. 
 
3. CROSS-OVERS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The five approaches discussed above show that “publicity” is capable of a wide 
range of interpretations.  It can mean an economic right to be exploited through a 
wide-ranging property right, or a dignitarian right to be protected through the right of 
personality.  As well as these conceptual differences, “publicity” can be used to 
distinguish between different practices, such as character merchandising or privacy, 
for example. 
 
While the above five categories can certainly be defended as identifiable trends in 
Western legal thinking, it would be erroneous to claim that they are absolute or 
mutually exclusive.  Particularly in the Common law tradition, academics are 
prepared to cross categories.  Thus, while Vaver is clearly engaged in the analysis of 
three statutory torts in Canada regulating publicity through the “appropriation of 
personality” category, he is also prepared to acknowledge the relevance of property 
to publicity rights, since “many modern definitions of property focus upon the 
existence of a right of exclusive enjoyment rather than upon whether the object of the 
right is tangible or intangible.”
122
  In cases like this, the boundaries between 
categories may become blurred, albeit not altogether erased.     
 
One writer whose work neatly illustrates two problems with these attempted 
classifications is Carty.  In the first place, her work demonstrates the ongoing 
evolution of academic thinking in this area.  Her 2004 article on “Advertising, 
Publicity Rights and English Law”
123
 placed emphasis on the merchandising and 
                                                 
121
 This will be further explored in Chapter 5. 
122
 Vaver, “What’s mine is not yours”, at 260. 
123
 [2004] IPQ 209. 
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advertising uses of the individual within the wider category of appropriation of 
personality, while her focus by 2007 marked a shift towards the broader “quest for 
the IP effect”.
124
  In publicity terms, this is the idea that “the celebrity industry 
(including “licensees”) seek commodification of the celebrity image”,
125
 which 
comes close to (while emphatically not endorsing) the broad publicity as property 
approach.  This observation highlights the constant evolution and shifting of 
parameters that occurs in publicity rights.   
 
A second challenge offered by Carty’s analysis is her insight into the role of the 
celebrity as the product itself.
126
  This interpretation is shared by Colston and 
Middleton who argue that “[i]mage… comprises both a powerful marketing tool and 
creates a new product.”
127
  This idea overlays a number of categories, most critically 
“publicity as property”, which treats the image or identity as the subject of property 
rights, and merchandising, which looks to the value in using image as a marketing 
tool.  It is therefore a more nuanced interpretation, as it draws out the differing 
functions performed by an individual’s image in different circumstances.  In addition 
to her contribution to the debate in this area, which will be drawn upon in the 
chapters to follow, Carty provides a valuable reminder that the suggested five 
categories are not exhaustive, nor are they definitive.  There is no easy comparative 
classification of publicity rights.   
 
Perhaps the key differences between the five approaches outlined can be summarised 
as:  
(i) economic interests versus dignitarian interests;  
(ii) property protection versus tort law; and  
(iii) exploitation by self versus exploitation (or “appropriation”) by others.   
These differences can, to some extent, be mapped on to the split between Civilian 
and Common law analyses of publicity rights:  whereas Civilian systems protect 
dignitarian interests through personality or quasi-delictual rights, Common law 
                                                 
124
 Carty, “The quest for the IP effect”. 
125
 Ibid., at 240. 
126
 “Advertising, publicity rights and English law”, at 210. 
127
 C Colston and K Middleton, Modern Intellectual Property Law, 2
nd
 ed, 2005 (henceforth Colston 
and Middleton, Modern Intellectual Property Law), at 631.  
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systems focus primarily on the economic interests at stake, through property law or 
through torts which evolved in the context of market practices, such as passing off 
and breach of confidence.  As Reiter has observed, “the classificatory angst that 
traditionally occupies civilians affected neither Prosser nor Judge Frank.  For them, it 
was enough to note that the right has value, without worrying overly about its 
nature.”
128
     
 
The Civilian/Common law differences are revealed most clearly in the divergence 
between the first two categories (property rights/ personality rights), although they 
are evident in all five categories to greater or lesser degrees.  As will be seen time 
and again throughout this thesis, the pragmatic Common law approach to the subject 
tends to see a problem in need of a remedy and find that remedy in the existing 
structure of actions and remedies, if necessary adapting them to meet the 
circumstances of the particular case.
129
  In contrast, Civilian systems respond to 
publicity claims with a scheme of extra-patrimonial rights, in which the patrimonial 
elements have no obvious home.  They do, however, provide more extensive and 
principled protection for the dignitarian and moral interests inherent in an 
individual’s personhood than do the Common law systems.  It is possible to have 
“[c]ertain rights of personality which are regarded as fundamental in the civil law 
tradition [but which] are not recognised in English law or Scots law, notably the right 
to one’s name; image (visual likeness); or voice.”
130
  Such differences “reflect deep-
seated cultural differences” between Anglo-American and European jurisdictions.
131
    
 
These five approaches, and the similarities and differences they reveal, serve a 
valuable role by providing a clearer understanding of publicity rights, and suggesting 
a tentative shape and structure for the future development of legal discourse in this 
area.  They also help to draw out some of the core social practices that are at the 
heart of “publicity” as a commercial and social activity.  Defining publicity in 
practice is the aim of Chapter 3. 
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 Reiter, “Personality and patrimony”, at 716.  
129
 See, for example, R Buxton, “How the common law gets made: Hedley Byrne and other cautionary 
tales” (2009) 125 LQR 60. 
130
 Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, para 3.1.2.  
131
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As Chapter 2 sought to show, “publicity” is capable of a wide range of 
interpretations.  Part of the problem with devising any coherent legal response to 
publicity is the lack of a single agreed definition or understanding of publicity in 
practice, coupled with the absence of common terminology.  What is “publicity” or 
“personality”?  Does “publicity” involve a property right over the individual’s 
identity or a personality right to protection of dignitarian interests?  The principal 
aim of this chapter is to develop a more nuanced account of the social practice of 
publicity.  Allied to this, a further aim is to use this account in order to devise a 
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framework and terminology to shape the analysis of publicity rights in future 
chapters.   
 
Any publicity exploitation gives rise to two fundamental questions:  what is being 
exploited and what form does the exploitation take?  It is essential to appreciate that 
these are two separate aspects and require separate consideration.  No contract can be 
drafted, no court can determine a case, and no writer can examine the right of 
publicity without having some idea of what is the subject matter of the contract, 
action or examination and to what use this subject matter has been put.   
 
For example, the very fact that the claimants in two leading English “publicity” cases 
– Irvine v Talksport
1
 and Douglas v Hello!
2
 – used different types of action to 
achieve their ends indicates some degree of difference between the two situations.  
To what extent are these both publicity actions?  What was the reason for suing for 
passing off in Irvine and for breach of confidence in Douglas?  These divergent legal 
claims suggest that there is a correlation between the legal action used in English law 
and the use made of the individual’s image or identity, and this correlation will be 
explored in more detail when considering the manner of the exploitation.  The 
subject matter of the exploitation is also important.  For example, has the 
individual’s name been used, or is it his image, or both, or something else altogether?  
What role is played by other, less tangible elements, such as reputation or 
“glamour”?
3
       
 
This chapter therefore seeks to construct a framework in which to analyse publicity 
cases.  Without this framework, it is too easy to confuse arguments relating to one 
element with those relating to another and this, in turn, gives rise to confusion and 
artificial disagreement.  One such example can be found in Douglas v Hello!.
4
  
Whereas Lord Walker stated that the Douglases’ “claims come close to claims to a 
“character right” protecting a celebrity’s name and image such as has consistently 
                                                 
1
 Irvine v Talksport Ltd  [2003] 2 All ER 881. 
2
 Douglas v Hello! in the Court of Appeal [2006] QB 125; and in the House of Lords [2008] 1 AC 1. 
3
 In the words of Carty, “Personality Rights and English Law”, para 7.2.6. 
4
 [2008] 1 AC 1. 
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been rejected in English law”,
5
 Lord Nicholls observed that “[n]or did Hello’s 
publication of pictures of this event constitute ‘character merchandising’”.
6
  
Regardless of the correct analysis, this reveals a divergence of classification at the 
very highest levels.  A second example of this (potential) confusion can be taken 
from Holyoak’s discussion of Kaye v Robertson,
7
 in which unauthorised photographs 
taken of the claimant in hospital were published in a national newspaper.  While 
most commentators today would class this as an invasion of privacy, in 1993 
Holyoak noted that “Kaye is an important decision in the evolution of recognition by 
the law of the practice of character merchandising”.
8
  Whether the publication of 
photographs of an ill actor can indeed be seen as the same activity as the application 
of images of ABBA to pillowcases
9
 requires further analysis.        
 
Separating out the strands of subject matter and use allows a much clearer insight to 
be gained and also enables us to distinguish, with greater precision and confidence, 
between activities such as “character merchandising” and media publication.  Once 
the subject matter and use have been identified, they can be used to provide a much 
more structured description of publicity in practice.  This, in turn, leads to a 
considerably more accurate definition of publicity for legal purposes.  Thus, the 
construction of a dual framework assists our understanding of publicity exploitation 
with reference to two key elements of the practice:  what is being exploited and to 
what use it is being put.  Each element complements and supports the other, by 
drawing out different elements of this complex area, thereby adding to the picture of 




                                                 
5
 Ibid., para 285. 
6
 Ibid., para 253. 
7
 [1991] FSR 62. 
8
 J Holyoak, “United Kingdom character rights and merchandising rights today” 1993 JBL 444, at 
455. 
9
 In Lyngstad v Anabas Products Ltd [1977] FSR 62. 
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2. THE DUAL CLASSIFICATION PART 1:  THE USE 
APPROACH 
 
2.1. Examining Publicity Uses 
This approach focuses on the different uses that can be made of the subject matter.  
(The subject matter will be considered in section 3.1 below and involves the 
individual’s identifying elements.)   
 
Colston and Middleton deploy the uses of publicity as a framework for their review 
of image rights, based on a tripartite structure.  The three uses that they identify are: 
• “merchandising of memorabilia using ‘character’ as a decorative 
device [whether real or fictional]; 
• endorsement of products [by the well-known]; 




This classificatory scheme can also be detected in the work of other writers in two of 
the five publicity rights approaches identified in Chapter 2.
11
  Like Colston and 
Middleton, Madow identifies three comparable categories of publicity, being 
“intense demand for information about the lives and doings of celebrities”; “a large 
and increasingly lucrative market for merchandise”; and enhancement of “the 




Another American academic, Goodenough, observes that: 
While the ways of turning humanity’s innate fascination with personal 
identity to account are probably bounded only by humanity’s ingenuity, five 
principal modes of use can be fruitfully isolated as encompassing most of the 
current activity in the market-place of the persona:  (i) informational use; (ii) 




These five uses can be fleshed out in greater detail.
14
  The informational use is news 
reporting where, importantly, the reported story is factual.  This can be contrasted 
                                                 
10
 Colston and Middleton, Modern Intellectual Property Law, at 632. 
11
 These are publicity as property and appropriation of personality.  The Civilian personality rights 
approach focuses primarily on the subject matter, and will be considered in section 3.1 below. 
12
 Madow, “Private ownership of public image”, at 129. 
13
 Goodenough, “Retheorising privacy and publicity”, at 41. 
14
 Ibid., at 41 to 42. 
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with the creative use, which is similar to informational use but where there is no 
longer a concern that the information is accurate.  Fictionalised accounts of 
individuals would therefore be covered by the second category.  The third use, 
advertising, is where an individual is used to help sell products or services “which 
are not themselves elements of the personality in question”.
15
  This can be either 
through endorsement, where the individual is seen to use the product himself, or 
simply through drawing attention to the item.  Icon use is where “the thing of value 
being used is the persona itself”, either through “pure representations”, such as 
posters and figurines, or through “utilitarian items,” where functional products are 
decorated with the image of the individual, such as t-shirts,
16
 lunch boxes etc.  The 
final category is the performance use, which arises where an actor performs in 
character or a singer or athlete performs in his own right.  Legal concerns may arise 
where the performance is recorded and can then be replayed or transmitted, with or 
without the consent of the performer.
17
     
 
As well as providing a detailed description of the uses of personal identity, 
Goodenough also sets out a convincing argument for rejecting profit and commerce 
as a central factor in publicity use.
18
  Although commercial use is widespread and 
drives much publicity exploitation, it is “less helpful” as a defining trait since “[s]uch 
terms always need careful qualification and explanations… All of these uses can be, 
and in the relentlessly for-profit world of America generally are, carried on as 
commercial activities, for the purposes of trade.”
19
  Accordingly, the notion of 
“commercial exploitation” of image and identity is not of great assistance as a 
defining factor of publicity, since it is capable of covering all publicity-type uses.  
Publicity use may often be commercial, but it need not be. 
 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., at 41. 
16
 Vaver observes that t-shirts “may have become the modern counterpart of the olden-day 
pamphlets”: Vaver, “What’s mine is not yours”, at 307.  This is supported by the South African case 
of Laugh it Off v South African Breweries 2006 (1) SA 144, which involved the use of t-shirts to 
parody leading commercial brands. 
17
 This recording and unpermitted broadcast of a performance was the focus of the dispute in Zacchini 
v Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company (1977) 433 US 562. 
18
 Commercial use is particularly prevalent in the “publicity as property” approach:  see Chapter 2, 
section 2.1. 
19
 Goodenough, “Retheorising privacy and publicity”, at 42 and at 62; also Zimmerman, “Who put the 
right in the right of publicity?”, at 61-62 and 67-68. 
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Carty identifies a “complex framework”
20
 of image use, which consists of four 
different fact situations.  These are: (i) the “allegiance” use of a celebrity, through the 
production of celebrity souvenirs or memorabilia such as t-shirts and posters; (ii) the 
“informational advertising use” of celebrity, which is effectively endorsement where 
the celebrity is used to provide a guarantee of the product or service concerned; (iii) 
the “enhancement advertising use” of celebrity, where the consumer’s attention is 
caught by the use of the celebrity, potentially including parody; and (iv) the 
“biographical information use” of celebrity, which is “attention-grabbing by media 
features about the celebrity himself” and which “lies somewhere between all three of 
the above uses as such [media] features are both selling the celebrity and selling 
themselves at the same time.”
21
  Carty believes these four different publicity rights 
should be treated differently in law and only the “information advertising use” is 
worthy of legal protection.
22
   
 
Beverley-Smith also addresses three types of use of persona.  Although his initial 
definition focuses on the use of personality for merchandising and advertising 
purposes,
23
 his subsequent review does include reference to a third category of use, 
being the privacy interests arising from media publication of information, in cases 




When these different analyses of publicity uses are compared directly, it can be seen 
that they all identify much the same uses, albeit using different terminology: 
                                                 
20
 Carty, “Advertising, publicity rights and English law”, at 216. 
21
 Ibid., at 216-217. 
22
 Ibid., at 258.  In a later article (Carty, “The quest for the IP effect”) Carty discusses areas of 
commercial development which are pushing for the “IP effect”.  The first of these areas is “the 
celebrity industry (including “licensees”) [who] seek commodification of the celebrity image” (at 
240).  This is a broader over-arching category which accommodates her four earlier categories.  The 
analysis here will proceed on the basis of her four uses. 
23
 Beverley-Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of Personality, at 3.   
24
 Ibid., at 210-211. 
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Icon use Merchandising  A lucrative 
market for 
merchandise 
Allegiance use Merchandising 
Performance - - - - 
 
This table emphasises the coherence between the categories used or referred to by 
most writers and, critically, it underlines the terminological differences.  All envisage 
Goodenough’s information, advertising and icon uses, yet apply a range of different 
labels to these uses.  For example, Goodenough’s “icon use” is variously known as 
“allegiance use”, “merchandise” use, and “merchandising”.   
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The one exception is Goodenough’s final category of performance use (covering use 
of recordings of performances by actors, singers or athletes), which is not evident in 
the other accounts.  McCarthy concludes that this type of use is not directly relevant 
to publicity, while noting that “many people have been misled into thinking that the 
right of publicity involves something else:  something called “performance values”.  
That is, the unpermitted appropriation or imitation of an entertainer’s performance or 
performance style.”
25
  He attributes this confusion to the Supreme Court case of 
Zacchini v Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company,
26
 where the plaintiff’s 
performance (being fired out of a cannon) was broadcast by a television station as a 
news feature, and this use was held to breach his right of publicity.  McCarthy, 
however, argues that cases such as this constitute a “very, very small slice of the 
right of publicity.”
27
  Further, “performance use” is most likely to be protected by 
copyright, which will subsist in the words, music, script, sound recording and/or 
performance as appropriate.
28
  Performance use will therefore be excluded from the 
scope of this thesis.   
 
With the performance use excluded, it can be seen from the above table that the 
majority approach provides a tripartite classification, which enables a meaningful 
distinction to be drawn between the uses without unnecessary fragmentation.  This 
tripartite framework will be adopted, to recognise the division of publicity into (i) 
information or image exploitation, through news reporting; (ii) endorsement or 
enhancement of advertising; and (iii) merchandising or allegiance use.   
 
2.2. The Tripartite Classification of Uses  
These three uses can be outlined as follows:  
 
1. An individual agrees to allow an entity (frequently a newspaper or a 
                                                 
25
 McCarthy, “Public personas and private property”, at 689. 
26
 (1977) 433 US 562. 
27
 McCarthy, “Public personas and private property”, at 690; also McCarthy, “The human persona as 
commercial property”, at 133.  Zimmerman takes this further, claiming that Zacchini “bears very little 
relationship” to the typical publicity cases: “Who put the right in the right of publicity?”, at 45.  
28
 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (henceforth CDPA 1988), s1, supplemented by ss3 and 5, 
and s180. 
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magazine) access to a particular area of his life, typically for a fee.  
Examples can readily be given, whereby an individual “sells” photographs of 
his wedding day to a gossip magazine
29
 or where a participant in a high-profile 
current event “tells all” to a newspaper in a (typically exclusive) deal.
30
  Tabloid 
newspapers rely on a ready supply of gossip or scandal about “celebrities”: one 
need only inspect the news-stand in any newsagent, stationer or bookseller to 
appreciate that such celebrity tales are weekly events.  This supply and demand 
for gossip and information can be thought of as an individual’s “media 
information” use-right.  It relies on the name and image of the individual, 
together with some element of information about them.  Any third party user, 
whether authorised or not, can be referred to as a “publisher”.  
  
2. An individual agrees to endorse, support or promote a particular product 
or service.  In these cases, the individual “tells the relevant public that he 
approves of the product or service or is happy to be associated with it.  In effect 
he adds his name as an encouragement to members of the relevant public to buy 
or use the service or product.”
31
  Note however that this use of name and image 
frequently comprises more than the provision of services, such as modelling or 
attending a photo shoot:  the supplier wishing to benefit from this support will 
usually have chosen a specific individual not for his modelling abilities (or not 
exclusively so) but for the added value provided by his public status or 
reputation.  Celebrity status or reputation therefore apparently has a role to play 
in most cases of this use. 
  
What is critical in this use is that the individual advertises or endorses the 
                                                                                                                                          
29
 Recent examples include David and Victoria Beckham (to OK! in 1999 for £1million); Michael 
Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones (to OK! in 2000 for £1million); Jordan and Peter Andre (to OK! in 
2005 for £2million); Ashley Cole and Cheryl Tweedy (to OK! in 2006 for £1million); and Wayne 
Rooney and Coleen McLoughlin (to OK! in 2008 for £2.5million).  Since official details of such 
arrangements are not published, definitive authority is hard to produce: all details taken from BBC 
online or Wikipedia.   
30
 Examples are numerous: the Royal Marines who were captured and held in Iran for two weeks in 
March and April 2007 sold their stories on their return to the UK.  The publicist Max Clifford makes a 
living from brokering such deals:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Clifford (accessed 15 November 
2008). 
31
 Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2355, para 9, per Laddie J.  
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products or services of another party:  it is not a self-promotion, nor is he the 
product himself.  This essential distinction has already been referred to in 
Chapter 2, section 3, where Carty and Colston and Middleton recognise the 
difference between the individual’s image which “comprises both a powerful 
marketing tool and creates a new product.”
32
  The advertising and endorsement 
use employs the individual as a marketing tool and not as a new product.  It is 
therefore fundamental that the individual is used in conjunction with another 
party’s goods or services. 
  
 There may be a link between the individual’s fame and the goods or services he 
is promoting.  This is the case, for example, with Jamie Oliver (chef) and 
Sainsbury’s (food) or with Tiger Woods (golf professional) and Nike (sports 
equipment).  This can be referred to as a “tools of the trade” endorsement.
33
  
Alternatively, the supplier may favour a “non-tools endorsement”,
34
 and simply 
wish to enjoy some “reflected glory” from the particular reputation or popularity 
of the individual in question, without there being a link between the activities of 
the individual and the product or service to be promoted.  Thus, David 
Beckham’s star status was valuable to Pepsi without him being involved in the 
soft drinks industry.
35
  Beverley-Smith et al also identify a third type of 
advertisement, where the individual is chosen solely for the purpose of 
“grabbing the attention” of the public,
36
 and there is no suggestion of 
endorsement of the product by the individual.  Carty refers to these three classes 
of celebrity promotion, but groups both tools and non-tools endorsement 
together as one category, called “information advertising use”, and treats the 
third non-endorsement use separately as the “enhancement advertising use” 
category.
37
   
  
                                                                                                                                          
32
 Colston and Middleton, Modern Intellectual Property Law, at 631; also Carty, “Advertising, 
publicity rights and English law”, at 210. 
33




As at 2004, Beckham’s deal with Pepsi was apparently worth £3million: Milligan, Brand it Like 
Beckham, at 120. 
36
 Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 2. 
37
 Carty, “Advertising, publicity rights and English law”, at 216-217. 
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 This broader category admits not only use of an individual to endorse a product 
(whether relevant to the individual or not) but also use in attention-grabbing 
advertising, with no suggestion of approbation or endorsement by the individual 
involved.  As Beverley-Smith notes, development of the law is not served “by 
drawing specious distinctions based on the inherently nebulous concept of an 
endorsement”
38
 and thus all three situations will be treated as a single publicity 
“use”.  
    
The division does, however, lead to a dilemma over the most appropriate name 
for this use of image and identity:  “advertising” (as favoured by Goodenough, 
Carty and Beverley-Smith) signifies the attention-grabbing use, and could  
potentially operate to exclude cases where there is implied endorsement; 
conversely “endorsement” (as used by Colston and Middleton) is inappropriate 
for those cases where there is no indication of support from the individual.  To 
divide the class into two separate categories would, however, unnecessarily 
complicate the analysis, given that the underlying aim in each case is the 
promotion of products and services through the attachment of the name and/or 
image of an individual.  This use can therefore be thought of as the “promotion 
use”, while emphasising that the promotion by the individual is on behalf of a 
third party, referred to as the “supplier” – although where done with the consent 




3. An individual agrees to produce or authorise production of goods which 
carry his name and/or image.  Common examples of these “mere image 
carriers”, as the Trade Marks Registry has termed them,
40
 include posters, 
calendars, t-shirts and mugs.  Here, the goods are not being bought solely 
because the purchaser wishes a new mug, nor are they being sold as trade 
marked items in the sense that the purchaser is specifically keen to buy a mug 
from a certain manufacturer as identified by its trade mark.  Instead, they are 
                                                 
38
 Beverley-Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of Personality, at 134. 
39
 This element of mutual benefit will be apparent time and again throughout this investigation. 
40
 G Black (published as G Davies), “The cult of celebrity and trade marks: the next instalment” 
(2004) 1:2 SCRIPT-ed 230. 
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seen as “badges of loyalty”;
41
 souvenirs or indicia of support for, or interest in, 
the individual who features on the product.  An example of merchandising was 
given in (the non-merchandising case of) Irvine v Talksport, where reference 
was made to “the sale of memorabilia relating to the late Diana, Princess of 
Wales.  A porcelain plate bearing her image could hardly be thought of as being 
endorsed by her, but the enhanced sales which may be achieved by virtue of the 




 In these cases the individual effectively becomes the product:
43
  when the 
consumer buys the David Beckham calendar or the Elvis Presley mug, they are 
“buying” David Beckham or Elvis Presley.  The significant distinction between 
the promotion use outlined above and the merchandising use is the difference 
already alluded to, between, respectively, image as a marketing tool and as the 
product itself.  In merchandising, the individual arguably becomes the product.
44
    
  
 Merchandising may involve products which are either a “pure representation” 
(for example, posters) or a “utilitarian” item (for example, t-shirts or calendars), 
as per Goodenough’s classification above.  In some cases there may be a 
perception of endorsement by the individual involved, but this is not necessary:  
all that is required is that the product bears the image of the individual which 
renders it attractive to its target audience.
45
  Whether authorised or not, the 
practice of production of mementoes is typically known as merchandising:  
where this practice is exploited, it will be referred to as the “merchandising 
use” and a third party exploiter (whether authorised or not) who produces goods 
bearing the image of the individual will be the “merchandiser”.  
 
Together, the media information, promotion and merchandising uses can be seen as 
the most commonly cited (and evidenced) types of publicity activity.  It is important 
                                                                                                                                          
41
 As used in Arsenal v Reed [2003] 3 All ER 865.  See also Zimmerman, “Who put the right in the 
right of publicity?”, at 63. 
42
 Irvine v Talksport [2002] 1 WLR 2355, para 9, per Laddie J.   
43
 See the distinction made above between the individual as a marketing tool and as the product itself: 
text and reference at note 32. 
44
 Colston and Middleton, Modern Intellectual Property Law, at 632. 
45
 Irvine v Talksport [2002] 1 WLR 2355, para 9. 
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to stress that the list cannot be treated as exhaustive, but should remain open.  
Cementing the types of use would risk stagnation and hamper development of the 
law, particularly as regards future evolution of commercial or social practices.  
However, the above three categories appear broad enough to cover “humanity’s 
ingenuity” to date.   
 
One important qualification to all use types is that there must be “public” use:  where 
the use of the image or identity is exclusively private, there will be no element of 
publicity to be indicted.
46
  The requirement for public use is implicit in each of the 
three uses discussed above: none of these publicity uses could be achieved by 
keeping the relevant publication, promotion or merchandise private.  This is not 
something which is explored by other writers
47
 and no court has had to consider the 
nature of the use in these terms, yet it stands to reason that an action for infringement 
of “publicity rights” can only lie where the use made involves some element of 
communication to the public.
48
  However, this requirement for public use does not 
equate to commercial or for-profit use since a charity, for example, could make use 
of an individual’s persona to promote its cause without directly raising income.  The 
rejection of “commercial use” as a defining criterion in section 2.1 above therefore 
still stands.      
 
2.3. The Paradigm Publicity Use Cases 
It is possible to identify a leading case in English law which is illustrative of each of 
these three uses and which can be used as a convenient point of reference for future 
discussion.  This section provides a brief summary of the paradigm publicity cases, 
without (at this stage) passing comment on the merits or otherwise of the legal 
actions. 
 
                                                 
46
 Private use may of course breach a different legal right, in which case it can be protected by that 
right. 
47
 One exception is Halpern who notes that “[b]y its nature, the right of publicity implicates speech”: 
SW Halpern, “The right of publicity:  Maturation of an independent right protecting the associative 
value of personality” (1995) 46 Hastings LJ 853 (henceforth Halpern, “Publicity: Maturation of an 
independent right”), at 867. 
48
 This can be contrasted with privacy actions, where the invasion itself may be actionable, as will be 
seen in Chapter 5. 
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Douglas v Hello! typifies the media information use.  In this case, a paparazzo 
photographer gained access to the Douglases’ wedding, which was held in private in 
the Plaza Hotel in New York in November 2000.  The paparazzo managed to obtain 
a number of unauthorised photographs of Catherine Zeta Jones and Michael Douglas 
at their wedding, which he sold to Hello! magazine.  Hello!’s publication of these 
photographs caused distress to the Douglases
49
 and destroyed the exclusive deal 
which the Douglases had concluded with OK!, a rival magazine to Hello!.  The 
Douglases’ successful action against Hello! was based upon the action of breach of 
confidence, as supplemented by the Article 8 right of privacy.  The Court of 
Appeal’s decision in favour of the Douglases was handed down in 2005,
50
 while the 
House of Lords’ ruling in favour of OK!, as exclusive licensee of the wedding 
photographs, was delivered in 2007.
51
   
 
The eventual award to the Douglases at first instance (and confirmed on appeal), 
comprised three elements: (i) £3,750 each for distress; (ii) £7,000 in respect of 
“additional costs incurred by reason of their having to bring forward preparation, 
approval and provision of the authorised photographs so as to enable them to appear 
in OK! issue 241 as part of the Claimants’ mitigation exercise”;
52
 and (iii) £50 each 
for breach of their data protection rights.
53
  OK! were awarded £1,033,156 by 
Lindsay J – this was overturned by the Court of Appeal, but was reinstated on appeal 




In respect of the promotion use, the leading case is Irvine v Talksport.
55
  This case 
arose from the unauthorised use by Talksport of a photograph of Eddie Irvine, the 
Formula 1 racing driver, to promote its radio station.  The manner in which the 
(legally obtained) image of Irvine had been doctored by Talksport suggested that 
Irvine was endorsing Talksport radio.  Irvine’s successful claim against Talksport for 
                                                 
49
 They were left “devastated and shocked” according to their evidence at trial: [2003] EWHC 786 
(Ch), paras 82-84, per Lindsay J. 
50
 [2006] QB 125. 
51
 [2008] 1 AC 1. 
52




 Douglas v Hello! [2003] EWHC 2629 (Ch); overturned [2006] QB 125; reinstated [2008] 1 AC 1. 
55
 Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2355, on appeal [2003] 2 All ER 881.      
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this use relied on the tort of passing off, alleging misrepresentation and confusion 
resulting in loss to Irvine.  The Court of Appeal affirmed the High Court’s judgment 
in 2003, and increased the award of damages to Irvine from £2,000 to £25,000.
56
  It 
is critical to note that the image at the heart of the dispute had been doctored.  
Whether Irvine’s claim would have been successful had the legally obtained image 
been left undoctored remains uncertain – and this fact operates as a substantial limit 




The merchandising use can be illustrated by two cases.  The first involved the 
unauthorised use of the images of real persons, when members of ABBA sued a 
company for applying their images and the band name to pillowcases.  Lyngstad v 
Anabas
58
 was, like Irvine, argued on the grounds of passing off.  Unlike Irvine, 
however, the band’s action was unsuccessful in the High Court, in part because 
precedent was against the plaintiffs since an action for passing off had been 
dismissed in a similar situation in 1948, McCulloch v Lewis A May Ltd.
59
  
Nonetheless, Lyngstad remains the leading English case in relation to merchandising 




However, a 1991 decision of the High Court regarding the unauthorised use of 
fictional characters indicates increasing judicial awareness of the changing social and 
commercial practice of merchandising,
61
 and suggests that there is no guarantee that 
                                                 
56
 [2003] 2 All ER 881. 
57
 The use of passing off as a vehicle for enabling recovery has been questioned by a number of 
commentators, including Carty, “Advertising, publicity rights and English law” at 238-243; Beverley-
Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of Personality; and Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property 
and Personality, at 23.  The utility of passing off will be assessed in Chapter 6 in the wider context of 
delict.  For present purposes, Irvine can be accepted as illustrative of the publicity use that this thesis 
seeks to address, without accepting the merits of a passing off action to remedy that use. 
58
 Lyngstad v Anabas Products Ltd [1977] FSR 62. 
59
 McCulloch v Lewis A May (1948) 65 RPC 58.   
60
 English cases such as Jane Austen Trade Mark [2000] RPC 879 and Elvis Presley Trade Marks 
[1999] RPC 567 have focused on trade marked names.  
61
 Walton J referred to the commercial practice of merchandising in Wombles Limited v Wombles 
Skips Limited [1975] FSR 488 and Tavener Rutledge Limited v Trexapalm Limited [1975] FSR 479, 
and the House of Lords did likewise in In Re American Greeting Corporation’s Application [1984] 1 
WLR 189, indicating a growing awareness of merchandising through the 1970s and 1980s, but it was 
not until Mirage Studios v Counter-Feat Clothing Company Limited that this had an explicit impact on 
the development of the law.  See also the discussion of this case in Chapter 2, section 2.4. 
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Lyngstad would be followed today.
62
  In Mirage Studios v Counter-Feat Clothing 
Company Limited
63
 the defendant applied imitations of the plaintiff’s cartoon 
characters, the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, to a range of clothing.  The Vice 
Chancellor accepted that this could constitute passing off, particularly given the 
evidence of public confusion in this case.  The scope of the Vice Chancellor’s 
judgment therefore suggests that a similar result could be reached in respect of 
individuals, contrary to the decision of the High Court in Lyngstad.  Taken together, 
these cases can be used to illustrate the category of merchandising use and provide 
some insight into the changing perception of merchandising practices.  
 
Throughout this thesis, these cases will be used to provide a reference point for each 
of the three uses identified here.  One feature of these cases which is worthy of note 
is that they all involved unsought and unauthorised use of the claimants’ names, 
images and identities.  It is therefore helpful to examine authorised and unauthorised 
use in greater detail.   
 
2.4. Authorised and Unauthorised Use 
The distinction between authorised and unauthorised use depends on the 
circumstances of the exploitation, rather than on the use made or the subject matter 
of that use.  Essentially, it is the difference between the Douglases’ contract with 
OK! for authorised publication of their wedding photographs and their litigation 
against Hello! for unauthorised publication.   
 
Despite the practice of authorised exploitation (which will be explored in detail in 
section 4 below), the judicial and academic focus has been very much on the 
unauthorised exploitation.  This focus is perhaps not surprising, since the litigation 
has arisen from this unauthorised use.
64
  Yet the real value of publicity lies in 
negotiated deals for authorised exploitation.  Whereas the Douglases were awarded 
less than £15,000 from Hello! by the High Court, the value of their contract with 
                                                 
62
 Although Laddie J made a clear distinction between the false endorsement practice in Irvine and the 
merchandising practice: Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2355, para 44. 
63
 [1991] FSR 145.  See also Chapter 2, section 2.4. 
64
 I am not aware of any litigation to date in the UK arising out of a contract for authorised use. 
A Right of Publicity in Scots Law 
51 
Part I, Chapter 3:  The Practice of Publicity 
OK! was £1 million.  From press evidence as to the fees paid for other celebrity 
weddings in the UK, it would seem that £1 million was the standard rate for such 
publication deals in the decade 1998-2008, with some couples even managing to 
negotiate fees in excess of that.
65
  Similarly, it has been suggested that of David 
Beckham’s weekly earnings of £90,000 at Manchester United, £20,000 was 
attributable to the Club’s use of his “image rights”.
66
  If true, this means that 
Beckham was earning more than £1 million per year for his image rights alone, from 
his club alone.  The unauthorised use of persona may hit the headlines and occupy 
court time, but it is the authorised and controlled exploitation which is the focus of 
commercial practice.     
 
A closer look at the concept of rights, however, reveals a small but important 
difference between authorised and unauthorised use of persona.  MacCormick 
considers the “right” to do something and the “power” to do it.
67
  Whereas rights, 
whether active or passive
68
, can be seen as “positions of benefit or advantage secured 
to persons by law”
69
 which “make[s] it appropriate for a relevant constraint to fall on 
another person”,
70
 powers are a different type of legal concept:   
The empowering aspect of law can be envisaged as involving a legally 
conferred capability to alter the legal situations or relationships of legal 
persons.  Powers in law in their simplest form are powers to vary in some 




This distinction between legal rights and powers can be applied in the context of 
exploitation of image.  If the law were to prohibit unauthorised use, an individual 
would have a passive right not to have his image and identity exploited without 
consent.  As part of this, the individual would also have an active right of choice as 
to whether to enforce this right or not:  “it is normally a matter of free choice whether 
                                                 
65
 See footnote 29 above.  
66
 Colston and Middleton, Modern Intellectual Property Law, at 631. 
67
 N MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory, 2007, (henceforth MacCormick, 
Institutions of Law), chapters 7 and 9. 
68
 MacCormick explores the notion of active and passive rights in some details at 120 et seq.  Note 
that his use of active and passive in relation to rights does not equate to my notion of the positive 
authorised use and the negative unauthorised use:  this division is better characterised by rights and 
powers as will be discussed immediately below.  Instead, an active right is the right of a right-holder 
to do, or not do, as he chooses, in respect of that right.  Ibid., 124-125. 
69
 Ibid., at 120. 
70
 Ibid., at 120. 
71
 Ibid., at 155. 
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or not to exercise any… remedial rights in case of breach”.
72
  On the other hand, 
where the law chooses to recognise the ability to exploit in person, that is authorised 
use.  This is not a right, strictly speaking.  Instead, authorised use is a power of the 
individual:  the individual is enabled, if he so chooses, to contract for use or 
exploitation of his image, thereby transforming the otherwise wrongful action of the 
party into authorised, permitted use.  It should be noted, however, that the individual 
does not have a right to do so, as no individual can demand that his image be used to 
promote products, for example.
73
  All the individual can do is contract for its 
exploitation where the opportunity arises.  For this reason, it is preferable to talk of a 
right of publicity, rather than a right to publicity.
74
     
 
It is worth noting that the existence of a right does not equate to the obligation to 
exercise that right.  MacCormick notes, in the context of privacy, that there is 
nothing wrong with conferring or recognising human rights to things which 
not everyone (even not many people) wants; for, of course, to have a right is, 
normally, to have the option whether one exercises it or not.  Those who 





This applies equally for all permissive rights:  there should be no compulsion to 
exercise a right of publicity if one were to be granted. 
 
Any analysis of publicity rights should therefore take account of the difference 
between attempting to prevent or recover for unauthorised use of persona (the 
negative right) and attempting to control the use of persona (the positive power).  A 
balanced review of publicity requires consideration of both elements.   
 
 
                                                 
72
 Ibid., at 120; also 129. 
73
 This analysis finds support from JE Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, 1997, (henceforth Penner, 
The Idea of Property in Law) at 91. 
74
 This can be contrasted with fundamental human rights such as the right to life. 
75
 N MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy, 1982/1986 (henceforth MacCormick, Legal 
Right and Social Democracy), at 178. 
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3. THE DUAL CLASSIFICATION PART 2:  THE SUBJECT 
MATTER APPROACH 
 
3.1. Identifying the Subject Matter 
Whereas the use approach provides a way to distinguish between the methods for 
exploiting individuals for publicity purposes, it does not categorise what is being 
exploited.  One benefit of considering what is being exploited is that it helps to 
distinguish publicity from other rights that can be enjoyed by individuals.  For 
example, where an individual enters into a contract for the provision of services in 
return for a regular salary, we can identify this as a contract of employment.  
Similarly, where there is exploitation of an individual’s painting, this is a matter for a 
copyright licence.  Alternatively, where there is exploitation of a brand, such as coca-
cola, we can distinguish this from the promotion use identified above, because the 
subject matter is a registered trade mark, rather than an individual.  The subject 
matter of the exploitation in each case allows it to be distinguished from other types 
of exploitation.   
 
We therefore need to identify what is being exploited in publicity cases, whether 
there is media information, promotion or merchandising use of an individual.  All 
five of the conceptual approaches to publicity rights identified in Chapter 2 can be 
drawn upon here.   
 
McCarthy, for example, writing in the publicity as property approach, asks (and 
answers) the question: 
What aspects of human identity does the right of publicity protect?  It protects 
anything by which a certain human being can be identified.  This covers 
everything:  personal names, nicknames, stage and pen names, pictures, and 
persona in a role or characterization.  It can also include physical objects 
which identify a person… And the Bette Midler decision reaffirms that a 




He notes that “persona” is preferable as the collective term used to describe the 
elements of human identity exploited, since “the traditional phrase “name and 
                                                 
76
 McCarthy, “Public personas and private property”, at 689. 
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Also writing in this tradition, Coombe gives a similarly broad definition of “celebrity 
image” which develops the theme of identifying the individual by referring to his 
recognition value.  Publicity therefore affects “not only or exclusively a celebrity’s 
visual likeness but rather all elements of the complex constellation of visual, verbal, 
and aural signs that circulate in society and constitute the celebrity’s recognition 
value.”
78
   
 
The all-embracing notion of what is covered by a right of publicity in the US is 
reflected in much of the state legislation which provides for a right of publicity or 
commercial exploitation of identity.  To take two examples,
79
 the Indiana right of 
publicity is defined as a property interest in name, voice, signature, photograph, 
image, likeness, distinctive appearance, gestures, or mannerisms.
80
  The State of 
Washington creates a property right over the name, voice, signature, photograph or 
likeness of the individual
81
 and then defines each of these individual terms (except 
“voice”) in some detail.
82
  The broad right of property in the US therefore extends 
over a broad concept of persona.   
 
The Civilian personality rights approach refers to “appropriation of a person’s 
identity (name or likeness)”.
83
  Although this does not expand in any detail on the 
concept of “identity”, it is helpful to cross-reference this with the (separate) notion of 
                                                 
77
 McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, para 4:45.  See also Westfall and Landau, 
“Publicity Rights as Property Rights”, where they reflect on the expansive range of indicia, and the 
causes of this, at 91, and 93-96; see also Chapter 2, section 2.1.   
78
 Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties, at 89, note 5. 
79
 For others, see The Florida Regulation of Trade, Commerce, Investments and Solicitations, Chapter 
540, Section 08; The Illinois Right of Publicity Act (765 ILCS 1075); The New York Civil Rights 
statute, Article 5: Right of Privacy; Kentucky Acts 1984, 391.170; Massachusetts General Law, Part 
III, Title I, Chapter 214, Section 3A; The Nevada Right of Publicity, NRS 597.770 – 597.810; 
Oklahoma Stat. tit 12, paras 1448 – 1449; and Rhode Island Title 9, Chapter 9-1, Section 28. 
80
 Indiana’s Publicity Law IC 32-36-1-7. 
81
 Washington Chapter 63.60 RCW Personality Rights, section 010.   
82
 Ibid., section 020(4) – (9). 
83
 Neethling, “Personality Rights”, at 543. 
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the right to identity.
84
  Here, identity is defined as a person’s “uniqueness which 
individualizes him as a particular person and this distinguishes him from others… 
Identity is manifested in various indicia by which a person can be recognized, such 
as his name, image, voice, fingerprints, handwriting, etc.”
85
  The two key elements 
which can be taken from this approach are first, a very broad notion of identity as a 
factor which distinguishes the individual from every other individual
86
 and secondly, 
an extensive, yet non-exhaustive, list of the sort of factors which serve to distinguish 
the individual. 
 
This definition of “identity” finds support from another writer in the Civilian 
tradition, Logeais, who notes that “fame is best conveyed through the name or 
picture which are inherent to the person”.
87
  However, while she is prepared to accept 
personal attributes of the individual as part of his identity, she does not agree with 
the annexation of external objects to represent that individual.
88
  Thus, she disputes 
the outcome of an Italian case which protected the “most distinctive elements of [the 
plaintiff’s] personality:  a woollen cap and a pair of small round glasses”.
89
  In 
contrast, an Italian commentator on this case notes (with apparent approval) that the 
plaintiff “had worn and still wore these accessories constantly and not occasionally, 
just to mark his personal identity, enriching it with something peculiar to be used as 
a recall of his features.”
90
   
 
Vaver lends support to this wider interpretation, by noting that ““[l]ikeness” cannot 
mean merely a person’s unadorned or nude appearance; a person’s characteristic 
dress may be as much a part of his personality as his face”.
91
  Consequently, even 
where the individual cannot be identified in person but only from surrounding 
factors, such as his clothes or accessories, there is sufficient identification to 
                                                 
84
 The right to identity is infringed where identity is used “in a way which cannot be reconciled with 
his true identity”, per Neethling, “Personality Rights”, at 540. 
85
 Ibid., at 540. 
86
 The potential problems posed by identical twins are not considered. 
87




 As discussed by S Martuccelli, “An up-and-coming right – the right of publicity:  its birth in Italy 
and its consideration in the United States” [1993] Ent LR 109, at 109. 
90
 Ibid., at 110, emphasis in the original.  
91
 Vaver, “What’s mine is not yours”, at 274. 
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constitute use of his image.
92
  Vaver in fact returns to the idea of identification and 
recognition, which is present in both the Civilian and American interpretations of 
identity.
93
  He extends the scope of protection to any aspect of the individual which 
can identify him in the minds of the public:  
Betty Grable’s legs were at least as valuable an asset to her as her face, and at 
least as recognizable by the crowds who flocked to see her movies…  There 
should be no a priori exclusion even of a person’s big toe if such has become 




Recognisability and identification are therefore central aspects of exploitation of the 
individual.  This leads to the possibility that the exploitation in fact relies on 
reputation:  the fact that the individual can be recognised and identified by the public 
at large requires that individual to have a public status, or reputation.  Support for the 
importance of reputation can also be derived from the fact that most of the claimants 
are famous.  This notion of recognisability, deriving from reputation, will be 
considered in section 3.2 below.   
 
Evidence of the elements of the individual that are exploited in publicity practice can 
also be taken from case law.
95
  In three
96
 of the paradigm cases identified above, the 
defendants had made use of (i) image and photographs, containing personal 
information about the subjects, in the case of Douglas; (ii) image, without name, in 
Irvine; and (iii) image and band name (ABBA) in Lyngstad.  Turning to other cases, 
we can see a broad similarity in the subject matter in question.  In Scotland, the name 
of an inventor of a new type of plough was used in advertising for ploughs designed 
and manufactured by the defender, and the court allowed the pursuer’s claim for 
interdict to stop this use.
97
  In England, a claim for unauthorised use of the nick-name 
of a popular children’s broadcaster, “Uncle Mac”, was rejected, because there was no 




 As per the quotations above.  See also Reiter, for example, who refers to the celebrity’s “recognition 
factor” which is “both marketable and valuable”: “Personality and patrimony”, at 726. 
94
 Vaver, “What’s mine is not yours”, at 274. 
95
 Whether every claim for unauthorised use has succeeded is not necessarily relevant at this stage, 
because all that is sought to be discerned here is a greater understanding of the subject matter of the 
exploitation. 
96
 The fourth, Mirage Studios v Counter-Feat Clothing, involved fictional characters. 
97
 Wilkie v McCulloch 1822-1824 2S (SC) 413.  Interdict granted and upheld by the First Division, on 
the grounds that “although he [Wilkie] had not the exclusive privilege of making and vending these 
improved ploughs, yet he was entitled, at common law, to prevent any one from impressing his name 
on those which were not made by him, or under his authority.” (at 414.)   
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common field of activity between the parties (radio broadcasting compared with 
breakfast cereals).
98
  American cases cover the same indicia featured in the above 
cases – name, image, reputation – but have also introduced some more exotic indicia.  





 and even a robotic look-alike.
101
    
 
In addition to these elements of image and indicia, there is evidence from publicity 
practice and from case law which indicates that in some cases, private information 
has also been used and exploited.  This is most obviously the case in the media 
information use.  The photographs of the Douglases’ wedding, for example, were 
important not just because they contained the image of the Douglases, but also 
because they conveyed information about the wedding:  what the bride and groom 
wore, the flowers, the venue, and so on.   
 
The picture that emerges is of the use of photographs and images, names and nick-
names, sound-alikes and look-alikes.  In some cases, these images and indicia will 
convey otherwise private, personal information.  Typically, the key element appears 
to be use of image, followed by name.  However, all these cases are linked by an 
underlying value.  The focus on image and indicia and information is very much a 
physicalist approach:  it considers what was physically used or exploited in the media 
information, promotion and merchandising uses.  It is possible, and indeed necessary, 
to take a different approach, which asks why the image of one person is worth 
£1million while the image of another is worth nothing?  What effects this value 
transformation?  The following section will explore the underlying value which is 
arguably the unifying element in all publicity exploitation. 
 
3.2. The Underlying Element:  Reputation   
There is plenty of evidence that the identity of, and personal information about, 
individuals is valuable.  However, it is arguable that image, indicia and information 
                                                 
98
 McCulloch v Lewis A May (1948) 65 RPC 58. 
99
 Carson v Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets Inc 698 F 2d 831.  
100
 Midler v Ford Motor Company  849 F 2d. 460 (9
th
 Cir. 1988). 
101
 White v Samsung Electronic America Inc 971 F.2d 1395 (9
th
 Cir 1992). 
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are important because they can be identified with a particular individual.  Out of the 
many women who gave birth to twins in February 2008, only one was offered $6 
million by People Magazine for the first pictures of the twins.
102
  It can therefore be 
suggested that it is not the photograph of twins which is worth $6 million to People 
Magazine, but the fact that the mother of the twins in this instance was Jennifer 
Lopez.  Her celebrity-status is what endows the baby photographs with their interest 
to the media and the public, and which generates a price tag far beyond the typical 
media response (or lack thereof).  Lord Nicholls referred to this idea in his opinion in 
Douglas v Hello!:  “The identity of this couple made their wedding an eminently 
newsworthy event.”
103
  Presumably other couples were married in New York on the 
weekend of 18 November 2000, but only Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta Jones 
licensed use of their wedding photographs for £1 million.   
 
In addition to these examples of media information use, the importance of identity – 
and recognisability – can also be seen in the promotion and merchandising fields.  
The reason that David Beckham is used by Police to promote sunglasses in 
preference to using a model is because the (majority of the) public recognise David 
Beckham and associate his fame and success with the product in question: 
We identify with and buy into celebrities for the same reasons we buy into 
brands.  They add colour and excitement to our life.  They provide a promise 
or a reassurance of a particular experience.  We admire what they do, how 
they look or what they represent.  They offer a shared frame of reference that 




The colour and excitement and the shared frame of reference come not solely from 
image or indicia or information, but from the underlying reputation and fame:  the 
“celebrity aura is a potent force”.
105
  This is not the case with less- or non-famous 
individuals.  As Holyoak notes “the world is not crying out for Jon Holyoak 
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sweatshirts now nor, it seems likely, in the future”.
106
  Absent a reputation which 
makes Holyoak readily identifiable by the public, there is little demand for use of his 
image. 
 
The underlying element which apparently creates the value and the attractiveness of 
a celebrity image is the recognisability of the individual, and this stems from his 
reputation.
107
  On this analysis, Beckham’s reputation becomes the core element 
which attracts Police sunglasses, just as Lopez’s reputation attracts People magazine 
and its chequebook.  The role played by reputation – or celebrity, popularity, fame, 
notoriety, glamour or goodwill – in publicity exploitation thus requires further 
examination:  to what extent is reputation essential to the exploitation, or is it simply 
one factor of many?  
 
Given that the cases discussed in section 2.3 above all involved celebrities, it is 
reasonable to speculate that this fame has been the primary attraction for any third 
party exploiter.  If so, then the subject of the use and exploitation could be the 
individual’s reputation rather than, or in addition to, his image or indicia or personal 
information.   
 
Support for this arises from reliance by claimants in England upon passing off to 
recover for unauthorised publicity exploitation.  Passing off is founded upon the 
reputation and goodwill of the claimant:  Irvine’s case against Talksport succeeded 
because, in the words of Laddie J, “Mr Irvine has a property right in his goodwill 
which he can protect from unlicensed appropriation consisting of a false claim or 
suggestion of endorsement of a third party’s goods or business.”
108
  Irvine’s recovery 
was thus not based upon unauthorised use of his image alone.  In fact, Irvine only 
objected to the doctored image of him which created a false impression of 
endorsement:  no action was pursued against Talksport for its use of the other 
(untampered) image of him on the winner’s podium.  Rather, an essential element of 
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Irvine’s claim was to demonstrate that he had goodwill in himself, which had been 
exploited through use of a falsified image.
109
     
 
It is possible, however, to question the weight that can be attached to this example.  
A central factor in such litigation is likely to be the claimant’s need to fit his 
commercial or personal grievance within an existing legal cause of action.  Irvine’s 
case relied on establishing that he had reputation and goodwill which he controlled 
and exploited in a series of other deals.  But this emphasis on reputation and 
goodwill would have been driven by the requirements of the tort of passing off and 
can therefore be seen as a tactical and expedient approach.  Passing off requires the 
claimant to prove the existence and appropriation of the claimant’s goodwill, rather 
than “image”:  Irvine’s case focused on goodwill rather than image.  Arguably, the 
importance of goodwill in this case tells us no more than that a claimant needs to 
demonstrate goodwill to prove his claim of passing off.   
 
Further, under this analysis, image or indicia are important because of the 
relationship between physical identity and intangible reputation.  It does not make 
sense to exploit “reputation” in the abstract.  Like goodwill, reputation is intangible, 
and must be represented in some tangible form.  If I wish to take advantage of David 
Beckham’s reputation, I must use some tangible representation of it, such as his 
name, signature or image.  The image or identity exploited in each case can be seen 
as the physical manifestation of the reputation.   
 
Logeais explores this point in her review of French case law.  She recognises that 
“the image is protected because it is the closest reflection or personification of the 
person’s fame achieved either because of artistic or professional skill or holding of 
positions entailing public exposure.”
110
  She expresses uncertainty, however, as to 
whether image is protected in order to protect the underlying fame or to recognise the 
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“efforts or personal or professional achievements which resulted in fame.”
111
  
However, since fame does not always result from personal or professional 
achievements (“accidental” heroes being one example), yet the French right still 
exists, it is perhaps the fame which is the underlying protected interest.
112
  In any 
event, the method of achieving this protection is through the individual’s image or 
identity, which is the tangible representation of the underlying fame.  Image and 
reputation are therefore inter-dependent and mutually reinforcing.    
 
The majority of examples of exploitation have featured celebrities with a reputation 
to exploit, and will presumably continue to do so.  Reputation is undoubtedly the 
magical ingredient which attracts the attention, and the fees, in the first place.  
Accordingly, reputation is the underlying, and inherent, element in all cases, and is 
exploited through use of the individual’s image or other indicia, together in some 
cases with personal information about him.  This is the case even where the 
reputation is negative.
113
  While there is a clear moral and social difference between 
a positive reputation and a negative or tarnished one, both may operate to bring the 
individual (and, of course, the goods or services in question) to the public’s attention.     
 
Yet there are, as ever, exceptions.  A number of cases, primarily from North 
America, suggest that it is not always reputation which is the underlying attraction.  





 or simply pictured in a magazine, as in Aubry v 
Editions Vice-Versa.
116
  Only the image was exploited, without name or reputation, 
presumably because, as non-famous individuals, use of name would be meaningless, 




 This of course has consequences for the potential justifications of a publicity right, and will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
113
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and there was no evidence of a pre-existing reputation.  A distinction can therefore 
be drawn between cases which use an individual’s image or indicia together with the 
benefit of reputation and those cases which simply rely on the indicia, typically 
image rather than name.  Despite this lack of fame or notoriety, the claimants in two 
of these cases were successful, while the claimant in Roberson lost by a majority 
decision of 4-3 and, as Goodenough suggests, was probably the inspiration for the 
privacy legislation which was enacted shortly thereafter, and which “aimed quite 
directly at the facts of the Roberson case”.
117
  As Goodenough notes “[o]therwise 
anonymous people can provide images of value to wrap around products and services 




However, the successful actions were based on privacy in Pavesich,
119
 and on the 
constitutionally-protected human right of privacy in one’s image in Aubry.
120
  This 
suggests that unauthorised exploitation of an individual’s image can be prevented 
without the need to show an established reputation in some jurisdictions.  Where 
such protection is afforded, however, it typically arises from privacy, rather than a 
publicity rights action. 
 
Without an underlying reputation or public status, the use of the private individual is 
arguably no different from use of a model.  Madow recognises this where he argues 
that “it is only because star images are sources and bearers of meaning that they have 
the power to “sell” commodities with which they are associated.  Their economic 
value… derives from their semiotic power – their power to carry and provoke 
meanings.”
121
  Individuals without a public reputation, such as agency models, are 
not able to provide additional meaning to a promotion use, for example.  Thus, where 
Roberson and Pavesich were used to advertise flour and insurance, the companies in 
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question were not attempting to trade on their reputation or recognisability in the 
public mind:  all that was being exploited was the image of the individual, without 
any sub-text.  In this way, Roberson and Pavesich were effectively non-professional 
models, whose images were used without their consent.  Further support for this 
analysis comes from Reiter, who refers to a case where 
a young man was unknowingly photographed during a gathering in a public 
park and the image was used to advertise beer.  The plaintiff claimed 
substantial sums for moral prejudice and unjust enrichment, because the 
brewery profited through the use of his image.  The court granted modest 
awards for the violations to his privacy and reputation, but on the unjust 
enrichment claim, awarded only the small amount the brewery would have 




The quantification of the commercial element for this non-famous claimant was 
based on a quasi-modelling fee, not on the value of his “identity” to the brewery. 
 
The problem with this analysis, which places the emphasis on the exploitation of 
fame and reputation, rather than image and indicia, is that it would risk precluding 
non-famous individuals from the scope of any available legal remedy enjoyed by 
their famous counter-parts.  Whereas all individuals have an image and indicia, only 
the well-known have a “reputation”.  Accordingly, private individuals would have to 
rely primarily on privacy-based remedies to seek redress for the unsought public 
exposure they have endured, or seek a lesser amount, such as a modelling fee, for the 
unauthorised use.   
 
Yet it is not clear why famous people should enjoy an additional legal right which is 
denied to the majority.  Although it would appear that most cases involve famous 
people this is not a reason for excluding the majority of the population from such 
protection.  Further, reputation is a variable commodity:  some may have “more” 
than others.  Fame is not an all or nothing factor, but rather one which varies along a 
spectrum.  It is something that everyone can attempt to cultivate, and to different 
degrees.  If fame or reputation is central to publicity, we are faced with a definitional 
problem in delineating “fame”, as regards both the necessary quantity and quality.  
These observations make it difficult to determine, without more, whether a publicity 
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right should arise only for celebrities or for all individuals.  This point will be 
considered in greater detail in Chapter 4.   
 
Regardless of the ideological arguments for and against reputation as an essential 
element in any legal right, it certainly appears to play a pivotal role in publicity 
practice.  Indeed, reputation and exploitation are bound up in a symbiotic 
relationship, whereby the publicity exploitation feeds and develops the reputation 
which is then increasingly valuable and desirable for future exploitation.  Image, 
indicia and information can be seen as the physical manifestation of the individual’s 
fame – or notoriety.  Since reputation cannot be exploited without some physical 
representation, image, indicia and information still have an important role to play – 
albeit information appears more prevalent in the media information use. 
 
4. ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTS FOR PUBLICITY 
EXPLOITATION 
 
Whereas the above review has drawn on case law and literature to produce a clearer 
understanding of use and subject matter, there is a third source of insight to publicity 
exploitation.  Commercial contracts between the individual and the publisher, 
promoter or merchandiser for exploitation of his identity can provide a valuable 
understanding of the interests of both parties.  What is particularly helpful here is that 
the focus shifts from unauthorised to authorised use.  In contrast to case law, which 
generally arises from use made without the consent of the individual in question, 
commercial contracts for exploitation involve authorised use of the individual’s 
identity. 
 
One obstacle to the study of such contracts is that they are usually a private matter 
between the contracting parties.  However, it is possible to derive some details of 
these contracts from other sources.  First, law reports of those cases involving 
unauthorised exploitation often reveal valuable details of authorised contracts 
because, all too often, unauthorised use will be made against a background of 
controlled, authorised exploitation.  Thus in Douglas v Hello!, details were discussed 
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in court of the contract between the Douglases and OK! for authorised 
exploitation.
123
  Similarly, in Irvine v Talksport the focus was on Talksport’s 
unauthorised use, but the High Court and the Court of Appeal set out in some detail 
contracts between Irvine and other parties, including the F1 team for which he raced, 
Ferrari, for exploitation of his image and indicia.  A second source of information is 
a pro forma “Personality Rights Agreement” prepared by a Scottish commercial law 
firm, for use by sports clubs and their players.  Thirdly, evidence of such authorised 
deals can be drawn from the work of other academics in this area and from the 
media.   
 
Turning firstly to the details that can be derived from Douglas v Hello!, the 
discussion by the Court of Appeal of the contract between the Douglases and OK! 
was extensive.  Clause 2 of that contract apparently stipulated that OK! was to have 
the exclusive right to publish the Photographs (as defined) for a period of nine 
months following the wedding.
124
  Clause 6 defined the “Photographs” as colour 
photographs taken by a photographer at the Douglases’ wedding and clause 7 
ensured that only pictures approved by the Douglases would be published by OK!.
125
  
The Photographs were not the only subject of the contract, as clauses 4 and 5 
authorised OK! to use, for the nine month period, the names, voices, signatures, 
photographs or likenesses of the Douglases in connection with the wedding for 
advertising purposes.
126
  The contract repeatedly refers to the subject matter being 
the wedding photographs and restricts the grant of other elements of image and 
indicia to use in connection with the wedding.  The focus of this relationship was 
clearly the event of the Douglases’ wedding, rather than the Douglases alone.   
 
The second source is Club pro forma, which takes the form of a licence to the Club 
from the contracting player (by way of the company incorporated to manage his 
intellectual property rights).  It is envisaged in the pro forma that the player will also 
have a separate service agreement with the Club for his sporting services, but this 
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remains unseen.  The subject matter of the licence is very widely defined to cover (i) 
the player’s name, likeness and image; (ii) photographs, recording, film, video 
footage and graphical images of the player; and (iii) any other information or images 
relating to the player, together with any intellectual property rights that exist in each 
of these categories.  It is not immediately obvious from this definition whether the 
subject matter is connected to a particular event, as with the Douglases’ wedding, or 
a particular product, as with some of Irvine’s promotion deals.  The focus of the 
agreement can in fact be discerned from the scope of the licence granted to the Club 
rather than the definition of the subject matter.  This licence is exclusive and 
perpetual in relation to the player’s Club activities and his provision of services to 
the Club, such as appearing in team kit.  In relation to any non-Club activities the 
licence is non-exclusive and of limited duration.   
 
While the subject matter to be exploited by OK! and the Club are similar – name, 
image and photographs – the scope of the two agreements is radically different.  OK! 
benefited from an exclusive deal in relation only to the wedding photographs, and to 
material necessary to promote these photographs.  This deal expired after nine 
months.  The Club, however, is granted what amounts almost to an assignation:  a 
perpetual, exclusive licence, which survives termination of the contract, in relation to 
images of the player in the team kit or performing his duties under the service 
agreement.
127
    This means that the player himself has no right to control the use of 
his image when he is wearing the team kit or playing for the Club.  As the term of 
this licence is stated to be perpetual, a calendar produced by the Club in future 
decades, featuring notable players from the Club’s history, could feature a 
photograph of the player in the team kit, entirely at the discretion and will of the 
Club, with no reference to the (potentially now elderly or deceased) player or his 
surviving family.  In other matters, outwith the parameters of the player’s sporting 
career, the Club benefits from a non-exclusive licence which terminates when the 
player’s service agreement terminates.  Evidence from Irvine v Talksport suggests 
that Irvine’s agreement with Ferrari was on broadly similar terms to the Club pro 
forma.  For example, Laddie J’s judgment refers to Irvine’s contract with Ferrari 
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which stipulated that Irvine “could not appear in the distinctive Ferrari red clothing 
in an endorsement save where that endorsement was through and on behalf of 
Ferrari.”
128
  Even when not wearing his racing colours, Irvine stated that “I would 
always obtain the consent of the team I drove for in respect of any such 
endorsements or sponsorships.”
129
  These restrictions mirror those imposed on the 
player by the Club pro forma.   
 
The impression given by the Club pro forma and the brief insight we have into 
Irvine’s relationship with Ferrari is of a highly restrictive and controlling sporting 
body and a player or driver who has little bargaining power.  This marks a powerful 
contrast to the terms of the Douglases’ deal with OK!, which allowed the Douglases 
to have full control over the photographs and text published, and even to refuse to 
provide any wedding photographs at all.  Evidence from the Court of Appeal 
judgment in Irvine v Talksport does, however, suggest that these ongoing obligations 
are not as restrictive in practice as they might appear on paper:  Irvine had a number 
of independent, non-Ferrari related promotion deals in 1999, worth at least 
£323,000.
130
  Even if the contract with Ferrari was restrictive, it did not appear to 
preclude the addition of a considerable sum to his income.  In fact, it is arguably 
thanks to this relationship with Ferrari, and his skill as a racing driver, that Irvine was 
able to command such sums in the first place.  As with most publicity deals, both 
parties stand to benefit from the arrangement. 
 
Little is revealed of Irvine’s other authorised promotion deals, but the Court of 
Appeal judgment does give some indication of what was provided by Irvine for his 
fee in each case.  For example, his deal with Hilfiger, worth £125,000 in fees and 
free products, permitted “images of Mr Irvine to be used in advertising the product 
and for him to make personal appearances.”
131
  For a mere £25,000, plus £63,000 of 
free products, Irvine agreed to “supply an image for promotional purposes and to 
wear the product”, the Bieffe racing helmets.  And a fee of £75,000 bought 
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Valleverde footwear “an image of Mr Irvine to be used for print advertising, a 
personal appearance at a promotion, and an appearance in a television commercial in 
Italy.”
132
  The focus in these brand-specific deals is on the use of Irvine’s image, 
together with an element of personal endorsement to promote the product.   
 
All the contracts reviewed appear to include provision for much the same subject 
matter:  elements of identity – name, likeness and image – together with information, 
photographs, footage or personal appearances.  It is difficult to isolate one factor in 
any contract which operated as the key focus of the deal.  This is in contrast to the 
paradigm cases of unauthorised exploitation discussed in section 2.3 above, where 
the focus was very often on one element – name or image, for example.  Thus, in 
Irvine v Talksport, as noted, the use of a (doctored) photograph of Eddie Irvine was 
the subject of the action:  there was no use of his name or any personal information 
or signature, for example.  So too with Douglas v Hello! where Hello!’s unauthorised 
exploitation was of specific wedding photographs containing personal information, 
in contrast with the extensive subject matter granted to OK!, which included the 
names, voices, signatures, photographs or likenesses of the Douglases as well as their 
wedding photographs. 
 
Part of the reason for the extensive grants made under these authorised deals, 
compared with the apparently more restricted scope of image used in unauthorised 
exploitation, may arise from the legal and commercial uncertainty surrounding this 
area of commercial practice.  This leads to two related conclusions.  As regards the 
agreements for authorised use, a cautious solicitor is likely to draft the terms of the 
licence as widely as possible, reflecting the fact that it is not certain how one 
successfully licenses name, image and reputation.  Interestingly, despite the 
conclusion in section 3.2 above regarding the importance of reputation in most cases 
of commercial exploitation, none of the licences considered here was explicitly for 
use of reputation.  This does not mean that reputation is not the underlying right that 
the parties are keen to exploit, but it does indicate that commercial practitioners do 
not wish to attempt to define it or explicitly trade in it.  It is difficult to know how 
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much significance to attach to its absence, but it is certainly worth noting.  It is 
probably not possible to determine precisely the subject matter as being either 
reputation or image/indicia/information, and there is certainly no reason to think that 
parties would limit their licence to one or the other, even if this were possible.  It is 
therefore not entirely surprising that contracts for authorised exploitation are drafted 
in such wide terms.  Further, it is difficult to determine how reputation could be 
licensed without making reference to the tangible elements representative of that 
reputation, such as name and image. 
 
The second conclusion to be drawn relates to the much narrower scope of the subject 
matter in cases of unauthorised exploitation.  Here, uncertainty over litigation for 
unauthorised use suggests that claimants are likely to frame their claim more 
narrowly, in terms of existing actions, rather than casting the net too widely, thereby 
risking an unfocused and irrelevant claim.  Thus, the Douglases’ claim against Hello! 
relied on breach of confidence and accordingly focused on use of the Douglases’ 
“information” in the wedding photographs, rather than use of reputation and 
goodwill or a more general claim for use of “image”.  Since information is the 
constituent element of the action for breach of confidence this is hardly surprising.  
Accordingly, as noted in section 3.2 above the more limited focus in litigation can be 
seen primarily as a tactical consideration, in fitting the facts of the case into the most 
appropriate cause of action.    
 
This review demonstrates that contracts for authorised exploitation of image and 
indicia are too complex to be easily categorised by subject matter:  it is not possible 
to pigeonhole them as contracts for use of name or image or information or 
reputation.  Instead, the key difference between these deals arises from the use made 
of the subject matter.   This is the primary difference between the media information 
deal struck by OK! for the (exclusive) right to publish the Douglases’ wedding 
photographs and the promotion right sought by Hilfiger and others to use Irvine to 
endorse their goods.  Further, the focus of these agreements can be distinguished, 
especially when the longer-term contracts between sportsman and club are 
considered.  The Irvine/Ferrari deal and the Club pro forma contract revolve around 
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an ongoing long-term relationship and involve a level of detail and control that is not 
required, or necessary, or even possible, in the one-off deals.  In contrast, the one-off 
deals (such as Douglas/OK!, Irvine/Valleverde and Irvine/Bieffe) are fixed-term 
agreements providing the benefit of the individual to be exploited in relation to a 
specific event (a wedding) or a specific brand or product (Valleverde footwear, 
Bieffe helmets).   
 
The complexities and uncertainties discussed above, regarding the subject matter, 
have been confirmed by this review of contracts for exploitation.  It is not possible to 
reduce publicity practice to the use of one element of the individual. Instead, 
information, such as wedding photographs, together with name and image and 
indicia (perhaps including racing colours) are all important elements.  Further, 
underlying all these constituent parts is the intangible, yet ever-present, reputation of 
the famous individual in question.  The one distinction that can be drawn more 
clearly is the use to be made of the individual, using the tripartite classification of 




This chapter has sought to build upon the analysis of legal responses to publicity in 
Chapter 2 by assessing the practice of publicity in a commercial setting.  The primary 
objectives of this chapter arose from the need to understand more clearly what the 
social and commercial practice of publicity is and how this affects the legal response 
to it.  Chapters 2 and 3 are therefore intended to work together to provide a 
foundation for the rest of the thesis.   
 
This review of practice relied upon evidence from case law, contracts and 
commentaries to develop a more structured understanding of the practical reality of 
exploitation of “publicity”.  From this, it has been possible to construct a coherent 
framework of publicity uses and to gain an understanding of the subject matter of 
these uses.  The three uses are:  
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Media information use: The use of an individual’s persona in the media, usually 
by way of an “exclusive” story; 
Promotion use: The use of an individual’s persona to advertise or endorse 
or otherwise promote the goods or services of another 
party; 
Merchandising use: The use of an individual’s persona on goods, where the 
individual effectively becomes the product himself, 




They can be represented by the three English cases of Douglas v Hello!, Irvine v 
Talksport, and Lyngstad v Anabas respectively. 
 
Together, the three uses can be thought of as the core of publicity practice.  Any 
publicity right should therefore be capable of addressing the exploitation – whether 
authorised or not – of these three uses.  A further defined term is therefore 
“publicity”, meaning the use of persona in public through the media information, 
promotion or merchandising uses, as defined above. 
 
The subject matter is more complex.  It can be thought of as the individual’s persona, 
which can be broken down into the narrower elements of image, indicia and 
information.  However, these can also be regarded as the physical manifestation of 
the underlying “asset” which is being exploited:  reputation.  Without reputation – 
fame and public status – it is arguable that much of the publicity practice would not 
exist.  The relevant defined terms for subject matter are: 
  
Image: The individual’s image in any format from which he can 
be identified, such as a photograph, drawing, computer 
generated image, some other graphical representation, or 
look-alike; 
Indicia: Any element of the individual which can be used to 
                                                 
133
 As per the distinction at section 2.1 above. 
A Right of Publicity in Scots Law 
72 
Part I, Chapter 3:  The Practice of Publicity 
identify the individual, whether (i) an inherent part of that 
individual, including but not limited to name, nickname, 
image and voice, including sound-alikes, or (ii) an 
adopted act or phrase or costume; 
Information: 
 
Personal information regarding the individual which can 
be divulged or not, at his choosing, but which is otherwise 
not in the public domain (such as wedding photographs);  
Reputation: The public reputation of the individual, whether negative 
or positive. 
 
Together, these elements can be thought of as an individual’s “persona” – and 
persona will be used as a defined term in the remainder of the thesis to refer to the 
individual’s image, indicia, information and reputation.   
 
A further distinction can be made as regards authorised and unauthorised 
exploitation.  The use classes and the subject matter are neutral, in the sense that they 
are present in both authorised and unauthorised exploitation.  There is no legal wrong 
involved in publicity use per se:  instead the focus turns to whether the use is 
authorised or unauthorised.  The media information use can just as easily be 
exploited by the individual through an authorised deal as it can by the unauthorised 
publication of the image and information by another party.  So too with the 
promotion and merchandising uses.  Cases such as Douglas v Hello! demonstrate this 
very neatly, with a contract for authorised use between the Douglases and OK! 
sitting alongside the litigation against Hello! for unauthorised use.  The authorised 
use can be regarded as a positive power of the individual to control and exploit, 
while the individual’s legal right to prevent or claim for unauthorised use can be 
thought of as a negative right.  The positive/negative distinction is therefore a 
critical one to make.  Together, the use classification and the positive/negative 










The previous chapters sought to explore the practice and academic analysis of 
publicity to understand what is being exploited, in what way, and by whom.  Now 
that the “what” has been identified, it is possible to address two further questions:  
the why and the how.  This requires consideration of whether legal recognition of 
publicity rights is justified (the “why”) and, if a justification can be found, an 
assessment as to how best these rights should be recognised in law (the “how”). 
 
The purpose of this Part is to consider the “why”, by assessing justifications for and 
against a legal right of publicity.  Chapter 4 identifies the interests of the individual 
which would be protected by a right of publicity, together with the wider social 
interests which would potentially be threatened by such a right.  Thereafter, three 
justifications in favour of such a right are advanced and a number of criticisms of 
other justifications are assessed.  
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If a legal right of publicity is advocated, it must be justified.  It is not enough simply 
to assert this, as: 
the defence of any legal, economic or social institution should be backed up 
by reasons or considerations likely to sway the free understanding of the 
participants in social life in favour of the institution that is being defended.1   
 
Such justifications are particularly important when the matter in question is a legal 
right which would impose duties as well as benefits, and which would be supported 
by the sanction of the civil law against those in breach.  It has been said that when 
governments make decisions about intellectual property rights they should allow 
change “only if a rigorous analysis clearly demonstrates that it will promote people’s 
basic rights and economic well-being”.2  A new right of publicity thus requires 
rigorous analysis, to provide the reasons and considerations in favour of such a right.   
 
Before turning to review relevant justifications, there are two initial points to be 
made.  The first arises from the placing of this chapter at this stage of the thesis, 
when it is not yet clear what form (if any) a right of publicity should take.  Justifying 
a legal right would be a very different task if the right were to be founded in delict 
rather than in property, for example, or unjustified enrichment rather than intellectual 
property.  So too with defences and remedies:  the strength of the right may impact 
upon the strength of the justification sought.  There are thus a number of known 
unknowns at this stage, which prevent a review of justifications directed towards a 
                                                 
1
 HM Spector, “An outline of a theory justifying intellectual and industrial property” [1989] EIPR 
270, at 270. 
2
 The Adelphi Charter, adopted by the Royal Society for the Arts, 13 October 2005. 
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specific legal right.  Instead, the justifications considered below will seek to support 
a legal right to control the use of persona.3  The precise nature of that right, and its 
limitations, will emerge from this justificatory project and the following chapters, 
which will consider the legal classification of publicity.   
 
This approach is necessary because there are compelling reasons in favour of 
assessing the justifications at this early stage.  In the first place, any review of 
publicity rights is meaningless unless the right can be justified.  To proceed with a 
detailed analysis of the scope, content and limitations of a publicity right based only 
on a presumption of eventual justification requires a considerable amount of 
goodwill from the reader.  Further, if it is not possible to justify publicity rights, then 
there is no further work to be done:  defining the nature and scope of the right 
becomes unnecessary.  It is also likely that the nature of the justifications – or lack of 
them – will play an important role in shaping any eventual legal right, its defences 
and remedies.  For these reasons, justifications will be dealt with at this stage in the 
thesis. 
 
The second introductory point is that writers appear to be capable of accepting or 
rejecting justifications for publicity rights, regardless of which of the conceptual 
categories4 their work falls into.  It would be wrong to conclude, for example, that 
those writers who discuss publicity rights in the broadest category of “publicity as 
property” are united in advocating such rights, whereas those who are classed in the 
personality rights approach reject them.  Although Madow has suggested that in the 
American tradition (which is broadly the “publicity as property” approach) there is 
“a solid, indeed an overwhelming consensus… that the right of publicity is a good 
thing”,5 there are plenty of writers in this approach who take a critical line.  Madow’s 
own analysis, for example, falls within this broad category of an all-encompassing 
publicity right, yet he has written a comprehensive critique of publicity right 
                                                 
3
 Persona being an individual’s image, indicia, information and reputation, as defined in Chapter 3. 
4
 Outlined in Chapter 2. 
5
 Madow, “Private ownership of public image”. 
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justifications.6  Writers in each category are capable of maintaining either a healthy 
scepticism or a pro-right conviction.   
 
A more problematic trend seems to be the varying rigour of the arguments advanced 
by those in the opposing camps.  As Carty notes, the pro-celebrity industry seems to 
think it is “ ‘obvious’ that the commercial worth of the celebrity magnet (particularly 
in advertising) belongs to them and that unauthorised use should be prevented by 
law.”7  This assumption by pro-publicity rights writers frequently results in a brief or 
sketchy consideration of the justifications for such an “obvious” right.8  In contrast, 
those who claim that publicity rights are insufficiently justified9 usually make their 
case against publicity in compelling detail.  Existing writing therefore tends to 
challenge rather than support any search for justifications10 – albeit Madow, who 
makes a highly persuasive case against publicity rights, observes that:  “[i]t may be 
possible to make a coherent and convincing case for the right of publicity.  But that 
case has yet to be made.”11  What follows is an attempt to address these challenges. 
 
2. BENEFITS AND HARMS:  IDENTIFYING THE INTERESTS 
AT STAKE 
 
Rights in law typically have one of two aims:  to enable individuals to advance their 
interests as they see them, or to protect them from harm.12  Part of the task of 
justifying legal protection for persona is to consider the benefits that a right of 
publicity would bring to the individual, and the interests it would protect.  It is 
                                                 
6
 Madow, “Private ownership of public image”.  Fisher identifies Madow as one of a “small group of 
commentators” who “began drawing explicitly on theories of intellectual property to criticize the right 
of publicity” in the 1990s: W Fisher, “Theories of Intellectual Property”, available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf (accessed 15 November 2008) at 37.   
7
 Carty, “The quest for the IP effect”, at 240-241. 
8
 Madow also recognises this point: Madow, “Private ownership of public image” at 136. 
9
 Including Madow, “Private ownership of public image”, Beverley-Smith, The Commercial 
Appropriation of Personality, and Carty, “Advertising, publicity rights and English law”. 
10
 A notable exception is Westfall and Landau, who conclude that “it is difficult to either support or 
criticize the existence of publicity rights all that strongly.”  Westfall and Landau, “Publicity Rights as 
Property Rights”, at 117, and also 118. 
11
 Madow, “Private ownership of public image”, at 135. 
12
 This duality is reflected in the difference between contract (an enabling tool) and delict (a 
protective/ defensive tool). 
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therefore helpful to consider the legal and commercial interests at stake in publicity 
practice.  What interest would be harmed by unauthorised use of persona?  What 
interest would be protected by the grant of a publicity right? 
 
This task becomes particularly important because, for many writers, it is the apparent 
lack of harm to the individual which is their primary objection to the case for 
publicity rights.  Carty, in particular, is a strong proponent of the need for the 
existence of a harm to justify the grant of any legal right.  In her discussion of the 
broader “IP effect”13 she argues that 
The IP effect would offer claimants wider protection, not intrinsically based 
on “harm” or “wrongs”.  Rather, it would provide redress where the 
defendant has benefited from the claimant’s creation or effort.  So it is the 
prevention of unjust enrichment or misappropriation which is the nub of the 
IP effect.14 
 
This, Carty argues, is flawed, since legal protection must respond to a harm rather 
than to a (harmless) transfer: it is insufficient to point to a benefit which has been 
transferred.  Instead, it must be possible to demonstrate that there has been harm 
caused through the unauthorised use of persona.  Consequently, “in the absence of 
specific wrongs such as trade mark infringement or defamation, the use of the 
celebrity magnet is open to all.”15  And Carty is quite clear that “no wrong per se 
resulted from the unauthorised exploitation of the persona of a celebrity, however 
“unfair” this may appear to the celebrity industry.”16  The need for law to respond to 
wrongs, protected by specific actions, rather than to assert general rights, is a much 
stronger tradition in Common law jurisdictions than in Civilian ones.17  Nonetheless, 
identifying the legal and commercial interests which are protected by publicity 
rights, and which are harmed by the lack of a publicity right, should be seen as an 
essential element of any consideration of justifications.    
 
                                                 
13
 That is, the idea that there is ever-increasing pressure for legal protection for intangibles, outwith 
the traditional categories.  Publicity, she argues, is one such example.  See Carty, “The quest for the IP 
effect”. 
14
 Ibid., at 239.  See also Carty, “Personality Rights and English Law”. 
15
 Carty, “Advertising, publicity rights and English law”, at 211. 
16
 Ibid., at 238. 
17
 For example, J Gordley, Foundations of Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment, 
2006, at 164; Carty, “Personality Rights and English Law”, para 7.2.1. 
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Two relevant interests can be discerned from the jurisprudence and academic 
writing.  These are (i) economic or commercial interests and (ii) dignitarian interests, 
which include, but are broader than, privacy interests.   
 
2.1. The Dual Interests in Publicity Literature 
One of the most detailed analyses of the economic and dignitarian interests comes 
from Beverley-Smith, whose work can be located primarily in the “appropriation of 
personality” approach.18  He defines dignitary19 interests as “a generic term for the 
essentially non-pecuniary interests that a person might have in his own personality:  
reputation, personal privacy and freedom from mental distress.”20  He also notes, 
however, that there is no single recognised definition of this term, which he believes 
reflects the “fact that there is no coherent notion of human dignity as a legal value.”21  
This view is reflective of the Common law tradition, in contrast with Civilian legal 
systems which would recognise a “coherent notion” of human dignity in law.22   
 
In the case of economic interests, however, Beverley-Smith is able to give a more 
extensive definition, centred round the concept that “a finite sum of money can 
provide complete recompense”23 for wrongful use of personality, such that the 
claimant feels “no further sense of loss, having received a sum of money which 
accurately reflects the value of what has been lost.”24  The economic value of 
publicity is derived from the commercial value individuals have to advertisers and 
the media, amongst others, allowing them to grant licences or otherwise trade in their 
persona.25  De Grandpre explains it rather neatly, by noting that “[f]amous people 
offer advertisers relationships with which they can communicate with the purchasing 
                                                 
18
 See Chapter 2.  Prosser, another writer in this category, also discusses these interests:  see Prosser, 
“Privacy”, particularly at 406. 
19
 Beverley-Smith uses slightly different terminology, referring to dignitary interests instead of 
dignitarian ones in The Commercial Appropriation of Personality, Part III.  I shall use the term 
“dignitarian” predominantly, but treat the two interchangeably.   
20
 Beverley-Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of Personality, at 141. 
21
 Ibid., at 10.  Although he accepts, at 141, that this is not the case in those jurisdictions which 
recognise injuria.   
22
 See for example Neethling, “Personality Rights”, at 530; Whitty, “Overview of Rights of 
Personality in Scots Law”; and Chapter 2, section 2.2 above.   
23
 Beverley-Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of Personality, at 8. 
24
 Ibid., at 8. 
25
 Ibid., at 8. 
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public”26 and that “[i]n the market for eyeballs, people who have the ability to deliver 
public attention are in high demand.”27  This creates the economic interest and, 
critically, should be capable of being objectively valued leaving no room for 
subjective values and beliefs, according to Beverley-Smith.  It is this objectivity 
which results in full compensation for economic harms being found in a “finite sum 
of money”:  only where there is a subjective loss (such as harm to a dignitarian 
interest) may this no longer be possible for the pursuer, and the interest will be 
compensated with an award of solatium. 
 
An earlier review of these interests can be found in Frazer’s article on 
“Appropriation of Personality”.28  Using slightly different terminology from 
Beverley-Smith, he concludes that  
privacy and property interests in personality may exist together or separately 
and should be treated accordingly, but without attracting the disadvantages of 
treating the two interests as the subject of different torts…  [T]he courts 
[would] award damages in respect of the distress and annoyance suffered 
and/or the financial loss incurred (or reasonably expected to be incurred) by 
the plaintiff.29   
 
These co-existent grounds for damages arise from the privacy and property interests 
that Frazer discusses, and can be mapped onto the dignitarian and economic interests 
respectively.30 
 
Those writers who fall within the broad “publicity as property” category identified in 
Chapter 2 are more likely to focus on the economic interest, at the expense of the 
dignitarian.31  Nimmer observes that actions such as privacy are generally 
unsatisfactory for publicity protection because there is often no infringement of 
dignitarian interests in such actions.32  Where a claimant has to rely on privacy-based 
                                                 
26
 de Grandpre, “Understanding the market for celebrity”, at 95.  See also Klink, “50 years of publicity 
in the US”, at 365 and Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties, at 88-92.  
27
 de Grandpre, “Understanding the market for celebrity”, at 94. 
28
 Frazer, “Appropriation of personality”. 
29
 Ibid. at 312, emphasis in the original. 
30
 In Civilian terminology, Frazer appears to advocate a monistic right, that is one which protects both 
interests, rather than two separate rights.  See Chapter 2, section 2.2, particularly the discussion of the 
monistic right in German law. 
31
 A good example here is Halpern, “Publicity: Maturation of an independent right”, at 857-860. 
32
 Nimmer, “The right of publicity”, at 204. 
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actions he may struggle to find redress since he has not suffered any harm to his 
dignitarian interests, yet the action is not intended to protect his economic interests, 
which may well have suffered harm.  Thus, the following situation can arise:   
plaintiff [a famous performer] frankly admitted that the use of his name and 
picture by the defendant did not subject him to any ridicule or cause him any 
humiliation whatever.  The court held there was a technical violation of the 
New York privacy statute but since the use of the plaintiff’s name and picture 
was non-offensive to him, plaintiff received nominal damages in the sum of 
six cents.  Plaintiff might well have taken the position that the use of the 
name and picture of a famous performer on the defendant’s program was 
worth a great deal more to defendant than six cents.33 
 
The emphasis here is undeniably on the economic interests of the plaintiff, rather 
than any dignitarian ones arising from loss of control or dignity.  Note, however, that 
the absence of humiliation was specific to the facts of this case:  there is no 
suggestion by the court that such unauthorised commercial use could never give rise 
to ridicule.34 
 
In fact, both Nimmer and McCarthy can be seen to distinguish between dignitarian 
privacy harms and economic publicity harms.  In McCarthy’s analysis “certain 
unpermitted uses of a person’s identity in advertising can give rise to one, or both, of 
these rights of privacy and publicity.  But while privacy is a personal and mental 
right, publicity is a commercial and business right.”35  The individual would 
presumably have a claim for breach of both rights, under McCarthy’s analysis, but 
they would remain separate rights and interests.36 
 
Even in the approach which focuses most strongly on the inherently personal nature 
of publicity, the (predominantly Civilian) personality rights category, the economic 
interest is now increasingly recognised in addition to the dignitarian one.  In German 
law, for example, Beverley-Smith et al point to a long history of judicial protection 
for ideal interests which is now, gradually, being supplemented by recognition of the 
                                                 
33
 Ibid. at 208. 
34
 Indeed, one does not have to look far to find an example of such a use:  the “Gentleman rider” case 
from Germany involved the use of the image of a professor of ecclesiastical law in an advertisement 
for a sexual stimulant:  BGHZ 26, 349, as cited in Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and 
Personality, at 144 and discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.2.   
35
 McCarthy, “Public personas and private property”, at 687. 
36
 This reflects the dualistic protection favoured in France, for example.  See Chapter 2, section 2.2. 
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economic aspects of personality rights, albeit “[s]ome uncertainties remain.”37  
Similarly, in France, the “traditional assertion, according to which personality rights 
are extrapatrimonial on the basis that the person is not a marketable commodity, 
seems to be giving way, however, since some attributes of the personality are 
increasingly being marketed.”38  As Neethling explains, the traditional division 
between patrimonial and non-patrimonial interests is problematic in cases where an 
individual’s identity “has a market or advertising value”39 since this use “infringes 
not only his personality, but also a patrimonial interest.”40  Where there is a 
patrimonial loss, Neethling states that this “can only mean that, in such instances, 
apart from personality harm, a patrimonial interest connected to the personality has 
also been damaged.”41  Both interests are acknowledged and are apparently of 
growing importance in Civilian jurisdictions, although the economic interest cannot 
be so easily accommodated within the scheme of dignitarian-based personality 
rights.42     
 
The tension caused by the duality of interests is emphasised by Carty’s approach, 
which sees the exercise of personal choice in publicity as the assertion of an 
economic interest, rather than a dignitarian one.  Although “dignitary interests may 
be encompassed within a publicity right – part of the publicity right may indeed 
involve the ability to control commercialisation of the image rather than simply to 
profit by it”43 she argues that these are not “personal” dignitary interests but 
“commercial” ones: 
Rather than impacting on the private space of the celebrity they impact on 
celebrity as brand…At the heart of such objections based on controlling 
dignitary interests are essentially commercial concerns:  the celebrity seeks to 
control the use of his persona in order to maintain full impact in its further 
and future commercial use.44     
                                                 
37
 Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 95.  These economic uncertainties 
include whether substantial damages will always be available, and whether personality rights can be 
licensed (also at 95). 
38
 Ibid., at 154. 
39
 Neethling, “Personality Rights”, at 543. 
40
 Ibid., at 543. 
41
 Ibid., at 535. 
42
 And Neethling suggests economic interests can be “controversial”:  Ibid., at 535.  See also Chapter 
2, section 2.2. 
43
 Carty, “Advertising, publicity rights and English law”, at 212, emphasis in the original. 
44
 Ibid., at 213.  Also Carty, “Personality Rights and English Law”, para 7.3.1. 
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Control here is not primarily a dignitarian concern, but a commercial one.  However, 
this analysis does not necessarily undermine the underlying dichotomy.  Control, 
even for commercial purposes, can still be seen as a dignitarian interest, allowing the 
individual to make his own life choices.  My ability to choose whether to be a 
solicitor or an athlete is a commercial choice in that it determines how I will earn a 
living, yet it is also a dignitarian choice in that I can opt for the career that will offer 
personal rewards and fulfilment.  Carty’s emphasis on the commercial relevance of 
control in publicity is indisputable, but the dignitary element of control also remains 
central to the right.  Arguably, her work serves to highlight just how tightly entwined 
these two interests are.  As Beverley-Smith et al conclude “an ability to control the 
commercial exploitation may be seen both as an economic right in maintaining 
commercial exclusivity and as an aspect of an individual’s dignity or autonomy.”45  
Control is therefore the lynchpin of both interests.   
 
  
2.2. The Dual Interests in Publicity Practice 
These dual dignitarian and economic interests can also be seen in practice.  
Milligan’s case study of David Beckham provides an insight into the world of 
celebrity branding and publicity practice.  By reviewing Beckham’s key endorsement 
deals from the late 1990s to 2003, Milligan assesses what each deal offered 
Beckham, implicitly revealing the control and management behind each endorsement 
contract.  Beckham appears to have decided which brands to endorse not solely on 
the basis of the fees offered, but also according to his image and priorities.46  Thus, 
whereas Beckham’s deal with Brylcreem was “a good launch pad”,47 his subsequent 
deal with Pepsi was “an ideal commercial opportunity”48 because “it gave him global 
distribution… and it sat with his mildly rebellious image”.49  In the case of Police 
sunglasses the “deal was important in being the first commercial contract that didn’t 
                                                 
45
 Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 3. 
46
 This can be thought of as the difference between the value of the deal (£) and its added value (a 
good fit with his personal brand). 
47




 Ibid., at 122. 
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draw on Beckham’s image as a footballer, but promoted his looks and fashion sense 
instead…. In terms of brand building, it was a clever move.”50  The increasing value 
and scope of these deals provides an insight into the level of control and planning 
that underlies the commercial exploitation of a celebrity brand.  This exploitation 
demonstrates the need for protection of dignitarian interests, through control and 
autonomy in managing Beckham’s publicity career, as well as the obvious economic 
interests advanced by these deals.  
 
Evidence in support of these dual interests can also be drawn from two of the 
paradigm English publicity cases, Irvine v Talksport51 and Douglas v Hello!.52  In 
Irvine, “control of the use of [Irvine’s] identity in giving endorsements enables him 
to enhance his image as a racing driver, and that in consequence he charges less for 
endorsing a fashionable product than an unfashionable one.”53  Control of persona, in 
itself a dignitarian interest, is also a critical part of future financial gain.  Irvine also 
provides us with guidance as to the longer-term implications of unauthorised use.  
Laddie J was prepared to accept that it “is possible that the damage already done to 
Mr Irvine may be negligible in direct money terms but the potential long term 
damage is considerable.”54  Thus, economic harm can be distinguished from non-
economic (or dignitarian) harm, and the longer-term consequences of both have been 
judicially recognised. 
 
The Douglases licensed exclusive publication of their wedding photographs for 
£1million, apparently placing them in the commercial-interest bracket.  In the House 
of Lords, Lord Nicholls noted that “Mr Douglas said his name and likeness are 
valuable assets to him.  It is important for him, for professional reasons, to protect his 
name and likeness and prevent unauthorised use of either.”55  However, the action 
against Hello! was primarily for the emotional distress caused.  Regardless of the 
                                                 
50
 Ibid., at 105. 
51
 [2003] 2 All ER 881. 
52
 [2006] QB 125. 
53
 Irvine v Talksport [2003] 2 All ER 881, para 59. 
54
 Irvine v Talksport [2002] 1 WLR 2355, para 74, per Laddie J. 
55
 Douglas v Hello! [2008] 1 AC 1, para 252.  Carty refers to this ongoing control as a “collateral 
concern” in publicity:  Carty, “Advertising, publicity rights and English law”, at 210. 
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scepticism of some commentators,56 it is certainly the case that “whilst the 
Claimants’ case is now chiefly for money it was not always so and it was not by their 
choice that it became so.”57  The action for financial compensation became necessary 
only when the Douglases’ application for an injunction was refused, indicating that 
their priority was to prevent publication rather than to recover economic 
compensation for use of the images.  Here, loss of control of their dignitarian 
interests resulted in a successful claim for compensation for the “real distress” they 
suffered from the publication of paparazzo photographs which left them “devastated 
and shocked”.58  Dignitarian interests and economic interests appear to co-exist for 
these claimants.    
 
2.3. The Economic and Dignitarian Interests in Other Areas of 
Law 
Legal recognition of these interests is not novel, as dignitarian and economic 
concerns are protected by law in other contexts.  Perhaps the closest analogy is with 
copyright.  Here, a statutory right protects an intangible asset, the copyright.  The 
copyright is created by the individual and can frequently be seen as a personal 
expression of the individual and his creativity.  The author’s dignitarian interests are 
protected by the moral rights granted.  These rights, which are inalienable, entitle the 
author to object, for example, to derogatory treatment and false attribution of the 
work.59  The statutory regime also offers protection for the author’s economic 
interests, as copyright can be exploited for commercial gain through assignation60 
and licensing61 of the right to copy.  Further, the very fact that no-one is entitled to 
copy the work without the owner’s62 consent63 arguably recognises the economic and 
                                                 
56
 Their claims in court have been described as “witness-box performances”, indicating that they were 
perhaps aware of the need to convince the court of this element of personal distress.  W Cornish and D 
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dignitarian interests of the owner.  Whether the work is plastered on every hoarding 
in the country or left languishing in a cupboard is, to some extent, a matter for the 
owner, and this choice can be exercised for dignitarian as well as economic reasons.  
 
Contract law similarly enables an individual to further his economic interests and to 
fulfil his dignitarian interests by living his life in the manner of his choosing, through 
the control and certainty that derives from enforceable contracts.  So too with 
property rights, which are most commonly equated with economic interests.  Thus, 
the right of ownership enables the owner to use his land or goods in the manner of 
his choosing, including to make money.  However, property rights are also capable 
of respecting the individual’s dignitarian interests.  The fact that the law enables an 
individual to control the use of his possessions or land enables him to make his own 
choices, thus respecting his autonomy.  Indeed, earlier justifications for the 
recognition of private property were based on notions of respect for the individual 
and the necessity of some means for him to express his personality.64   
 
The interests that would be protected by a publicity right are recognised and 
protected in other areas of law.  There can be nothing controversial per se about the 
protection of (i) economic or commercial interests, looking to realise the value in 
persona and control its future economic potential; and (ii) dignitarian interests, 
looking to dignity, autonomy, and control.  
 
2.4. Dignitarian and Economic Interests:  Mutually Exclusive or 
Mutually Compatible?  
Although there is widespread recognition of both economic and dignitarian interests 
in publicity, one question is whether a single right of publicity could or should 
protect both the dignitarian and economic elements.  This is reminiscent of the 
debate between monistic and dualistic protection, but must be considered here in 
                                                 
64
 For an analysis of Lockean and Hegelian justifications for property see for example J Hughes, “The 
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light of the different legal systems in the UK.  This question arises in English law in 
part because of the very nature of current protection.  Where a celebrity has 
attempted to shoehorn his claim for infringement of a “publicity right” into a breach 
of confidence/Article 8 action, concerns arise as to whether this inherently personal 
privacy-based action should be used to protect what is seen as an economic interest.   
 
This concern was reflected in Lord Walker’s dissenting speech in Douglas v Hello!:  
it is not obvious why a claimant should be able to invoke the law’s protection 
for the confidentiality of his or her private life (this claim being based on the 
high principle of respect for human autonomy and dignity) and also to invoke 
its protection for the commercial confidentiality of the same or similar 
material, as a trade secret, until it is to be disclosed for profit at a time of his 
or her own choosing.65 
 
These concerns are legitimate so far as they go.  Whilst it is indeed “not obvious” 
why a legal right designed to protect one set of values should be used to protect 
others which are apparently “at odds” with them, this does not mean that both types 
of value can never co-exist.  Indeed, the monistic right in German law proves that it 
is possible for one right to protect both economic and dignitarian interests.66  And as 
copyright illustrates, it is possible for both interests to be protected in one legal 
scheme, where that scheme has been specifically developed to address them.67  The 
concern here arguably arises only where there is no such tailored scheme and 
individuals instead manipulate an existing legal action to meet their needs.  This is a 
valid concern, but it does not mean that no such tailored protection can ever exist.  
Instead, it could be addressed by the creation of a coherent scheme of publicity rights 
in law specifically intended to protect the interests involved.  This would enable 
individuals to protect both their economic and dignitarian interests, as appropriate, 
without attempting to shoehorn a claim for one into an action designed to protect the 
other.   
 
                                                 
65
 [2008] 1 AC 1, para 275, per Lord Walker.  See also the written submissions, “Case for the 
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My conclusion therefore is that the two interests are not mutually exclusive:  they are 
equally relevant and compatible.  This reflects the reality of publicity practice:  
“looking at the problem purely from a commercial appropriation perspective, or from 
an exclusively dignitary right of privacy perspective, distorts the true picture.  Both 
economic and dignitary interests have to be taken into account.”68 
 
 
3. THE COMPETING INTERESTS 
 
Although academic attention has traditionally focused on individuals and 
unauthorised exploiters, the interests of other parties – such as licensed exploiters 
and the public in general – can be discerned through some of the arguments made 
against publicity rights.  In fact, two such interests soon become apparent.  The first 
of these is the right to freedom of expression, as embodied in Article 10 ECHR or in 
the American first amendment right to free speech:  “one of the most difficult areas 
of this body of law is when the right of publicity must be balanced against the free 
speech concerns of the first amendment.”69  The second competing interest is that of 
the creative commons, specifically the commons of cultural imagery.  Celebrities 
derive their meaning from, and contribute meaning to, the cultural tradition, such that 
“celebrities often cannot be viewed as a separate phenomenon, a discrete item of 
creativity.”70  In borrowing from and becoming part of our “cultural commons”,71 
celebrities and their persona become part of the public domain and should arguably 
be available for others to draw upon, without the restrictions created by a right of 
publicity.  Both these interests will now be examined in more detail.     
 
3.1. Freedom of Expression 
Freedom of expression, or free speech, is fundamental in our society.  The grant of 
an enforceable right of publicity could operate to deprive certain parties in certain 
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 Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 62. 
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situations of the right to use persona in their own speech or expression, thus 
curtailing freedom of expression.  The two interests are therefore apparently in 
competition.  In assessing the merits of a right of publicity, it becomes necessary to 
consider the relationship between a private right to control persona and the 
fundamental right to freedom of expression.  The need to strike a balance is 
recognised by most writers in this area.72  Even those who support a right of publicity 
accept the importance of freedom of expression.  Goodenough, for example, suggests 
that it would be wise “to allow unfettered freedom for the expression of information 
about people on matters of public interest, no matter whose ox it gores, and 
considerable freedom for the creative use of persona.”73       
 
However, free speech does not entail the right to say freely anything one wishes.74  
Civil rights and criminal wrongs exist to prevent or deter the making of untruthful 
statements, by way of defamation and perjury for example, while misrepresentations 
can be challenged by way of an action for passing off.  Yet there is still a grey area to 
negotiate between a blatant lie and the purest truth; an area of half truths, misleading 
associations and even silence.  For Hughes, the right to freedom of expression should 
exist only on the truthful side of this divide: “freedom of expression is meaningless 
without assurances that the expression will remain unadulterated. Free speech 
requires that speech be guaranteed some integrity.”75  Where the unauthorised use of 
persona is misleading, we should be slow to protect it through freedom of expression.  
In Irvine v Talksport76, for example, the image of Irvine used by Talksport was 
misleading because it had been doctored.  Talksport’s use of Irvine’s image was 
                                                 
72
 One exception is Halpern, who believes that free speech issues are at the “outer edge” of publicity 
rights, since exploitation of “the hard economic commercial value of an individual’s identity” is 
primarily commercial.  Consequently, free speech issues “have little impact on the avowedly 
commercial appropriation of identity”:  Halpern, “Publicity: Maturation of an independent right”, at 
868. 
73
 Goodenough, “Re-theorising privacy and publicity”, at 70. 
74
 For an analysis of post-HRA case law  regarding “insulting” expressions (of controversial religious 
or political beliefs), see R Reed and J Murdoch, A Guide to Human Rights Law in Scotland, 2
nd
 ed, 
2008 (henceforth Reed and Murdoch, Human Rights Law in Scotland), para 7.44; A Geddis, “Free 
speech martyrs or unreasonable threats to social peace? – “Insulting” expression and section 5 of the 
Public Order Act 1986” [2004] PL 853. 
75
 Hughes, “The philosophy of intellectual property”, at 359, his emphasis, footnote omitted. 
76
 [2003] 2 All ER 881. 
A Right of Publicity in Scots Law 
90 
Part II, Chapter 4: Justifying a Right of Publicity 
therefore an adulterated expression which could not, and should not, be protected by 
a defence of freedom of expression.   
 
The converse of course is that the individual cannot hide behind a publicity right in 
order to project a misleading persona.  This forms the basis of one of Carty’s 
objections to the grant of a publicity right:  
the celebrity image may be used as a vehicle for social comment or criticism.  
Free speech is threatened when the publicity right is seen as allowing the 
celebrity to impose his “preferred meaning” not allowing different 
interpretations by others, though those interpretations may be used for 
powerful social criticism.77 
   
This use of persona to project a “preferred meaning” is well illustrated by the case of 
Campbell v MGN,78 where Campbell’s lies regarding her use of drugs were exposed 
by the defendant newspaper.  The need to correct the misleading impression 
projected by Campbell formed a fundamental part of the Daily Mirror’s defence.79  In 
doing so, the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR was balanced 
against Campbell’s rights under Article 8.80  
 
The right to freedom of expression is an important interest, which must be weighed 
against the individual’s interests in a publicity right.  Any publicity right should be 
subject to a proportionate restriction arising from the public interest in freedom of 
expression, although this in turn should be subject to the individual’s right to protect 
persona and interests such as reputation and privacy.  
 
3.2. Creative and Communicative Use  
The second relevant public interest is the cultural “creative commons”.  Celebrities 
are a critical part of the creative commons in popular culture, since “star images are 
widely used in contemporary American culture to create and communicate meaning 
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and identity.”81  Celebrity images are therefore not simply marks of identity or 
commodities, but “are constitutive of our cultural heritage”.82  Use of existing 
cultural imagery (whether of individuals or otherwise) is at the core of postmodernist 
music and art, where “pre-existing works and images are consciously and openly 
appropriated, reworded and recycled.”83  In this world, celebrities “provide 
meaningful resources for the construction of identity and community.”84  Coombe 
cites a number of examples, including Judy Garland, who “had a special place in gay 
culture as the symbol gay men used in the pre-Stonewall period to speak to each 
other about themselves.”85 
 
Against this background, the right of publicity “chills commercial, expressive uses of 
already famous people.  In this light, a central challenge of the right of publicity 
consists in balancing rights in personal identity with the necessity of allowing 
everyone to dip into a rich common cultural pool.”86  Madow expresses the concern 
that a right of publicity (certainly where it is cast as a property right) fails to achieve 
this balance, and instead transfers this “semiotic value” of celebrity image into 
private ownership.87 
 
To illustrate the damage that this transfer to private ownership would potentially 
cause, Madow explores the use of celebrity persona to create and communicate 
meaning, and the resultant conflict between different interest groups:  
popular culture remains what it long has been:  a struggle for, and over, 
meaning.  It is a contest in which dominant groups try to naturalize the 
meanings that best serve their interests into the “common sense” and “taste” 
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of society as a whole, while subordinate and marginalized groups resist this 
process with varying degrees of effort and success.88 
 
The two groups who are competing to annexe popular culture and impose their own 
meanings upon it are identified by Madow as the “culture industries” and 
subcultures.  Some of the latter can be “relatively powerless” yet still able to generate 
meanings to compete with the “dominant ideology”89 promoted by the culture 
industries.  In this contest it is impossible, Madow argues, for the law to remain 
neutral:  it can act either to  
strengthen the already potent grip of the culture industries over the production 
and circulation of meaning, or it can facilitate popular participation, including 
participation by subordinate and marginalised groups, in the processes by 
which meaning is made and communicated.90   
 
Creating a legal right over the substance of the cultural commons – the celebrity 
images which populate it – denies the subordinate groups access to that commons 
and thereby deprives them of the ability to create and communicate cultural meaning.  
De Grandpre shares Madow’s concerns “for what he [Madow] perceived to be the 
courts’ privatization of popular culture through the commodification and 
appropriation to celebrities of socially constructed meanings.”91  While the public at 
large apparently stands to lose, celebrities and the big-business interests of the 
culture industries appear to gain through such a right. 
 
On this analysis, protection of publicity rights interferes with freedom of expression 
and creative expression, not least by removing celebrity persona from the “rich pool” 
of the cultural commons.  Given these competing interests against publicity rights, it 
becomes necessary to seek some factor which will justify favouring one set of 
interests over the other, that is to say granting the legal right of publicity or 
withholding it.  The remainder of this chapter will explore possible justifications in 
support of the individual’s interests in publicity rights and address arguments made 
against them. 
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4. ACCEPTING THREE REBUTTALS OF PUBLICITY 
RIGHTS 
 
Before turning to justifications in support of publicity rights, it is necessary to 
acknowledge and reject three arguments which are commonly advanced in favour of 
a right of publicity, but which in fact fail to justify such a right.  These are the 
incentive justification, the labour-desert justification, and the consumer protection 
justification.  In brief, these justifications contend that: 
(i) individuals will not develop valuable identities unless there is an incentive to 
do so, and legal protection provides that incentive by ensuring that control 
and the potential for commercial gain is vested in the individual;  
(ii) the individual has laboured to create a valuable persona, and a legal right is 
the individual’s desert or reward for doing so; 
(iii) control by the individual over use of his persona in advertising, 
merchandising and the media is necessary for public protection, to ensure that 
consumers are not misled by false advertising or publicity.   
 
Part of the problem with the first two of these arguments is that there is a tendency to 
confuse the subject matter under review.  While the analysis in Chapter 3 showed 
that the subject matter of protection is persona –name, image, and reputation – these 
incentive and labour-desert arguments often look to justify protection for the value in 
persona.  Instead, as we shall see, the value is a separate consideration which does 
not affect the existence of the persona (since we all have a persona), nor the 
recognition of a right of publicity.92   
 
Madow’s dismissal of the incentive argument is comprehensive.  The idea that 
people will labour for some end only if there is a sufficient incentive, or “some 
measure of assurance that they will be able to reap what they sow”93 does not apply 
in publicity.  McCarthy appears to advance this justification, on the basis that even a 
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slight inducement enriches us all, but concedes that it is “hypothetical” since the 
degree of incentive “can probably never be proven either in the abstract or in any 
particular case.”94  Madow, however, shows that the incentive justification is severely 
flawed: 
Farmer Brown might give up growing corn and turn to hunting if marauders 
were free to invade his land and steal his crop.  Novelist Brown might give up 
writing mysteries and turn to investment banking if others were free to copy 
and sell his books.  But will Quarterback Brown give up professional football 
and his multimillion dollar salary if others are free to use his picture on 
posters or T-shirts without paying him for the privilege?  Not likely.95 
 
Vaver also questions the incentive justification on a broader front when he asks 
whether the incentive of copyright protection has really made any difference to 
creative output:  
Are we sure that much of what the law vigorously protects would not have 
been created anyway, with no, or at least much less vigorous, protection?  In 
crude terms, would I write less or worse letters or articles if my work was 
protected for, say, only 10 years?  Or even not protected at all?96 
 
The need for an incentive is frequently lacking in publicity, and therefore cannot act 
as a justification for recognition of a legal right.97  Further, the opportunity to profit 
from publicity often arises – as Vaver and Madow recognise – regardless of whether 
or not there is a specific legal right of publicity.  There is therefore nothing to be 
gained from anchoring the grant of a right of publicity to claims that an individual 
needs such a legal right to act as an incentive to develop his persona.   
 
Closely related to the incentive justification is that of labour-desert, whereby a legal 
right to exploit persona is seen as the individual’s reward for his labour in creating a 
valuable persona.98  An initial point to note is that this justification is also frequently 
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tied to the value in persona whereas, as mentioned above, publicity rights can arise in 
any persona, not only valuable ones.   
 
In any event, the labour-desert justification fails to support a publicity right because 
there is frequently no evidence that the individual has laboured to create his 
persona.99  Justifications based on Locke’s theory of labour are inappropriate since 
“[t]he labor justification cannot account for the idea whose inception does not seem 
to have involved labor”.100  A popular persona is “sometimes the result of hard work 
towards securing a public image based on an internal vision.  But quite often they are 
creations of pure chance, perhaps the only “intellectual property” without 
intentionality.”101  Labour may well play a critical role in creating the value in the 
persona, as demonstrated by industry players such as Milligan: in Brand it Like 
Beckham, he makes very clear reference to the level of labour and effort that goes 
into creating and maintaining the valuable Beckham brand.  For every Beckham, 
however, it is possible to point to other individuals who have exploited their persona 
on the back of little or no effort.102  As Madow suggests, such justifications are “a bit 
quaint”, being tied “normatively and conceptually, to a picture of individual creation 
and originality, and of self-authorship as well”.103  Further, even for those individuals 
who do labour at their persona, Madow suggests that their attempts may not succeed 
in such a direct manner:   
No matter how long and conscientiously he “labors” to create and maintain a 
preferred public image, and no matter how adept and shrewd his advisors and 
handlers are, he cannot make his persona “mean” precisely and solely what 
he wants it to mean.104 
 
Thus, the value in persona is not always within the individual’s control and the 
product of his labour.  While evidence reveals that some individuals do labour very 
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carefully to maximise the appeal of their persona, it is hard to deny that in other 
instances “[t]he notion that a star’s public image is nothing else than congealed star 
labour is just the folklore of celebrity, the bedtime story the celebrity industry prefers 
to tell us and, perhaps, itself.”105    
 
Further, the correlation between the labour and the fame is too uncertain and 
unreliable to operate as a suitable incentive, since there is usually no direct 
correlation between labour invested and celebrity status.  As Madow notes, “Fame 
does not play fair; it plays favorites”.106  The economic consequence of this is that 
“the market structure will often make it nearly impossible for a contestant to assess 
rationally the marginal revenue of an additional hour of training.”107 
 
Another concern is that highlighted by Coombe, amongst others.  She points to the 
“studios, the mass media, public relations agencies, fan clubs, gossip columnists, 
photographers, hairdressers, body-building coaches, athletic trainers, teachers, 
screenwriters, ghostwriters, directors, lawyers and doctors”108 who are all involved in 
the “creation” of the persona – especially the fame – of celebrities.  With reference to 
Marilyn Monroe, she also assigns some of the credit for persona to the general 
public.109   
 
As this very brief review shows, individual labour may often be present and it may 
often be extensive, but it need not be.  Even where labour can be demonstrated, it 
does not follow that it was exclusively the labour of the individual in question, nor 
can it be proven that there is a direct correlation between labour invested and the 
resulting persona.  Labour therefore cannot operate to justify a general right of 
publicity.110 
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Consumer protection justifications on the other hand turn the focus from the 
individual to the public at large.  On this analysis, publicity rights are needed to 
“protect consumers from deceptive trade practices, especially false representations of 
endorsement or sponsorship”111 or to clamp down on “advertisers of dangerous or 
shoddy products… manipulat[ing] consumers by exploiting powerful celebrity 
images.”112  While a publicity right would ensure that all exploitation would be 
authorised, and therefore not confusing in that regard, Madow disputes the need to 
introduce a publicity right simply for these purposes.  Members of the public are no 
longer, if they ever were, likely to believe wholeheartedly that a celebrity uses or 
believes in the product he advertises.113  Madow also notes that a right of publicity 
would far exceed the consumer protection function ascribed to it, by applying in a 
much wider range of situations.114  A further objection is that protecting consumers is 
a concern, and therefore a justification, only where they are exposed to unauthorised 
exploitation:  in instances where the individual agrees to the use of his persona then 
there can be no risk of consumer confusion through false or misleading use of 
persona.115  
 
Thus, consumer protection concerns alone cannot justify the creation of a publicity 
right,116 and especially not in the case of the positive power to exploit.  Where 
publicity is otherwise justified, however, then its contribution to consumer protection 
can be seen as an additional advantage.  Although consumer protection may be one 
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consequence of a right of publicity, it should properly be regarded as an incidental 
benefit rather than a driver for the right. 
 
While each of these justifications may have something to offer in support of a right 
of publicity, it is clear that they are insufficient as they stand.  Other justifications 
must be sought. 
 
5. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PUBLICITY RIGHTS 
5.1. Introduction 
With the rejection of three commonly-advanced arguments now agreed, we can turn 
to those justifications which seek to demonstrate that a carefully constructed 
publicity right can be justified and is certainly desirable, not least when contrasted 
with the two alternatives:  the unsystematic status quo or no right at all.   
 
At the outset, it should be acknowledged that publicity is not a right which is 
especially easy to justify.  It is not a right which is clearly “good” or beneficial:  it is 
not a right which tackles poverty or outlaws torture or makes a notable contribution 
to scientific endeavour.  On the other hand, neither is it a prejudicial or dangerous or 
oppressive right.  It does not promote racial segregation or discrimination against 
women, for example.  A publicity right is, all things considered, a right to regulate a 
specific practice – and that practice benefits all parties concerned: the individuals 
who retain control of their persona, while gaining a financial advantage; their 
commercial exploiters whose custom and reputation is increased; and the populace at 
large who enjoy the “fun”,117 colour and human interest that exploitation brings.  As 
McCarthy observes “the human mind is more fascinated by people than by ideas… 
most of our social conversation concerns people.”118  A publicity right may not feed 
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the world, but nor is it intrinsically harmful.119  This is a useful perspective to 
maintain throughout this chapter. 
 
The first justification takes a rather pragmatic approach, by recognising the reality of 
the practice and the uncertainty of the existing unsystematic legal response.  The 
second and third justifications look respectively to the dignitarian and economic 
interests inherent in publicity, to demonstrate why a right is necessary.  Although 
objections to these justifications have been made, and will be considered below, it is 
submitted that these are not fatal but instead provide a basis for recognising 
limitations to a right of publicity.  While acknowledging that a right of publicity must 
be limited by certain counter-interests, these three justifications operate to show that 
a publicity right is legally and practically desirable.   
 
5.2. Ordering the Chaos  
Publicity exploitation is something which happens extensively, as was seen in 
Chapter 3.  The available evidence shows that individuals and exploiters treat 
publicity exploitation as a valid commercial practice like any other.  There is a large 
industry built around brand management, licensing, celebrity endorsement, and 
public relations.  The positive practice of publicity exploitation is alive and well.  
Conversely, there is also a visible trend of unauthorised use followed by litigation to 
prevent or recover for this use.  The courts have been willing to protect the interests 
of both the individual120 and the authorised exploiter.121  The door to publicity rights 
protection is therefore ajar, if not wide open. 
 
This can be seen as the logical progression of legal development.  De Grandpre, who 
provides an economic justification for publicity, refers to “the evolution of the right 
of publicity in the last one hundred years or so, from not being recognized at all, to 
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being recognized as an inalienable personal right, to becoming, in many jurisdictions, 
a form of property.”122  The social practice has driven the legal change, and with the 
increasing practice of publicity comes a crystallisation of the law, as “general 
principles of fairness and equity… give way, in their maturity, to more certain legal 
rules.”123  This need for certainty results in the drawing of  
… ever sharper lines around our entitlements so that we can identify the 
relevant players and so that we can trade instead of getting into confusions 
and disputes – confusions and disputes that would otherwise only escalate as 
the goods in question became scarcer and more highly valued.124  
 
Although publicity is not tangible, it is potentially exposed to scarcity and exhaustion 
nonetheless, as will be examined in section 5.4.2 below.  Thus, in publicity, as in 
other areas of law, the evolution of social practice can be seen to drive the evolution 
of law. 
 
Law as a response to social reality arguably takes us only a limited way towards a 
justification for publicity.  Indeed, some would contend that it does not even achieve 
that, since reliance on commercial practice alone is on one view “hardly a 
satisfactory basis on which to analyse the development of the law.”125  It is certainly 
the case that other activities are prohibited by law despite the brisk trade and social 
participation that they generate.  The fact that there is supply and demand for cocaine 
and heroin is, on its own, unlikely to convince the public that these drugs should be 
legalised.  There are of course arguments that legalisation of these drugs would 
enable more effective control by the government, as some arguably “undesirable” 
activities (such as the production and sale of alcohol) are licensed to enable them to 
be regulated.  This analogy is not exact, however, since publicity is not obviously 
socially undesirable in the same manner as drugs, even if the desirability of legal 
protection is not universally accepted.  Nonetheless, it does demonstrate that there 
must be more to a legal right than the simple fact of social and commercial practice 
in that area.  In the words of Coombe (in the context of property): “the decision to 
allocate particular property rights is a prior question of social policy that requires 
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philosophical and moral deliberations and a consideration of social costs and 
benefits.”126   
 
Consideration of the social costs and benefits follows in sections 5.3 and 5.4 below 
but, for the present, law’s response to the practice of publicity provides the first 
justification for a right of publicity.  The fact that most legal systems have, so far, 
recognised a right of publicity through a wide range of causes of action, produces a 
twin-pronged justification for a clearer, more coherent right.   
 
In the first place, publicity rights do exist in many jurisdictions, and even in those 
jurisdictions where there is no publicity right, claimants can usually obtain some 
measure of protection through an amalgam of rights, including registered trade 
marks, passing off and privacy laws.127  If the onus is on the “advocates of change” to 
prove the benefits128 then this works both ways:  not only do those in favour of a right 
of publicity have to prove why such right is necessary, but those who are opposed to 
publicity rights have their own justificatory mission, in order to show why these 
existing rights should be withdrawn altogether.  Those who wish to reject publicity 
entirely must make a case for this.129  Even Madow, who persuasively argues against 
the justifications for a publicity right, acknowledges this and claims that “[t]here is 
work to do on the other side of the question as well.  A definite argument for the 
outright abolition of the right of publicity cannot be made on the present state of the 
record.”130  It is not sufficient to do this simply on the grounds that the existing 
method of protection is inappropriate for the task of protecting publicity.  For 
example, many English commentators argue that passing off is not suited to protect 
publicity interests.131  I would agree with this assertion, but not with the subsequent 
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 Coombe, “Author/izing the celebrity”, at 368. 
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claim that rejecting passing off (or any other specified doctrine) as a home for some 
element of publicity rights equates to the rejection of publicity rights in all 
circumstances.  Rejecting a specific doctrine does not equate to rejecting the 
underlying premise of protecting publicity rights.  It is therefore not sufficient for 
critics of publicity rights to challenge them on the basis that the current method of 
protection is inappropriate: legal protection per se must be addressed.   
 
Closely allied to this is the second prong of this justification.  Both proponents and 
opponents of publicity rights point to the typically chaotic and incoherent nature of 
current publicity protection.  The current UK and US approaches – the latter reliant 
on a wide range of state legislation, case law, federal jurisprudence, tort and unfair 
competition restatements – are certainly not an ideal coherent whole.  The protection 
for publicity rights in the US is not necessarily to be envied or emulated. 
 
Yet this does not mean that publicity rights could never have such coherence.  
Although some critics use the unsystematic or chaotic nature of legal protection as an 
argument to reject publicity rights in principle,132 the opposite conclusion is at least 
equally valid.  Instead of being advanced as an argument against publicity rights, 
these concerns of chaos and incoherence can be seen as an argument for a publicity 
right.  The dangers of allowing rights to develop through ad hoc litigation, as is 
currently the case in the UK, and the advantages of strategic and deliberate 
legislative development are demonstrated by Hughes in his consideration of 
intellectual property in general: 
There is a very simple reason why the legal doctrines of unfair competition 
and trade secret protection are inherently oriented toward the value-added 
theory:  they are court-created doctrines and people rarely go to court unless 
something valuable is at stake.  When intellectual property is created more 
systematically, such as through legislation, the resulting property doctrines 
seem less singularly oriented toward rewarding social value.133 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Laddie stated in person that he viewed Irvine as a straightforward passing off case and that it did not 
involve issues of publicity (a right with which he disagreed). 
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Any rejection of publicity rights based on its incoherent development to date can be 
countered by advocating the advantages of legislation.  Criticism of the status quo 
should not result in the automatic rejection of publicity rights as a whole.   
 
It is possible to advance a counter-argument, by claiming that the rationalisation of 
the existing ad hoc protection through legislation only holds good where there is a 
prior justification in favour of a statutory right.  However, this argument is capable of 
working equally for and against statutory protection:  the chaos and incoherence of 
ad hoc measures cannot be advanced as a ground for abolishing any such right(s) 
without a prior justification for the abolition either. 
 
The reality is that publicity practice – and legal acceptance of that practice – is a 
feature of life.  This operates as a justificatory sword and shield.  The internal 
incoherence of that “right”, or series of rights, demonstrates just why a single, 
purpose-built right is needed, thereby attacking the status quo.  But the current 
practice also shields publicity rights from opponents who wish to cut it down 
altogether, since they too must provide a justification for such a course of action.   
 
This rather pragmatic justification, based on the need to impose some order on the 
incoherence that is existing publicity rights protection, is supported by two 
substantive justifications, which appeal to dignitarian and economic considerations.    
 
 
5.3. The Dignitarian Rationale for Publicity 
The second justification in favour of a right of publicity is based upon fundamental 
notions of autonomy and dignity which are inherent to each individual, coupled with 
the fact that publicity rights enable control of persona, which is also inherent to each 
individual.   
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5.3.1. Autonomy and Dignity  
Autonomy is the notion that individuals should be free to make their own life 
choices, with as little regulation from external sources as possible, subject to the need 
for each individual to respect the self-respect and bodily integrity of others.134  The 
exercise of autonomy enables each individual to take responsibility for his own life 
choices and pursuit of the “good life”.135  Such is the importance of autonomy in the 
Western legal tradition that MacCormick says “[i]f there is any fundamental moral 
value, that of respect for persons as autonomous agents seems the best candidate for 
that position.”136  The role of law is, in part, “to prevent the violation of a citizen’s 
autonomy, dignity and self-esteem.”137 
 
In fact, MacCormick argues that the fundamental human right to privacy is based on 
the prior acceptance of individual autonomy:  “the value upon which privacy rests is, 
surely, the value of autonomy in shaping a personal, as distinct from a public, 
dimension of one’s life.  The wrong of intrusion is the wrong of infringing that 
aspect of an individual’s autonomy contrary to his wish and without his 
permission.”138  This argument is made in the context of privacy, and it is not my 
intention to predicate a right of publicity on a prior right of privacy.  Nonetheless, the 
recognition of autonomy as the principle underlying privacy, and its importance in 
enabling the individual to control that right of privacy together with recognition of 
the corresponding wrong done by unauthorised intrusion, is of relevance when 
justifying a right of publicity, as will be examined below.  
 
Alongside autonomy, and complementing it, is the notion of dignity.139  The right to 
autonomy is seen as contributing to an individual’s dignity: 
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The right to make one’s own decisions about many aspects of one’s fate, and 
to contribute to decisions made by others which affect one’s life can be seen 
as a major contribution to an individual’s dignity, likening the notion [of 
dignity] to a Kantian perspective on morality.140 
 
In this way, dignity works to “bolster individual freedom by making it desirable to 
enhance autonomy and moral integrity or to provide social and political rights to an 
infrastructure which enables people to live in a dignified way.”141 
 
The correlation between autonomy and dignity – and their fundamental place in our 
society – gains further support from Article 8 ECHR, which states that “[e]veryone 
shall have respect for his private and family life, his home and correspondence.”  
Eady J recently affirmed the correlation between privacy and dignity in Mosley v 
News Group Newspapers Ltd, wherein he held that the infringement of Mosley’s 
privacy by the News of the World “has taken away or undermined the right of another 
– in this case taken away a person’s dignity and struck at the core of his personality.”  
As Moreham argues, the Convention jurisprudence on Article 8 reveals five sub-
categories of private life interest and one of these is the “right to live 
autonomously”.142  Although Moreham’s focus is on infringement of autonomy and 
personal freedom in sexual and familial relationships and medical treatment,143 she 
recognises that “all interferences with private life will affect autonomy to some 
extent”.144  Thus, anything which interferes with my autonomy interferes with my 
right to respect for my private life and, indeed, with other rights guaranteed by the 
ECHR.145   
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Respect for autonomy is not restricted to human rights:  it affects every area of life.  
Radin assesses the relationship between property and personhood, in particular in 
relation to objects so “closely related to one’s personhood [that] its loss causes pain 
that cannot be relieved by the object’s replacement.”146  Objects which fall into this 
class “could be described as simply a category of property for personal autonomy or 
liberty.”147  Although she goes on to develop this theory in much greater detail than 
can be related here, her starting point is worth noting, whereby individuals can 
become connected with the external world through being bound up with external 
“things” which “they feel are almost part of themselves.”148  Property can therefore 
be a very necessary expression of an individual’s autonomy and dignity. 
 
However, autonomy is not sacrosanct:  not all interferences with the exercise of 
autonomy will be prohibited.  In some cases there may be a valid (albeit potentially 
paternalistic) restriction on individual actions, in order to protect the interests of 
other individuals or society in general.149  A good example of this is the French ban 
on dwarf-throwing competitions, because “it was an affront to human dignity to put 
on a spectacle devoted to allowing spectators to throw a person selected by reason of 
his suffering from a physical handicap”.150  The need to respect the human dignity (of 
society in general) was given priority over the interests of the dwarf in question, who 
was in fact keen to participate in such competitions in order to make a living.  
Accordingly, dignity here was placed “above the freedom of an individual member 
of the group to choose how to exploit his or her physical form.”151  Objective 
conceptions of dignity can therefore be used as a ground on which to interfere with 
the exercise of (possibly subjective standards152 of) personal autonomy. 
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5.3.2. Autonomy and Dignity in the Context of Publicity  
How does this understanding of autonomy and dignity apply to publicity rights?  
Central to the exercise of autonomy and dignity are the notions of personal choice 
and control, and these are the very notions which are jeopardised where there is no 
right of publicity.  Lacking a right of publicity, an individual can attempt to control 
when and where his persona – his very identity – is used, and by whom, but there is 
no certainty of success.  Coombe acknowledges the fundamental connection between 
an individual and his persona, whereby individuals “never lose their autonomy from 
the objects that circulate in their likeness.”153  Critically, lack of control makes it 
difficult to prevent unauthorised or unsought use of persona.  It is the unsought 
intrusion which MacCormick identifies (above) as the heart of intrusion into privacy, 
and there seems to be no reason for reaching a different conclusion in the case of 
publicity.  Thus, autonomy and dignity operate to justify a right for each individual 
to control use of persona.154 
 
Control, and thus autonomy, lies at the heart of McCarthy’s justification of a 
publicity right: 
the [justification] that appeals the most to me is the simplest and most 
obvious.  It is the natural right of property justification.  It is an appeal to first 
principles of justice.  Each and every human being should be given control 
over the commercial use of his or her identity.  Perhaps nothing is so strongly 
intuited as the notion that my identity is mine – it is my property, to control as 
I see fit.  Put simply, my identity is “me”.  The existence of a legal right to 
control identity would seem to be essential to any civilized society.155 
 
This is a powerful and emotive argument, and underlies the “natural rights of 
property” school of thought.  I am not seeking to advocate a natural right of property 
for publicity however:  whether or not property is indeed the most appropriate legal 
classification will be examined in Chapter 6.  Nonetheless, as the added emphasis in 
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the above quotation shows, McCarthy identifies control of identity as the core notion 
to be protected, and this is inherent in the rights to autonomy and dignity.156   
 
McCarthy’s justification is made in the context of a Common law jurisdiction, and 
there is likewise evidence of the primacy of the individual and personal choice in 
Civilian jurisdictions.  Neethling starts his review of personality rights by noting that 
they “recognize a person as a physical and spiritual-moral being and guarantee his 
enjoyment of his own sense of existence.”157  In the context of German law, 
Beverley-Smith et al explain that §823 I BGB, which protects absolute subjective 
personality rights,158 is “based on a theory of subjective rights which has its roots in 
the legal philosophy of Immanuel Kant and the legal theory of Savigny:  subjective 
rights delimit certain spheres in which each individual can act according to his or her 
free will.”159    
 
Further, the protection of autonomy and dignity can be seen clearly in the protection 
of other intangible attributes of personhood:  one’s beliefs, emotions and 
relationships, and education.  These are attributes that Western legal systems – both 
Civilian and Common law – are committed to protecting, and they all enable 
autonomous action and self-determination.  Article 8 (respect for family and private 
life), Article 9 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion), and Article 2, 
Protocol I (right to education) ECHR guarantee these intangible aspects of an 
individual. 
 
An analogy can also be drawn between persona and the tangible aspects of each 
individual.  Just as my hands and kidneys are mine to control,160 so is my persona.  
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Although this raises the spectre of ownership of the body and body parts,161 it can in 
fact be addressed without resolving this complex moral and ethical question.  
Whether or not I can truly be said to “own” my hands or my kidneys does not detract 
from the fundamental principle that no-one else has any better right to control what I 
do with them than I do.  My right to dignity and autonomous action necessitates that 
I have control over my hands and my kidneys, and my body in general.  Thus, 
whether hands or kidneys are susceptible to ownership does not need to be 
definitively answered to be able to answer the primary question:  who controls them?  
I do.162 
 
Not only do autonomy and dignity require each individual to have control of his life 
and his life choices, but they also illustrate the harm caused when that right to control 
is denied, unless there is a legitimate reason for such denial, as in the case of the 
dwarf-throwing competition.  Whether or not such good reasons exist in cases of 
publicity will be considered in section 7 below.  The present examination will focus 
on the consequences of denying the individual the right to control the use of his 
persona. 
 
5.3.3. Denial of Autonomy and Dignity in Publicity  
Where an individual is unable to control the use of his persona, it impacts on both his 
negative right to prevent use and his positive power to exploit his persona.  Since 
there is no right for the individual to give or withhold such consent, persona becomes 
freely available for use by others,163 without the need to seek the consent of the 
individual.   
 
Yet a specific wrong occurs where the individual’s persona is used without his 
consent.  Spence analyses the consequences of unpermitted use of a trader’s brand 
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name in the context of passing off.164  Although the current discussion does not focus 
on use of corporate identity in passing off, the points he makes hold good.  The 
starting point for Spence’s argument is that where a company uses a rival trader’s 
brand without the consent of that trader, it is making an untruthful representation and 
“a community that claims to value truthfulness, must be reluctant to allow one party 
to suffer harm, or indeed another party to benefit, as a consequence of an untruthful 
statement.”165   
 
In a passionate claim, Spence emphasises the attack on autonomy that results where 
unauthorised (and therefore “untruthful”) use is made of the rival brand, such that it 
becomes a mask that is used by the unauthorised exploiter: 
The maintenance of a society of autonomous persons must involve at least 
some prevention of others, unauthorised, speaking on their behalf.  In this 
way, the wrong in passing off not only parallels the wrong in plagiarism, it 
also somehow parallels the wrong in torture.  As De Grazia has pointed out, 
one of the wrongs involved in torture is the appropriation of another’s voice, 
the unauthorised assumption of the right to speak on his behalf.  It is arguably 
precisely this right that is involved when one trader claims to speak through 
the identity of even a corporate rival.166 
 
The claim here is that just as torture is used to subjugate the voice of the victim to 
that of the torturer, so the unauthorised use of the brand suppresses the brand owner’s 
voice and imposes upon his brand the voice or “message” of the unauthorised user.167   
 
What is particularly interesting about Spence’s argument is that it is made in the 
context of one company passing itself off as another juristic person, yet it can be 
applied to the use of an individual’s brand – his persona – as well.  Where this 
happens, the individual has lost control of his persona and thus his autonomy is 
infringed, because his persona is used to convey the message of another party 
without his consent or control.  Further, although passing off is traditionally seen as 
an action to protect the economic interests of the trader, Spence’s arguments here 
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reveal the dignitarian interests that are also present in a misrepresentation of the 
company through misuse of its trade mark.  These arguments, made in the context of 
passing off disputes between companies, arguably apply with even greater force in 
the case of publicity rights, where the subject of the misrepresentation is a natural 
person whose very identity is being abused and misappropriated.   
 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to accept that, at a practical level at least, there is much in 
common between Eddie Irvine and victims of torture throughout the world.  While 
the analogy between torture and passing off put forward by Spence is thought-
provoking, it is arguably too extreme to command much sympathy in this context.  
Its underlying message can instead be applied through a less emotive analogy. 
 
The real harm done in such cases, Spence argues, is the unauthorised use, and 
consequent suppression, of someone else’s voice.  This results in harm both to the 
individual, or company, and to the society which receives the “untruthful” message.  
A similar, yet less extreme, analogy for the suppression of voice and subsequent 
harm can be found in the right to vote.  This is an intangible right of every adult, and 
is recognised as fundamental in a democratic society.  The unauthorised “use” of 
someone else’s vote would deprive that individual of his voice in a democratic 
society and be an affront to his autonomy.  If an individual’s vote were to be 
commandeered or confiscated, harm would be done to the individual and to the wider 
society and the process of democracy.  Not only would the individual have lost his 
voice and, consequently, his ability to speak on his own behalf and his autonomy, but 
society’s interest in truthfulness (and democracy) would also be tarnished if it failed 
to stop the misuse.  
 
The association of identity with truthful communication which underlies Spence’s 
argument can also be found in the Civilian right to identity.  Neethling defines the 
right to identity as arising from a person’s “uniqueness which individualizes him as a 
particular person and this distinguishes him from others…  A person’s identity is 
infringed by falsification, i.e. where indicia are used in a way which cannot be 
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reconciled with his true identity.”168  Although the identity right which Neethling is 
discussing is a personal, non-patrimonial right, the importance of the right of the 
individual to prevent false use is evident here. 
 
This concept of using persona to deceive can also be found in Logeais’ analysis of 
the French image right.  She states: 
fame is best conveyed through the name or picture which are inherent to the 
person and therefore their use or perfect imitation makes identification 
certain.  Because these intrinsic “marks” are so personal and inseparable 
from the person, their use implies some necessary deliberate involvement of 
the person, that is, the likelihood of deception or implied endorsement, unless 
the use is too blatantly inconsistent with their status or position to imply a 
likely consent on the part of the celebrity.169 
 
This echoes Spence’s concern that, unless the use is blatantly false, it is potentially 
deceptive and harmful to society and to the individual.  Even Madow accepts that use 
which does constitute a misrepresentation is not to be permitted, since he argues (in 
the context of a specific example) that the actor Robert Young cannot “cry foul when 
someone markets a T-shirt emblazoned with his smiling, benign face and the slogan 
“Father Knows Nothing” – provided, of course, it is clear to consumers that Young 
himself has neither approved nor sponsored the product.”170  Thus, Madow appears 
to concede that use which is misrepresentative, and purports to use the individual’s 
persona – his “voice” – where there has been no consent, should not be permitted.  
However, where there is no misrepresentation then, on this analysis, we should be 
slower to accept that there is a problem.  One situation where Madow would contend 
that there is no misrepresentation would be where the publicity use is “blatantly 
inconsistent” with the individual’s status.  This might arise in some cases of 
subversive or parodic cultural communication, discussed in section 3 above as one of 
the competing interests to the individual’s interests in persona.   
 
Madow also questions the contention that celebrities suffer dignitarian harm from the 
unauthorised use of their persona where they actively seek publicity.  Whereas 
unknown individuals could legitimately protest at unwanted publicity: 
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Claims of such emotional injury were not nearly as convincing when they 
came from celebrities, however.  After all, how could a movie star or 
professional athlete, who had deliberately and energetically sought the 
limelight, complain of embarrassment or hurt feelings when an advertiser or 
merchandiser simply gave his face some additional publicity?171  
 
Yet this is contradicted by the evidence of celebrities such as Irvine and the 
Douglases, already noted in section 2 above.  Even if allowance is made for the 
possibly strategic motivations of the parties in asserting this dignitarian distress, it 
does seem unlikely that there will never be embarrassment or distress.  Furthermore, 
such reaction is deeply subjective, and it is difficult to legislate for this.  Although 
not all celebrities will be embarrassed on all occasions, we should not rule out the 
potential for such emotional distress and dignitarian harm.    
 
The right to control use of persona is essential in any society which professes to 
respect dignity and autonomy.  Failure to protect this harms the individual and 
society as a whole. 
 
5.3.4. Autonomy and Dignity in the Economic Interest 
Although this justification relies on fundamental notions of each individual’s 
personhood, and innate rights, it should not be taken to limit a right of publicity to 
protection of dignitarian interests.  Protection of autonomy and dignity enables 
control of economic as well as dignitarian interests. 
 
This stance contrasts with Madow’s, for example.  As shown in the previous section, 
he is prepared to accept that justifications based on personal interests could operate 
to justify a publicity right, but declines to consider them, since they “can at most, I 
think, justify a personal right against certain kinds of unauthorized commercial 
appropriation.”172  Madow’s primary reason for reaching this conclusion appears to 
be that the damage done to interests such as dignity is not damage to the individual’s 
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wallet, or economic interests, “but to her interest in not being misrepresented or cast 
in an offensive “false light.””173    
 
However, it is not obvious that the economic and dignitarian interests can be so 
clearly separated.  As discussed in section 2 above, they are parts of the same whole, 
and that whole is the individual’s persona.  Where there is control there can be 
exploitation (for profit or otherwise) as well as the right of non-exploitation.  To 
some extent, this is the same as the basis for employment.  Where an individual has 
the right to control the use of his hands and intellect, he can choose to exploit them 
commercially by seeking employment, and he has control over the nature of that 
employment.  No other private party174 has the right to control the individual’s choice 
of employment or unemployment, and whether the individual chooses to pursue the 
highest salary, the most rewarding career, or the most interesting lifestyle is a matter 
for the individual.  It does not make sense to say that where the individual controls 
his body and intellect for the purposes of a career which meets his dignitarian 
interests then that control will be respected, but not where he chooses to exercise that 
control for the economic rewards that employment brings.  Further, economically- 
and emotionally-fulfilling careers are not mutually exclusive, and this also applies to 
publicity rights.  The ability to control the use of my persona – to publish in OK! 
instead of Hello! – may be as rewarding to my dignitarian as to my economic 
interests.  The fact that both OK! and Hello! offered the Douglases the same fee 
suggests that there was indeed an additional, non-monetary, deciding factor between 
the two magazines:  a dignitarian factor, perhaps?  Support for the protection of 
dignity and autonomy in an economic context can also be drawn from the 
Restatement of the Law on Unfair Competition, 3d, which focuses on the 
commercial value in identity and states that “[l]ike the right of privacy, the right of 
publicity protects an individual’s interest in personal dignity and autonomy.”175   
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5.3.5. Summary  
Respect for autonomy and dignity are two principles at the heart of our legal 
tradition, and reflect the importance of allowing each individual to make his own life 
choices and pursue his own concept of the morally good life.  In the context of 
publicity rights, autonomy and dignity require that each individual has control over 
something as inherently personal and inseparable as persona.     
 
The denial of a right of publicity therefore interferes with autonomy and dignity in 
two ways, reflecting the positive and negative aspects of publicity identified in 
Chapter 3.  In the first place, the individual loses the certainty of control in cases of 
self-exploitation of persona.  While it is always open to the individual to enter into 
contracts for exploitation of persona, the legal right behind such agreements remains 
uncertain, absent a recognised publicity right.176  Secondly, the lack of a right 
effectively places each individual’s persona in the public domain, where it can be 
used by anyone, without seeking the consent of the individual.  As Spence shows, the 
misrepresentation that arises from use of an individual’s persona – his “voice” – 
without his consent harms society as well as the individual, not least because of the 
infringement of the individual’s autonomy and dignity.  However, it would be 
erroneous to conclude that a justification based on autonomy and dignity can only 
justify use of persona in a dignitarian context.  As was shown, the right to control 
persona results in protection for the individual’s economic interests as well as his 
dignitarian interests.   
 
 
5.4. The Economic Rationale for Publicity 
In addition to the dignitarian justification considered above, two separate, but 
mutually re-enforcing, arguments can be made to show why a right of publicity is 
also necessary on economic grounds.  The first draws on considerations of economic 
efficiency, while the second relates to the benefits derived from striking a balance 
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between private rights and the public domain.  This economic rationale constitutes 
the third justification to be advanced in favour of a publicity right. 
 
5.4.1. Economic Efficiency  
This justification is predicated on the argument that the practice of publicity is 
economically and socially valuable, and that formalised legal protection will enhance 
these values through certainty and order, to ensure the maximum utility of persona.  
Economic arguments in the context of intellectual property were most famously 
advanced by Posner.177  However, they have been applied to publicity by Grady178 
and de Grandpre,179 in two key articles which show why a right of publicity is 
justified on economic grounds.180  In the words of Grady:  
Under the theory presented in this article, the right of publicity is needed to 
ensure that publicity assets are not wasted by a scramble to use them up as 
quickly as possible.  The right of publicity privatizes a public good (in 
publicity) and thus encourages a more sensible use of this type of social 
asset.181 
 
This is akin to the tragedy of the (traditional) commons, whereby the scramble to use 
resources adversely impacts on their long-term availability.  The first challenge for 
this justification therefore is to identify the “social asset” or “public good” that will 
be protected from such over-consumption through a publicity right, and the second is 
to assess whether over-consumption of this asset is likely.   
 
In respect of the first question, the social asset to be protected is persona.  As 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, persona is valuable for the “eyeball appeal” it 
engenders and the economic value of that appeal.  It is also socially valuable, for the 
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central role that persona plays in our cultural commons, both through the creation 
and communication of meaning182 and by the addition of common human interest.183  
Given the extensive social and commercial use of celebrity persona by corporations 
and by the public, they are correctly regarded by Grady as “socially valuable 
publicity assets.”184  The available evidence also suggests that such exploitation is not 
limited to celebrity persona.185  
 
The second question, regarding the likelihood of over-consumption, requires more 
detailed analysis. 
 
5.4.2. Over-Consumption Leading to Tragedy? 
Just as fish can be safeguarded by requiring a licence to fish, Grady argues that a 
“legal right of publicity can be understood as a fishing license designed to avoid 
races that would use up reputations too quickly.”186  Whereas uncontrolled public use 
of persona would lead to this exhaustion, a right for the individual to control such use 
would minimise this risk.  Evidence in support of this can be drawn from Milligan’s 
comparison between George Best and David Beckham.  Milligan shows that, even 
lacking a formal legal right, Beckham’s greater awareness of the need for 
management of image has successfully avoided Best’s rapid burnout of the value and 
meaning in his image through overexposure.187 
 
Madow, however, challenges this notion of the tragedy of the commons as applied to 
individuals.  He concludes that there is no comparable limited commons which could 
be exhausted: advertisers will always be able to find a new celebrity or individual to 
promote their goods.  Thus, in Madow’s words “there would be no “tragedy” in the 
classic parable if the herdsmen, after depleting their common pasture, could simply 
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move on to another one.”188  Celebrities act as “pastures” for the herdsmen 
advertisers and publishers, and the grazing public can be moved from one pasture to 
another, with no limitation or depletion of the herdsmen’s supply.  Given the 
limitless number of celebrities and individuals in general, there would seem to be no 
risk of exhaustion – and, in any event, Madow asks whether exhaustion of all the 
available celebrities would be any cause for concern.189   
 
Yet this approach is open to challenge.  In the first place, Madow queries whether 
total exhaustion of all available celebrities would be problematic, since “the 
promotional values”190 attaching to celebrities could be replaced by “the myriad other 
techniques”191 currently used by advertisers to attract attention.  However, he does 
not address the loss to the public arising from such over-exhaustion.  He himself has 
drawn attention to the valuable social role played by persona, in allowing the 
communication of meaning in social and cultural contexts.  If all available personas 
are over-exploited to the point of becoming meaningless, there will be no cultural 
commons left to provide a stock of communicable meaning.  Thus, if we accept the 
role that Madow assigns to celebrities in the creation and communication of 
meaning, it would be a cause for concern if, in extreme circumstances, all available 
celebrity personas were to be exhausted.  Importantly, this cultural concern remains 
even if the advertising value of persona could be replaced by another technique.  The 
likelihood of complete exhaustion may be remote, but the question remains:  if 
celebrity persona is so valuable to cultural communication, surely it is in the public 
interest to ensure that this source of meaning and expression is not devalued through 
over-exposure and exhaustion?     
 
The second objection to Madow’s challenge is that it relies on addressing scarcity 
from the angle of the herdsman, which in this case would be the user or advertiser.  
This is the approach in the classic parable, not least because the pasture is inanimate.  
But in our case, the “pasture” of the commons is an individual and it is possible to 
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exhaust his persona, to that individual’s detriment.  Over-grazing and exhaustion 
becomes a more serious concern when the pasture itself has interests and rights.  The 
advertisers, or herdsmen, may be free to move on to fresh pastures, but the 
individual/pasture is left with a depleted, and valueless, identity if it is over-
exploited.  The ongoing individual behind the persona is acknowledged by Coombe:   
Arguably the celebrity evokes the fascination she does because however 
endlessly her image is reproduced, her substantive duration, that is, her life, 
never becomes wholly irrelevant.  She never loses her autonomy from the 
objects that circulate in her likeness.192 
 
If the objects that circulate in her likeness become depleted and valueless, the 
celebrity behind them also suffers, since the persona and celebrity are inextricably 
linked. 
 
While this over-grazing may not be a tragedy for the herdsman-exploiters, it is still 
arguably a loss to two other parties: the wider community and the 
individuals/pastures themselves.  Frazer, for example, takes a very decided stance on 
this:  “In economic terms, personalities should be regarded as scarce resources since, 
although there is a fairly high degree of substitutability, the use of a personality by 
one person will diminish its usefulness to other users.”193  If its usefulness to others is 
diminished, its economic value also diminishes.  This analysis is supported by a 
number of sources providing an insight into the practical side of exploitation.  
Evidence presented to the Court of Appeal in Irvine v Talksport included a statement 
from Irvine that “an endorser cannot in practice endorse more than one product or 
service in any one particular field.”194  Where unauthorised use is made of an 
individual’s persona in one field, it effectively closes the gate on other, authorised, 
exploitation in that same field.  In this sense, the individual’s persona is exhausted in 
much the same way as the original pasture.  Individuals have a vested interest in 
preventing exhaustion resulting from unauthorised use and in ensuring that the 
meaning and value attached to their persona is preserved.  Again, this management 
can be seen in Milligan’s comparison between the (mis)management of George Best 
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in the 1960s and the more controlled approach taken by and on behalf of David 
Beckham in recent years.195   
 
To this extent, the tragedy of the commons becomes the “tragedy of the pastures”:  
an argument which may have little relevance where the pasture is inanimate, but 
which deserves more serious consideration where the pasture has rights and interests.  
Whereas Madow argues that the celebrity pasture is (effectively196) inexhaustible, it is 
in fact the case that, although the total number of pastures may be limitless, each 
individual pasture is certainly exhaustible.197  For Frazer, this individual scarcity 
provides a reason to protect identity: 
Purely in terms of economic efficiency, therefore, there may be a justification 
for converting personality from no-ownership to private property.  Since an 
over-use of personality may permanently depress its value, it is most 
important that such property right be protected by way of injunction as well 
as by damages.198 
 
As the law has responded to protect tangibles from over-exploitation, so it can also 
respond to the risk of over-exploitation of persona: “[w]e can ration the use of 
highways by imposing tolls.  We grant celebrities a property right to ration the use of 
their names in order to maximise their value over time.”199 
 
Doing so also recognises the dignitarian value, as well as the economic value, of 
persona to the individual.  While it may not be a great tragedy to an individual 
advertiser if Beckham’s persona is rendered meaningless through over-exploitation, 
it is most certainly a personal tragedy for Beckham – and arguably a tragedy for that 
section of the population which uses his persona for “informative and recoding” uses, 
in Coombe’s terminology.  This over-exploitation would negatively impact on 
Beckham’s dignitarian interest identified above, regardless of the consequences for 
his economic interest.   
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Whereas Madow favours the unprotected free use of such valuable imagery, de 
Grandpre and Grady argue that unprotected use typically results in a net loss to 
society, since over-exploitation results in the degradation and exhaustion of any 
meaning in that image to the detriment of the individual, the public, and ultimately 
the exploiters:   
the public also tires of celebrities; many become stale, the buzz surrounding 
them giving way to fatigue and even contempt.  For this reason, becoming 
and remaining a celebrity requires careful management, for it depends on 
constantly evoking the right impressions and remaining in the public’s 
unaided memory.200   
 
5.4.3. Allowing Net Positive Externalities 
However, this economic argument does not necessarily produce a right of publicity 
which creates a private stranglehold.  Madow makes the point that not all uses of 
persona will necessarily result in a diminution in the value of that persona.201  In fact, 
with reference to the property right of publicity in the US, de Grandpre claims that 
“the current right of publicity is overbroad”202 and grants more protection than is 
required to satisfy the economic case for a publicity right.  Instead, any right to 
control must be balanced against positive uses of publicity which promote or 
enhance the value, or at least which do not cause damage to it.  De Grandpre 
challenges the need for publicity to be recognised as a property right, since this gives 
excessive control to individuals.  He thus disputes Coase’s view:   
As Ronald Coase suggested, why not simply give everyone an absolute 
property right in her identity and let the market decide who should control 
what rights over whose identity?  As one might suspect, the problem lies with 
transaction costs, which can be sizable and may not be passed on to 
consumers.203 
 
These transaction costs include, for example, negotiating a licence with the 
individual and the fee to be paid.  Instead, transaction costs for “beneficial” uses can 
be minimised or excluded by enabling the public to use persona in certain cases 
without breaching the prior publicity right.  This, in effect, acts as a defence to a 
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claim for breach, or operates to remove any individual right in that situation.  In the 
language of economic analysis, “the law of publicity should prohibit unauthorized 
uses of identity that harm it – that result in net negative externalities – but would 
allow unauthorized uses that result in net positive externalities – informative or 
recoding uses, for example.”204    
 
This is a balancing exercise, in order to achieve the promotion of “net positive 
externalities” while preventing “net negative externalities”.  A right to control use of 
persona is necessary on economic grounds to prevent the exhaustion of these 
valuable social images as discussed in the previous section, but the economic 
justification also recognises that any such right should not be absolute.  Exceptions 
are necessary to enable certain beneficial or net-gain uses.  Not only would such 
exceptions for “beneficial” uses be to the public’s advantage, but in some cases they 
would benefit the individuals too.  This is because an absolute right of control “is 
unlikely to result in an optimal production of fame because our understanding of 
celebrity suggests that the media must be able to publicize it and the public must 
have meaningful opportunities to use it creatively, in formal and informal 
contexts.”205  These balances will be considered in section 7 below. 
 
5.4.4. Maximising Efficiency Through a Balance of Rights 
The need for a balance to be struck between private interests and public interests is 
also reflected in the second economic justification to be considered.  Commentators 
typically favour either control of property through private rights or the freedom of 
public use associated with the public domain.  An alternative to the either/or 
approach is posited by Howkins, who disagrees with the view that private rights are 
the “sole source” of innovation and economic growth: 
I regard both the public domain and private rights as capable of generating 
economic activity.  They are both economically efficient.  They are both 
tools.  They are not ends in themselves.  They are tools to achieve ends – 
creativity, innovation, growth and knowledge.206 
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Treating private rights and the public domain as tools to be used to achieve certain 
ends makes it easier to understand that neither one nor the other is always the best or 
most efficient answer:  instead, a balance is required.  Where an appropriate balance 
is achieved, the ends served by these tools will be enhanced.  Thus, as Howkins 
argues, it is “the balance that is efficient (or not): neither the public domain nor a 
private right on its own.”207  This approach is echoed in the Adelphi Charter, which 
states that “[t]he public interest requires a balance between the public domain and 
private rights.  It also requires a balance between the free competition that is essential 
for economic vitality and the monopoly rights granted by intellectual property 
laws”.208   
 
In searching for justifications for a publicity right, it is important to remember that 
seeking an either/or outcome may not be the most efficient one:  public and private 
interests may both be best served through a balance of rights and freedoms.  This 
reflects the conclusion drawn in the previous section that a property right of publicity 
is “overbroad”, and that net positive externalities should be recognised as limitations 
or exceptions to the right. 
 
In fact, the interaction of rights and freedoms is arguably essential for both camps, as 
Coombe demonstrates.  She discusses the role of legal regulation of private rights in 
enhancing and advancing the interests of the public domain.  Her analysis of the role 
of celebrity in popular cultural expression (a use which she undoubtedly supports) 
highlights the complexity of the interaction between private rights and cultural use: 
The law of publicity rights, by prohibiting reproductions of the celebrity 
image for another’s advantage, promotes the mass circulation of celebrity 
signifiers by ensuring that they will have a market value.  If the image were 
freely available for mass reproduction, there would, presumably, be less of an 
incentive to engage in the investments necessary to disseminate it through 
media channels.  Ironically, then, the law creates the cultural spaces of 
postmodernism in which mass media images become available for signifying 
practices.  It produces fixed, stable identities authorised by the celebrity 
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subject, but simultaneously creates the possibility of places of transgression 
in which the signifier’s fixity and the celebrity’s authority may be contested 
and resisted.209 
 
Coombe’s analysis suggests that de-regulation would not lead to a freeing up of 
celebrity image for general cultural consumption, but that it would lead to an 
increased scarcity not only through over-use (as addressed above) but also through 
reduced production.210  Arguing for persona to be part of the public domain would 
not necessarily bring the advantages of free use that its advocates seek.  Without the 
legal regulation to create “the cultural spaces of postmodernism” in which celebrity 
persona flourishes, the possibility of cultural re-configuration of that persona will be 
diminished211 – something which Madow would, presumably, regret.  
 
5.4.5. Summary 
If the economic aspect of publicity practice is accepted (and even opponents of 
publicity rights concede the practical economic value of persona), there is 
considerable support for striking a balance between private and public interests.  A 
legal right of publicity can help to engender the very social and cultural practice 
which Coombe, Carty and Madow support.  As Grady and de Grandpre 
acknowledge, however, an exclusive private right of publicity is not necessarily the 
answer either.  Howkins suggests that striking a balance can be the most efficient 
solution.  In the case of publicity, this would recognise the value of persona to the 
public domain where freedom of expression or cultural communication is at stake, 
but enable the necessary private control to ensure that over-exploitation does not 
diminish either the economic or dignitarian interests in persona.     
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5.5. Two Further Objections Considered 
Two arguments which are commonly used to deny a right of publicity are the 
arguments from free-riding and from wealth allocation.  These objections can also be 
challenged, thereby strengthening the case in favour of publicity rights.  
 
5.5.1. The Argument from Free-riding 
The argument from free-riding is expressed by Madow as the idea that “society has a 
strong and independent moral interest in preventing people from free riding.”212  If 
such misuse is not prevented, then the exploiter will receive something for nothing, 
or, in classic intellectual property terminology, will have reaped without sowing.213  
According to Madow, the problem with such contentions is that “there is still no 
general common law prohibition against benefiting from the commercial efforts of 
others.”214  He provides several examples of situations where one person’s creativity 
is enjoyed and exploited by others since, once it has been voluntarily placed in the 
market, it effectively becomes freely appropriable.215  Gordon makes the point that 
there is at least a balance to be struck:  where all free riding is identified as wrongful, 
such “a prohibition is itself potentially destabilizing, and, though it may express one 
community norm, important contrary community norms exist as well.”216     
 
Although Madow notes there may be no common law rule against free-riding in the 
abstract, it is nevertheless a practice which the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) has criticised.  The WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook 
deals with unfair competition217 and the problem of free-riding, which it defines as 
“any act that a competitor or another market participant undertakes with the intention 
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of directly exploiting another person’s industrial or commercial achievement for his 
own business purposes without substantially departing from the original 
achievement.”218  WIPO addresses this problem principally from the perspective of 
free-riding on a competitor’s achievements, rather than specifically the problem of 
free-riding on an individual’s persona.  However, whether a business free-rides on a 
juristic person’s reputation or a natural person’s reputation, through persona, the 
action remains the same, and the free-rider’s business is insufficiently distinguished 
from the original “achievement”.  WIPO states that unfairness arises from “the 
obvious exploitation of the notoriety of the indication [that is, trade mark]… without 
any proper effort being made to depart substantially from the characteristic features 
of that particular achievement, but also from the risk of damage to the reputation of 
the existing business.”219  There is therefore a two-fold wrong: (i) the initial 
undifferentiated use by the exploiter and (ii) the subsequent risk of damage to the 
individual’s reputation.   
 
Applying the language of economic analysis used by Grady and de Grandpre above, 
the net economic costs of commercial free-riding on persona are negative, that is to 
say, the exhaustion or degradation of the particular identity, together with the 
potential consumer confusion, will outweigh any benefit to the public.  Free-riding is 
therefore not an activity that should constitute a permitted exception to a right of 
publicity. 
 
This argument against free-riding reflects the core private law concern with the 
prevention of unjustified enrichment which, as Gordley argues,220 can be seen to 
underlie contract and delict.  Whether unjustified enrichment is the most effective 
way to prevent free-riding in publicity cases will be explored in more detail in 
Chapter 6. 
 
There is also a moral or dignitarian ground on which to reject free-riding, reflecting 
the concerns expressed above regarding honest use and the dangers of taking 
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another’s voice.  WIPO states that free-riding is “contrary to honest business 
practice”.221  While free competition is encouraged by WIPO, unfair competition is 
not.222  WIPO thus sanctions measures to combat unfair competition, which would 
arguably include measures to prevent free-riding on another’s reputation, even where 
that does not cause consumer confusion.  The connection between free-riding and 
unfair competition in this context is emphasised by the recognition of a right of 
publicity in the Third Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition.223 
 
Further, free-riding can be challenged in the particular context of publicity, where 
there is use of part of the individual against his will.  Here, the unauthorised use does 
not exploit a separate creation in which I have invested my personhood:  the thing 
exploited is my personhood.  Regardless of the additional “meaning” which fame, 
celebrity or society may have imposed upon an individual’s persona, it remains a 
representation of a human being which is used for gain by another without any 
consideration for that individual’s interests, whether commercial or dignitarian.  A 
comparison can be drawn here with slavery:  “we cannot alienate the whole of our 
labour because then we would be made slaves”.224  It is difficult to justify an 
institution which condones the commercial exploitation of another individual without 
that individual’s consent, and free-riding does just that.  As one American court 
stated in a publicity case: “Let the word go forth – there is no free ride.  The 
commercial hitchhiker seeking to travel on the fame of another will have to learn to 
pay the fare or stand on his own two feet.”225 
 
5.5.2. The Argument from Wealth Distribution  
The second counter-justification is that of wealth distribution.  Madow questions the 
role of publicity in distributing wealth upwards, to those who already have wealth: 
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Why, we may properly ask, should the law confer a source of additional 
wealth on athletes and entertainers who are already very handsomely 
compensated for the primary activities to which they owe their fame?226 
 
This rhetorical question is echoed at a much later stage in his article, where he 
addresses the issue of whether the law should play a role in allocating wealth.227  
Questions such as this were considered by economists like Smith, who conceded that 
limited monopolies might have a beneficial role in allowing creators and inventors to 
reap the economic rewards, if any, of their creation or invention.228        
 
Two observations can be made in response to Madow’s objection.  In the first place, 
it is arguably not solely the law that confers this additional source of income.  The 
social practice and corresponding market demand – the fact that there are willing 
“buyers” and “sellers” of publicity, even if there is nothing in law to buy and sell – 
creates the value.  As Madow himself accepts, if  
sneaker makers were free to use Michael Jordan’s picture in their 
advertisements… Jordan would still be able to command a price, maybe a 
hefty one, for wearing a particular brand of sneaker in the Big Game or for 
touting or demonstrating its virtues in a television commercial.  Or suppose 
T-shirt makers were free to use Bruce Springsteen’s picture without his 
permission.  Some consumers would probably choose to purchase the T-shirt 
“officially authorized” by Springsteen – because they would expect him to 
monitor its quality, because they would want their money to go to him, or 
because they would derive a closer sense of identification with him in this 
way.229 
 
As I demonstrated in Chapter 3, publicity value is predominantly derived from 
authorised exploitation, and this exploitation is not solely reliant on legal sanction, as 
we have seen.  It is not the legal right but the marketplace which creates the value:230  
a commercial practice does not need the sanction of law to “create” the value.  Law 
may provide certainty, which in turn may enhance the value,231 but this is not the 
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same as creating the initial value.232  A clear example of a lucrative market without 
the sanction of law is the cocaine trade.  Not only is cocaine not recognised as a 
legitimate trade, it is positively prohibited.  Despite this, it is still worth a staggering 
amount of money.   
 
Thus, to suggest that it is the legal protection which creates and confers the publicity 
value appears to be misleading. Legal recognition may well benefit individuals by 
creating certainty in their dealings for authorised exploitation, but the commercial 
evidence suggests that law is not solely or even primarily responsible for creating 
that value in the first place.  The only additional source of wealth for individuals that 
would arise from a legally-sanctioned right of publicity comes from compensation 
for unauthorised exploitation.  Although these figures may be high in the US, in the 
UK the Douglases’ compensation for unauthorised use was less than £15,000, 
compared with the £1 million price tag for the authorised deal.233  Madow’s claim 
that adopting a legally enforceable right is responsible for this value can therefore be 
disputed: it may enhance it by the greater legal and commercial certainty which 
would come from a legal right, but it does not create the value at the outset.       
 
A second observation about Madow’s wealth distribution point is that it is made in 
isolation about publicity.  He questions why we should expect the state to provide 
publicity rights which would “operate to channel additional dollars to the very people 
– Einstein rather than Bohr, Vanilla Ice rather than Too Short – who happen to draw 
first-prize tickets in the fame lottery.”234  But  arguably a patent right rewards people 
who have drawn winning tickets in the intelligence lottery, while those who are 
blessed with sporting prowess are rewarded in preference to those who are not, no 
matter how hard the latter may try to gain that coveted Olympic gold.  The capitalist 
economy is not concerned with the equal or communal distribution of wealth.  As 
McCarthy argues, if we accept Madow’s argument in respect of publicity, 
“consistency would demand that we refuse property rights in Rolls Royce and 
Mercedes automobiles, personal swimming pools, expensive personal jewelry, and 
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the like.”235  McCarthy raises a further objection in relation to Madows’s assertion 
that publicity channels wealth to stars who are already wealthy.  Giving the example 
of a former Olympian whose name is being used to promote cereal, McCarthy points 
out that allocating the value to the retired athlete rather than the cereal conglomerate 
is not a redistribution “upwards”.236  Madow’s argument may therefore have a certain 
egalitarian appeal but, in the context of a capitalist society, it is insufficient to 
operate as an argument against publicity rights.   
 
6. IDENTIFYING THE INDIVIDUAL 
 
Accepting the justification from autonomy and dignity impacts upon the question of 
who can exercise a publicity right in two important ways.  In the first place, it 
operates to exclude fictional characters.  Where a right of publicity is justified on the 
grounds that it protects the inherently personal image of an individual, it operates to 
exclude fictional characters from its scope.  Thus, the cartoon Teenage Mutant Ninja 
Turtles237 would be excluded from publicity rights, whereas Eddie Irvine would not.  
As noted in Chapter 2, this boundary is somewhat blurred in the case of individuals 
who are strongly identified with a particular fictional character, such as Paul Hogan 
and Crocodile Dundee.  Although the distinction may be less clear-cut in these cases, 
nonetheless the right of publicity would extend to Paul Hogan as an individual, 
thereby encompassing his activities in character (subject always to any copyright 
issues arising).   
 
The second consequence of the justification from personhood is that it answers the 
question whether the right should be limited to celebrities or available to all.  So far 
in this thesis, I have deliberately used “individual” to refer to the holder of any 
publicity right, while recognising that the majority of those who will benefit and 
exercise the right will be celebrities:  the signal importance of reputation was 
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discussed in Chapter 3.238  The lure of fame transforms persona into a valuable 
“asset” and reputation is at the core of publicity exploitation.  On this analysis, the 
conclusion would be that only celebrities could or should benefit from a publicity 
right.  Yet it has already been noted (section 4) that the subject matter is persona, not 
the value in that persona.  The consequence of this, together with the justification 
from autonomy, is that every individual should benefit from any legally recognised 
publicity right in his persona.   
 
As would be expected from his emphasis on the inherently personal nature of a 
publicity right, McCarthy is very strongly in favour of a universal right: 
Does the right of publicity cover only celebrities?  The answer is clearly no.  
The right of publicity is an inherent right of identity possessed by everyone at 
birth.  While the commercial value of a celebrity’s identity is understandably 
greater than that of a non-celebrity, this does not mean that only celebrities 
have a right of publicity.239 
 
And as Nimmer rather pragmatically notes “[i]t is impractical to attempt to draw a 
line as to which persons have achieved the status of celebrity and which have not; it 
should rather be held that every person has the property right of publicity”.240   
 
Vaver also agrees that “personality protection surely should not depend on how rich 
or famous a person is”.241  Unsurprisingly, authors in the Civilian personality rights 
camp also favour a universal right.  As Logeais says, “[e]veryone gets an image at 
birth… there is no reason to discriminate between a celebrity and an anonymous 
individual.”242  Neethling couches this in even stronger terms:  personality rights are 
highly personal and are therefore “non-transferable, uninheritable, incapable of being 
relinquished or attached, they cannot prescribe, and they come into existence with the 
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birth and are terminated by the death of a human being.”243  There is certainly no 
suggestion that such rights are exercisable by some persons but not by others. 
 
It is an equitable and fair proposition to assert that if publicity rights are to be 
recognised by virtue of their inseparable link to the individual upon whose persona 
they depend, then they should be recognised equally for all individuals.  The 
personhood justification has this consequence: it ensures the availability of the right 
to all individuals. 
 
However, while all individuals are entitled to a publicity right by virtue of their 
inherent image, the impact of fame potentially makes itself felt when it comes to 
assessing damages.  This can be seen in arguments advanced by McCarthy, Nimmer 
and Vaver, amongst others.  Thus, McCarthy accepts that the commercial value of 
the celebrity’s persona is “understandably greater” than that of an anonymous 
individual.  Nimmer’s position is revealed by the full extent of the quotation used 
above, where he goes on to argue that: 
… it should rather be held that every person has the property right of 
publicity, but that the damages which a person may claim for infringement of 
the right will depend upon the value of the publicity appropriated which in 
turn will depend in great measure upon the degree of fame attained by the 
plaintiff.244 
 
So too with Vaver who observes that, in New York at least, “it did not matter one jot 
on the issue of liability whether the plaintiff was a private person or a public person. 
When one came to consider damages, the factor was relevant; the nature and extent 
of recovery could quite properly differ depending upon the circumstances of a 
particular plaintiff.”245  These sentiments are also echoed by Madow in a footnote, 
where he notes that  
[s]trictly speaking, everyone, obscure as well as famous, “has” a right of 
publicity…  As a practical matter, however, as Nimmer himself conceded, the 
right of publicity “usually becomes important only when the plaintiff (or 
potential plaintiff) has achieved in some degree a celebrated status”… this is 
because the damages recoverable for infringement of the right depend on the 
commercial value of the publicity that has been appropriated…  Very rarely 
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will the economic value of a noncelebrity’s persona be sufficient to support a 
lawsuit for infringement.246 
 
The justifications in support of publicity rights therefore serve to shape the extent of 
the right in two ways.  In the first place, they demonstrate that the right should be 
available to all individuals, by virtue of the universal nature of personhood and 
persona.  In the second place, they draw out a secondary factor which impacts at the 
stage of compensation for unauthorised use and licence fees for authorised use.  
Reputation may affect the size of the licence fee and the calculus of damages, but it 
should not impact on the prior creation of the right.  The role of reputation in the 
quantum of damages will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.  
 
7. BALANCING THE INTERESTS:  SHOULD THERE BE A 
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY? 
 
The above review demonstrates that the justifications from autonomy and dignity and 
the economic analysis operate to support a legal right granting control of persona to 
the individual.  The nature of the dignitarian justification means that such a right of 
control should be available to all individuals.   
 
However, the precise legal nature of this right remains to be determined.  I have 
consciously sought to avoid justifying a particular type of legal right, and instead 
focused on the need to control use of persona.  Determining the legal nature of a 
publicity right will be undertaken in Chapters 5 and 6, where it will be unavoidably 
shaped by the conclusions reached in this chapter.  The fact that competing interests 
have also been identified must be taken into account.  Even an economic analysis in 
favour of a publicity right recognises that there is an economic case for limiting any 
right, so that permitted uses may be made.  Individuals’ interests in the grant of a 
right can be contrasted with the public interest in freedom of expression and use of 
the cultural commons, as discussed in section 3 above.  There is thus the critical issue 
of the balance to be struck.     
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In fact, balancing freedom of expression with private interests is not a new 
endeavour, and courts in Europe and the US are now well versed in this exercise.  
(As McCarthy observes, “such line drawing is the stock in trade of the law.”247)  
Since the Human Rights Act 1998 introduced (to all intents and purposes) the ECHR 
with direct horizontal effect in the UK, Scottish and English courts have balanced 
Articles 8 and 10 in order to protect the privacy of individuals and the rights of 
publishers, as will be examined in Chapter 5.   
 
What is clear is that Article 10 does not automatically trump other rights.248  Instead, 
it can, and should, have an important role to play to “balance new limits on the use of 
persona”.249  Freedom of expression can therefore be accommodated as a balancing 
interest, allowing the courts to weigh the competing interests of publicity and 
freedom of expression where they arise.  For this reason, freedom of expression shall 
be considered in Chapter 7 in the context of the scope of the publicity right, rather 
than at this prior stage of justifying or denying publicity rights.  
 
The same conclusion applies in the case of the second competing interest:  the need 
to preserve the cultural commons.  It is possible to recognise publicity rights and the 
interests of the genuine cultural commons, by creating a publicity right and then 
recognising certain creative or cultural uses as defences.  This would protect the 
interests of those who used persona to create new meaning or pass quasi-political 
comment on existing meaning, in the manner of Laugh It Off v South African 
Breweries.250  This balance can be achieved by recognising a right of publicity for 
individuals, to enable them to control use of persona, which is then countered by a 
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defence of parody and fair use.  Again, this will be examined in more detail in 
Chapter 7, in looking at limitations to a publicity action.   
 
 
8. THE ALTERNATIVE QUESTION 
 
Whereas this chapter has so far sought to justify the recognition of a right of 
publicity, there is in fact an alternative question that can be posed.  It is possible to 
suggest that this entire justificatory project can be replaced with this question such 
that, even if all the above arguments advanced in favour of publicity rights were to 
be rejected, this question and answer can resolve the matter in favour of the creation 
of a publicity right.  By addressing both the primary question and this secondary 
question, and by answering both in favour of a right of publicity for the individual, 
the case in favour of publicity rights becomes even stronger.  
 
This alternative question is posed by Reiter: 
the crucial question for the law is not the unanswerable moral question, “Do 
celebrities deserve the earning power their status commands?” but rather the 
factual question, “Given that celebrities command considerable commercial 
power, who should benefit?”251 
 
Goodenough chooses to address this question and provides a rational, and personal, 
answer:   
If there were no control over the persona, as Madow advocates, then the 
values inherent in it would be at the full disposal of capital-rich companies… 
as between a star whose name is to be used and a huge manufacturing 
company making the use, I, at least, would rather see the star control the 
value of the use of her identity than leave the benefit solely to the company.252   
 
There cannot be many who would disagree with Goodenough here.253  Even Madow 
acknowledges that “caution” is required since “in a “free use” world… it is not only 
popular cultural practice that would be liberated.  Large corporate actors would also 
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be set free to “graze” on the celebrity commons.”254  While these corporate actors 
would still seek to differentiate themselves from the rest of the herd, the unlimited 
use of persona would be a part of that – especially for companies, like Talksport,  
Hello! and Anabas, which are keen to exploit the popular figures of the day. 
 
Denying a legal right of publicity does not cancel out the commercial value inherent 
in persona or award it to some party who is more deserving (however such a party 
could be identified).  Instead, it means that the value becomes a free-for-all and this, 
in turn, means that, realistically, it is most likely to be annexed for the benefit of 
“capital-rich companies”.  In the absence of legal protection, the commercial value in 
persona is as likely to fall to the “huge manufacturing company” or the media 
enterprise – neither of which are likely to be more deserving or have any greater 
demands on our sympathy than the individual in question.  It is certainly most 
unlikely to benefit the man in the street or the small creative enterprise. 
 
The practical reality of the creation of a legal right is that it assigns whatever value 
there may be in persona to the individual.  This is echoed in Hughes’ work on 
intellectual property, where he observes that “[p]roperty rights in the persona give the 
individual the economic value derived most directly from one’s personality.  As long 
as the individual identifies with his personal image, he will have a personality stake 
in that image.”255   
 
On this analysis, the question of justification becomes an issue not of determining 
whether or not we need a right, but how we respond to the undeniable commercial 
practice which exists.  As Reiter contends, the question under this analysis moves 
from the moral to the factual.  Despite this, the answer to his factual question, as with 
the moral one, remains the same:  the individual is entitled to the control (both 
economic and dignitarian) of persona which a right of publicity would formally 
recognise, subject always to the balances noted above, to respect freedom of 
expression and the creative use of the cultural commons.   
 
                                                 
254
 Madow, “Private ownership of public image”, at 240, footnotes omitted.  Emphasis in the original. 
255
 Hughes, “The philosophy of intellectual property”, at 341, emphasis added. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I have sought to explore the “reasons or considerations likely to sway 
the free understanding of the participants in social life in favour of the institution that 
is being defended.”256  This has involved examining the interests that would be 
protected by a right of publicity and balancing these against the competing interests.  
It is clear that justifying a right of publicity is a very complex task and, as 
demonstrated (in section 8 above), can depend to some extent on the question that is 
asked.  Nonetheless, whether one looks to the question of whether an individual 
should be entitled to a right of publicity, or the alternative question of who should 
benefit from the undeniable value of the commercial practice, the answer is the same:  
a right of publicity, vested in the individual, can demonstrably be justified.   
 
Individuals, whether famous or not, have certain dignitarian and economic interests 
in their persona, which can be protected through control.  Where their persona is 
used without consent, they suffer harm to those interests.  Not the least of these 
harms is the risk of adulterated “free” speech through misuse of persona, which 
challenges the integrity of persona and the very notion of free speech or freedom of 
expression.  A society which professes to respect autonomy and dignity cannot deny 
the individual’s right to control and protect something as inherently personal as his 
image, indicia, information and reputation.  Parallels have been drawn between the 
harm resulting from unconsented use of persona and the harm arising from 
unauthorised use of one’s vote, where the individual’s “voice” is appropriated for 
unauthorised purposes.   
 
These justifications do not, however, claim that a publicity right is inviolate and 
should trump all other interests at stake: an unfettered property right in publicity is 
“overbroad”, as de Grandpre recognised.  In particular, the right to freedom of 
expression should be recognised as an important limitation on such a right.  
However, its proper role is as a counter-balance to any publicity claim, and not as a 
                                                 
256
  HM Spector, “An outline of a theory justifying intellectual and industrial property” [1989] EIPR 
270, at 270, as quoted at note 1. 
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basis for rejecting the validity of such a right.  So too with the need for creative 
expression, through parody or other creative works, to communicate new cultural 
meanings and challenge existing ones.  Instead, exceptions and limitations should 
and must be recognised.  These competing interests do not operate to defeat claims to 
publicity, but are correctly to be viewed as limitations to any such right, and 
accordingly, the scope of such interests will be considered in more detail in Chapter 
7.  Before that stage is reached, the scope of the right itself needs to be examined. 






Now that the examination of publicity rights in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 has provided a 
clearer understanding of publicity and justified a publicity right, it is possible to 
move to an evaluation of the most appropriate “home” for a right of publicity, which 
poses the third question:  how are such rights to be protected in Scots law?   
 
As the law currently stands, a number of legal actions could be pressed into service 
to enable the protection and exploitation of different elements of the right of 
publicity.  The discussion in Chapter 3 showed that individuals in England have 
sought to protect their negative right to prevent or recover for unauthorised use 
primarily through tort, and pursuers in Scotland are likely to attempt to use such 
actions.  Statutory rights such as data protection have also been pressed into service.  
The positive power to exploit the value in persona has been explored by 
commercially motivated individuals through contracts, as was seen in Chapter 3 
regarding, for example, Irvine’s relationships with Ferrari and Hilfiger, and the Club 
pro forma contract.   
 
The rest of this thesis will assess where a right of publicity should lie in Scots law.  
First, publicity’s relationship with privacy will be examined, in Chapter 5.  The focus 
of Chapter 6 will move to a consideration of real and personal rights in Scots law, to 
see if either of these categories of right could provide a home for publicity rights.  
Chapter 7 seeks to identify the limits of the right, together with appropriate remedies 
when the right (within those limits) has been breached. 
 
The conclusions reached in the previous chapters will be central to this examination:     
 
1. Exploitation of persona can be authorised or unauthorised.  The rights or 
powers enjoyed by the individual differ between the negative right to prevent 
exploitation and the positive power to engage in authorised exploitation, 
either in person or through a third party. 





2. Exploitation of persona can usefully be distinguished according to three 
different methods of exploitation:  the media information use, the promotion 
use, and the merchandising use.  Each of these is capable of both authorised 
and unauthorised exploitation. 
 
3. The subject matter of exploitation is a complex amalgam of name, image and 
identity, voice, gestures and characteristics, frequently supplemented by some 
personal information and, in most cases, reliant upon an underlying 
reputation – collectively referred to as the individual’s “persona”. 
 
The interests which are at the heart of a right of publicity are both dignitarian and 
economic.  Control of persona is central to enabling the individual to exercise 
autonomy in deciding what use, or not, to make of his persona.   
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The close relationship between privacy and publicity has already been highlighted in 
previous chapters, most notably in Chapter 2.  As Cornish and Llewelyn observe, “all 
but the most unremittingly secretive can be induced to reveal home truths at some 
price”
1
 and it is also true to note that commercial organisations, almost without 
exception, are prepared to exploit these same home truths and to pay the price to do 
                                                 
1
 Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property:  Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights, 
6
th
 ed, 2007 (henceforth Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property), para 9-04. 
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so.  For the right fee, privacy can give way to publicity.  On this analysis, publicity is 
the other side of the privacy coin.   
 
This chapter will start with an examination of the concept of privacy in the UK, 
before going on to assess whether publicity truly is derived from, or dependent upon, 
privacy rights.  In this examination, privacy is not a generic concept, but is the legal 
concept of respect for one’s private life arising from Article 8 ECHR.
2
  In turn, 
publicity is the notion of the media information, endorsement and merchandising 
uses of persona, as defined in Chapter 3, whether in their authorised or unauthorised 
context.   
 
 
2. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE UK 
2.1. Introduction  
Cornish and Llewelyn define privacy as “the desire of an individual to be free of 
intrusion”.
3
  This echoes the basis of privacy as expressed by MacCormick, who 
additionally notes the importance of control of privacy to the individual: 
some kind of desire for seclusion… This desire for seclusion should not be 
construed in all cases as a desire to exclude all other human beings from 
one’s life or some aspect of it; rather it is a desire to have the last say on 





While this may be the conceptual basis of privacy, it does not address how that desire 




As recently as 1983, Frazer could state that, in law, the “concept of ‘privacy’ is so 
subjective that there is substantial disagreement among writers as to its nature and 
                                                 
2
 For a review of privacy pre-ECHR see Kilbrandon, “The law of privacy in Scotland” (1971) 2 
Cambrian L Rev 35. 
3
 Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property, para 9-01. 
4
 MacCormick, Legal Rights and Social Democracy, at 175. 
5
 Moreham also draws this distinction between the theoretical desire underlying privacy and the 
objective standard applied in law:  see Moreham, “Privacy in public places”, at 617. 
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scope.”
6
  While there is still no specific tort of privacy,
7
 consequently forcing Scots 
and English law to protect such interests “in a piecemeal fashion in several disparate 
areas”,
8
 it would nevertheless be fair to say that the law has moved on considerably 
since 1983.  Privacy in the UK, while still evolving, owes its current existence to the 
ECHR and to the Human Rights Act 1998.
9
   
 
Article 8 of the ECHR, as incorporated into Scots law by section 1(2) of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, ensures that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence.”
10
  It is this which offers individuals 
the right to prevent, or subsequently recover for, an invasion of their privacy.   
 
2.2. Breach of Confidence  
The problem facing pursuers both in Scotland and in England in privacy actions has 
been how to introduce Article 8 ECHR into court in the absence of direct horizontal 
effect
11
 or a specific action for privacy.  Indirect horizontal effect has resulted in the 
                                                 
6
 Frazer, “Appropriation of personality”, at 295.  This level of disagreement reflects MacCormick’s 
comment about the consequent need for achieving certainty through “intelligent legislation”:  see 
Chapter 1, page 2.    
7
 And never will be at common law, according to Wacks, in part because of the “notorious judicial 
inertia in this field”:  R Wacks “Why There Will Never be an English Common Law Privacy Tort”, in 
A Kenyon and M Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law, 2006, at 155.  See also 
Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406, paras 51 and 52, per Lord Hoffmann.   
8
 Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 77.  These areas include data protection, 
the Protection From Harassment Act 1997, defamation, and breach of confidence, amongst others.  
See HL MacQueen, “A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Personality Rights in Scots Law, Mainly with Regard to 
Privacy”, in NR Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative 
Perspective, forthcoming 2009.  Note, however, that the disparate areas may differ north and south of 
the border:  Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, paras 3.4.6-3.4.8. 
9
 This came into force in the UK on 2 October 2000: helpfully, this was just in time for the Douglases, 
whose wedding took place the following month (18 November 2000).  
10
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4.XI.1950, 
Article 8(1). 
11
 Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 restricts the application of the Act to “public bodies”.  A 
human rights claim cannot be raised directly against a private body, but human rights issues must be 
considered by the courts (which are public bodies) in any case brought before them.  In any action 
against a private body, therefore, there must be a prior cause which enables the claim to reach court, 
where human rights issues can then be considered.  For a brief review of the problems of horizontal 
application and privacy in England see NA Moreham “Privacy and horizontality:  Relegating the 
common law” (2007) 123 LQR 373.  An earlier and more detailed analysis in this field is Morgan, 
“Privacy, confidence and horizontal effect”.  There is no longer any doubt over the availability of the 
remedy in horizontal relationships, and this approach was underscored by Resolution 1165 of the 
Council of Europe (passed against the background of the death of the Princess of Wales in a car crash 
following pursuit by reporters) which emphasised that Article 8 privacy rights should be enforceable 
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creative use of existing Scottish and English doctrines, some of which have been 
extensively “developed”, almost beyond recognition.  The most obvious example in 
this area is the doctrine of breach of confidence.  Restated by Lord Goff in the 
Spycatcher case
12
 in 1990, it has since taken some interesting turns as lawyers have 
made it the most likely vessel for introducing privacy concerns of this nature in 
court.  The extent of the development of this action can be illustrated by the contrast 
between the law in 1984 as stated by the Scottish Law Commission, and in 2004 as 
stated by the House of Lords.  The Scottish Law Commission’s view in 1984 was 
that breach of confidence in Scotland required some relationship of confidence 
between the parties, and was typically “based in express or implied contractual 
obligations, there being very few cases which can clearly be discerned to derive from 
some other branch of the law such as delict”.
13
  By 2004 the House of Lords was able 
to state (at least in relation to English law) that in privacy cases the action for breach 
of confidence:   
has now firmly shaken off the limited constraint of the need for an initial 
confidential relationship… The essence of the tort is better encapsulated now 
as misuse of private information.
14
   
 
This approach was also present in the Court of Appeal’s 2005 decision in Douglas v 
Hello! where they stated: “In so far as private information is concerned, we are 





This use of breach of confidence as the “home” for privacy has caused considerable 
problems
16
, since information which is confidential is not necessarily private, and 
                                                                                                                                          
against private persons, including the media.  See para 12 of the Resolution, available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta98/ERES1165.htm  (accessed 17 
September 2007); and HL MacQueen, “A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Personality Rights in Scots law, 
Mainly with Regard to Privacy” in NR Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in 
Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, forthcoming 2009, para 12.2. 
12
 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109. 
13
 SLC No. 90, Breach of Confidence, 1984, para 2.1.    
14
 Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 457, para 14, per Lord Nicholls, emphasis added; also para 17where 
Lord Nicholls says:  “The time has come to recognise that the values enshrined in Articles 8 and 10 
are now part of the cause of action for breach of confidence.”  See also Murray v Big Pictures [2008] 
EWCA Civ 446, para 24.   
15
 [2006] QB 125, para 53.  Is this possibly an oblique reference to another entertainer?! 
16
 Not least in relation to the scope of the action in cases of commercial confidence.  See Carty’s 
analysis of the current role of commercial confidence following these Article 8 developments: “An 
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vice versa.  Thus, confidential information is that which is secret, yet to “confine the 
law of privacy to cases involving secrets of some kind would, however, be to ignore 
both the result in the Hannover case, and the fact that the privacy interest is different 
from the interest in preserving confidentiality.”
17
  Nevertheless, since 2000, a 
number of individuals have relied on the “revised” doctrine of breach of confidence 
shored up by Article 8 ECHR to claim against the media and other parties for 





  The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has also been 
involved in Article 8 cases involving intrusion into private life, most notably Peck v 
The United Kingdom
20
 and von Hannover v Germany.
21
  These developments in the 




Infringement of privacy under Article 8 can now arise where the information in 
question is either (i) protected by a relationship of confidentiality, as in cases such as 
Spycatcher,
23
 McKennitt v Ash,
24
 and Mosley v News Group Newspapers Limited
25
 or 
                                                                                                                                          
analysis of the modern action for breach of commercial confidence:  when is protection merited?”  
[2008] IPQ 416 (henceforth Carty, “The modern action for breach of commercial confidence”). 
17
 Jones and Wilson, “Photographs, privacy and public places”, at 360.  See also Michalos, “Douglas v 
Hello:  The final frontier”, at 204. 
18
 For example, CC v AB [2006] EWHC 3083 (QB); McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73; A v B&C [2002] 
2 All ER 545; X v BBC 2005 SLT 796; Lord Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspapers Limited 
[2008] 1 QB 103; Murray v Big Pictures [2008] EWCA Civ 446. 
19
 For example, Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 457; Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] 
EWHC 1777 (QB). 
20
 Application No 44647/98, 28 January 2003.   
21
 Application No 59320/00, 24 June 2004.  See also Sciacca v Italy (no. 50774/99). 
22
 See, for example, Richardson and Hitchens, “Celebrity Privacy”; Michalos, “Douglas v Hello:  The 
final frontier”; Michalos, “Image rights and privacy:  After Douglas v Hello”; Morgan, “Privacy, 
confidence and horizontal effect”; R Mulheron, “A potential framework for privacy?  A reply to 
Hello!” (2006) 69 MLR 679; T Aplin, “The development of the action for breach of confidence in a 
post-HRA era” [2007] IPQ 19; A McLean and C Mackey, “Is there a law of privacy in the UK?  A 
consideration of recent legal developments” [2007] EIPR 389; T Pinto, “A private and confidential 
update – not for publication” [2007] Ent LR 170; H Delany and C Murphy, “Towards common 
principles relating to the protection of privacy rights?  An analysis of recent developments in England 
and France and before the European Court of Human Rights” [2007] EHRLR 568 (henceforth Delany 
and Murphy, “Towards common principles relating to the protection of privacy rights?”); Jones and 
Wilson, “Photographs, privacy and public places”; J Gibson, “A Right to My Public:  Copyright, 
Human Right or Privacy?”, in F MacMillan and K Bowrey (eds), New Directions in Copyright Law 
Volume 3, 2006; Moreham, “Respect for private life”; Moreham, “Privacy in public places”.  Wacks 
laments that the “voluminous literature… has failed to produce a coherent or consistent meaning” of 
the notion of privacy:  R Wacks, “Why There Will Never be an English Common Law Privacy Tort”, 
in A Kenyon and M Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law, 2006, at 175. 
23
 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109. 
24
 [2008] QB 73. 
25
 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB). 
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(ii) where it is protected by virtue of its private nature, as in cases such as Campbell v 
MGN,
26
 CC v AB,
27
 and Murray v Big Pictures.
28
  As Eady J noted in Mosley v News 
Group Newspapers Limited, the reason the law protects information which is private 
even if there is no relationship of confidence is “because the law is concerned to 
prevent the violation of a citizen’s autonomy, dignity and self-esteem.”
29
   
 
In light of the fact that breach of confidence is now only part of the story, it is 
essential to consider when protection will arise absent an obligation of confidence. 
 
2.3. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy  
Information will be protected under Article 8 where the recipient is subject to a duty 
of confidence
30
 or where the information is private.  The question then arises as to 
what constitutes private information.  Judicial development – heavily influenced by 
Strasbourg jurisprudence – has moved away from assessing the existence of a right 
of privacy based on whether or not the incident or information was publicly 
available, and instead looks to whether the individual had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  For example, in Peck v The United Kingdom
31
 the reproduction on 
television and in the press of CCTV footage of Peck carrying a knife in Brentwood 
was an invasion of his right to privacy.
32
  The ECtHR held that Peck “was in a public 
street but he was not there for the purposes of participating in a public event and he 
was not a public figure.”
33
  The media publication of the CCTV images meant that 
his presence in the street “was viewed to an extent which far exceeded any exposure 
to a passer-by or to security observation… and to a degree surpassing that which the 
applicant could possibly have foreseen”.
34
  The scope of the public dissemination of 
these images contravened Peck’s reasonable expectation of the degree of public 
exposure to which he would be subject.  Similarly, the Court of Session in X v BBC 
                                                 
26
 [2004] 2 AC 457. 
27
 [2006] EWHC 3083 (QB). 
28
 [2008] EWCA Civ 446. 
29
 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), para 7. 
30
 As per the test in Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Limited (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109.  
31




 Ibid., para 62. 
34
 Ibid., para 62. 
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was prepared to accept that the pursuer had a stateable case in her privacy action, 
despite the fact that part of the personal information in question related to 
proceedings in open court.
35
  As a result of cases such as these, “[i]t is no longer 
possible to draw a rigid distinction between that which takes place in private and that 
which is capable of being witnessed in a public place by other persons… a decision 
excluding privacy protection simply because the claimant was in public could now 
be subject to challenge in Strasbourg.”
36
   
 
In Campbell v MGN,
37
 however, the House of Lords was prepared to accept that 
there might be circumstances when a public figure in a public place could have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy: 
We have not so far held that the mere fact of covert photography is sufficient 
to make the information contained in the photograph confidential. The 
activity photographed must be private. If this had been, and had been 
presented as, a picture of Naomi Campbell going about her business in a 
public street, there could have been no complaint. She makes a substantial 
part of her living out of being photographed looking stunning in designer 
clothing. Readers will obviously be interested to see how she looks if and 
when she pops out to the shops for a bottle of milk. There is nothing 
essentially private about that information nor can it be expected to damage 
her private life. It may not be a high order of freedom of speech but there is 




Following the decision of the ECtHR in von Hannover
39
 and subsequent Court of 
Appeal decisions in England
40
 this idea that “popping out for a bottle of milk” may 
be unprotected by privacy can no longer be said to be an accurate statement of the 
law.  The decision in von Hannover indicated that even a public person in a public 
                                                 
35
 2005 SLT 796. 
36
 Moreham, “Privacy in public places”, at 610.  See also Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34, para 
19. 
37
 [2004] 2 AC 457. 
38
 Ibid., para 154, per Baroness Hale.  This approach was explicitly influenced by the New Zealand 
judgment of Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34.  The contents of the photograph for which an 
injunction was sought and refused in John v Associated Newspapers were “akin to “popping out for a 
pint of milk”” and did not give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy.  [2006] EWHC 1611 (QB), 
paras 15 and 18.     
39
 Von Hannover v Germany App no 59320, 24 June 2004. 
40
 The difficulty of reconciling Campbell and von Hannover was grappled with by Patten J in Murray 
v Big Pictures, but his attempts to do so were not expressly followed by the Court of Appeal in that 
case, which instead focused on the fact that the claimant here was a child, distinguishing it from 
Campbell and von Hannover.  For Patten J’s reasoning, see [2007] EWHC 1908 (Ch), especially paras 
60-66; for the Court of Appeal see [2008] EWCA Civ 446, para 47 et seq. 
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place would have a reasonable expectation of privacy if she was not carrying out 
public duties, such that “the mere fact that someone is in some sense a public figure 
does not mean that she has no right of privacy when in a public place.”
41
  Thus, 
whether or not one has a reasonable expectation of privacy no longer turns upon the 
distinction between    
on the one hand, a person’s private recreational activities and, on the other 
hand, routine activities such as a walk down the street or a trip to the grocer’s 
to buy milk since, in some circumstances, the latter could also attract a 




Recent guidance from the Press Complaints Commission echoes this conclusion, by 
stating that photographs should not be taken of people in private places without their 
consent, and it defines “private places” as “public or private property where there is a 




Only where the information in question is already widely available will a particular 
remedy be denied, as in Mosley, where it was held that there could be no reasonable 
expectation of privacy, sufficient to warrant an injunction, in respect of images 
which were already widely available, although damages were still available.
44
  
Further, Lord Phillips in Douglas v Hello! in the Court of Appeal, opined that the 
publication of images could infringe the claimant’s privacy, even where these images 
had previously been published: 
Insofar as a photograph does more than convey information and intrudes on 
privacy by enabling the viewer to focus on intimate personal detail, there will 
                                                 
41
 Jones and Wilson, “Photographs, privacy and public places”, at 357.  
42
 Waelde and Whitty, “A Rights of Personality Database”, para 11.4.4(b).  A recent example of just 
such a trip to the shops being protected is Murray v Big Pictures [2008] EWCA Civ 446.  In an earlier 
case, John v Associated Newspapers, Eady J did make reference to the position of the claimant’s feet 
in the photograph in question, noting that “his feet are still on the public street”, but this observation 
was caveated with the words “[i]nsofar as it still matters”, [2006] EWHC 1611 (QB), para 4. 
43
 See the Press Complaints Commission’s Code of Practice at Article 3 and the Note thereto: 
http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/practice.html (accessed 24 June 2008). 
44
 [2008] EWHC 687 (QB).  This was the (unsuccessful) action for an injunction to stop the News of 
the World from posting video footage of the S&M session on its website.  The subsequent action by 
Mosley for infringement of privacy raised, amongst other issues, a different question as to loss of the 
right to privacy because of the extent of prior public exposure:  Eady J was asked to consider the 
argument that “the Claimant forfeited any expectation of privacy partly because of the numbers 
involved; that is to say, with so many participants [in the S&M session] it should not be regarded as 
private.  This was coupled with reliance upon the fact that he liked to record these gatherings on 
video, with the consent of all those present, so as to have a “memento”.”  Eady J rejected this 
argument and upheld the claimant’s privacy action, awarding damages of £60,000.  [2008] EWHC 
1777 (QB), paras 109 and 236. 
A Right of Publicity in Scots Law 
149 
Part III, Chapter 5: Privacy as a Basis for Publicity 
be a fresh intrusion of privacy when each additional viewer sees the 
photograph and even when one who has seen a previous publication of the 




Whether repeated publication will infringe an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy is likely to depend on the facts of the case, particularly the extent of the 
previous circulation:
46





Even in circumstances where the party attempting to disclose has a connection with 
the event or information in question, the courts have been prepared to uphold the 
claimant’s reasonable expectation of privacy and refuse the right to publish.  In CC v 
AB
48
 the information in dispute was highly personal, but arguably not particularly 
worthy of protection:  the intimate relationship to be disclosed in the tabloids was 
adulterous.  As Eady J. observed “even an adulterous relationship may attract, at 
least in certain respects, a legitimate expectation of privacy.”
49
  In addition, as is 
clear from Mosley v News Group Newspapers Limited, the party seeking to disclose 
may be subject to a duty of confidentiality, as per “pure” breach of confidence cases, 
even where she is also involved in, or part of, the information to be disclosed.  Thus, 
a member of an S&M group was in breach of her duty of confidence to all other 
participants by recording and selling details of an S&M session, regardless of her 
wish to disclose it.
50
  In the very different factual circumstances of McKennitt v Ash
51
 
there was also an “old-fashioned breach of confidence by way of conduct 
inconsistent with a pre-existing relationship”.
52
  Ash’s claim that the information also 
concerned her was insufficient to overcome this obligation of confidence.
53
   
 
                                                 
45
 [2006] QB 125, para 105. 
46
 See Moreham, “Privacy in public places”, at 612 and 615-616. 
47
 Ibid.; Michalos, “Douglas v Hello:  The final frontier”. 
48
 [2006] EWHC 3083 (QB). 
49
 Ibid., para 30.  In fact, the judge appeared to have considerably more sympathy for the adulterous 
claimant than for the defendant who sought “revenge” and “some financial gain” (para 10) and who 
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 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), paras 105-108.  This presumably overturns, or can be distinguished 
from, Ouseley J’s view that prostitutes do not owe a duty of confidentiality to their clients: Theakston 
v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC 137 (QB), paras 73-75. 
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 [2008] QB 73. 
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 Ibid., para 8. 
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Not all commentators have welcomed these developments.  In Michalos’s analysis 
“[w]here the image is actually private, privacy should be respected, but there is a 
slow creep into the right to take photographs of people in public places that is not to 
be welcomed.”
54
  Even where the photographs are taken in a private or controlled 
place – as in Douglas – such that the information in them is inaccessible, Michalos 
queries whether the law should protect something which is trivia and thus not 
inherently private.  Yet the Court of Appeal did not assess the privacy of these 
images according to their nature as “trivial tittle-tattle”
55
 but rather according to the 
ECtHR approach of determining whether there was a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.
56
  It is suggested that this is in fact the correct approach when the action is 
based on Article 8 privacy rights,
57
 although different considerations may arise when 




A final factor is likely to be the nature of the information, with the highly personal 
details of Campbell’s medical treatment for drug addiction and the sexual 
predilections of Mosley, for example, both being regarded as intimate matters which 
carried a high expectation of privacy.  As Fenwick and Phillipson note, based on 





These cases indicate that the basis for enforcing one’s Article 8 privacy rights, as 
most recently affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Murray
60
 and by Eady J in 
                                                 
54
 Michalos, “Image rights and privacy:  After Douglas v Hello”, at 387. 
55
 Ibid., at 386. 
56
 See Ibid., at 387 for her analysis of von Hannover and its impact on English law. 
57
 While it could be argued that the more trivial something is, the less likely it will be that a reasonable 
expectation of privacy will arise, nonetheless it is suggested that this test is not relevant in cases of 
privacy.  It arises in breach of commercial confidence to ensure that protection is granted to material 
which “merits protection because it is potentially of value” (per Carty, “The modern action for breach 
of commercial confidence”, at 436), yet value is not the rationale for protecting information under 
Article 8.  
58
 For an analysis of the role of breach of confidence in protecting commercial or trade secrets, see 
Carty, “The modern action for breach of commercial confidence”. 
59
 Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, at 779. 
60
 Murray v Big Pictures [2008] EWCA Civ 446, para 39.  See also paras 35 and 36.  Leave to appeal 
this decision to the House of Lords was refused on 27 October 2008: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/minutes/081028/ldordpap.htm#judbus (accessed 
8 November 2008). 
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Mosley,
61
 is whether the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  This is 
influenced by factors such as the nature of the information, the nature of any 
relationship between the parties,
62
 particularly whether or not a duty of confidence 
was owed,
63
 the way in which the information was obtained,
64
 and the location.
65
  
The Murray case also suggests that children (or their parents on their behalf) will 
have a higher expectation of privacy.
66
   
 
One element which may operate to reduce (albeit not necessarily to negate
67
) the 
reasonable expectation of privacy is the prior conduct of the claimant.  Where the 
information sought to be disclosed is intended to correct a prior lie that the claimant 
has propagated, the courts are likely to recognise the public interest in the 
publication.
68
  This was the situation in Campbell v MGN, where the House of Lords 
agreed that MGN were at liberty to publish the fact that Campbell used illegal drugs, 
since this revelation would correct the prior misleading image created by Campbell’s 
adoption of an anti-drugs stance.  The use of photographs of Campbell outside the 
Narcotics Anonymous venue to illustrate the story was, however, excessive and thus 
infringed her privacy.
69
   
 
Case law over the last eight years has shown a gradual convergence of contrasting 
European approaches to privacy.
70
  Whereas French law has traditionally afforded 
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 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), para 7. 
62
 Delany and Murphy, “Towards common principles relating to the protection of privacy rights?”, at 
580, citing Browne v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2008] 1 QB 103. 
63
 As for example in McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73. 
64
 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Limited [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), para 17, per Eady J.  The 
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reasonable expectations of privacy.  See also Moreham, “Privacy in public places”, at 628-632. 
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 Moreham, “Privacy in public places”, at 621-623. 
66
 [2008] EWCA Civ 446.  Contrast Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34, where the court looked for 
evidence of a “serious risk” to the children (para 159). 
67
 See for example the analysis by A McLean and C Mackey, “Is there a law of privacy in the UK?  A 
consideration of recent legal developments” [2007] EIPR 389, at 393. 
68
 Gordley puts forward an interesting critique of this, suggesting that in some cases hypocrisy is 
preferable to the disclosure of vice: Foundations of Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust 
Enrichment, 2006, at 236. 
69
 Photographs may well be treated as particularly intrusive, as Campbell illustrates.  This is echoed in 
John v Associated Newspapers Ltd, where the claimant only sought to restrain publication of a 
photograph, and not the accompanying text.  [2006] EWHC 1611 (QB), para 3. 
70
 Although differences do remain.  For analysis of both convergence and continuing differences see, 
for example, Waelde and Whitty, “A Rights of Personality Database”, para 11.8.2; Delany and 
Murphy, “Towards common principles relating to the protection of privacy rights?”. 
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“almost startlingly high levels of protection”
71
 for privacy, it now gives increased 
recognition to the importance of the freedom of the press, influenced in part by the 
ECtHR.  Conversely, the traditionally media-friendly approach in English law, and 
even the more balanced German approach to privacy, is being strengthened in favour 
of the private life of the individual as a result of the Strasbourg jurisprudence.
72
       
 
Article 8 will therefore be engaged if there is “a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the sense that a reasonable person in [the claimant’s] position would feel that the 
Photograph should not be published.”
73
  If Article 8 is engaged, “the next question 
would be how the balance should be struck as between the individual’s right to 
privacy on the one hand and the publisher’s right to publish on the other”,
74
 thereby 
taking account of the defendant’s Article 10 right to publish.  It is thus necessary to 
examine the right of freedom of expression under Article 10. 
 
2.4. Freedom of Expression 
Article 10 guarantees the right to freedom of expression, but this right is subject to 
“such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society… for the protection of the reputation or rights 
of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence”.
75
  
Thus, Article 8 can operate to limit the extent of the Article 10 right.  Conversely, 
Article 8 may be limited by such interference as is necessary in a democratic society, 
for example for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
76
  Both rights are 
of equal importance, and both must recognise limitations arising from the other.
77
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 Delany and Murphy, “Towards common principles relating to the protection of privacy rights?”, at 
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72
 Ibid., paras 572-574 and 581-582. 
73
 Murray v Big Pictures [2008] EWCA Civ 446, para 39.  See also paras 35 and 36. 
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 Ibid., para 40. 
75
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4.XI.1950, 
Article 10(2).  
76
 Ibid., Article 8(2). 
77
 Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 457, para 113, per Lord Hope; In re S  [2005] 1 AC 593, para 17, 
per Lord Steyn.  For commentary on this point, see Delany and Murphy, “Towards common 
principles relating to the protection of privacy rights?”, at 570; HL MacQueen, “A Hitchhiker’s Guide 
to Personality Rights in Scots Law, Mainly with Regard to Privacy”, in NR Whitty and R 
Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, forthcoming 
2009; Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, at 691. 
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This legal background can be contrasted with that in America, where the First 
Amendment right to free speech is typically paramount at the expense of other 
interests: “[t]he un-balanced American approach flows from factors peculiar to that 
jurisdiction, namely the absolute nature of the First Amendment, and the fact that it 
is not balanced by any constitutional right to informational privacy.”
78
   
 
In the UK, and indeed in Europe, once the claimant’s Article 8 right has been 
engaged the courts are required to balance it with Article 10, to determine if the 
defendant’s right to freedom of expression justifies the intrusion into the claimant’s 
privacy.  Since neither right takes priority, the courts must assess the interests at 
stake on each occasion, and this balancing process involves  
what is sometimes called an “intense focus” on the facts, that is, a sensitive, 
nuanced and contextually specific examination of the particular factual 
circumstances of each case, incorporating an evaluation and attachment of 




Eady J has expressly stated that broad generalisations of the kind used in the past – 
such as “public figures must expect to have less privacy” – are now incompatible 
with this process.  Such “generalisations can never be determinative.  In every case 





When carrying out this balancing exercise, however, one of the key tests is the public 
interest.
81
  It has been observed that “what interests the public is not necessarily in 
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 G Phillipson and H Fenwick, “Breach of confidence as a privacy remedy in the Human Rights Act 
era” (2000) 63 MLR 660, at 686.  See also Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34, para 73.  Contra 
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 Waelde and Whitty, “A Rights of Personality Database”, para 11.5.  The language of “intense 
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81
 Fenwick and Phillipson assert that “the weight of any claim under Article 10 should be assessed by 
reference to the contribution that the publication in question makes to a debate of serious public 
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the public interest”.
82
  Instead, “[t]he judge will often have to ask whether the 
intrusion, or perhaps the degree of the intrusion, into the claimant’s privacy was 
proportionate to the public interest supposedly being served by it.”
83
  Whether 
publication is in the public interest will depend on a number of factors, the first being 
whether the information can be said to “contribute to any debate of general interest to 
society”.
84
  Eady J applied this test in Mosley, noting that the “debate” prompted by 
the News of the World’s publication of the story in question was unlikely to be that 




The public interest may also depend upon a number of specific factors, including the 
disclosure of criminality,
86
 the need to correct lies,
87
 and the nature of the use to be 
made of the information in order to serve the public interest.  As a general rule, 
political speech can expect to be afforded greater weight (and therefore be more 
likely to be protected against competing rights by Article 10) than that attaching to 
artistic expression or commercial expression.
88
  However, even where such public 
interest factors are present, disclosure will not always be justified.  In the words of 
Eady J: 
Would it justify installing a camera in someone’s home, for example, in order 
to catch him or her smoking a spliff?  Surely not.  There must be some limits 
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 Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 457, para 58 and also para 117, where it was accepted that the public 
had an “undoubted” right to know that Campbell had misled them as regards drug taking.  
88
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Despite judicial and academic guidance on the nature and extent of the public 
interest, “there continues to be a difference of opinion on the extent to which certain 
material, particularly relating to the private lives of celebrities, contributes to debate 
on matters of legitimate public concern.”
91
  In all cases, the balancing test will come 
down to what is proportionate in the circumstances.  However, recent decisions have 
tended to favour the individual’s right of privacy at the expense of freedom of 
expression:  “despite the continuing theoretical presumption of equality as between 
the two articles, significant restrictions have been placed on the enjoyment of Art. 10 






In 2009, judicial protection of privacy can thus be said to arise under breach of 
confidence and Article 8 in one of two ways, depending on whether the information 
is confidential or whether it is allegedly private and the individual had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  Once Article 8 is engaged, the court will usually have to 
balance the pursuer’s Article 8 interests with the defender’s Article 10 interests, to 
determine, on the facts of each case, which right should be protected. 
 
The alliance of breach of confidence and Article 8 has not only been used to protect 
against unwelcome dissemination of details of private lives.  It has also featured 
successfully in one case which involved the commercial exploitation of an 
individual’s private information:  Douglas v Hello!.  Here, the Douglases sought to 
use privacy to claim against Hello! for its unauthorised publication of their wedding 
photographs (that is, enforcing their negative right) while at the same time granting 
                                                 
90
 Ibid., para 130. 
91
 Delany and Murphy, “Towards common principles relating to the protection of privacy rights?”, at 
574. 
92
 Ibid., at 570.  Similarly, Fenwick and Phillipson refer to the current Strasbourg jurisprudence as 
revealing “a strikingly restrictive view of the role of the press”: Media Freedom, at 695. 
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the right to OK! to publish photographs of the same event (that is, exploiting their 
positive power).  This evidence of commercial exploitation of publicity on the one 
hand and an attempt to restrict publication on the other, has led to the conclusion that 
Douglas is a publicity action masquerading as a privacy action.
93
  Can privacy, as 
developed under Article 8, operate to protect the publicity interests of individuals? 
 
 
3. PUBLICITY AS A PRIVACY RIGHT 
3.1. Introduction 
Having established the parameters of the right to privacy, it is now possible to assess 
whether or not this right can operate as the basis for a right of publicity in Scots law.  
Waelde and Whitty assert that privacy and publicity are “fundamentally two sides of 
the same coin, namely, the right to prevent and to control the dissemination of one’s 
image.”
94
  Whereas privacy is based on the need to protect dignitarian interests, 
however, publicity is the “extra-patrimonial right to privacy and identity or image… 
[which] entails the right to prohibit others from disclosing or disseminating it and a 
right of a patrimonial character to commercial exploitation of the personal 
information by waiver or licensing.”
95
   
 
Publicity can be seen as a daughter of privacy or, less flatteringly, as privacy’s 
“underbelly”,
96
 its key trait being the commercial exploitation, by waiver or licence, 
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253.  See also R Mulheron, “A potential framework for privacy?  A reply to Hello!” (2006) 69 MLR 
679, at 700; Michalos, “Image rights and privacy:  After Douglas v Hello”, at 385; Richardson and 
Hitchens, “Celebrity Privacy”, at 251; and N Gardner and K Brimstead, “Confidential information – 
damages” [2005] EIPR N190, at N191. 
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 Waelde and Whitty, “A Rights of Personality Database”, para 11.4.5; contra Carty, “Advertising, 
publicity rights and English law”, at 212-215. 
95
 Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, para 3.4.9.  This definition owes much 
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of personal information and identity which could otherwise be kept private, at the 
option of the individual.   
 
When the Douglases sought to recover from Hello! for publication of unauthorised 
photographs of their wedding, it was this newly-emerging concept of privacy upon 
which they relied.  In the words of the Court of Appeal: 
Applying the test propounded by the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN, 
photographs of the wedding plainly portrayed aspects of the Douglases’ 
private life and fell within the protection of the law of confidentiality, as 
extended to cover private or personal information.
97
   
 
This view was upheld, albeit not as the direct subject of the appeal, in the House of 
Lords.
98
  Further, the initial publication of the authorised photographs by OK! did not 
operate to deprive the Douglases of their privacy regarding the unauthorised 
images.
99
   
 
Douglas also demonstrates the dual aspects of publicity, both of which must be 
examined against our understanding of privacy established above.  In enforcing the 
negative right to prevent unauthorised use, what role does the current privacy action 
have to play?  And can waiver of privacy constitute the positive power to exploit?  
Three areas will be considered below in order to determine whether the right of 
publicity identified in Chapter 3 can be protected through the right of privacy. 
 
 
3.2. The Need for a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Whether an Article 8 remedy is available depends on whether there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  As with Douglas, where the claimant can demonstrate this, 
the unauthorised use will, on the face of it, be remediable.  
                                                 
97
 [2006] QB 125, para 95.    
98
 [2008] 1 AC 1.  Even Lord Walker, in the minority, was prepared to indicate support for the 
decision of the Court of Appeal: “I should not be taken as expressing the view that the judge and the 
Court of Appeal were wrong about the modest awards of damages made in their [the Douglases’] 
favour.”  (para 295.) 
99
 See section 2.3 above.  Michalos points out that this decision has granted the Douglases what is in 
effect a permanent injunction against publication of the unauthorised images:  “Douglas v Hello:  The 
final frontier”, at 245-246. 
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When this test is applied to two of the cases advanced as paradigm publicity cases in 
Chapter 3, we see the limits of Article 8 as a basis for publicity cases.  In Irvine v 
Talksport Ltd,
100
 the element of persona used (Irvine’s image) was a publicly 
available photograph, which was not provided in circumstances of confidence nor 
was it such as to give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy.  So too with the 
subject matter in Lyngstad v Anabas, where the photographs used on the badges and 
pillowcases were obtained by way of copyright licence from the studios 
responsible.
101
  Even if the claimants in these cases had tried to demonstrate a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the particular images used, the 
defendants would have been able to avail themselves of the defence that the images, 
and the information they contained, were already widely known.
102
  There could 
therefore be no privacy-based action in these instances, yet the claimants suffered a 
wrong which, in Irvine’s case, was remediable under another tort. 
 
An Article 8 action is relevant where the aim is to keep information out of the public 
domain – even if, as in Douglas, the claimant intends to make subsequent use of that 
information through his own exploitation of it.  Where the publicity action arises 
from a fact situation in which there could be no claim for privacy,
103
 then the basis 
for the publicity action must be sought elsewhere, as indeed happened in Irvine and 
Lyngstad.   
 
Moreover, Article 8 is concerned with personal information, yet the subject matter of 
a publicity right is persona.  This concept, as defined in Chapter 3, includes personal 
information, but also extends to name, image, indicia and reputation.  While an 
image or representation of an individual is undoubtedly capable of conveying 
information – as in Douglas v Hello! – in many cases the “information” in question 
                                                 
100
 [2003] 2 All ER 881.  
101
 [1977] FSR 62, at 65, per Oliver J. 
102
 This is in contrast to Douglas v Hello!, where the unauthorised images were not publicly available 
– a (controversial) factor which played a key role in the House of Lords decision.  See section 3.4.3 
below. 
103
 The alternative principle of inaccessibility under the “traditional” doctrine of breach of confidence 
has been analysed by Carty, “The modern action for breach of commercial confidence”.  However, 
this is of limited value since, as Carty notes, the two actions have very different rationales (at 428). 
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will be negligible, as in Irvine v Talksport.  A further obstacle to raising a privacy 
action in Irvine would therefore be the lack of information which was exploited by 
Talksport:  the focus of the action was the image and associated reputation.
104
  
Privacy actions, which protect information that gives rise to a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, are therefore too narrow in scope to accommodate use of material which 
may not be private and may only constitute information in the loosest sense.  Even 
where no private information is conveyed by an image, its use may impact upon the 
individual’s autonomy and dignity, and may have a commercial value to authorised 
exploiters. 
 
Thus, privacy under Article 8 is too narrow a basis for publicity rights.  The publicity 
use, as identified in Chapter 3, stretches further than infringement through the 
unauthorised dissemination of private information.  Instead, it encompasses 
unauthorised public use of persona, whether or not that persona is subject to an 
obligation of confidence or a reasonable expectation of privacy, and whether or not 
that persona constitutes “information” per se.   
 
3.3. Private Information:  Invasion versus Dissemination 
The taking of the photograph, private possession of the photograph and the 
publication of the photograph are entirely separate.  So far it is publication 
that has been enjoined but we may be moving into a world where delivery up 





One distinction which is not always made explicit in privacy cases under Article 8 is 
whether the infringement arises from the invasion or from the subsequent 
dissemination of the private elements.  For example, Eady J in Mosley refers to the 
action being “breach of confidence and/or the unauthorised disclosure of personal 
information”.
106
  Although “[m]ost of the decided cases are concerned with the 
                                                 
104
 Irvine & Others v Talksport Ltd [2003] 2 All ER 881. 
105
 Michalos, “Image rights and privacy:  After Douglas v Hello”, at 385. 
106
 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), para 3, emphasis added.  See also, for example, the judgment of Patten J 
in Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd  [2007] EWHC 1908 (Ch), where he observed that such Article 8 
claims call upon the courts to prevent dissemination by “imposing limitations on the publication of 
events which were visible to any member of the public who happened to be around at the time.” (para 
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publication of the offending photographs… in some cases there may be antecedent 
acts which ought also to be wrongful.”
107
     
 
This distinction undoubtedly needs to be made, since the Article 8 right to private life 
has been used in much wider circumstances than publication of private information.  







  Even the simple act of taking a 
photograph could, in theory, breach an individual’s privacy.
111
  These diverse ways 
in which privacy can be infringed, together with the cases already examined in this 
Chapter, reflect Prosser’s analysis of privacy, wherein he identified four distinct 
ways in which privacy can be invaded:
112
 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private 
affairs. 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name and 
likeness.   
Only the last of these can be aligned to the publicity right under investigation. 
 
The breadth of this privacy action is in marked contrast to a publicity action which, 
by its nature, arises from the unauthorised dissemination, rather than the antecedent 
invasion.  As noted in Chapter 3, it is a key element of the publicity right (and 
wrong) that the use must involve an element of public use.  This can be illustrated by 
an unreported Scottish criminal case from 2008.  The accused pled guilty to a breach 
of the peace arising from his actions in photographing a young woman in a street in 
                                                                                                                                          
20, emphasis added.)  This was followed in the Court of Appeal, which referred to the principles in 
cases of “wrongful publication of private information.” Murray v Big Pictures [2008] EWCA Civ 
446, para 27. 
107
 Jones and Wilson, “Photographs, privacy and public places”, at 359.  See also Moreham, “Privacy 
in public places”; Morgan, “Privacy, confidence and horizontal effect”. 
108
 Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406, albeit the Human Rights Act 1998 did not apply 
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refused to formulate a general principle of “invasion of privacy”, para 19. 
109
 Martin v McGuiness 2003 SLT 1424; Howlett v Holding [2006] EWHC 41 (QB). 
110
 Ward v Scotrail 1999 SC 255. 
111
 Moreham, “Privacy in public places”, at 633-635. 
112
 Prosser, “Privacy”, at 389. 
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Edinburgh.  Feeling unwell, the woman had left a bar in the city centre and gone 
outside for air, where the accused took photograph(s) of her.
113
  Sheriff Hogg 
apparently commented that “[t]he lady concerned was entitled to her privacy and not 
to have a passing stranger take a photograph”.
114
  While this may or may not 
constitute a civil wrong under the law of privacy, it is difficult to see where any 
publicity complaint could lie, unless or until the photographer disseminated the 
image.  Merely taking the photograph would not infringe the media information, 
promotion or merchandising uses.   
 
This distinction highlights one of the differences between privacy and publicity:  
while privacy can be breached by the invasion or the subsequent dissemination of 
information, a publicity action is concerned only with the dissemination or public use 
of persona.  Privacy is effectively concerned with inward-looking actions as well as 
their external communication, whereas publicity’s concern is control of the external-
facing persona, being what is brought to the public attention.  Article 8 privacy rights 
are therefore in this sense much broader than the right sought by publicity – in 
contrast to the test of a reasonable expectation of privacy, which was concluded to be 
too narrow to support a publicity action.  While this does not necessarily preclude 
privacy as the basis of a right of publicity, it does indicate that there is not a terribly 
close fit between the two rights.   
 
3.4. Positive Exploitation 
While the previous two sections have considered problems with using privacy rights 
to protect the negative right of publicity, or unauthorised use, this section assesses 
whether or not privacy can offer a route to enable positive exploitation of persona, 
through consensual use.  This requires analysis of the right as between the individual 
and the exploiter, and between the exploiter and unauthorised users. 
 
                                                 
113
 This case was reported by the BBC on 3 October 2008: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/edinburgh_and_east/7651107.stm (accessed 8 October 2008).  To 
date, no case report has been located, and given the guilty plea there may not be one. 
114
 As per the BBC report: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/edinburgh_and_east/7651107.stm . 
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3.4.1. Waiving the Right to Privacy 
Once an individual has a right to exclude others from a sphere of his life, a 
potentially lucrative market then arises in which to waive the right, in return for a fee.  
The control of private information which results from breach of confidence/Article 8 
enables the individual to exploit this control as he chooses.  Morgan observes that 
“an injunction… would naturally place the protected party in a position to exploit his 
image commercially – by negotiating payment to release it”.
115
  Such controlled 
waiver of privacy arguably creates the possibility of publicity in respect of any 
material covered by confidence and privacy.  Where an individual is willing to reveal 
truths for a price, as in Douglas, there is no breach of confidence and no interference 
with the individual’s private life, because the individual has consented to this 
dissemination of information:  he has waived his right to be let alone.  However, 
whether this is sufficient to constitute a right of publicity remains to be seen. 
 
Certainly, this interpretation of the logical consequence of privacy protection (in 
practical terms, at any rate) has considerable attraction for those keen to exploit any 
interest in their personal lives.  Yet it perhaps ignores the commercial basis of such 
deals:  “in reality, advertisers would not pay famous people such as sports and 
entertainment personalities for giving up their privacy, but would pay because such 
persons’ images already had a “recognition value”.”
116
  It is this recognition value 
which was identified
117
 as being a key ingredient in much publicity practice, 
exploited through use of physical representations such as name, image and 
information.   
 
This leads to an initial obstacle with waiver of privacy rights, arising from the 
slightly different subject matter of privacy and publicity rights, noted earlier.  
Whereas privacy offers protection for private information, publicity seeks protection 
for persona.  Thus, a positive power to exploit publicity cannot be constituted by the 
waiver of a privacy right in respect of non-private images (such as those in Irvine). 
                                                 
115
 Morgan, “Privacy, confidence and horizontal effect”, at 450.  See also Whitty, “Overview of 
Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, para 3.4.9; Colston and Middleton, Modern Intellectual Property 
Law, para 18.7.5.   
116
 Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 59, footnote omitted. 
117
 Chapter 3, section 3.2. 
A Right of Publicity in Scots Law 
163 
Part III, Chapter 5: Privacy as a Basis for Publicity 
 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider whether waiver can operate to provide a 
positive power to exploit.
118
  Those who advocate the derivation of the right of 
publicity from the prior right of privacy effectively argue for a right to exploit the 
interest in private images or information through waiver: if “either English or Scots 
law were to recognise a common law or delictual right to privacy against individuals, 
it would enable anyone to protect information and images concerning them, and 
indirectly allow a right to publicity”.
119
  But if the right to privacy cannot be waived, 
then no positive power can be derived from this right.  Although the private law right 
of breach of confidence could be waived, it is less easy to separate out the human 
rights aspect of this right, and the question of whether or not human rights can be 
waived is not an easy one to answer.   
 
Some writers believe that “[h]uman rights, by doctrine, can – and in fact should – not 
be transferred, waived or inherited”
120
 and certainly it is troubling to conceive of the 
right to life or to freedom from torture being capable of waiver:  no-one is likely to 
advocate consent or waiver operating as a defence to murder.
121
  However, it remains 
the case, as stated by Reid and Blackie in the context of personal bar, that “[t]here is 
no rule that rights enshrined in the ECHR may in no circumstances be waived.”
122
  It 
is therefore possible in theory for an individual to contract to waive his right to 
privacy.   
 
It has, however, been recognised that it is difficult (and often undesirable) to 
establish implied waiver:  
the fact that an individual has disclosed personal information on one or more 
occasions cannot readily be taken to signify that he or she has abandoned the 
                                                 
118
 This discussion takes place in the context of waiver of rights in Scots law in general, and against 
the specific background of waiver of a right to privacy derived from Article 8 ECHR.  For an analysis 
of waiver of Civilian personality rights, see Waelde and Whitty, “A Rights of Personality Database”, 
para 11.4.3(b), (c), and (d).  
119
 Colston and Middleton, Modern Intellectual Property Law, para 18.7.5. 
120
 Klink, “50 years of publicity rights in the US”, at 381. 
121
 EC Reid and J Blackie, Personal Bar, 2006, (henceforth Reid and Blackie, Personal Bar) para 18-
10. 
122
 Ibid, para 18-10.  See also para 5-17. 
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right to protect the confidentiality of similar matters on an open-ended 
basis.
123
   
 
It is therefore perfectly possible for an individual to court publicity in relation to one 
personal issue, while rigorously maintaining his privacy (and the commercial value 
of that privacy) in another.
124
  Using waiver cannot defeat an ongoing right but, at the 
same time, it does demonstrate a potential ability for an individual to control what 
elements of privacy they will waive, and when.  Despite this, it is hard not to 
sympathise with the view that “human rights based concepts… are not well suited to 
protect comprehensively the value of popularity.  They fail to secure damages and 
can stand in the way of essential trade requirements”.
125
   
 
Further, waiver operates to remove the granter’s right of action against the 
“infringer”, rather than making the use legal.
126
  The third party user therefore only 
gains the right as against the person granting the waiver, and would have no defence 
against any other individual who may have an action, such as a second person 
featured in the private images.
127
  Waiver of a privacy right may be a pragmatic 
response to publicity exploitation, but it is less satisfactory than the positive grant of 
a publicity right. 
 
3.4.2. Third Party Rights Derived from Waiver 
Even if waiver were to be accepted as a valid method of enabling the dissemination 
of otherwise private information, it is also necessary to consider the extent of the 
grant and the consequences of this for the third party.  Specifically, where a third 
party (such as a newspaper) has paid for the exclusive right to publish otherwise 
                                                 
123
 Ibid., para 18-11.  This applies with even greater force when the publicity sought comes after the 
infringement of privacy:  Peck v UK, Application No 44647/98, 28 January 2003, para 86. 
124
 As for example per McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73; see also Moreham, “Privacy in public places”.  
The same applies in Civilian jurisdictions:  Waelde and Whitty, “A Rights of Personality Database”, 
para 11.4.3(c). 
125
 Klink, “50 years of publicity rights in the US”, at 381. 
126
 For example, see Haelan Laboratories v Topps Chewing Gum Inc 202 F 2d 866 (2
nd
 Cir 1953), at 
867, Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 130-131, and Milligan, Brand it Like 
Beckham, at 130. 
127
 Where the exploiter seeks to use images regarding two people, he would need to see consent of the 
second person (also through waiver) in order to avoid this situation. 
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private information, what is the extent of its rights against an unauthorised publisher 
of the same (or similar) information?  
 
It is submitted that the power to waive does not constitute a particularly strong legal 
basis for granting an enforceable right to the authorised user.  Reid and Blackie note 
that “personal bar is a doctrine which suppresses rights rather than creates them”,
128
 
which suggests that waiver (being a personal bar to the enforcement of the privacy 
right) may be capable of acting as a shield but not as a sword.
129
  While this will aid 
the authorised user in a direct claim with the individual, it is far less likely to help 
where the user wishes to claim against another party and needs a sword, rather than a 




The grant of a waiver thus does not place the third party exploiter in an ideal position 
in law, although large sums will frequently have been paid for this privilege.
131
  Part 
of the problem arises from the fact that a “licence only makes an action lawful which 
would otherwise have been unlawful.”
132
  The same can be said for a waiver, since as 
noted above it is in effect a form of personal bar.
133
  It is therefore not clear that the 
grant of a waiver provides the third party with an enforceable right against any other 
infringer.   
 
3.4.3. Third Party Rights: An Exclusive Licence  
If rights based upon waiver are troublesome, there is no indication that a third party 
right based upon a purported exclusive licence is any more satisfactory.  This is well 
illustrated by Douglas v Hello!
134
 in the House of Lords – a decision which 
encapsulates the considerable difficulties of attempting to found a licensable 
                                                 
128




 The English concept of equitable estoppels may, however, be more effective in such situations:  
Ibid., paras 5-22 – 5-23.  
131
 See Chapter 3, section 4 
132
 Michalos, “Douglas v Hello:  The final frontier”, at 243.  Where the licence is supported by a 
statutory scheme, an exclusive licensee may benefit from an enforceable right, as for example with 
copyright under s92 of the CDPA 1988. 
133
 Reid and Blackie, Personal Bar, para 18-10. 
134
 [2008] 1 AC 1. 
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commercial interest on a right of privacy.  Nonetheless, the case is the leading 
authority in England for the existence of the legally enforceable right of an 




In order to determine whether OK! had an enforceable right against Hello!, the Lords 
had to consider three issues: (i) whether the Douglases’ wedding photographs 
amounted to confidential information; (ii) whether OK! benefited from that 
confidence; and, if so, then (iii) whether Hello! had infringed that confidence by 
publishing the unauthorised images, or whether OK! had already placed the 
information in the public domain by publishing authorised photographs, thereby 
destroying any confidentiality in those images.
136
   
 
Lord Hoffmann, for the majority, concluded that these wedding photographs did 
constitute confidential information.
137
  Given that the wedding photographs qualified 
as confidential information, the second issue to be determined was the nature of 
OK!’s right in the Douglases’ photographs, that is to say, what right was granted to 
OK! under its contract with the Douglases?  A significant factor for the court appears 
to have been the high value of the information
138
 to both contracting parties:   
The point of which one should never lose sight is that OK! had paid £1m for 
the benefit of the obligation of confidence imposed upon all those present at 
the wedding in respect of any photographs of the wedding.  That was quite 
clear.  Unless there is some conceptual or policy reason why they should not 
have the benefit of that obligation, I cannot see why they were not entitled to 
enforce it.  And in my opinion there are no such reasons.  Provided that one 
                                                 
135
 The Douglases’ claim was disposed of by the Court of Appeal in favour of the Douglases, and 
Hello! chose not to appeal the outcome to the Lords.  Thus, the Lords only required to consider the 
rights of OK! vis-à-vis Hello!: “this appeal is not concerned with the protection of privacy.  Whatever 
may have been the position of the Douglases, who, as I mentioned, recovered damages for an invasion 
of their privacy, OK!’s claim is to protect commercial confidential information and nothing more.” 
[2008] 1 AC 1, para 118, per Lord Hoffmann.   
136
 Although the facts were novel, their Lordships were clear that the principles to be applied were 
those previously established in the leading breach of confidence cases in England, Coco v AN Clark 
(Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 and Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Limited (No 2) [1990] 
1 AC 109. 
137
 [2008] 1 AC 1, para 118. 
138
 Carty observes that the focus on the fee paid meant that the debate moved “from protecting 
“secrecy” to protecting the value of OK’s investment”, “The modern action for breach of commercial 
confidence”, at 448. 
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keeps one’s eye firmly on the money and why it was paid, the case is, as 




In the absence of any conceptual or policy reasons against protection, OK!’s interest 
in the confidentiality of the wedding photographs, derived from the high value 
contract with the Douglases, was one that the Law Lords were prepared to protect.   
 
This conclusion leaves a number of questions unanswered.  If the Douglases had not 
charged a fee at all, or if they had charged a lesser sum, would the law still have 
protected OK!’s exclusive right?  The commercial value of the deal might be 
negligible, yet the facts and subject matter would otherwise remain the same.  Since 
the value of the deal appears to form the basis in law of OK!’s enforceable right 
(described by Michalos as a “jurisprudential leap”
140
), it is essential to have as much 
clarity about the scope and extent of this alleged right and the means of creating it – 
clarity which is currently lacking.  As Reid observes, if “an obligation between A 
and C is to be recognised in Scots law, it will require a more principled foundation 
than the assertion that A has paid a great deal of money to B.”
141
   
 
The third issue was whether Hello!’s publication breached that confidence.  Baroness 
Hale and Lord Brown agreed with Lord Hoffmann’s analysis that OK!’s publication 
of certain authorised images meant that those images were in the public domain
142
 
but “no other pictures were in the public domain and they did not enter the public 
domain merely because they resembled other pictures which had.”
143
  Noting that he 
could not understand Lord Nicholls’ view that publication of approved photographs 
rendered publication of unapproved photographs acceptable,
144
 Lord Hoffmann (and 
the majority) concluded that OK! had an enforceable right of confidence in the 
                                                 
139
 [2008] 1 AC 1, para 117, per Lord Hoffmann, his emphasis.  Lord Hoffmann was supported by 
Lord Brown: “Having paid £1m for an exclusive right it seems to me that OK! ought to be in a 
position to protect that right and to look to the law for redress were a third party intentionally to 
destroy it.” (Ibid, para 325). 
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 Michalos, “Douglas v Hello:  The final frontier”, at 243.  
141
 Reid, “Personality rights in the modern Scots law of delict”, para 4.4.2. 
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 [2008] 1 AC 1, para 122, per Lord Hoffmann. 
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authorised photographs.
145
  Nonetheless, the distinction between the information 
contained in the two sets of images is rather slender, and exposes the final outcome 
to the suspicion that what was protected was not information (as per a privacy action) 




This decision arguably makes commercial sense, by reflecting the intentions of the 
Douglases and OK!.  In determining whether or not OK! had an interest recognised 
in law, the majority were clearly influenced by the fee paid by OK! for use of the 
wedding photographs.  There is certainly merit in a legal system which is grounded 
in the reality of commercial practice:  Laddie J endorsed this approach in the context 
of passing off (rather than privacy), where he said “passing off is closely connected 
to and dependent upon what is happening in the market place… [it] responds to 




Yet this very appeal to commercial reality is the weakest part of the judgment,
148
 and 
one that was opposed by Lord Walker, who argued that “the confidentiality of any 
information must depend on its nature, not on its market value.”
149
  Relying on the 
commercial value of a deal to determine its status as a legally protected right is 
intellectually troublesome, and creates considerable legal uncertainty.
150
  There can 
certainly be no assurance that a Scottish court would follow this decision,
151
 and the 
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evidence suggests that it should not be adopted, since “OK!’s right was said not to 
arise because of a proprietary interest but by reason of a licence in Equity (a concept 




The rather unprincipled manner by which the solution was reached in Douglas v 
Hello!, and the uncertain impact of the judgment of the House of Lords in Scots law, 
tend to support the pressing need for a principled response to clarify the legal 
interests of the individual, the authorised user as licensee, and the unauthorised user 
as defendant.   
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
The above analysis has examined the connection between the existing right of 
privacy and the proposed right of publicity.  Although privacy actions are available 
as a rather pragmatic basis for publicity type actions, as in Douglas, the attempt to 
rely on privacy is unsatisfactory, on both theoretical and practical grounds.  Although 
there may be similarities between the two actions, not least as regards the desire to 
control public access to private image and information, shoe-horning publicity into 
privacy does not benefit either interest.  Whitty argues that “[r]ecognising the 
different natures of privacy and publicity is more intellectually honest than trying to 
subsume the latter into the former.”
153
  This sentiment is also expressed by Michalos: 
The courts need to deal with the fact that trade secrets, commercial property 
in images and genuinely private personal information are different animals 
and need different causes of action.  It may be that, whilst decreed 




Carty supports this conclusion, noting that “the creation of some form of image or 
publicity right needs to be expressly debated as a possible separate right, not slipped 
                                                 
152




 Michalos, “Image rights and privacy:  After Douglas v Hello”, at 387.  See also Wacks:  “The 
solution, as I have said, plainly lies in clearly drafted legislation that provides a remedy in tort for 
unwanted publicity.”  R Wacks, “Why There Will Never be an English Common Law Privacy Tort”, 
in A Kenyon and M Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law, 2006, at 183. 
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under the radar of the action for breach of confidence by the celebrity industry.”
155
  
But absent such a debate, privacy appears to be one course of action the celebrity 
industry is taking, as in Douglas. 
 
Two separate short-falls with shoe-horning publicity into privacy actions are 
apparent.  The first relates to the negative right to prevent publicity exploitation.  
Where the persona exploited does not constitute private information, then Article 
8/breach of confidence can have no role to play, since there will be no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  Privacy is too narrow a basis on which to protect material 
which may not be private and may not be “information”, other than in the broadest 
sense.  Any unauthorised use of persona which does not infringe the individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy will remain unprotected under a privacy action.  
Secondly, where the publicity sought is in fact the positive power to exploit, an 
action which is derived from privacy will be reliant on waiver.  As demonstrated, this 
may be commercially viable, but is not a particularly satisfactory legal solution, not 
least as regards the rights of any third parties involved.     
 
The following chapter will examine other rights in Scots law, to determine if an 
alternative right can be found to protect persona as a whole, in all publicity situations 
– the promotion and merchandising uses as well as media information – and whether 
through negative or positive exploitation.   
                                                 
155
 Carty, “The modern action for breach of commercial confidence”, at 453 – although she goes on to 
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“Advertising, publicity rights and English law”, at 215.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In light of the limitations, explored in Chapter 5, of the current privacy action it is 
necessary to consider other rights in Scots law to determine where a right of publicity 
should most appropriately be located.  The following section will consider the nature 
of real and personal rights in Scots law against the key features of publicity, as 
summarised in the introduction to Part III.  
 
 
2. THE NATURE OF RIGHTS IN SCOTS LAW 
 
As there is no legislative or judicial precedent for a publicity right per se in Scotland, 
any such right in Scots law can be written on a clean slate, albeit a slate with pre-
existing lines ruled on it to shape the writing.  In analysing publicity in the context of 
Scots law, it is critical to bring a clear understanding of these ruled lines, its 
taxonomy, which is the product of Scots law’s mixed heritage: “[i]n Scots law… the 




Although a detailed review of the history of Scots private law is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, a brief summary of its mixed roots is helpful to place real rights and 
personal rights in context.  The first (and arguably greatest) “systematizing 
influence”
2
 was provided by Viscount Stair, who “fused the sources of the Scottish 
common law, going back to Celtic and Saxon law, and variously influenced by 
Anglo-Norman feudal law, canon law, and Roman law, he stamped this rich 
amalgam with the pattern, the grid of the civilian tradition.”
3
  Since Stair, the ever-
increasing influence of the English Common law has, unsurprisingly, diluted this 
                                                 
1
 D Visser and NR Whitty, “The Structure of the Law of Delict in Historical Perspective”, in K Reid 
and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland Vol II, 2000, (henceforth Visser and 
Whitty, “The Law of Delict in Historical Perspective”), at 427. 
2
 Ibid., at 431. 
3
 Ibid. 
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Civilian tradition,
4
 leaving Scots law as a mixed legal system, open to influences 
from both traditions. 
 
Stair, following Grotius (closely but not exactly
5
), distinguished between a real right, 
jus in re, and a personal right, jus ad rem.
6
  This real/personal division has been 
retained to the present day, such that the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia has a volume 




In his Institute, Erskine defines the real/personal division as follows:  
the essential difference may be perceived between rights that affect a subject 
itself, which are called real, and those which are founded in obligation, or, as 
they are generally styled personal.  A real right, jus in re, whether of property 
or of an inferior kind – as servitude – entitles the person vested with it to 
possess the subject as his own; or, if it be possessed by another, to demand it 
from the possessor, in consequence of the right which he hath in the subject 
itself; whereas the creditor in a personal right or obligation has only a jus ad 
rem, or a right of action against the debtor or his representatives, by which 
they may be compelled to fulfil that obligation, but without any right in the 




Erskine’s definition of these rights highlights a fundamental difference between the 
two:  the focus of the real right is a “thing”, whereas a personal right typically arises 
from obligation and exists in respect of a particular individual or his representatives.  
The obligation creating the personal right can be (to use Stair’s terminology) 
conventional, arising from consent, or it can be obediential, whereby it is imposed by 
law.  In Scots law, a contract is a conventional obligation, while delict and 
unjustified enrichment are obediential obligations.
9
  One consequence of the 
distinction between conventional obligations and obediential ones is that, whereas 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., at 427. 
5
 Ibid., at 434. 
6
 Stair, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, DM Walker (ed), 1981, at II, 1, I.  The term jus in 
personam is also used for personal rights, see R Feenstra, “Real rights and their classification in the 
17
th
 Century:  The role of Heinrich Hahn and Gerhard Feltmann” 1982 JR 106, at 106-107. 
7
 See K Reid (ed), The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol XVIII “Property”, 
(henceforth Reid (ed), SME Vol XVIII), para 1. 
8
 J Erskine, An Institute of the Law of Scotland, JB Nicolson (ed), 8
th
 ed, 1871, at III, I, 2.  
9
 This division is only one, albeit the most common one, of the various possibilities for such 
classification.  For a detailed analysis of the divisions of personal rights and their historical origins, 
see Visser and Whitty, “The Law of Delict in Historical Perspective”, particularly at 434-436.  See 
also MacCormick, SME Reissue “General Legal Concepts”, paras 31-32.  
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obligations under contract are typically owed only by the parties to the contract,
10
 
obediential duties are more broadly owed.   
 
As Visser and Whitty point out, “rights in personam not to be harmed by delict, 
have, as their correlative, obligations owed by an indefinite class of people.”
11
  
However, once the obligation has been breached in a specific instance, the right 
which then arises is “a right against another person or against a determinate, and 
usually small, number of other persons”.
12
  In contrast, real rights are derived from a 
“thing” and are therefore “enforceable against any person who challenges [their] 
existence”.
13
  They are commonly said to be good against the world.  The correlative 
duty to the real right is the duty not to interfere and it is owed by the rest of the world 
to whoever owns the real right:  it is not based upon a personal relationship.
14
  A 
further important feature is that the real right is a right rather than a power:  whether 
one chooses to enforce this right is optional,
15
 but the fact of its enforceability is not.   
 
In the sections that follow, the right of publicity will be assessed against personal 
rights and real rights, to determine how best a right of publicity should be classified 
in Scotland’s mixed legal system, taking into account both the nature of publicity and 
the nature of rights in Scots law.  This will ensure, as far as possible, that the 
development of a right of publicity follows the ruled lines provided by the 
established taxonomy. 
 
                                                 
10
 Subject to any third party rights arising under a jus quaesitum tertio. 
11
 Visser and Whitty, “The Law of Delict in Historical Perspective”, at 473. 
12




 Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, at 25-27. 
15
 See Chapter 3, section 2.4. 
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3. PERSONAL RIGHTS 
 
As Friedmann observes, in the context of the English Common law, the “causes of 
action and the rights of recovery in torts and restitution presuppose the existence of 




If protection for publicity rights is to be found in the fields of delict or unjustified 
enrichment it is necessary to ascertain the “initial entitlement” which can be 
vindicated through these doctrines.  A pursuer cannot hope to succeed in an action 
for infringement of publicity rights in delict or unjustified enrichment without first 
establishing his legally-protected interest nor, it is submitted, can he be entirely 
certain that any contract for the authorised exploitation of persona will be enforced.   
 
It is my submission therefore that personal rights are suitable as vehicles for 
protecting a right of publicity, but that the right itself must be established as an 
existing entitlement, or prior right.  Once a prior right of publicity – being a right to 
control the use of one’s persona in the media information, promotion and 
merchandising uses – has been recognised either by the legislature or judiciary, then 
personal rights have an important role to play.  This section will explore the reasons 
why publicity cannot be located solely within contract, delict or unjustified 
enrichment without an “initial entitlement”, before assessing the protection that 
personal rights do offer once an initial right has been established. 
 
3.1. Conventional Obligations:  Contract 
A contract is a voluntary agreement between two parties
17
 and can therefore be used 
to good effect where there is consensus between parties as to the subject matter of the 
contract and the use to be made of it.  Where the two parties are in agreement, there 
                                                 
16
 D Friedmann, “The protection of entitlements via the law of restitution – expectancies and privacy” 
(2005) 111 LQR 400, at 400; see also 406 and 409.  A similar idea of protected interests is expressed 
in German law, §823 BGB.  
17
 Definitions of “contract” from a number of jurisdictions, including Scotland, are referred to in 
Chapter 2, section 1. 
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can be little doubt that contract is ideally placed to regulate their relationship.  The 
principle of freedom of contract enables the parties to determine their own terms,
18
 
negotiated to suit their purposes and to reflect their bargaining positions within the 
open market.  Any breach of contract can be resolved either through agreed contract 
provisions or by appeal to the courts.     
 
It is difficult to see, however, what role contract has to play in the case of the 
negative publicity right where there is very definitely no relationship or consensus 
between the parties.  Further, the doctrine of privity of contract also restricts the 
application of contract in publicity rights:  a contract may grant a right for an 
authorised party to exploit persona, but cannot confer upon that authorised party any 
right against a subsequent unauthorised user of persona.
19
  The exception is where 
the contract takes the form of a licence of a real right, which enables the licensee to 
raise an action against an infringer where the licensor would have that right.  This of 
course requires a real right to be the subject of the licence, and whether persona can 
be protected by real rights will be examined in section 4 below.  In the absence of a 
real right to be licensed, however, contract plays an essential role in regulating the 
relationship between willing parties, but cannot regulate or impose an obligation on 




A secondary consideration is the subject matter of a contract for the exploitation of 
persona.  Even absent a prior right of publicity in Scots law, there is nothing to 
prevent willing parties from contracting to use persona (howsoever they choose to 
define it) for publicity purposes.  Nonetheless, a prior right of publicity would 
provide a much more certain basis for the contract.  There is a risk, however slight, 
that any licence or contract for exploitation could be unenforceable lacking a prior 
publicity right.  This is particularly the case if the authorised exploiter were to sue for 
specific implement of the contract, since the “terms of the order for specific 
                                                 
18
 HG Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts, Vol 1, 29
th
 ed, 2004, para 1-012.  This principle is of course 
subject to statutory regulation, such as the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
19
 Although the House of Lords appears to have allowed something very like this in Douglas v Hello!, 
by allowing OK! to recover by virtue of a licence in equity, [2008] 1 AC 1.  See Chapter 5, section 
3.4.3.   
20
 WM Gloag and RC Henderson, The Law of Scotland, (eds) Coulsfield and MacQueen, 12
th
 ed, 2007 
(henceforth Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland), para 8.02. 
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implement must be precise”
21
 and no decree will be pronounced “if the contract itself 




Thus, contract is an enabling tool but not a creating one.  In response to the positive 
power to exploit, contract is well placed to regulate the relationship where there is a 
prior right of publicity.  When faced with unauthorised exploitation, contract is 
powerless to assist the aggrieved individual. 
 
3.2. Obediential Obligations I: Delict 
The case of delict is more complex.  Here, reparation must be made for loss caused 
by a legal wrong, as reflected in the maxim damnum injuria datum.  All three 
elements must be shown, such that if there is no loss, no legal wrong or no causal 
connection between the two, there can be no recovery.
23
  In ascertaining whether 
delict could protect publicity rights it is necessary to establish whether unauthorised 
use of persona could amount to a legal wrong causing a loss recognised by law.   
 
It is submitted that, while delict would certainly have a role to play where a publicity 
right was already recognised (Friedmann’s “initial entitlement”), it is harder to 
identify the role that delict could play without such a right in Scots law.  There is 
certainly no publicity delict per se in Scots, or indeed in English, law, although, as 
with English law, there is a reasonable chance that the nominate delicts of passing off 
and breach of confidence (or misuse of personal information) could operate to 
protect some of the interests infringed through unauthorised use of persona.
24
  
Whether a general delictual action for publicity could be recognised is unclear.  Two 
                                                 
21
 W McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3
rd
 ed, 2007, para 23-13. 
22
 Ibid., para 23-14. 
23
 Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland, para 26.01. 
24
 As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, and used, for example, in the cases of Douglas v Hello! and 
Irvine v Talksport.  Reid comments (generally favourably) on the extent to which protection for 
personality rights as a whole can be provided by delict:  Reid, “Personality rights in the modern Scots 
law of delict”; E Reid, “Protection for rights of personality in Scots law:  a comparative evaluation” 
2007 EJCL 11.4.  Contra Whitty, who acknowledges that personality interests, as a wider category, 
“do not align exactly with the delicts which protect those interests”, “Overview of Rights of 
Personality in Scots Law”, para 3.3. 
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separate observations provide insights to the nature of the delictual obligation in 
Scots law.  
 
The first is provided by Visser and Whitty, in their review of the structure of the law 
of delict in Scotland and its historical background.  They note that the future 
development and understanding of delict will depend on “a proper understanding of 
what the purpose of the law of delict should be”
25
 but that “this sense of purpose has 
never been fully developed in Scots law.  Until this happens anomalous categorizing 
will tend to persist and it will be difficult to classify evolving species.”
26
  Lacking 
this sense of purpose, it is difficult to determine whether publicity is the sort of right 
that delict is intended to protect.  Are the interests at stake relevant interests for the 
purposes of delictual liability?  And if so, how should they be classified?   
 
If publicity rights can be protected by delict, then help can be derived from a second 
observation, from Norrie this time, that  
The law of Scotland has never operated within strict and exclusive classes of 
action and, so long as the defender is made aware of the claim he is being 
called upon to answer, it matters really very little whether his culpability is 
founded on intent or neglect.
27
     
 
Indeed, Norrie speculates that the distinction between the intentional delicts and 
negligence is of diminishing relevance and the two categories may eventually 
collapse into one, based on a general concept of fault.
28
  Norrie also makes the point 
that, in Scots law, there is a traditional “distrust of nomina juris:  [instead] the wrong 
is actionable if it infringes a legally recognized interest and it does not matter 
whether the wrong has an appropriate name.”
29
  If it can be established that the 
dignitarian and economic interests in publicity are legally recognised, and that 
infringement of those interests is a wrong, then it is not necessarily fatal to an action 
in delict that there is no appropriately named delictual action for publicity.  Similarly, 
                                                 
25




 KM Norrie, “The Intentional Delicts”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private 
Law in Scotland Vol II, 2000, at 479.  
28
 Ibid., at 480 and 482. 
29
 Ibid., at 508. 
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whether the unauthorised use is intentional
30
 or negligent is likely to be of 
increasingly little importance.   
 
While comfort can be taken from Norrie’s recognition of the flexible approach to 
delict in Scots law, such that culpability is at the heart of the action (whether through 
intent or neglect), it is still essential to show that the harm resulting from the 
unauthorised use of persona is harm to an interest protected by delict, and that the 
unauthorised use is itself a legal wrong.  In the absence of a recognised right of 
publicity, it is submitted that these are both stumbling blocks for a pursuer in 
Scotland.   
 
In the first place, we are required to identify a relevant interest which is harmed by 
wrongful use of persona.  Visser and Whitty refer to the protected interests identified 
by Stair as “(a) life, (b) members and health, (c) liberty, (d) fame, (e) content, delight 
and satisfaction, and (f) goods and possession.”
31
  An expanded version of this list is 
provided in Gloag and Henderson,
32
 where the right to life is regarded as the ultimate 
interest.  Personal security and liberty are the next mentioned, including the right of 
an individual to be “safeguarded from unfounded aspersions on his character”.
33
  
Fraud and invasion of property rights (including both corporeal and incorporeal) 
follow, where the harm may be either direct or indirect, the latter through delicts 
such as nuisance.  Thereafter, things become harder to define:   
The extent to which a person has a right to protection of his general economic 
interests, as distinct from specific items of property, is, however, problematic.  
Such interests are protected against fraud but difficulties surround questions 
of remedy for other forms of intentional harm as for negligence…  Cases in 
which there is no liability for harming economic interest, whether 





                                                 
30
 There is a debate in Scots law as to whether the necessary intent is the intent to carry out the act or 
to cause the end harm:  Norrie discusses this and appears to favour the latter approach.  See KM 
Norrie, “The Intentional Delicts”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in 
Scotland Vol II, 2000, at 478. 
31
 Visser and Whitty, “The Law of Delict in Historical Perspective”, at 435.  See also Whitty, 
“Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, para 3.2.2 and section 3.4. 
32
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Gloag and Henderson then explain that damnum absque injuria, or loss without legal 
wrong, can arise from the “invasion of a mere liberty, or advantage enjoyed on 
sufferance”.
35
  Unless publicity rights protect an interest or right recognised as such, 
then it is likely that the invasion of publicity rights through unauthorised use will be 
regarded as damnum absque injuria. 
 
A review of these protected interests suggests that it is not at all clear that they 
extend to the interests affected by publicity rights, as identified in Chapter 4, namely 
dignitarian and economic interests.  In respect of the dignitarian interests in 
autonomy and control, the delictual interests appear to require insult or defamation, 
rather than loss of control of, or misuse of, identity.  MacCormick recognises the 
uncertainty here, suggesting that personality rights are still dependent on earlier 
notions of personal honour:  
The emergence of rights of personality in Scots law in the early twenty-first 
century is still, however, somewhat conjectural, though there is no doubt that 
the actio iniuriarum is available in cases of extreme insult, even without the 
falsehood normally inherent in defamation, and even without any quantifiable 
pecuniary loss.
36
    
 
A pursuer whose persona has been exploited without his consent may well be able to 
recover in delict for any insult arising (for example, if he is associated with an 
unsavoury product, or the use is in some way derogatory).  Whether dignitarian harm 
arising from loss of control, without more, would be encompassed by these delictual 
interests remains doubtful.   
 
The outcome is even less certain in respect of the individual’s economic interests.  
Although delict does encompass some economic interests, these are often limited to 
specific interests, such as trade or employment, and redress in these cases is further 
limited because the law will recognise the harmful act as a “wrong” only where it 
was carried out in an illegal way
37
 or by parties acting in concert
38
 or it consists of 
inducing the individual to breach a contract.
39
  The publication of an advertisement 
                                                 
35
 Ibid., para 26.03. 
36
 MacCormick, SME Reissue “General Legal Concepts”, para 95. 
37
 Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland, para 26.07. 
38
 Ibid., para 26.06. 
39
 Ibid., para 26.08. 
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featuring David Beckham with a claim that he enjoys using a particular product 
could not conclusively be said to constitute a recognised delictual economic harm. 
 
Although significant questions remain over the ability of the general delictual duty of 
care to protect publicity interests, nominate actions could potentially provide 
protection for pursuers in individual cases.  The action of passing off, for example, 
was used in the English case of Irvine v Talksport.
40
  Yet there has been considerable 
criticism of the expansive interpretation required to fit the facts within the 
established action,
41
 and doubts about its specific applicability in Scots law have 
been raised.
42
  A further possibility, albeit arguably a remote one, is the actio 
iniuriarum.  In addition to support from MacCormick, above, the actio iniuriarum 
has recently been favourably considered by Whitty,
43
 while in Stevens v Yorkhill 
NHS Trust,
44
 the Court of Session also made reference to this doctrine.  Yet 
“although there is no doubting its importance as a source, it is questionable whether 
it offers a sustainable model for the modern development of personality right 
protection”.
45
  Further, MacQueen observes that, in general, the judicial response has 
been “at best tentative”.
46
  It is not entirely surprising, therefore, that pursuers have 
not sought to invoke the actio iniuriarum.  These practical considerations, and 
uncertainties, suggest that the actio iniuriarum is unlikely to be relied upon in 
litigation in Scots law.   
 
                                                 
40
 [2003] 2 All ER 881.  
41
 Carty, “Advertising, publicity rights and English law” at 238-243; Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, 
Property and Personality, at 23; Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, para 3.4.9 
42
 Reid questions whether Scottish courts would follow this decision, partly because the historical 
basis for delictual actions is different from that in tort, and partly because she concludes there is no 
obvious loss suffered – although this latter concern has arguably been addressed by my discussion of 
the interests harmed in Chapter 4.  Nonetheless, Reid’s concerns add another layer of doubt to the 
efficacy of using delict as a home for such interests.  See Reid, “Personality rights in the modern Scots 
law of delict”, para 4.4.1. 
43
 NR Whitty, “Rights of Personality, Property Rights and the human body in Scots law”, (2005) 9 
Edin LR 194; also Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, particularly section 3.2. 
44
 2006 SLT 889.  Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, para 3.4.13.  In Martin v 
McGuiness the court reflected, but did not comment, on the possible role of the actio iniuriarum, 2003 
SLT 1424. 
45
 Reid, “Personality rights in the modern Scots law of delict”, para 4.5.4(b). 
46
 HL MacQueen, “A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Personality Rights in Scots Law, Mainly with Regard to 
Privacy”, in NR Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative 
Perspective, forthcoming 2009, para 12.5.  
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Alternatively, there may be cases where unauthorised use of persona constitutes 
defamation,
47
 or causes extreme insult or ridicule, giving rise to an action for verbal 
injury,
48
 or possibly convicium.
49
  While the utility of these nominate delicts
50
 is not 
questioned, the advisability of basing protection for publicity rights as a whole on 
existing delictual actions and interests is questionable.  The lack of a clear “initial 
entitlement” gives rise to uncertainty and risks shoe-horning an action for one 
grievance into an existing cause designed for another.  As Vaver notes, the problem 
of such shoe-horning is  
less one of fitting an outgrown foot into a size too small; it is that the shoe 
keeps getting repaired until nothing much is left of the original.  Sometimes 
old shoes last longer and work better if they are kept for their old job, and 
new pairs are acquired for new and different jobs.
51
 
     
Further, such ad hoc protection is often fortuitous.
52
   Whether a pursuer can recover, 
and whether a defender can make use of an appropriate defence, is dependent on 
whether the pursuer’s claim can – fortuitously – be shoe-horned into an existing 
action, potentially one which was never designed with such a publicity claim in 
mind.  For example, a nominate delict which affords protection for dignity will 
operate where the unauthorised publicity use also injures dignity, but not otherwise.  
This ad hoc protection violates principles of legal certainty and coherence, and is 
damaging not only to those who wish to assert their publicity rights, but also to those 
who are called upon to defend such claims.  A final concern is how a pursuer can 
protect both dignitarian and economic interests arising from the same use of persona, 
without invoking two or more delictual actions. 
 
                                                 
47
 Tolley v Fry [1931] AC 333. 
48
 Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, paras 3.2.2 – 3.2.5. 
49
 The Hon. Lord Kilbrandon reviewed a number of actions relevant to protecting an individual’s 
dignity in 1971, albeit he noted that these actions were rare in Scots law, and their usage has not 
noticeably increased since then.  Thomson’s view that it is now too late to revive convicium is 
therefore highly persuasive.  See Lord Kilbrandon, “The right of privacy in Scotland” (1971) 2 
Cambrian LRev 35 at 38-39; J Thomson, Delictual Liability, 3
rd
 ed, 2004, at 278.  See also Whitty, 
“Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, para 3.2.6.  
50
 Subject to the elements of liability (including in some cases injury, wrongfulness and fault) being 
fulfilled: Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, section 3.5. 
51
 D Vaver, “Advertising using an individual’s image: a comparative note” (2006) 122 LQR 362, at 
368.  See also Klink “50 years of publicity in the US”, at 387. 
52
 See Beverley-Smith’s commentary on Tolley v Fry in The Commercial Appropriation of 
Personality, at 253-254. 
A Right of Publicity in Scots Law 
183 
Part III, Chapter 6: Real Rights and Personal Rights:  Publicity in Scots Law 
Whether delict is capable of protecting the interests affected by publicity rights, as 
identified in Chapter 4, therefore remains unclear.  However, in extending any 
protection to publicity interests, Visser and Whitty’s warning is relevant:  the lack of 
a sense of purpose does not assist with the classification of evolving species of delict.   
 
Even if unauthorised use of persona results in a harm recognised by delict, there is a 
second potential hurdle to be overcome.  This is the need to show that unauthorised 
use of persona is a legal wrong.  Again, it is not clear that, on the present state of the 
law, this is the case.  A pursuer would have to show that he has an exclusive right to 
his persona, which conversely means that use of persona by others must be 
proscribed.  Yet, as MacCormick notes, an action against Neil Armstrong in a 
Scottish court for trespass on the moon should not succeed: “the absence of any 
prohibition in Scots law entails a (passive) right in Mr Armstrong that the action 
against him be summarily dismissed”.
53
  The absence of a prohibition creates a right 
to walk on the moon, and this analysis holds good “in all less fanciful or trivial 
cases.”
54
   
 
A further obstacle to situating publicity within delict arises from the nature of the 
awards available.  In cases of negligently caused harm, the only remedy (other than 
interdict) is “a monetary compensation of the hurt, that is to say damages.”
55
  Yet in 
the publicity cases, the nature of the harm caused may be wider than economic loss 
or injury to feelings, particularly in light of the longer term damage that may be 
caused to reputation (as was explored in Chapter 4, section 2.2).  Consequently, a 
monetary award may be insufficient in all cases to repair the damage done to the 
individual’s persona and a wider and more creative palette of remedies, including 
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 KM Norrie, “The Intentional Delicts”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private 
Law in Scotland Vol II, 2000, at 515, and see also 496.  See also Gloag and Henderson, The Law of 
Scotland, para 26.01; M Hogg, Obligations, 2
nd
 ed, 2006, para 3.03. 
56
 See further Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, section 3.7, particularly para 
3.7.2.  Appropriate remedies will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, Part B.  
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The next issue is whether delict, in its current form, is capable of protecting the 
positive power to exploit.  Delict is concerned with the need to protect individuals 
from harm – as is clearly illustrated by the wording of the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997, which creates a statutory delict of harassment with the words 
“Every individual has a right to be free from harassment”.
57
  This is not a right to 
control how or when you wish to be harassed:  it is a right to ensure you are not 
subjected to harassment.  The publicity right sought, however, is not a comparable 
right to be free from publicity, but to ensure that any publicity is controlled.     
 
Control, through the positive exploitation of delictual rights, could be achieved 
through the use of waiver.
58
  For example, it is possible for an individual to waive his 
right to seek an interdict for trespass, and to require a fee for doing so:  this is, in 
effect, what the lease of a flat achieves.  Waiving rights in, or consenting to, a 
delictual wrong for a fee is therefore at least a possibility to be explored, as is 
implied waiver or personal bar.
59
     
 
However, waiver is not an entirely satisfactory method of permitting authorised 
exploitation of persona.  Where an individual grants a waiver in respect of some 
action, this does not mean that the action becomes legal; rather it modifies the 
granter’s right of action against the infringer.
60
  Other pursuers may exist, against 
whom the infringer would have no defence of consent.
61
  In addition, any flaw in the 
consent granted would invalidate the waiver, rendering the defender liable.  Even 
where a valid waiver was granted, the authorised user would still face problems in 
enforcing it against third parties.
62
  Thus, waiver of a right to enforce is far less 
satisfactory for authorised users than would be a positive grant of a right, enforceable 
again the granter and third parties.    
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 Protection from Harassment Act 1997, section 8(1).  
58
 Waiver of a right in delict can be distinguished from waiver in the context of human rights, as 
discussed in Chapter 5 – but similar problems arise. 
59
 See further Reid and Blackie, Personal Bar, chapter 18, particularly paras 18-03, 18-04 and 18-06. 
60
 For example, see Haelan Laboratories v Topps Chewing Gum Inc 202 F 2d 866 (2
nd
 Cir 1953), at 
867; Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 130-131, and Milligan, Brand it Like 
Beckham, at 130. 
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Despite these objections, it is submitted that delict is a valuable supporting tool for 
those trying to enforce their publicity rights.  Specifically, if a publicity right were 
recognised in Scots law, then delict would provide a vehicle for enforcing and 
protecting that right.  The grant of a right to control use of persona would provide an 
identifiable “wrong” in the event of interference with that right, especially if this 
publicity right were to be a class of real right, since interference with property rights 
is explicitly regarded as a wrong by Stair and by Visser and Whitty.
63
  It would also 
make harm to the individual much easier to identify, thus helping to fulfil the 
requirements of damnum injuria datum.   
 
In addition to protecting a specific right of publicity, delict would also have an 
ongoing role to play in protecting pursuers in cases where the facts of their complaint 
fall within existing delictual actions or protected interests.  (Leading examples of 
such use to date, in England, are Irvine v Talksport and Douglas v Hello!.)  Delict 
would therefore provide a valuable interstitial or “default” right to protect dignitarian 
interests, specifically where there is defamation or insult.  
 
3.3. Obediential Obligations II: Unjustified Enrichment  
For a claim in unjustified enrichment to exist, the defender must have been enriched 
as a result of his acquisition of some objective value at the expense of the pursuer, 
and that this acquisition be unjustified.  This definition introduces three different 
elements:  the need to show (i) that there is an enrichment of the defender; (ii) at the 
expense of the pursuer; and (iii) that the retention of the enrichment is unjustified.  
The pursuer must also show that it is equitable for the defender to redress (or for the 
courts to compel the redress of) the enrichment.
64
  The enrichment of the defender 
                                                 
63
 As per the text at notes 31 and 32 above. 
64
 This definition is provided by R Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment:  Enrichment by Deliberate 
Conferral:  Condictio, Volume 1, 2003, para 1.02.  Similar definitions are provided by H MacQueen, 
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can arise from a transfer from the pursuer to the defender or from the imposition of 
goods or services by the pursuer on the defender – both acts in which the pursuer is 
the active party.  Alternatively, the defender may be the active party, where he is 
enriched through the taking of an entitlement of the pursuer.
65
  Since we are dealing 
with unauthorised use of persona, it is more likely that the defender will be the active 
party, where he “takes” or uses the persona without consent. 
 
Unauthorised use of persona appears at first sight to meet these criteria:  it involves 
the enrichment of the defender, through the use of the pursuer’s persona without 
having paid for such use.  Such enrichment is at the expense of the pursuer, who has 
lost control of that persona.  Further, the lack of consent suggests that there is no 
justification for the “taking” of the pursuer’s persona by the defender.  Yet although 
this initial assessment sounds very promising, closer examination suggests that 
unjustified enrichment may fail to assist a pursuer in the absence of a prior legal right 
of publicity.  This is because, as MacQueen makes clear, whether something is an 
unjustified enrichment depends on principles of law, rather than an intuitive response 
to the demands of justice on the part of the court.
66
  A pursuer who wishes to recover 
for unauthorised use of his persona must therefore satisfy all elements of the 
definition of the unjustified enrichment action, rather than simply seeking to show 
that the use was unfair and unpermitted.  And, when applying these three parts of the 
definition to publicity, it becomes apparent that at least two of them are likely to pose 
problems for unjustified enrichment – albeit both would, arguably, be overcome if 
there were a recognised legal interest in persona or publicity, which would constitute 
Friedmann’s “initial entitlement”.     
 
The first hurdle is the need for the pursuer to show that the enrichment has been 
made at his expense.  This generally, but not always, requires the pursuer to be able 
to show a loss.
67
  In straightforward cases of taking of property by the defender, the 
pursuer’s loss mirrors the defender’s gain.  Yet it is not clear that taking persona 
                                                                                                                                          
suggest that the final element of this definition is not part of the action, but rather goes towards any 
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creates a mirror loss, nor that it would be recognised as a loss in the absence of a 
recognised right or initial entitlement to one’s persona.  An alternative to showing 
loss is to demonstrate that the defender has interfered with or invaded a right of the 
pursuer, since “it does not appear proper that the defendant should be allowed to 
benefit from interfering with a right which the legal system has assigned specifically 
to the plaintiff.”
68
  Here, “the loss can usually be seen as the inability of the 
impoverished person to make, or bargain for the, use of its own property or rights, or 
the diminution in value of the property following its unauthorized use.”
69
  Gloag and 
Henderson notes that the reversal of an enrichment arising from this invasion or 
interference “is usually explained on the basis that it supports property rights”
70
 and 
indeed intellectual property rights.  However, in order to rely upon this the pursuer 
would need to demonstrate the legal right which has been interfered with by the 
defender’s action.  Blackie and Farlam argue that, although Scots law “contains 
particular examples [of such claims]…, it has yet to develop a general rule.  What is 
needed is a wide definition of a “patrimonial right” as invaded.”
71
  Thus, where there 
has been an interference with an established right, there will be a legal basis for the 
action for unauthorised taking or interference.  In other situations, and absent a wide 
concept of patrimonial rights or a specific publicity right, it is not clear what specific 
right will have been invaded by the defender.   
 
For a pursuer to show that the unauthorised use of his persona has been at his 
expense, he would therefore require to demonstrate either that there has been an 
objective “loss” which mirrors the defender’s gain, or that there has been an invasion 
of his rights.  This latter category of loss is more likely to apply in cases of publicity, 
but it is not fully developed in Scots law, and there is no evidence at this stage that 
the courts would recognise “publicity” as the necessary right invaded.  Scots law 
therefore appears to need the recognition, by the courts or legislature, of a prior legal 
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right in publicity before a claim could be founded in unjustified enrichment.  We are 
thus led to the conclusion that unjustified enrichment is capable of providing an 
appropriate cause of action for breach of a publicity right – but we are still without 
the necessary prior publicity right. 
 
The second obstacle for the pursuer is the need to show that the enrichment is 
without legal cause:  an enrichment only “falls to be reversed if its retention is 
supported by no legal ground.”
72
  Examples of acts which constitute a legal ground 
for the enrichment include a valid contract, a court order, a legacy or donation.
73
  
However, there is some uncertainty as to whether Scots law currently requires the 
absence of any legal basis for the transfer or enrichment, or whether, in line with the 
English approach,
74
 the pursuer must show “unjust factors” involved, such as 




 posits the existence of a third way in 
Scots law, whereby both elements must be shown, since “absence of a legal ground 
can only be a necessary rather than a sufficient basis for identifying reversible 
enrichment”
77
 – the unjust factor may therefore operate to help identify a reversible 
enrichment.  There is no clear answer to this at present in Scots law, but Hogg 
suggests that the “third way” can perhaps “be equated with the wider concept of 
absence of legal ground which has been suggested in this text [Obligations] as of the 
essence of the ‘third way’.”
78
  Further, MacQueen suggests that the burden of proof 
reflects the need for more than a simple absence of legal basis, since “it is for the 
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person who wants to reclaim an enrichment to show reasons why that should be 
allowed.”
79
   
 
Thus, whether pursuers have to prove the absence of legal ground with or without an 
unjust factor remains uncertain.  Demonstrating the unjust factor may be less of a 
concern, however, in the case of unauthorised taking or interference, since the 
defender’s acts will be wrongful if there is no legal basis for them.  Nonetheless, this 
requirement, even on a minimalist interpretation, could be a hurdle too far for 
pursuers in publicity cases at present.  Without a prior right of publicity, it is not 
obvious that the defender’s use is without legal cause:  rather, it is arguable that it is 
the pursuer’s claim that lacks a legal basis.  As discussed in section 3.2 above, with 
reference to Neil Armstrong, if there is no prior right to use persona, then surely 
there is no reason why the defender should not use it?  
 
It is submitted that the lack of a clear right of publicity would undermine an attempt 
to use unjustified enrichment to seek restitution for unauthorised use of persona.  
Although such a claim cannot be ruled out on the current state of Scots law, it is fair 
to say that the recognition of a prior right of publicity would significantly enhance 
the pursuer’s claim.   
 
The discussion so far has focused on the use of unjustified enrichment to protect the 
negative right, in the context of unauthorised use.  Where a claim in unjustified 
enrichment could be made out, it would also assist the individual’s exploitation of 
the positive power, through authorised use.  If the above two objections can be 
overcome in order to enable a claim for unauthorised use (that is, where a recognised 
loss and a lack of legal basis for the use can be shown), then these elements would 
equally provide the foundations of a contract for authorised use.  Since unjustified 
enrichment is founded upon the notion of an enrichment without legal cause, any 
contract for use of persona would provide the necessary legal basis for the defender’s 
use.
80
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A final complication is the doctrine of subsidiarity, which would, if applicable, 
require the pursuer to exhaust other remedies before turning to unjustified 
enrichment.  Whitty analyses a number of cases where subsidiarity has been 
accepted, such that “claims to redress enrichment arising from the act of the enriched 
party are excluded by possessory actions or delictual claims for damages”,
81
 and 
concludes that “generally these cases were wrongly decided.”
82
  The better view, he 
submits, is that the subsidiarity of enrichment actions to other actions “should have a 
restricted role in the future”.
83
  In fact, it may be of relevance primarily in cases 
where the enrichment has been imposed by the pursuer on the defender and the 
pursuer then seeks compensation for his actions, rather than takings cases.  
Nevertheless, the existence of subsidiarity adds a further layer of doubt to a pursuer’s 
claim in unjustified enrichment in publicity cases. 
 
While unjustified enrichment has much to offer as an action for the negative right 
and as a basis for the positive power, it is currently hampered by the absence of a 
discrete right of publicity which would, if recognised, provide a strong basis for 
reliance on unjustified enrichment.  Additionally, the Scots law of unjustified 
enrichment is still in a state of transition, following the considerable academic and 
judicial contributions to the field in the two decades from 1985.
84
  “The revision of 
Scots enrichment law is far from complete”
85
 albeit “the stage is set for the law of 
unjustified enrichment to be developed to its full potential”.
86
  Questions therefore 
exist to which there are no clear answers in this field and this, coupled with the 
uncertainty of the current legal status of publicity rights, suggests that it would be an 
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optimistic pursuer who would hope to find a remedy for infringement of a publicity 
right in unjustified enrichment at present.    
 
3.4. The Role of Personal Rights  
The above review has sought to show that personal rights could play an important 
role in enabling the positive exploitation and negative enforcement of a right of 
publicity, through contract, delict and unjustified enrichment.  However, in all cases, 
the cause of action would be immensely strengthened by the recognition of an “initial 
entitlement”, constituted by a prior right of publicity.   
 
Thus, a recognised publicity right could be licensed by way of a contract between 
willing parties, while unauthorised use of persona would amount either to a delict, 
whereby the wrongful use of persona causes harm to the individual, or an unjustified 
enrichment for the defender, in “taking” and using a right for which he would 
otherwise have had to seek consent.   
 
In the absence of a specific right of publicity, the use of personal rights remains 
valid, but suffers from a lack of clarity.  Persona could be licensed or assigned 
through contract in the exploitation of the positive power.  An action in delict or 
unjustified enrichment could be raised to recover for unauthorised use but, in each 
case, the pursuer would have to be able to shoehorn his rights and interests into 
existing rights and interests protected by these branches of the law – and the 
problems inherent in this approach have been explored in the preceding sections.  
However, this undoubtedly remains a valid approach where the pursuer is able to do 
so, such that personal rights could provide interstitial support for publicity rights,  in 
much the same way that the action for passing off supports registered trade mark 
rights, while breach of confidence supplements the statutory right of copyright and 
protects trade secrets, which can be relied upon in the absence of a patent right.   
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The conclusion of this examination is that the use of personal rights to protect 
persona would be strengthened significantly by the recognition of a right of publicity.  
Is such a right a real right?  
 
 
4. REAL RIGHTS 
4.1. Introduction 
Whereas personal rights are concerned with rights against persons, real rights exist in 
“things”.  A key advantage of this is that a real right can be enforced against any 
individual who interferes with the thing, as the subject matter of the right.  In the 
context of publicity it is necessary to identify the “thing” that is the subject matter of 
the real right and also to outline the real rights recognised in Scots law, to determine 
whether any of them is appropriate for the protection of publicity rights.  If a suitable 
right does exist, the next step is to identify the thing that would be the subject of that 
right. 
 
The current examination takes place against the backdrop of Scots law where, 
following the Civilian or Roman taxonomy: 
a real action protecting the thing (res) can be exercised against everybody, 
since a property right imposes duties of abstention to everybody in the world.  
In contrast, a personal action protecting the person can be exercised only 
against the particular person that is subject to the obligation… Therefore, real 
actions have an erga omnes (against everybody) characteristic when 
contrasted with personal actions.
87
       
 
With the caveat that “[a] definitive list of the real rights recognised in Scots law has 
never been attempted”,
88
 Reid lists eight real rights established in Scots law: 
ownership (dominium); right in security; proper liferent; servitude; lease; possession; 
rights held by the public; and exclusive privilege.
89
  Of these, ownership is the “main 
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right”
90
 and the others are subordinate real rights or “jura in re aliena, that is to say, 
property in the rights of another.”
91
  Thus, ownership is the primary real right and the 
other real rights typically exist in relation to the thing owned by another, as 
limitations on it.  These subordinate real rights are therefore dependent on there 
being a pre-existing right of ownership held by another, and can only exist where the 
real right of ownership has previously been constituted.    
 
Further, only ownership is “a permanent and residual right.  For usually the 
subordinate real rights are temporary in nature.  They are burdens on the ownership 
of another, and if and when they come to an end, the residual right of ownership may 
be enjoyed unfettered.”
92
  Thus, the holder of a subordinate real right has a more 
curtailed right than the owner of a thing.  Although ownership must be capable of 
subsisting over every thing, not all things need be susceptible to all other real rights.  
To give an example, a car is capable of being owned and possessed, but could not be 
the subject of a servitude.  
 
The exception to this is the “subordinate” real right of exclusive privilege, which is 
not a jus in re aliena.  Rather, exclusive privilege is “an exclusive, and valuable, 
right to do something and, hence, to stop others from doing the same thing.”
93
  The 
best example of exclusive privilege today is – for those who do not view it as 
property – intellectual property.  Hume, following Adam Smith, classed intellectual 
property as a right of exclusive privilege
94
 and Reid agrees that, as it is not a personal 
right, then there is merit in adopting Hume’s analysis.
95
  He does, however, express 
concern that “Hume’s view cannot be accepted without a certain amount of damage 
to the core idea of real rights.  For a real right is a right in a thing, and in the case of 
exclusive privilege it is not clear that there is a separate thing in respect of which a 
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right can arise.”
96
  Exclusive privilege, and the classification of intellectual property, 
merit further attention and will be discussed in section 4.3 below. 
 
4.2. Owning Persona   
The right of ownership is defined by Reid as “a right to use, or to prevent others from 
using, a thing”,
97
 and he quotes from Hume who tells us that real rights impose an 
“obligation upon all the world… to respect that right of his, and abstain from 
troubling him in the use and enjoyment of that thing”.
98
  It is the right to control the 
use of the thing, whether by exploiting or using it in person, by licensing it to others, 
by preventing use, and ultimately by selling or assigning it.   
 
The positive and negative publicity uses can thus be met by recognising a real right 
in the individual’s persona.  A real right in persona would constitute the prior right or 
initial entitlement identified in section 3 above.  This right could be vindicated, if 
infringed, through delict or unjustified enrichment, or could form the subject matter 
of a contract for authorised exploitation.   
 
If real rights are in theory capable of protecting publicity, it becomes necessary to 
determine whether persona can be treated as a “thing”.  We therefore need to know 
how Scots law defines “things”.   
 
4.2.1. Defining Things in Scots Law 
If the law is to grant and enforce the right to exclude the world, it must ensure that 
the world knows exactly from what things it is being excluded:  the res that are the 
subject of property rights must be clearly identified.  Honoré makes the observation 
that “it is clear that to stare at the meaning of the word ‘thing’ will not tell us which 
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protected interests are conceived in terms of ownership”.
99
   We must therefore look 
for other means of identifying our things. 
  
MacCormick considers the right to a horse, to shares in a company and to a house, all 
of which are things or res in the eyes of the law: they 
are conceived as durable objects existing separately from and independently 
of other objects and of persons, subject to being used, possessed, and enjoyed 
by persons, and capable of being transferred from one person to another 
without loss of identity as that very thing.
100
   
 
This definition of a thing gives us three criteria to be met before thinghood can be 
demonstrated: (i) it must be durable; (ii) it must exist separately from and 
independently of a person; and (iii) it must be capable of being transferred from one 
person to another without loss of identity. 
 
Each of these three elements can be considered in turn.  Firstly, a thing must endure.  
MacCormick explains that this requires that a thing must have “a continuing identity 
over a period of time”
101
 and in some cases it will also have a location in space.  
Defining durability in this manner means that incorporeals can be things, as they 
endure in time, albeit not in space, while corporeals have both a spatial and a time 
vector.   
 
The second requirement, that of separate existence, continues the process of 
reification and allows us to draw a more definite line between things and non-things.  
Separability operates to exclude from property certain “things” which may 
demonstrate typical markers of objects of property, such as value, control, 
exploitation and exclusion, but which are not things.  As Penner argues, I can value 
or even exploit a friendship, and I can control and exclude others from a talent I 
possess, yet friendship and talents are not typically classed as “things” within the 
scope of real rights.  The difficulty “lies in treating these things as separate from us 
in any straightforward way.”
102
  This need for separate and independent existence 
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thus excludes certain things of value or aspects of my body, such as friendship or my 
eyesight, from the sphere of property, as they cannot exist independently of me.  As 
Penner memorably puts it, “[w]e do not… pay taxes with our eyesight.”
103
   
 
The requirement for a “thing” in property to have an existence independent from the 
owner does not exclude intangibles per se, but it does help to resolve questions of 
ownership of persons, whether in whole or in part, or their incorporeal elements.   
Whereas classification of things as corporeal or incorporeal allows us to categorise 
our bodies as corporeal but does not provide guidance as to thinghood, 
MacCormick’s definition now determines that our own bodies are not things for the 
purposes of property law, as they are not capable of separate existence from us, or 
from our persons.  Yet although MacCormick’s definition helps us reach this 
conclusion, the question of ownership of human bodies remains a complex and 
ethically-charged one.
104
   
 
From MacCormick’s definition, Penner concludes that although an individual cannot 
be said to own his own body, this does not exclude the possibility of owning other 
people, as their bodies do exist separately and independently of our own and may 
therefore be capable of being owned.
105
  In contrast, however, Whitty believes that it 
is not possible for anyone else to own you, but that you may be able to “own” 
yourself.
106
  It is suggested that MacCormick’s analysis is to be preferred.  Although 
owning other human beings is a concept unacceptable to our society, it is not an 
impossible one: slavery was “an institution which permeated [Roman] law and 
society but which is so alien to ours.”
107
  It is therefore not correct to conclude that a 
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legal system cannot recognise a human body as susceptible to ownership, although 
society may have very cogent reasons for deciding that a human being should not be 
owned by another.   
 
The criterion of separability and independent existence also allows a second point to 
be made, relating to corporeality.  It is not possible to reject intangibles as things by 
arguing that, unlike corporeal objects, their independent existence is a product of 
statute or the operation of law.  MacCormick accepts this proposition but denies it is 
unique to intangibles: 
It is certainly true that the existence, identity, and mutual separateness of 
incorporeal things such as copyrights, patents, company shares, servitude 
rights, contractual benefits and the like depend entirely on conventions of 
thought and speech constituted by legal rules.  But it cannot be supposed that 
the identity and separateness of corporeal things is something utterly 




For example, a ton of coal is correctly regarded as a corporeal moveable, but whereas 
the coal itself is naturally occurring, the measurement of it is entirely a product of 
highly regulated human conventions.
109
  So too with land, which is naturally 
occurring but is frequently identified in Land Certificates and legal documents by 
imaginary lines which have no physical representation on the ground itself and are 
only reproduced as grid references on maps.
110
  Thus, corporeal things which are 
frequently held up as paradigm examples of pre-existing things are in fact subject to 
the same rigorous quantification, measurement and delineation, often statutory, as 
intellectual property or other intangibles.   
 
Returning to the notion of separation, the philosopher T.H. Green, writing in the 
nineteenth century, conceived of private property as being not separate but part of an 
individual.  Appropriation, according to his analysis (which echoes Hegel’s), 
involves man taking and fashioning  
certain external things, certain things external to his bodily members.  These 
things, so “taken and fashioned”, cease to be external as they were before.  
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They become a sort of extension of the man’s organs, the constant apparatus 
through which he gives reality to his ideas and wishes.
111
   
 
The point remains however that the things which are taken and fashioned must start 
out as being “external to his bodily members” – further evidence of the need for 
separate and independent existence as a criterion of thinghood. 
 
The final requirement in MacCormick’s definition of things is that of transferability 
without loss of identity.  This requires that the thing maintains its character, and is 
capable of being the same, regardless of who owns it.  This emphasises the erga 
omnes character of real rights:  because real rights impose a duty of exclusion on 
third parties which is not person-specific but thing-specific, the duty owed by the 
third party in respect of the thing remains the same no matter who the owner is.  A 
thing must have a continuing identity regardless of how often it is transferred, or to 
whom.   
 
One helpful test at this stage as to whether something is separable and transferable 
(and therefore capable of ownership) involves asking whether it can be treated with 
other corporeal and incorporeal property in certain situations.  Thus, it is possible to 
ask what things may be attached by creditors in the event of insolvency.  Shifting the 
focus from the individual to creditors raises the much more complex question of 
whether and how creditors could harness the latent or future value of such “assets”.  
This approach thus operates to highlight the distinction between separability and 
transferability, as it is possible to conceive of something which is separable but not 
always transferable.  Asking whether a creditor could appropriate the thing may 
therefore help to clarify what can be treated as a thing to be owned: it may be “a 
better test of the property status of our right to our kidneys to ask, not whether we 
may sell them, but whether they can be removed and sold by our trustee in 
bankruptcy to pay our debts.”
112
   
 
                                                 
111
 Green, extract from “Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation”, and reproduced in CB 
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112
 Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, at 117.  See also Westfall and Landau, “Publicity Rights as 
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This becomes particularly problematic in the field of publicity rights, where the 
question arises as to how (and indeed whether) a publicity right should be 
integrated into the Scottish system of real rights and personal rights and 
whether it is or ought to be a real right and as such assignable to singular 
successors, attachable by the diligence of creditors, adjudgable in bankruptcy 




If persona were to be recognised as a “thing” could it fulfil the tripartite definition?  
And could it be passed to creditors or inherited on the death of the individual?   
 
4.2.2. Persona as a Thing 
For an individual’s persona to be the subject of a real right of ownership, it must 
meet the criteria of durability, separability and transferability.  If this is the case, then 
the persona becomes subject to the usual consequences of property ownership.  Both 
these aspects of property are problematic in the case of persona.   
 
As regards the tripartite definition, only the durability criterion presents no problems 
(at least during life): both the separability and transferability criteria do.  It is 
meaningless to talk of one’s image, for example, being separate or separable from 
one’s corporeal body or capable of transfer without loss of identity.  The very notion 
of persona is so clearly bound up with the individual that to attempt to separate out, 
and transfer on, the constituent (and intangible) elements of a publicity right is a 
thankless task.  The relationship between persona and the individual is fundamental – 
and fatal, since “for a thing to be held as property, we must not conceive of it as an 
aspect of ourselves or our ongoing personality-rich relationships to others.”
114
     
 
Further, if persona were to be treated as a thing in Scots law, it would be subject to 
the usual consequences of property ownership.  Thus it could be assigned outright 
(not simply licensed) or used to satisfy the debts of a creditor.  Yet to contend that an 
individual’s persona could form part of his estate on bankruptcy fails to reflect the 
reality of the situation.  The considerable problems experienced in the US from 
                                                 
113
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treating publicity as a property right in this context have been examined in detail by 
Westfall and Landau, who conclude that “it seems relatively clear that publicity 
rights should not be treated as property for purposes of bankruptcy.”
115
  Yet the 
pragmatism of this approach, whereby publicity is property for some purposes but 
not for others, does not sit comfortably with the principles of property law in 
Scotland.     
 
As we saw in Chapter 4, persona is an inherent part of each individual.  During life, 
persona is not separable from the individual, nor can it be transmitted without loss of 
identity – quite literally, in this case.  Consequently, it fails to meet the criteria for 
thinghood under Scots law and thus falls outwith the scope of ownership.   
 
Curiously, this does allow us to conclude that persona may be transmissible on death, 
because at that point the personhood justification ceases to operate to protect the 
individual (although it may operate in favour of their heirs) and persona will be 
incapable of further change or development at the hands of the individual.
116
  Thus, 
Marilyn Monroe and James Dean are still iconic figures today, decades after their 
deaths, and, while the public perception of them may evolve over time, their names 
and images remain fixed as they were at the time of their deaths.  A problem does 
arise post mortem however as regards the durability of persona after the death of the 
individual.  This may result in persona no longer being regarded as durable, unless it 
can be shown that the persona as fixed in the public consciousness does endure, as 
with Monroe and Dean.
117
     
 
The rejection of persona as a thing in Scots law means that publicity rights cannot be 
subject of ownership in Scotland, despite their treatment as such in the value-focused 
Common law system of the United States, for example.
118
  This conclusion in Scots 
law denies individuals the benefit of the most comprehensive legal right, the real 
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right of ownership.  Although individuals may regret this conclusion, there would be 
very serious concerns with treating persona as a thing subject to ownership (not least 
the subset of persona which comprises personal information).  Doing so would create 
a far-reaching right, beyond any requirement of publicity rights.  Concerns about the 
consequences of this were central to many of the arguments discussed in Chapter 4, 
which were made against a property right in publicity.  Even those writers who were 
in favour of a publicity right accepted that a property right granted “overbroad”
119
 
protection for publicity. 
 
If individuals were to be granted property rights in their name, stage name, nick-
name, image, voice, characteristics and “trade mark” gestures or catchphrases, 
private information, together with reputation and goodwill, if any, then their right to 
control would far exceed anything currently recognised or even required.  The 
analysis of publicity rights so far emphasises the value of these attributes when they 
are exploited, typically commercially.  Yet to recognise them as property would take 
legal protection far beyond the exploitation of persona in the publicity uses.  Instead, 
a property right would enable an individual to control any use of his persona, 
including use in a wide range of government, administrative, health, and employment 
contexts, and in news reporting.
120
  This would be an extreme and unprecedented 
development, and would require extensive exceptions, defences and permitted uses.  
The advantage of providing an individual with a strong right to control the use of his 
persona is far out-weighed by the damaging impact that would be caused by the grant 
of such a right, or the complications involved in minimising this impact.  The 
repercussions would be much wider than simply the protection of an individual’s 
publicity rights. 
 
4.2.3. Summary of Rights in Things  
The above analysis has demonstrated that the real right of ownership can only be 
exercised in respect of a “thing”:  for publicity to be protected through ownership the 
                                                 
119
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subject of publicity exploitation, persona, would require to be classified as a “thing”.  
Yet the concept of things in Scots law is such that persona does not qualify as a 
thing.  Regardless of its treatment in other jurisdictions, the persona of an individual 
is neither separable nor transferable. 
 
However, as noted above, the eighth real right is peculiar since it does not depend on 
the prior existence of a thing.  Instead, exclusive privilege is a right which enables 
the holder of the exclusive right to do something, and to prevent others from doing 
that thing.   
 
4.3. Exclusive Privilege 
4.3.1. The Right of Exclusive Privilege – Advantages and Obstacles 
Exclusive privilege is a monopoly right,
121
 being “an exclusive, and valuable, right to 
do something and, hence, to stop others from doing the same thing.”
122
  It is 
identified by Reid as the eighth real right.
123
  Its status as a real right is supported by 
earlier writers in Scots law, including Adam Smith
124
 and David Hume.
125
  Smith 
classes exclusive privileges as real rights through an analogy with the rights of the 
heir to inherit:  “[i]f therefore we account the right of inheritance to be a real right, as 
it certainly is, all other exclusive priviledges will for the same reason be accounted 
real rights”.
126
  Hume notes that the right of the heir to take up the succession “is not, 
by any means, a full and perfect right of property”
127
 but that nonetheless the features 
of the right are such that it “is thus marked with all the characters of a proper 
legitimate and real right.”
128
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Despite its historical pedigree, exclusive privilege is frequently overlooked in Scots 
law today,
129
 and perhaps with some justification:  many of the examples of 
exclusive privilege given by Smith and Hume are no longer terribly relevant to 
current society.  For example, Hume provides considerable detail of the privileges of 
the Royal Burghs and the Merchant Guilds
130
 – both of which he asserts “are proper 
instances of real right”.
131
  While monopoly rights over port and ferry facilities
132
 are 
still exercised today, the privileges of the Burghs and Guilds, the right of thirlage,
133
 
the right to hunt down game once the chase has started,
134
 and the right of the heir 
between the death of the last proprietor and the inheritance
135
 are not rights which 
could be said to play a primary role in daily life in the twenty-first century.   
 
Although the historical classes of exclusive privilege may have lost much of their 
relevance, the concept is potentially of considerable utility for the protection of more 
modern rights, including publicity.  Of primary importance is the fact that it is the 
only real right in Scots law which does not have a “thing” as its subject.  This is 
significant for publicity where, as demonstrated, persona cannot be classified as a 
thing.  While this excludes persona from ownership it is not a handicap in the context 
of the real right of exclusive privilege.  Further, Reid’s definition of exclusive 
privilege – an exclusive and valuable right to do something and to prevent others 
from doing the same thing – sounds very much like the right that individuals try to 
exploit and protect in publicity situations. 
 
From this initial analysis, it appears that publicity could well be classed as a right of 
exclusive privilege in Scots law, since the focus is on the right to do (and prevent 
others from doing) a particular act, rather than on an identifiable and transferable 
thing.  Yet although publicity appears to fit within this notion of exclusive privilege, 
a potential problem arises.  In light of the typical subject matter of such rights 
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historically, it is not entirely clear whether a right of exclusive privilege can be 
assigned or licensed or whether it inheres only to the person granted the privilege.  
For example, where a miller was granted a right of thirlage, was it open to him to 
exploit this right by sub-contracting the milling – effectively licensing the right – or 
was his exploitation of the right limited to working it himself?  If rights of exclusive 
privilege cannot be assigned or licensed, this would adversely affect the value of 
classing publicity as a right of exclusive privilege since, as shown, the positive 
exploitation of publicity frequently occurs through licensing.   
 
Hume’s analysis of the exclusive privileges of the day does not clarify whether the 
exclusive privilege of freemen of Royal Burghs to export the staple goods
136
 could be 
assigned by a freeman to another individual.  The same doubt applies to the privilege 
of “the exercise of crafts or mechanical trades within Burgh, which is confined to the 
freemen of the Burgh’s incorporated trades.”
137
  Although these and similar 
privileges are the subject of fifteen pages of discussion in Hume’s Lectures, there is 
no direct insight into whether such exclusive rights can, in themselves, be traded.  
The grant of the right, from the King or through power delegated to the Magistrates 
and Council,
138
 was the primary source of the right.  In some circumstances, ex-
soldiers were able to take up a restricted trade and if this happened “the privilege is 
extended to the wives, widows, and children of such old soldiers”
139
 but only where 
they could carry out the trade themselves.  Aside from these references to a limited 
right to transfer or extend the right, and then only to personal rather than commercial 
assignees, it is not at all obvious that there was any trade in the privilege itself:  the 
inference is very much that the exclusive privilege was personal to the holder.  The 
value of the privilege came from being entitled to carry out the privileged act, and 
not from the value of assigning or licensing it. 
 
One class of exclusive privilege which does derive considerable value from the 
ability to assign or license it, as well as to exploit it in person, is intellectual property.  
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What insights, if any, can be derived from intellectual property’s role as a right of 
exclusive privilege? 
 
4.3.2. Intellectual Property:  A Right of Ownership or a Right of 
Exclusive Privilege? 
As Bell noted, a patent right: 
is useful as property in these respects:  1. It secures to a patentee the profits of 
the sale of the thing invented.  2.  The privilege may be assigned in whole or 
in part.  The patent generally bears a restriction not to be communicated to 
more than five.  But the whole privilege may be sold.
140
   
 
Similarly, copyright can be enforced by assignees or successors of the author,
141
 as 
well as being exploited by the author in person.  Intellectual property therefore 
allows for exploitation in person, and the correlative right to prevent unauthorised 
exploitation, as well as the right to exploit through transfer, through assignation or 
licensing, to third parties.      
 
The question therefore arises whether intellectual property is indeed a right of 
exclusive privilege, being a limited monopoly, or whether its transferability indicates 
that it is in fact a thing subject to ownership.  This debate arises from the historical 
origins of intellectual property
142
 since today there is less doubt
143
 that intellectual 
property can be classed as “property” in the sense of ownership.  The current 
statutory bases of the various intellectual property rights assert their status as 
property.  Thus, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 opens with the 
statement that “Copyright is a property right”.
144
  Under the Trade Marks Act 1994 a 
“registered trade mark is a property right”,
145
 and the Patents Act 1977 states that, in 
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Scotland, any “patent or application for a patent, and any right in or under any patent 
or any such application, is incorporeal moveable property”,
146
 and that such right can 
be licensed, assigned or be made the subject of a standard security.
147
   
 
Academic work, particularly in the Common law tradition, frequently equates 
intellectual property with corporeal property:  a patent, for example, grants “a right to 
exclude, just as the law of trespass does with real property.  Intellectual property is 
intangible, but the right to exclude is no different in principle from General Motors’ 
right to exclude Ford from using its assembly line”.
148
  The current leading work on 
property in Scots law, the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, observes of intellectual 
property that “nearly all the rights are treated as a form of incorporeal moveable 
property, transferable by assignation”.
149
  MacCormick observes that there is 
certainly no conceptual problem with treating intellectual property rights as “things” 
susceptible to ownership, since the “existence of incorporeal things, requires 
durability in time, not extension in space….  On this view, there is no special 
problem about applying the Gaian scheme to items of intellectual property as to other 
incorporeal things.”
150
   
 
Historically, matters were not always so clear.  Smith referred to the concept of state-
granted monopolies as real rights in his introductory lecture, and then devoted part of 
his second lecture to these exclusive privileges – yet also used the language of 
property.  He stated that  
the property one has in a book he has written or a machine he has invented 
which continues by patent in this country for 14 years, is actually a real right. 
During that time he can claim restitution, or shew for damages from any one 
who prints his book or copies his machine, so that he may be considered as 




                                                 
146
 Patents Act 1977, s1(2). 
147
 Ibid., ss31(3) and 31(4). 
148
 F Easterbrook, “Intellectual Property is Still Property”, in A Moore, Information Ethics Privacy, 
Property, and Power, 2005, at 114. 
149
 Reid (ed), SME Vol XVIII, para 802.   
150
 MacCormick, SME Reissue “General Legal Concepts”, para 121, footnote omitted.  The Gaian 
scheme referred to is that of “persons, things, actions”.   
151
 Meek et al, Adam Smith Lectures, at i.20.  See also A Smith, Wealth of Nations, (ed) K Sutherland, 
1998, for further analysis, particularly at 60, 352 onwards and 418. 
A Right of Publicity in Scots Law 
207 
Part III, Chapter 6: Real Rights and Personal Rights:  Publicity in Scots Law 
Hume classed patents and copyright as exclusive privileges
152
 and concluded that 
these rights were not founded on common law.  Instead, “the copyright of authors 
rests intirely upon statute, upon the Statute the 8
th
 of Queen Anne”.
153
  This opinion 
is based in large measure upon the English case of Donaldson v Beckett
154
 heard in 
1774, wherein a 6-5 majority of the House of Lords held that  
Whatever encouragement may be due to authors, the common law cannot, 
after the silence of ages, pronounce at once upon a new species of rights 
which has been hitherto property, not properly known…  The statute of Ann 
was not declaratory of the common law, but introductive of a new law, to 




The Court of Session had reached the same conclusion the previous year
156
 and 





Of the historical debate, MacQueen has stated that in Scotland “the firm view came 
to be that copyright was not a right of property but a form of statutory monopoly, 
restricting for reasons of public policy what would otherwise be the natural liberties 
of mankind.”
158
  Deazley’s analysis of the origins of copyright supports this 
assessment.  He concludes that the evolution of copyright in the eighteenth century 
from the Statute of Anne to the case of Donaldson v Beckett
159
 has been subject to a 
“back-reading”.
160
  This has created a myth regarding the origin of copyright, which 
advances the view that the Statute of Anne was passed to protect the labour of 
authors and their property in that labour.  In doing so, the Statute allegedly over-
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turned the “common law” notion of copyright in published works
161
 and replaced it 
with a limited monopoly right for authors of 14 years.  Deazley seeks to show that 
there was no comparable concept of copyright or author’s rights prior to the Statute 
of Anne, and that this notion of the common law rights of authors has been 
constructed, post-legislation, in the eighteenth century and thereafter.
162
  He 
concludes that “[a] statutory phenomenon, copyright was fundamentally concerned 
with the reading public, with the encouragement and spread of education, and with 
the continued production of useful books.”
163
  Copyright was therefore never 
intended to protect the proprietary interests of the author, but was indeed a limited 
statutory grant of a right to encourage the dissemination of learning.  What came 
after was an attempt to impose sense and order on the complex and non-linear 
progression of copyright in the eighteenth century,
164
 coupled with the evolving 
scope of copyright, and drew strength from the notions of property in one’s labour, 
as popularized by Locke.
165
  Deazley’s analysis would support the notion of 
copyright as a right of exclusive privilege, created by statute, rather than a property 
right arising at common law. 
 
Yet the Statute of Anne, and cases such as Donaldson v Beckett, were concerned 
only with regulating the use of published works.  Copyright in unpublished works, 
which Deazley argues
166
 was effectively created by implication in Donaldson v 
Beckett, remained a matter for the common law until the Copyright Act 1911.
167
  As 
Richardson and Hitchens note “the right of publication of such texts [that is, private 
writings and etchings] was reserved to the author on the basis of a property right in 
the unpublished work, supplementing the various statutory copyrights in published 
                                                 
161
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works.”
168
  There is also evidence that copyright in both published and unpublished 
works (that is, copyright arising from statute and by operation of the common law) 
was treated as “property” rather than a monopoly right.  Morison’s Dictionary, for 
example, records a number of cases in the eighteenth century under the heading 
“Literary Property”, some of which related to the right of the author in works which 
were intended to remain unpublished.
169
  The historical debate may partly be 
coloured by the increasing importance of the terminology of property in the 
nineteenth century, as the market economy grew in importance.  Accordingly, 
“[t]rade secrets were often labelled “property”.  So too were unpublished texts, 
including texts of a more personal kind”.
170
 
   
Given the complex (and, according to Deazley, partly mythologized) origins of 
copyright and other intellectual property rights, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
attempt to reach a definitive conclusion as to the legal status of intellectual property 
rights in the twenty-first century.
171
  It is arguable that two factors mean that the 
resolution of this issue, while instructive, is not essential for current purposes.  In the 
first place, the reality is that intellectual property rights have been capable of transfer 
from the outset as, for example, Bell makes clear.
172
  Thus, their ultimate 
classification in theory as rights of ownership or of exclusive privilege does not 
impact upon whether or not they can be assigned or licensed in practice.  The second 
point is that intellectual property is entirely dependent on statute for its existence.  To 
this extent, its classification as property or exclusive privilege is over-ridden by its 
statutory basis.  Where the legislation does not cover either the creation or the 
particular act of copying, then there is no remedy in copyright for the creator.
173
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Perhaps the final word for the present review should go to Reid who acknowledges 
the complexities in classifying intellectual property rights: 
there are obvious points of resemblance between intellectual property rights 
and real rights in the traditional sense, in particular the fact that both types of 
rights are enforceable against the world at large, and it is plain that 
intellectual property rights cannot be classified as personal rights.  
Consequently, unless they form a third category of right sui generis, as in 
some legal systems, it may be that Hume’s classification [as exclusive 




Whether viewed as rights of exclusive privilege or ownership, or indeed in some 
third class as sui generis rights, modern intellectual property rights are powerful 
economic tools which protect the valuable intangible output of an individual, 
together with his moral or dignitarian interests.  Further, they rely upon a statutory 
grant to determine their full extent.  The right to assign and license is therefore the 




5. THE NATURE OF A PUBLICITY RIGHT IN SCOTS LAW 
5.1. Introduction 
Having looked at personal and real rights, it is now possible to address the question 
of where a right of publicity fits in Scots law.  Publicity is a difficult right to classify, 
in part because of the tension caused by the need to protect its economic and 
dignitarian interests equally.  From the foregoing analysis of publicity rights and 
Scots law, it is submitted that neither ownership nor personal rights reflect the 
complex right revealed: a right which is non-separable but requires to be good 
against the world; which is personal to the individual, but of considerable 
commercial importance; and which can be licensed but not assigned.   
 
It is submitted that the most appropriate classification of any right of publicity in 
Scots law is as a right of exclusive privilege.  While personal rights may be used to 
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enforce an individual’s right against a particular party, the right of publicity needs to 
be good against the world and capable of being licensed.  This would suggest that 
publicity is a real right, yet the real right of ownership cannot be engaged, since 
persona is not a “thing” in Scots law.  Thus, publicity rights fall most appropriately 
into the curious category of rights of exclusive privilege, which recognises real rights 
in monopolies, without the need for a thing.  Further strength for this conclusion can 
be drawn from a brief comparison of publicity with the closest monopoly right, 
intellectual property. 
 
5.2. Intellectual Property and Publicity Rights 
For present purposes, intellectual property rights demonstrate a very valuable 
characteristic:  the ability to recognise and protect economic and dignitarian interests 
at the same time.  Copyright, for example, grants a transferable economic right and a 
non-transferable moral right.  The commercial value in intellectual property can be 
exploited through licensing or assigning.
175
  With regard to copyright, MacQueen 
notes that “licensing comes into its own and gives the copyright owner considerable 
power to control the market in his work.”
176
  Further, “[c]opyright is not simply 
about earning a reward for the owner, as might still happen with a compulsory 
licence; it embraces the author’s moral right to control reproduction.”
177
  Both the 
economic and dignitarian interests enable control, albeit subject to internal regulation 
through the statutory grant of the right and external regulation through, for example, 
competition law.
178
     
 
Moral rights are intended to allow the creators of works to “control the treatment and 
presentation of their work by others”
179
 and, critically, “these rights remain with the 
                                                 
175
 See for example Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property, chapter 7 (exploitation of patents); 
chapter 13 (exploitation of copyright).  
176
 H MacQueen, Copyright, Competition, and Industrial Design, 2
nd
 ed, 1995,at 3. 
177
 Ibid., at 21. 
178
 For example, through the grant of compulsory licences.  The interface between intellectual 
property and competition is explored in a series of articles in the December 2005 edition of SCRIPT-
ed, (Vol 2, Issue 4), available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/issue2-4.asp (accessed 22 
June 2008).    
179
 E Adeney, The Moral Rights of Authors and Performers, 2006, para In.01. 
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author or performer even after economic rights have been alienated.”
180
  Although 
their recognition in the UK “can best be described as defensive, with most [moral 
rights] aimed at addressing perceived threats to industry”
181
 rather than perceived 
threats to authors, it remains the case that authors of copyright works have the right 
to be identified as the author of the work; to object to derogatory treatment of the 
work; and to prevent false attribution of the work.
182
  These are all rights aimed at 
protecting the author’s moral or dignitarian interests in his work and accordingly in 
the UK they remain with the author for the duration of his life and with his assigns 
for the duration of the copyright in the work,
183
 although they can be waived.
184
  
Copyright therefore demonstrates the critical attribute of control and exclusion which 
characterises property rights and gives them value, both economic and moral.  This 
duality is similar to that sought for publicity rights, whereby the economic value can 
be exploited through licensing or personal use while the dignitarian interests of the 
individual are also protected.   
 
A final point of interest is the support that writers such as Hume and Smith gave to 
intellectual property monopolies.  Despite being opposed to monopolies in general, 
as being “extremely detrimental”
185
 and tending to “promote the poverty or, which 
comes to the same thing, the uncomeatibleness of the thing so monopolized”,
186
 
Smith acknowledged that the privileges of copyright and patents “can do no harm 
and may do some good, [and] are not to be altogether condemned”.
187
  Hume 
likewise appeared to support these rights, despite criticising the abuse of other 
                                                 
180
 Ibid., para In.05. 
181
 Ibid., para 14.02.  Again, this reflects the control exercised by the industry, as raised in Chapter 4. 
182
 These rights are contained in the CDPA 1988, ss77-79 (identification as author), 80-83 (derogatory 
treatment) and 84 (false attribution).  
183
 CDPA 1988, s86(1), subject to the exception in s86(2) which provides that the right to object to 
false attribution only lasts for the life of the author plus 20 years.  Note that in some jurisdictions, such 
as France, the droit moral is believed to last indefinitely following death: see Adeney’s comment on 
this in The Moral Rights of Authors and Performers, 2006, para 2.52. 
184
 CDPA, s87. 
185
 Meek et al, Adam Smith Lectures, at  ii.33.  See also N MacCormick, “On the very idea of 
intellectual property: an essay according to the institutionalist theory of law” [2002] IPQ 227, at 237. 
186
 Meek et al, Adam Smith Lectures, at ii.34.  The use of “uncomeatibleness” in these lectures is 
probably a neologism referring to the exclusivity of any item subject to a monopoly.  Thanks to 
Professor John Cairns for his help with my interpretation of the Lectures in this regard. 
187
 Ibid., at ii.33. 
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monopolies in particular commodities.
188
  However, the support given to a monopoly 
right of copyright by Hume, Smith and others, was qualified by the need to ensure 





5.3. Creating a Right of Publicity in Scots Law 
The question then arises how such a right of exclusive privilege in persona could be 
recognised in Scots law.  It is suggested that any such right would require to be 
statutory.
190
  It is not entirely clear that a new common law monopoly right could be 
recognised through judicial development.  Although there is no clear guidance either 
way, the primary rights of exclusive privilege in evidence today have their basis in 
statute.  Earlier rights, such as thirlage or hunting down game, may well have had a 
common law origin, but the basis for this is no longer obvious in Scots law.
191
  
Whether classed as a right of exclusive privilege or as property subject to ownership, 
intellectual property rights arise from statutory grants, as was discussed above, and 
any increase in the scope of these rights results from legislative amendment, rather 
than judicial development.  
 
A statute creating a right of publicity would enable a holistic, coherent and consistent 
approach to this new right, framed within the establish category of exclusive 
privilege.  This would be in contrast to the ad hoc, and often opportunistic, 
development of new rights through litigation which, of necessity, is limited by the 
scope of the individual action before the court.
192
  A legislative solution would be 
capable of recognising both the economic and dignitarian interests in the monopoly 
                                                 
188
 Hume’s Lectures IV, at 60. 
189
 For example, Davies, Copyright and the Public Interest, para 4-005, citing Lord Macaulay’s 
speeches in the Houses of Parliament, 1841.  See also the discussion of this point in Chapter 7, section 
3. 
190
 This raises a question as to legislative competence.  It is suggested that the Scottish Parliament 
would have competence to introduce a new statutory right of exclusive privilege, since “private law” 
is not reserved, although intellectual property matters are, as per The Scotland Act 1998, s126, and 
Schedule 5, Head C4.  See also Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, para 3.4.9, 
note 322.  
191
 Neither Hume nor Smith are explicit on this point. 
192
 For an account of the serious limitations of development of the common law in this way, see R 
Buxton, “How the common law gets made: Hedley Byrne and other cautionary tales” (2009) 125 LQR 
60; also Westfall and Landau, “Publicity Rights as Property Rights”. 
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right, as copyright demonstrates.  The scope of the right, its limitations, the method 
for exploitation, and remedies for breach could all be clearly specified, thus 
accommodating both authorised and unauthorised exploitation in one measure.  A 
statutory grant would also address the slight question that remains as to whether 
rights of exclusive privilege are susceptible to transfer, since it would be in the power 
of the statute expressly to enable, or prohibit, any assignation or licence of 
persona.
193
  Further, a statutory grant could provide that any licensee of persona 
acquires an enforceable right against the world through that licence.  A final 
advantage of a statutory monopoly is that the right could be framed in such a way to 
ensure it is considerably more limited in scope than a property right, thereby 




Reference to the various US statutes which create a right of publicity is also 
instructive.  Although the wide scope of these (largely property-based) rights is not 
advocated, they do show the degree of creativity which can be achieved through 
legislation.  For example, the State of Washington distinguishes between an 
“individual” and a “personality”, enabling it to grant differential post mortem rights 
to those it regards as personalities and who have a commercial standing.
195
  This 
example is not intended to advance the merits of this provision, but rather to 
demonstrate the flexibility and degree of precision that can be achieved in a statutory 
right, features which are often lacking in the ad hoc development of a right through 
litigation. 
 
In drafting a monopoly right, however, the legislature will need to consider the scope 
of the publicity right in greater detail than has so far been done.  The next, and final, 
Chapter will seek to delineate the scope of the right in greater detail. 
 
                                                 
193
 Whether persona, as something inherently connected with and to the individual, is a suitable 
subject for assignation or licensing will be examined in Chapter 7. 
194
 As per my conclusions in section 4.2.2 above and Chapter 4 in general.  See also Westfall and 
Landau, “Publicity Rights as Property Rights”, for an account of the expansionist tendencies of 
common law property rights, arising from the “property syllogism”. 
195
 Washington Chapter 63.60 RCW Personality Rights, sections 020 and 040.  A different example 
can be seen in the statutory publicity rights of Illinois and Indiana, which both have rather creative 
provisions for recognising the right post mortem: The Illinois Right of Publicity Act (765 ILCS 1075), 
section 25; Indiana’s Publicity law IC 32-36-1-19. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to consider the limits and remedies appertaining to the 
monopoly right of publicity that has emerged from the foregoing study.  Since 
monopolies can be detrimental
1
 and any property right risks being “overbroad”,
2
 the 
limits on a right of publicity are therefore extremely important, and help to balance 
the interests of the individual with the competing interests of other parties.
3
  Part A 
of this Chapter seeks to provide a clearer insight to the limits of the right of publicity.  
Once these limits have been more clearly defined, it is necessary to consider the 
remedies for the individual in the event of infringement and Part B will, therefore, 
explore appropriate remedies. 
 
In addressing these issues, this Chapter draws on a small-scale piece of empirical 
research conducted in the course of writing this thesis.  The conclusions from my 
online survey, carried out in 2006 (the “2006 Online Survey”
4
), are illustrative of 
opinion as to some of the limits and remedies discussed below.   
 
 
                                                 
1
 As per Smith:  Meek et al, Adam Smith Lectures, at ii.33-ii.34. 
2
 In the words of de Grandpre: “Understanding the market for celebrity”, at 79. 
3
 As identified in Chapter 4 and considered also below. 
4
 The questionnaire used can be found in Appendix A. 
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PART A:  LIMITS 
 
While the thesis thus far has focused upon identifying a right of publicity for the 
benefit of the individual, it has been acknowledged that the grant of such a right 
impacts upon the interests of other parties.  Consequently, the right should go no 
further than is required to protect the individual’s dignitarian and economic 
interests.
5
  The limits of the right, and the countervailing interests which balance the 
right, must therefore be examined.  There are five elements which operate to limit the 
extent of the right or its exercise: 
1. formalities in respect of creation; 
2. duration of the right; 
3. transfer and transmission of the right; 
4. countervailing rights; and 
5. permitted uses. 
In the case of an action for publicity infringement, these five elements operate to 
establish: (i) whether or not there is a right (have all formalities been complied 
with?); (ii) whether there is any limitation on enforcement (has the right expired or 
been transferred?); (iii) whether there is a countervailing right which operates to 
prevent reliance on the right; and (iv) whether there is a defence to the infringement 
claim, based upon permitted uses.  The following sections will consider each of these 
in turn, and the rights of authorised users will, where relevant, also be considered. 
  
The resolution of these issues depends to a large extent on the purpose to be fulfilled 
by the new right and the justifications for that right.  There is therefore a 
considerable crossover between this chapter and the review of justifications in 
Chapter 4. 
 
                                                 
5
 See Chapter 4, section 9 and Chapter 6, section 5.3, with reference to Smith and Hume.  In the 
context of copyright, Davies notes that Chafee’s fourth ideal of copyright requires that protection 
“should not extend substantially beyond the purposes of protection.” Davies, Copyright and the Public 
Interest, para 9-002. 
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The law often imposes formalities which must be complied with before a right comes 
into existence.  For example, certain contracts are legally binding only where 
statutory formalities regarding writing have been met
6
 while, in the case of land, the 
real right of ownership arises only once the title has been registered in the Land 
Register:
7
  until that point, the purchaser will have a personal right against the seller 
– and then only if the formalities of contract have been fulfilled.  With patents and 
trade marks, registration is necessary to benefit from statutory protection.
8
  What 
formalities, if any, should apply in the case of publicity? 
 
2.1. Labour or Creativity  
One option, which can be swiftly dismissed, would be the need for a minimum 
standard of labour or creativity in “creating” the persona which is to be protected by 
the right of publicity.  As was shown in Chapter 4, the need for prior labour, and the 
extent and quality of that labour, are problematic concepts, and it is frequently 
impossible to determine in any given case whether there has been labour expended in 
creating the persona and, if so, by whom.
9
  More fundamentally, a labour or 
creativity prerequisite is contrary to the justification for the right of publicity, which 
refers not to the need to protect (or provide an incentive for) labour expended on 
persona, but to protect the individual’s autonomy in his persona.
10
   
 
Further, even if we were to assume that (a) a labour requirement could be defined 
and (b) an identifiable point of creation could be determined, we would still be faced 
                                                 
6
 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s1. 
7
 Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979, s3. 
8
 See for example the Patents Act 1977, ss7-9 and 14-20; the Trade Marks Act 1994, s2(1). 
9
 See Chapter 4, section 4.  Madow says that “[t]he notion that a star’s public image is nothing else 
than congealed star labour is just the folklore of celebrity, the bedtime story the celebrity industry 
prefers to tell us and, perhaps, itself.”  Madow, “Private ownership of public image”, at 184. 
10
 See Chapter 4, section 5.3 
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with the issue of an ever-evolving image for each individual.  Would the right be re-
created with each new achievement or hairstyle of the individual?
11
   
 
In any event, as copyright shows, where there is a requirement for some degree of 
labour or creativity (or originality in the case of copyright), this requirement is 





An alternative formality, and one which requires more detailed consideration, is 
whether or not the right of publicity should come into existence only on the 
registration of persona, in a manner similar to the trade mark and patent registration 
systems.  In their analysis of the emergence of modern intellectual property law, 
Sherman and Bently argue that the evolution of the modern system of registration for 
designs, patents and trade marks is one of the hallmarks of the modern intellectual 
property regime.
13
  Focusing on the administrative aspects of registration (such as 
form-filling, providing a two-dimensional representation of the mark or design, and 
so on), means that registration becomes an end in itself, rather than being seen as “a 
poor imitation of the “true” property – one which was twice removed from the 
essence of the intangible property”.
14
  So long as the invention, design or trade mark 
could be reduced to the required descriptive and illustrative form, protection would 
be granted:  theoretical debates as to the role of creativity and the merits of treating 
intangibles as property were superseded by this administrative “closure” of 
intangible property rights.
15
  Intellectual property disputes likewise moved away 
                                                 
11
 Madonna, for example, is well known for re-working her image.  The consequences of extending a 
right through re-working the original subject matter can be seen in early copyright debates.  
MacQueen notes that Sir Walter Scott was able to extend copyright protection until at least 1870 as a 
result of revising and re-issuing his works:  H MacQueen, Copyright, Competition and Design, 2
nd
 ed, 
1995, at 3.  Copyright duration was finally tied exclusively to the life of the author by the Copyright 
Act 1911.   See also WM Landes and R Posner, “An economic analysis of copyright law” (1989) 18 J. 
Legal Stud. 325, at 363; R Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7
th
 ed, 2007, para 3.3. 
12
 “Mundane” compilations such as a timetable index and the listing of programmes to be broadcast 
have been held sufficient: Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property, para 11-05, and cases cited 
therein. 
13
 Sherman and Bently, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law, at 180-186.  See also 67-76. 
14
 Ibid., at 185. 
15
 Ibid., at 180 and see also 182-183. 
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In turning the focus from the abstract to the concrete, registration performs a number 
of beneficial functions.  First, it marks the creation not of the intangible but of the 
legal right over the intangible.  The subject of the patent or trade mark may exist, but 
the existence of the legally enforceable right is dependent on registration.  Secondly, 
registration marks priority, making it easier to determine which party was first to 
acquire the legal right (if not the underlying subject).
17
  The third advantage is that 
registration enables the owner of the right to be identified with some certainty.
18
  A 
final benefit – and one often cited as the rationale behind granting the legal right in 
patent cases – is that registration of the patent, design or trade mark provides a 




Registration often works in tandem with unregistered rights at common law.  For 
example, where an inventor chooses not to register his invention to obtain a patent, 
he can, in certain circumstances, rely on commercial confidence in trade secrets to 
protect the invention.
20
  Similarly, the law of passing off provides a remedy for 
misrepresentative use of an unregistered trade mark.  One option for publicity rights 
would therefore be to restrict the exercise of the right to those who have registered 
their personas, while common law rights (such as passing off and the Article 8 right 
to privacy
21
) could operate to provide protection insofar as they can in unregistered 
cases. This would have the advantage of providing certainty as to when a statutory 
(registered) right of publicity could be exercised, albeit with the risk that the 




                                                 
16
 Ibid., at 186. 
17
 Ibid., at 68. 
18
 Ibid., at 68. 
19
 Ibid., at 69.  See also, for example, Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property, para 3-37; 
MacQueen et al, Contemporary Intellectual Property, paras 10-16 – 10-18. 
20
 See, for example, Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property, chapter 8. 
21
 As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5. 
22
 Carty discusses the risks of an expansive application of the doctrine of breach of confidence, 
whereby it offers wider protection for inventions than that offered by patents:  “The modern action for 
breach of commercial confidence”, particularly at 433. 
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There are four arguments against imposing a registration requirement for a statutory 
right of publicity, however.  The first consideration is derived from the personal 
nature of the subject:  the individual’s persona.  As was concluded in Chapter 4, 
persona is something which inheres to the individual.  Writing in the Common law 
tradition, McCarthy says “The right of publicity is an inherent right of identity 
possessed by everyone at birth.”
23
  This attitude is even more strongly held in 
Civilian systems, where Neethling argues that personality rights, as a category, 
“come into existence with the birth and are terminated by the death of a human 
being.”
24
  Since every individual has, from birth, a persona, it is counter-intuitive to 




A further consequence of the personal nature of the subject is that the main benefits 
of registration are not easily applied to a right which is so intimately associated with 
the individual.  Unlike patents, designs and trade marks, for example, publicity rights 
do not give rise to doubt as to the original owner,
26
 nor is there any need to establish 
priority or to share information about the subject for the benefit of the world at large.  
The typical benefits of registration (which help justify its use) are therefore lacking 
in publicity rights.   
 
Thirdly, the need for a sui generis right of publicity is, in part, based on the lack of 
protection at common law and the need to ensure a more coherent, rational system of 
protecting economic and dignitarian interests.  To limit this system to those who 
have chosen to register their persona is disadvantageous to individuals and to other 
parties alike.  Where there has been no registration, both the individual and 
prospective (or actual) users are left with the incoherent and potentially ad hoc 
protection and liability provided for by passing off and Article 8 – protection which 
was criticised on a number of grounds in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  There may also be 
judicial doubts as to the merits of allowing a pursuer to recover through doctrines 
                                                 
23
 McCarthy, “Public personas and private property”, at 688. 
24
 Neethling, “Personality Rights”, at 534.  Also Logeais, “The French right to one’s image”, at 168. 
25
 This can be distinguished from the administrative requirement to registers births and deaths:  
subsequent rights, such as the right to life, are not dependent on having registered one’s birth. 
26
 The position of subsequent owners, if any, will be considered in section 3.3. 
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such as passing off, where he could have achieved the legal protection he seeks 
through registering his persona.  These factors add to the already existing 
uncertainties as to the availability and extent of such common law rights.   
 
The fourth objection is that registration brings costs for both parties:  the individual 
who has to pay to register his persona
27
 and, to a lesser extent, the user who has to 
check the register to see if there has been a registration.  These costs are particularly 
problematic in the case of a right which is intended, in part, to protect dignitarian 
interests.  Requiring an individual to register (and to pay for such registration) in 
order to protect these interests contradicts the basic need to safeguard them. 
 
Simplicity and certainty have much to offer all interested parties and, given that all 
individuals have a persona which can be the subject of publicity rights, that 
simplicity and certainty is more likely to be found by creating a standard right 
applicable to all.  The universal nature of persona and publicity requires a universal 
right.   
 
The analogy has already been drawn between the right of publicity and copyright and 
it is interesting to note that copyright is one of the few intellectual property rights not 
dependent on registration.  There are two practical obstacles to imposing a 
registration requirement on copyright works, namely the large volume of copyright 
works and the low value of many of them.
28
  These objections are also relevant to 
publicity where, for many individuals, persona will have a low (albeit rarely 
negligible) economic value.  Further, since all individuals have a persona, the large 
volume of possible applications would prove a considerable administrative burden if 
registration were required.  A third reason why copyright is not well suited to 
registration is that “unlike the situation with patents, designs and trade marks where 
applicants had to describe what it was that they were claiming, in the case of 
copyright it was the object itself, the libretto, the score, or the book, rather than a 
representation of it, which was deposited at Stationers’ Hall.”
29
  Copyright is not 
                                                 
27
 And will often incur legal costs, as well as the registration costs,  in doing so. 
28
 Sherman and Bently, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law, at 183-184. 
29
 Ibid., at 184, emphasis in original.  Footnote omitted. 
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susceptible to further reduction.
30
  Again, the same can be said of publicity, where 
the persona is not easily reduced to registrable criteria in the same manner as patents, 
designs or trade marks.  Further, unlike any of the other intellectual property rights, 
no guarantor of originality is required, since persona, by its very nature, cannot be 
pirated.  Individuals may imitate another person
31
 but they cannot be another person.        
 
It is therefore suggested that there should be no formalities as to either labour or 
registration attaching to the proposed statutory right of publicity.  In the same way as 
copyright comes into existence with the expression or fixation of the idea, publicity 
rights should come into existence with the individual.
32
  A further advantage of this 
joint birth date is that the date of creation of the right can be ascertained with 




Careful consideration must be given to the term of a right of publicity. Whereas the 
real right of ownership has no fixed term, subordinate real rights frequently expire on 
the occurrence of a certain event, although the thing over which the right is held will 
endure.  Rights of exclusive privilege, especially statutory monopolies,
33
 typically 
have an expiry date after which there is no right and no remaining control.  
 
                                                 
30
 This difference between copyright and the other intellectual property rights is indicative, according 
to Sherman and Bently, of the “pre-modern” nature of copyright protection: The Making of Modern 
Intellectual Property Law, at 193.  The differences between copyright and trade marks and patents 
become more explicit if one uses the term “industrial property” rather than intellectual property, since 
the origins and rationales for legal protection of industrial property do not easily apply to copyright.  
For a discussion of these differences see Reid (ed), SME Vol XVIII, paras 801-802.  
31
 For example, Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties, at 96-97; Madow, “Private 
ownership of public image”, at 197; Carty, “Advertising, publicity rights and English law”, at 249-
250.  The consequences of fraudulent imitation are examined in cases such as Morrisson v Robertson 
1908 SC 332 and Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2004] 1 AC 119. 
32
 Infancy is no barrier to publicity: see the advertisement in Appendix C; also Suri Cruise:  
http://www.out-law.com/page-7274 (accessed 4 January 2009).  
33
 See CDPA 1988, ss12-15; the Patents Act 1977, s25; and the Trade Marks Act 1994, s42. 
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Adam Smith believed that monopolies in general were extremely detrimental.
34
  
Giving the example of a company set up to pursue trade with a “remote and 
barbarous nation”, he concedes that some trade advantages may be necessary and 
that  
[a] temporary monopoly of this kind may be vindicated upon the same 
principles upon which a like monopoly of a new machine is granted to its 
inventor, and that of a new book to its author.  But upon the expiration of the 




The expiry of the monopoly right was essential to ensure that the benefit to the 
individual was not procured at society’s expense, because the “privilege involved 
should be seen as a derogation from the order of natural liberty, and thus as one to be 
extended only so far as the justification for it runs.”
36
  Once the term of the 
monopoly expires, the subject of the right will lapse into the public domain to be 
available to all.
37
  In creating a new monopoly to protect publicity rights, it is 
necessary to consider what time limits should be placed upon that monopoly to 
protect the “order of natural liberty”.   
 
3.2. Duration in Life 
Determining the duration of the right requires the identification of both the start date 
and the end date.  These are separate issues but, in the case of publicity, are 
inextricably linked to the life of the individual.  As was concluded above, the date of 
creation of the right should be the date of birth of the individual.   
 
The next issue to be determined is therefore the duration of the right.  In America, 
where publicity is regarded as a property right, the various statutory rights of 
publicity provide for a lifetime duration.
38
  This should not necessarily be the case 
here, however, when it is recommended that the right of publicity should be 
                                                 
34
 But see also Chapter 6, section 5.2, referring to Smith’s and Hume’s support for limited monopoly 
rights in the case of intellectual property.   
35
 A Smith, Wealth of Nations, (ed) K Sutherland, 1998, at 418, emphasis added. 
36
 MacCormick, Institutions of Law, at 236. 
37
 Hughes, “The philosophy of intellectual property”, at 324. 
38
 See the US legislation cited below; a detailed analysis of the statutory protection is given by 
McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, chapter 6.  He notes that each statutory response is 
“one of a kind”, para 6:6.   
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recognised as a monopoly right, rather than as property.  Assistance can instead be 
sought from the statutory monopoly rights of intellectual property.  These rights all 
have fixed terms, but each is different not only in length but also in its potential for 
renewal.  Patents expire 20 years after the application was made and are non-
renewable.
39
  In contrast, trade marks have a shorter lifespan of 10 years, but this is 
subject to the right to renew the registered mark for a further period of 10 years, 
which is exercisable indefinitely.
40
   
 
When copyright was first introduced as a monopoly right by the Statute of Anne 
1709, the grant was limited to 14 years, followed by a renewed grant of a further 
period of 14 years if the author was still alive at the expiry of the first period.  In the 
300 years since then, the duration of the copyright has been revised and now 
currently exists for the life of the author plus 70 years.
41
  Landes and Posner state 
that these fixed terms not only reduce the adverse consequences of monopolies, they 
also reduce tracing costs, being the costs incurred with the necessary effort and 
expense to trace the owner of a prior intellectual property right in order to seek 
consent to use the right.
42
   
 
Where should publicity rights fall on this spectrum of term?  It seems clear that, as 
monopoly rights, they should have a fixed duration.  Although this provides the need 
for a limit, it does not provide any further guidance as to what that limit should be.    
There is no underlying principle which dictates that monopolies must expire after x 
years, although Smith would argue that any monopoly created should be of the 
                                                 
39
 The Patents Act 1977, s25(1), states that the 20 year period shall begin with the date of filing the 
application for the patent “or such other date as may be prescribed”.   
40
 Trade Marks Act 1994, ss42 and 43.  However, marks which are not used can be removed on 
application, if 5 years’ non-use can be proved, per s46(1).  Subject to this, it is possible for trade 
marks to last indefinitely:  Trade Mark 1, registered on 1 January 1876, is still in force today:  
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/tm/t-find/t-find-number?detailsrequested=C&trademark=1 (accessed 18 July 
2007). 
41
 CDPA 1988, s12.  Note that this is in fact the length of copyright protection for literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic works:  other periods are in place for sound recordings and films, as per ss13A, 
13B, 14 and 15.  Moral rights have separate terms (s86).  Until the CDPA 1988 came into force, there 
were a limited number of rights which lasted in perpetuity.  These were unpublished literary, dramatic 
and musical works, together with unpublished engravings and photographs.  The CDPA 1988 implied 
an expiry date of 31 December 2039 for the copyright in any such works in existence at the time of the 
Act, per Schedule 1, para 12(4).   
42
 WM Landes and R Posner, “An economic analysis of copyright law” (1989) 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 
at 361.  
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shortest possible duration to fulfil its intended purpose,
43
 and Landes and Posner 
point to the costs involved in tracing the right’s owner several decades after the first 
creation.  Thus a patent should secure a viable return to the inventor within 20 years 
and is also one of the hardest rights to trace, given its likely incorporation and 
development in many other products.  Trade marks, in contrast, protect the trading 
name and goodwill of a business and therefore need to last for as long as the business 
name does, but with the proviso that they lapse where the business fails to renew it or 
use it.  Other than making reference to these economic factors, the duration of 
intellectual property rights is entirely a matter for the legislature, dependent on the 
purpose to be served by the monopoly and the competing interests. 
 
As demonstrated above, the purpose of publicity rights is to enable individuals to 
control and manage their persona, thereby protecting their dignitarian and economic 
interests.  Publicity is therefore a right which combines the personal values and 
economic values arising from the individual’s persona.  Although the economic 
interests could be met with a time-limited monopoly, a fixed term duration does not 
reflect the dignitarian element of the right.  This leads to the conclusion that publicity 
rights should endure for the life of the individual.
44
   
 
  
3.3. Post Mortem Duration 
While the right of publicity should endure for the life of the individual, the extent of 
any post mortem duration requires separate consideration.  It has been observed that 
the exploitation associated with publicity does not necessarily cease when the 
individual does: 
A person may not live for long, but his or her beliefs, personality and image 
can live on and be passed down from one generation to another.  Decades 
                                                 
43
 See Chapter 6, sections 4 and 5; N MacCormick, “On the very idea of intellectual property: an essay 
according to the institutionalist theory of law” [2002] IPQ 227, at 237. 
44
 This reflects both the statutory right of publicity in the US and the Civilian personality rights 
approach:  see Chapter 2. 
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after their deaths, the images of Marilyn Monroe and James Dean continue to 
sell posters and T-shirts.
45
   
 
The question then arises whether there should be any post mortem right over 
persona.
46
  If so, how long should such rights last and who should enjoy and enforce 
them? 
 
There is certainly truth in Beverley-Smith’s comment that “reputation and injured 
dignity are generally of no concern to a deceased person”.
47
  It is also true to say that 
nothing is of concern to a deceased person yet, nonetheless, both dignitary and 
economic issues which may occur after his death may concern an individual while 
still alive.  It is presumably this which motivates people to leave wills which deal 
with both financial and personal matters after their death.
48
   
 
The Civilian position is summarised by Waelde and Whitty, as being that 
“personality rights generally are not actively transmissible by succession on the 
victim’s death but that after death relatives (or universal successors) of the deceased 
may have remedies in their own rights under rules prohibiting any interference with a 
deceased person’s body or reputation.”
49
  However, while this may be the starting 
point, Beverley-Smith et al note that: 
A trend is emerging in French case law according to which the non-economic 
element of personality rights is indescendible, but the economic element 





In Germany there is a division between the economic and non-economic interests.  
Following the leading case regarding the rights of Marlene Dietrich’s heirs, it has 
been accepted that “personality rights, as far as they protected economic interests, 
                                                 
45
 Milligan, Brand it Like Beckham, at 177.  For a short commentary on post mortem celebrity, see 
www.forbes.com/media/2008/10/27/death-career-move-biz-deadcelebs08-cx_ns_1027steinberg.html 
(accessed 23 December 2008).   
46
 This is different from the right of the individual’s successors to continue, or to initiate, any legal 
action for wrongs committed while the individual was alive, which is a valid course of action. 
47
 Beverley-Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of Personality, at 124. 
48
 Wills often provide for matters such as funeral instructions and the distribution of items of 
sentimental value as well as financial and material matters, indicating that most individuals do wish to 
plan for some element of ongoing economic and dignitary autonomy even after death. 
49
 Waelde and Whitty, “A Rights of Personality Database”, para 11.4.3(e). 
50
 Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 204. 
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  In contrast, the non-economic, or ideal, interests can be 
enforced post mortem but only by relatives, rather than being freely available for 
testamentary disposal.
52





Neethling, in his review of personality rights, gives brief consideration to personality 
rights post mortem.  He contrasts the approach of what he terms the “traditional 
school” of France and Switzerland, whereby all personality rights are terminated by 
death and “the idea of post-mortem personality rights is rejected”,
54
 with the German 
and Austrian approaches, for example, whereby (as discussed above) an individual’s 
personality rights “continue after his death and are maintained by his relatives as 
fiduciaries.”
55
  In the specific case of publicity rights, Neethling concludes that “[i]n 
so far as this right or interest is patrimonial”
56
 it should fall into the owner’s estate on 
death, but this should be seen as “part of the immaterial property right to the 
advertising image (of the deceased)”,
57
 thus meriting different treatment from his 
extra-patrimonial personality rights.   
  
The US approach, unsurprisingly, is willing to embrace a post mortem right, 
reflecting the predominant classification of publicity as a property right.
58
  Westfall 
and Landau argue that the classification of publicity as a property right resulted in 
syllogistic reasoning, which drove the recognition of post mortem protection for 
publicity.
59
  This was despite considerable arguments against post mortem 
protection, including the difficulties of “durational line-drawing” after death, and the 
increasing conflict between private rights and free speech the longer the right lasts.
60
  
The best policy argument in favour of a post mortem duration is, they conclude, the 
risk that the right could be suddenly cut off at any time as a result of the death of the 
                                                 
51
 Ibid., at 104, referring to BGHZ 143, 1 December 1999 – Marlene Dietrich. 
52
 Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 126-127. 
53
 Ibid., at 128. 
54
 Neethling, “Personality Rights”, at 243. 
55
 Ibid., at 243. 
56
 Ibid., at 240. 
57
 Ibid., at 240. 
58
 See Chapter 2, section 2.1 and the US state legislation referred to therein. 
59
 Westfall and Landau, “Publicity Rights as Property Rights”, at 83 et seq. 
60
 Ibid., at 86. 
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individual, harming the economic interests of the individual and licensees.
61
  Landes 
and Posner also advance an economic justification in favour of a post mortem right.  
Although the heir to an individual is unlikely to need post mortem protection to 
recoup the initial investment in that individual’s persona, the heir could “argue that, 
unless there is a property right in the public figure’s name and likeness, there may be 
congestion, resulting in a loss of value.”
62
   
 
Despite, or because of, the over-reliance on the property syllogism, post mortem 
rights are now firmly established in the US.  Of those states that have judicially 
considered the matter, most “have recognised that the right is descendible and has a 
limited post mortem duration of between 10 and 100 years.”
63
  Statutory provision 
also allows a post mortem duration.  In Florida, for example, the right expires 40 
years after the death of the individual,
64
 while Kentucky favours 50 years
65
 and 
Indiana extends protection for 100 years post mortem.
66
  Washington takes a slightly 
different approach, and offers post mortem protection for 10 or, in the case of a 
“personality”
67




Support for a post mortem right can be drawn from the 2006 Online Survey, where 
respondents were generally in favour of a post mortem right.  The level of 
enthusiasm amongst respondents appeared to depend on whether they thought that 
the right should be classed as a real right or a personal right.  Of the 27 respondents 
who favoured a property right, 17, or 63%, believed that the “ownership” of an 
individual’s persona should be capable of transfer, and therefore enforcement, on 
death.
69
  71 of the respondents who viewed persona as a personal right answered the 
“post mortem” questions and, of these, 56.3% believed that the right to enforce 
                                                 
61
 Ibid., at 87-88. 
62
 WM Landes and R Posner, “An economic analysis of copyright law” (1989) 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 
at 362-363. 
63
 Beverley-Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of Personality, at 184.  See also Westfall and 
Landau, “Publicity Rights as Property Rights”, at 83.   
64
 The Florida Regulation of Trade, Commerce, Investments and Solicitations, Chapter 540, Section 
08 (5). 
65
 Kentucky Acts 1984, 391.170(2). 
66
 Indiana’s Publicity law IC 32-36-1-8. 
67
 Defined as an individual whose name and likeness has a commercial value. 
68
 Chapter 63.60 RCW Personality Rights, section 040(1) and (2). 
69
 Graph 1, Appendix B. 
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protection should be transferred on death.
70
  This slight difference in response 
reflects the nature of the two rights being considered by the two response groups.   
Those who saw persona as a property right were more likely to favour a post mortem 
right, in line with the standard consequences of property, whereas those who classed 
it as a personal right were not.   
 
Nonetheless, allowing the right of publicity to continue post mortem adversely 
impacts upon the use of persona by the public in general, conflicting with the 
principles of freedom of expression and cultural communication, identified in 
Chapter 4.  To prevent persona from falling into the public domain on death is a 
considerable extension of any publicity right.  This is particularly the case since 
publicity rights are predicated in part on the personal nature of persona yet, after the 
death of the individual, persona can only ever be of interest to other parties, whether 
heirs or other users.  Although the publicity value does not necessarily cease on 
death, the personal interest in protecting it does.  There is therefore a strong case for 
terminating a right of publicity on the death of the individual, not least because the 
subject of the right is so closely tied to the existence of the individual in question.  
This also has the practical advantage of ensuring the date of expiry of the right can 
be determined with clarity.   
 
One further option is to find a “middle way” for post mortem protection.  In Nevada, 
for example, the commercial use of a deceased person’s name, voice, signature, 
photograph or likeness does not require consent where the publicity right has not 
been conveyed by the person in life to another party and where that person has no 
surviving successor.
71
  Thus, if there is no one with a direct interest, derived from the 
deceased, to enforce the publicity right it will lapse on the death of the individual.  
Further, even where there is a surviving successor, the publicity right can only be 
asserted where the successor’s claim has first been registered with the Office of the 
Secretary of State, on payment of a filing fee.
72
  This mechanism ensures that the 
                                                 
70
 Graph 2, Appendix B. 
71
 The Nevada Right of Publicity, NRS 597.800(2). 
72
 Ibid., NRS 597.800(3) and (4).  The filing fee is $25:  the relevant form is at 
http://sos.state.nv.us/business/trademarks/pdf/mark-publicity.pdf (accessed 24 December 2008). 
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publicity right does not endure post mortem when there is no-one with any interest or 









A compromise would therefore be to allow a post mortem duration for the right 
where the individual has specifically sought such protection, for example, by 
specifically including it in a testamentary disposition.  However, it is suggested that a 
more restrictive approach, providing greater certainty, would be to grant a post 
mortem right only on registration of the persona by the individual prior to death.  
Whereas registration was deemed to be undesirable for the exercise of the right 
during life, given the dual considerations of universal application and accessibility, 
these issues do not apply to a right which is to operate after the death of the 
individual.  Individuals who have a track record of exploiting their persona or who 
desire to protect it post mortem would be able to ensure its limited continuity by 
registering their persona in much the same way as a trade mark (for example, by 
specifying their name, any pseudonyms, and evidence of their image and indicia).  
One considerable advantage that registration would bring would be the increased 
ease with which it would allow tracing of rights’ holders.
76
  Further, the imposition 
of a registration fee, which would seem inappropriate for a right which protects 
dignitarian interests, is far less objectionable when the registered publicity right 
would be used primarily for commercial gain by the surviving relatives or 
beneficiaries.    
 
The need for registration prior to death raises the question of what happens if the 
individual dies, perhaps unexpectedly, without registering but surviving relatives 
nevertheless wish to exercise the right post mortem.
77
  Should a period of grace be 
                                                 
73
 The Illinois Right of Publicity Act (765 ILCS 1075), section 25. 
74
 Indiana’s Publicity law IC 32-36-1-19. 
75
 Oklahoma Stat. tit 12, para 1448E. 
76
 As noted above, although tracing costs are minimised during life, since the right holder is the 
individual, this is not the case post mortem:  requiring registration makes it considerably easier to 
trace the holder of the right post mortem.  
77
 This consideration also applies to individuals who die before any statutory right is introduced.  
Would the surviving relatives of Rikki Fulton (d. 2004) be entitled to register his name and image? 
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recognised in which to allow for post mortem registration?
78
  Although surviving 
relatives may understandably desire such a period, it is not clear that there is a 
pressing need for it.  Those whose persona is likely to have an ongoing significance 
post mortem are likely to be well advised (wide-ranging celebrity trade mark 
registrations
79
 provides evidence of this), and thus in a position to register for a post 
mortem right as soon as they feel the need for it.  Where the individual has not seen 
fit to register his persona, thereby allowing it to lapse into the public domain on 
death, it is not clear why relatives should be able to over-ride this position.  Further, 
providing that only the individual is entitled to register his persona ensures that he 
can make the necessary testamentary provision for it, consequently avoiding the 
practical difficulties of determining which surviving relative is entitled to register 
and thereafter exercise the right post mortem.
80
     
 
The only remaining question is how long this registered right should last.  This is 
ultimately a question of policy,
81
 but there seems no need for the lengthy protection 
offered in some US states.  Given the greater emphasis on commercial interests 
following the death of the individual, it is not inappropriate to compare the duration 
post mortem with the industrial intellectual property rights:  trade marks and patents.  
This would suggest a post mortem duration of between 10 and 20 years, with the 
option, if there is evidence of a need, for an extension of term through re-registration 
in the manner of trade marks, rather than through the initial grant of a right.  Thus, if 
the right is exploited and enforced post mortem, it would be open for the 
beneficiaries to re-register the right:  in the absence of this, the persona would lapse 
into the public domain.  A shorter post mortem right based on these economic 
                                                 
78
 Similar to the period of grace in US patent law (but not in Europe), allowing inventions to be 
patented within a limited period of the invention being disclosed publicly.  See Cornish and Llewelyn, 
Intellectual Property, para 5.10 et seq. 
79
 G Black (published as G Davies), “The cult of celebrity and trade marks: the next instalment” 
(2004) 1:2 SCRIPT-ed 230. 
80
 Entitlement of surviving relatives to register persona is likely to be a particularly thorny problem 
post mortem. 
81
 Davies refers to Macaulay’s comment in the House of Commons in 1841, regarding the post 
mortem duration of copyright, and his observation applies equally here:  “this is a point which the 
legislature is free to determine in the way which may appear to be most conducive to the public 
good”.  Davies, Copyright and the Public Interest, para 10-006, citing Macaulay, in Hansard, House 
of Commons, Vol. 56, February 5, 1841, col. 365. 
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considerations also reflects the dignitarian approach reflected in the post mortem 
treatment of personality rights in Civilian systems.   
 
 
4. TRANSMISSION AND TRANSFERABILITY 
 
The review thus far has recognised that the publicity right is inherently connected to 
the individual, with the consequence that it should be exercised by the individual and 
last for his lifetime and potentially, subject to registration, for a fixed period 
thereafter.  Two subsequent questions derive from this conclusion:  can the right be 
transferred during life and can the right be transmitted after death?
82
   
 
4.1. Transfer of the Right in Life:  Assignation and Licensing  
Regardless of the post mortem extent of a publicity right, the individual will be faced 
with more immediate concerns regarding the transfer of the right during his lifetime.  
As MacQueen notes in relation to intellectual property: 
Although each of the rights confers on the owner an ability to stop activity 
using the property in question, in most cases the owner will prefer that such 
activity take place.  A major purpose of the laws of intellectual property is to 
provide a legal framework under which the inventive, creative and 




This juxtaposition of the right to prevent with the need to enable third party activity 
arises in the context of publicity rights, reflecting the positive and negative uses.  
Individuals will be best able to exploit the value in their persona if they are able to 
share that with other parties, and control this external use of it.  However, as seen in 
Chapters 4 and 6, publicity is inherently connected to the individual and therefore 
inalienable.  The practical reality of commercial exploitation comes up against the 
theoretical analysis which confines publicity to the individual.   
 
                                                 
82
 This section is concerned with the transmission of the right of publicity as a primary right:  for a 
detailed analysis of the transmissibility of secondary rights in personality rights as a whole, see 
Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, section 3.6. 
83
 Reid (ed), SME Vol XVIII, para 802, emphasis added. 
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This is most evident in the Civilian tradition.  It has been stated that “[n]one of the 
civil law systems seek to abandon the traditional doctrine of the inalienability of 
personality rights.”
84
  Yet the tension between theory and practice is well illustrated 
by Beverley-Smith et al’s review of French and German law, where strong 
statements of principle are later modified by an awareness of the practice.  Thus the 
statement that “[i]t is traditionally asserted in France that personality rights are 
inalienable, that is can neither be waived nor assigned”
85
 is followed six pages later 
with the recognition that, in France, agreements are made “daily” for the 
“commercial exploitation of personal attributes”.
86
  Although it is not clear whether 
consent to use of personality rights “operates merely as an enforceable promise not to 
sue or as the transfer of a right, in the nature of a property right… enabling the 
licensee to sue third parties”
87
 such commercial agreements are nonetheless 
concluded.  Similarly, for German law, the authors discuss four different methods for 
allowing third party use of an allegedly inalienable right,
88
 concluding that the 
“attempt to reconcile the inalienability of personality rights with the demands of the 
advertising and merchandising business is hard to sustain doctrinally.”
89
        
 
This problem is not so evident in the US, where publicity is treated as a property 
right, with all the consequences that entails.  The pragmatism of the American 
“publicity as property” approach is evident in the words of Judge Frank:  
a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to 
grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture… Whether it be 
labelled a ‘property’ right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag 





As Madow observes, it “seemed natural and obvious to the court that celebrity 
personas should be treated as garden variety commodities, to be bought and sold in 
                                                 
84
 Waelde and Whitty, “A Rights of Personality Database”, para 11.4.3(d). 
85
 Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 191. 
86
 Ibid., at 197. 
87
 Waelde and Whitty, “A Rights of Personality Database”, para 11.4.3(d). 
88
 These are waiver, medical law consent, irrevocable consent and licensing:  see Beverley-Smith et 
al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 130-137. 
89
 Ibid., at 132. 
90
 Haelan Laboratories v Topps Chewing Gum 202 F.2d 866, at 868, per Frank J. 
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the market like any other…  The court was simply giving legal form (and protection) 
to preexisting commercial practice.”
91
   
 
Yet this approach, which reflects the commercial reality of transfer and exploitation 
of publicity rights, is not without its problems either.  Whether or not one classes 
persona as property does not alter the fact that it is not separable from the individual 





There is therefore a risk that courts and academics become entrenched on one side or 
other of the debate, determined either to reflect the reality of exploitation by allowing 
transfer or to uphold the sanctity of legal taxonomy by refusing to countenance the 
transfer of a right so inherently bound to the individual.   
 
However, a transfer of rights does not have to be outright, but could be constituted by 
the grant of a temporary right to use the persona by way of a licence.  Whereas sale 
or, in intellectual property, assignation
93
 transfers full ownership, a licence ensures 
that control remains with the owner, subject to the terms of the licence.  While an 
inalienable aspect of an individual, such as persona, could not be assigned, there is 
no reason why its use could not be licensed for a particular purpose.   
 
Licensing offers a very flexible solution, where matters such as the duration, the 
territory, and the purposes for use can all be specified, subject to any necessary 
provisions for termination or revocation if required by the licensor.
94
  In the words of 
Beverley-Smith et al, regarding German law, 
the personality right is regarded as one single right, which protects both 
economic and non-economic interests.  A licence transfers one piece of this 
cake to the licensee.  However, since the licence can be revoked under 
                                                 
91
 Madow, “Private ownership of public image”, at 174, but note he should not be taken to endorse 
this view. 
92
 See Chapter 6. 
93
 In Scots law, typically only personal rights are assigned: R Anderson, Assignation, 2008, para 1-01.  
However, the statutory terminology of assignation applies to intellectual property rights, see for 
example the CDPA, s90.  The terminology of assignation will be used here. 
94
 See, for example, Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property, para 7-25 regarding patents, but 
applicable to all licences. 
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exceptional circumstances and since the licence usually expires after a certain 





This split between “mother” and “daughter” rights is arguably what all licences seek 
to achieve, whether in this field or any other, and conveys the duality of a grant of a 
right together with the retention of control by the licensor. 
 
The study of authorised exploitation in Chapter 3 demonstrated that most contracts in 
Scotland and England for authorised exploitation of publicity are constituted by 
licence, rather than an attempt to assign the rights.  Some of these licences, such as 
the pro forma licence between the sportsman and the Club or the agreement between 
Irvine and Ferrari, are drawn in such broad terms as to be close to a full assignation, 
but stop short of a full transfer.
96
  Indeed, a licence can be drafted in such a way that 
the practical outcome for the licensee is almost the same as if he had taken a full 
assignation, but the distinction remains, since “an assignment is in essence a transfer 
of ownership (however partial), while a licence is in essence permission to do what 
otherwise would be infringement.”
97
     
 
The results of the 2006 Online Survey demonstrate support for a temporary transfer, 
through licensing.  Whether or not persona should be capable of transfer was asked 
twice; once of those respondents who classed persona as a property right and once of 
those who classed persona as a personal right.  The 27 respondents who viewed 
persona as a property right were asked “should an individual be entitled to transfer or 
sell on his persona to a third party?”.  Of these, 55.6% favoured an outright transfer, 
compared with 37% who did not and 7.4% who did not know.
98
  When the question 
was asked of these respondents whether there should be a right for the owner to 
permit others to use it, by way of a licence, the response was unequivocal:  92.6% of 
respondents favoured the right to do so and to charge a fee, while the remaining 7.4% 
were split evenly between those who thought there should be a right to license but 
                                                 
95
 Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 133.  See also Waelde and Whitty, “A 
Rights of Personality Database”, para 11.4.3(d). 
96
 See Chapter 3, section 4. 
97
 Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property, para 13-11. 
98
 Graph 3, Appendix B. 
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not to charge a fee (3.7%), and those who did not know (3.7%).
99
  No-one answered 
the question in the negative.  Although support for assigning was high (at 55.6%), 
support for licensing was nearly unanimous at 96.3%.  Even though respondents 
classed publicity as a property right, they were apparently more comfortable with the 
idea of licensing, rather than assigning, persona. 
 
For those respondents who classed persona as a personal right, the question asked 
was “should the individual/ enforcer of the right of commercial persona be entitled to 
waive their right to enforce?  And should there be a right to charge a fee for granting 
a waiver?”
100
  The answers open to respondents were: (i) to allow waiver and the 
right to charge a fee; (ii) to allow waiver but not for a fee; (iii) to refuse the right to 
waive (making it in effect an entirely inalienable right, more akin to a human right 
such as the right to life); (iv) to opt for no enforceable right at all; or (v) don’t 
know.
101
  Of the 73 “personal rights” respondents, 87.7% were in favour of the right 
to waive this personal right, with 68.5% opting for the right to charge a fee for this 
waiver and 19.2% favouring a gratuitous waiver.  A much smaller proportion (8.2%) 
favoured prohibiting the individual from waiving his right to enforce. 
 
Classification of publicity rights as a statutory monopoly is capable of enabling some 
degree of transfer, which stops shorts of full assignation.  This conclusion reflects 
both current commercial practice and the views evidenced in the 2006 Online 
Survey.  The distinction between assignation and licensing is particularly important 
in light of the problems identified with an outright transfer of persona, which by 
nature is an inherently personal “asset”, tied to the individual.  This restricts any 
transfer of persona to a (temporary) licence to use, rather than an (outright) 
assignation.  The conclusion that can be drawn is that the monopoly right of publicity 
should be capable of being licensed but not assigned. 
 
                                                 
99
 Graph 4, Appendix B. 
100
 The question was asked slightly differently for personal rights respondents, to reflect the different 
legal basis in question. 
101
 Graph 5, Appendix B.  Note that a total of only three respondents of 73 chose the last two options. 
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4.2. Transmission of the Right Post Mortem  
Whether or not the right can be transmitted to heirs, or transferred on thereafter, has 
largely been answered by the foregoing analysis at section 3.3 above.  Where the 
persona has been registered, successors in title to the individual should benefit from a 
publicity right and, since the right is no longer tied to the individual upon whose 
persona it depends, there is no theoretical obstacle to recognising the right as fully 
transferable.  This alters the attributes of the right in two ways.   
 
In the first place, as was discussed above, it diminishes the justifications for the right, 
so that the right should continue in existence only if specific steps have been taken to 
that end, namely registering the persona.  Further, the duration of the right becomes 
tied to the statutory period.  The second consequence however is that the right can be 
transmitted on death in accordance with the individual’s testamentary wishes, and 
thereafter becomes freely transferable, by assignation as well as licensing, for the 
duration of the right post mortem.   
 
Thus, on death, the right of publicity becomes a more explicitly economic right, and 
falls to be treated with other economic monopoly rights, such as trade marks.  Only 
by registering the mark in life can a post mortem right be created, to take effect on 
death, for the benefit of the beneficiaries according to the deceased’s will.  This 
reflects the conclusion in Chapter 6, section 4.2.2, whereby the problems with 
transferring persona in life were held not to apply after death:  although persona is 
inalienable from the individual in life, this restriction does not apply post mortem. 
 
 
5. COUNTERVAILING RIGHTS  
 
One of the fundamental conclusions of Chapter 4 was that any right of publicity must 
be balanced against the legitimate competing interests of the wider public in the use 
of persona.  This section aims to consider and delineate the necessary counter-rights 
which would operate as exceptions to the right of publicity.  These are often implicit 
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in the literature, but need to be made explicit.  Two such rights have already been 
identified:  freedom of expression and cultural communication. 
 
5.1. Freedom of Expression 
The right to freedom of expression, as protected by Article 10 ECHR, provides for 
the right to receive and impart information and ideas.  It acts as a balance to the 
exercise of the proposed right of publicity, since the right to impart information can 
be exercised through the use of persona to communicate.  There is precedent for 
countering publicity rights in this way in the United States, for example, where the 
constitutional right to free speech under the First Amendment acts as a defence to, 




Although Article 10 is accorded “a conspicuously elevated status in the human rights 
framework”,
103
 it is not an automatic trump over other rights.
104
  Article 10(2) does 
recognise the existence of other rights which may require to be balanced against the 
right to freedom of expression.  As has been seen in previous chapters, English case 
law to date has involved the courts in carrying out a balancing exercise between the 
right to privacy under Article 8 and the right to freedom of expression under Article 
10.
105
  This jurisprudence has clearly established that once the claimant’s Article 8 
right is engaged, there must be a balancing between that Article 8 right and the 
defendant’s Article 10 right.  In each case, the question of which right takes 




Whilst this need for balance is well-established as regards Article 8, we are not 
directly concerned with privacy here, as was concluded in Chapter 5.  The question 
                                                 
102
 See, for example, McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, section 3:6 and 3:47; 
Goodenough, “Re-theorising privacy and publicity”, at 51-53; and Carty, “Advertising, publicity 
rights and English law”, at 223.  
103
 C Angelopoulos “Freedom of expression and copyright:  the double balancing act” [2008] IPQ 
328, at 329.  
104
 Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 457, para 113, per Lord Hope; In re S [2005] 1 AC 593, para 17, 
per Lord Steyn. 
105
 Chapter 5, section 2.4. 
106
 See for example Mosley v News Group Newspapers Limited [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), para 11; 
Chapter 5, section 2.4. 
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becomes what other rights, if any, must be balanced against Article 10?  Article 
10(2) allows for restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression to 
accommodate, amongst other things, the rights of others.
107
  This would include 
intellectual property rights, for example, since the very purpose of intellectual 
property is to regulate the use (and prevent unauthorised use) of literary works, trade 




Thus intellectual property rights may necessitate legal protection for one individual 
(by way of copyright, for example) which adversely interferes with the freedom of 
expression of others.  Freedom of speech will clash with copyright where “it might 
be necessary – because adequate alternative means of expression do not exist – to use 
a protected text to achieve an expressive goal that it would not otherwise be possible 
to achieve.”
109
  Where this is also the case with publicity (that is to say, where the 
particular speech required can be achieved only through the use of a particular 
individual’s persona) then Article 10 should enable this.  This is subject, however, to 
balancing Article 10 against the publicity right since, in Spence’s words (regarding 
intellectual property in general):  “[i]t may be that I can only contribute to public 
debate if I have the right both to be identified with my speech and to prevent it from 
being distorted.”
110
  Any distortion of persona in this speech may thus reduce the 
weight to be accorded to freedom of expression. 
 
As with privacy, there is no single answer to the problem of balancing private rights 
with the right to freedom of expression, and it is never possible to provide a 
definitive guide as to which right takes precedence on any occasion.
111
  Instead, the 
                                                 
107
 For a detailed discussion of the scope of the Article 10(2) provision for interference with the right, 
see Reed and Murdoch, Human Rights Law in Scotland, paras 7.29 et seq. 
108
 Angelopoulos provides an analysis of why copyright and freedom of expression are capable of 
working together “like a well oiled machine, enhancing each other in the process”.  C Angelopoulos, 
“Freedom of expression and copyright:  the double balancing act” [2008] IPQ 328, at 353. 
109
 M Spence, “Intellectual property and the problem of parody” (1998) 114 LQR 594, at 610, 
footnote omitted. 
110
 Ibid., at 609. 
111
 Section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 appears to encourage the courts to give priority to 
freedom of expression, but this reading would run into difficulties since, as Reed and Murdoch note, 
“if the courts were to construe the provision as adversely affecting the application of countervailing 
Convention guarantees (for example, Article 8’s requirement of respect for private life), a litigant who 
was unsuccessful in the domestic courts could bring proceedings in Strasbourg.”  Reed and Murdoch, 
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courts would need to balance the rights of each party on a case-by-case basis, by 
making “a sensitive, nuanced and contextually specific examination of the particular 
factual circumstances of each case, incorporating an evaluation and attachment of 
weight to both of the competing interests.”
112
  If the balance is not achieved, there is 
a risk that “tenuous property interests [may be allowed] to outweigh substantial 
expression rights.”
113
      
 
Two final observations reinforce the point that the Article 10 right is strong but not 
unlimited.  In the first place, Article 10(2) expressly states that the exercise of the 
right “carries with it duties and responsibilities”.  This encompasses, for example, the 
duty to ensure that any opinions have a reasonable factual basis.
114
  Secondly, even 
where the unauthorised user successfully relies upon his Article 10 right to counter 
the individual’s publicity right, the court may still award compensatory damages to 
the individual for the use made of his persona, since “ “Freedom of expression 
should not normally carry with it the right to make free use of another’s work”, to 
profit from it without compensation.”
115
  Article 10 is an important limit on the right 
of publicity, but it remains a qualified limit.   
 
 
5.2. Cultural Communication 
Creative or cultural communication, as explored in Chapter 4, was identified as an 
important use of persona where that use created new meaning or passed quasi-
political comment on the existing meaning of a persona.  In the words of de 
Grandpre, “a central challenge of the right of publicity consists in balancing rights in 
personal identity with the necessity of allowing everyone to dip into a rich common 
                                                                                                                                          
Human Rights Law in Scotland, para 7.33.  Reed and Murdoch provide a detailed discussion of 
judicial consideration of section 12 at para 7.34.   
112
 Waelde and Whitty, “A Rights of Personality Database”, para 11.5. 
113
 Laugh if Off v SAB 2006 (1) SA 144, para 74. 
114
 Reed and Murdoch, Human Rights Law in Scotland, para 7.32. 
115
 C Angelopoulos, “Freedom of expression and copyright:  the double balancing act” [2008] IPQ 
328, at 342.  The unattributed quotation is from Ashdown v Telegraph Group [2002] Ch 149, para 46. 
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  The cultural commons has a role to play as a countervailing right 
to a monopoly right over persona.
117
   
 
Perhaps the first point to note is that where the use of persona is necessary to enable 
the communication of opinions and ideas, this is likely to be protected by Article 10 
ECHR.  Thus, where there is a genuine communicative purpose served by the use of 
persona, which cannot be met in any other way, then the individual’s publicity right 
will be matched by the countervailing right of expression, as discussed in the 
previous section. 
 
In other cases, where the use is indeed part of cultural communication, intended for 
social or subversive comment, this should be recognised as a valuable contribution to 
our society.  This is articulated in the copyright debate by MacMillan, who supports 
“a distinction between productive and reproductive uses of another’s copyright work.  
The former involving a creative use of existing copyright work, whilst the latter 
involves a merely exploitative use of someone else’s intellectual property.”
118
  This 
distinction can also be applied to publicity to help protect genuine creative use of 
persona. 
 
Nonetheless, as discussed in Chapter 4, section 5.4.4., Coombe and Howkins refer to 
the need to be wary of over-reliance on the concept of cultural communications at the 
expense of the prior private right.  Use of publicity – on both sides of the fence – 
needs a framework in which to flourish.  It is submitted that, since the practice of 
cultural communication depends upon the prior practice of publicity, this exception 
to publicity should be treated not as a countervailing right, which exists on its own 
merits, but as a subsequent right, being a permitted use of persona.  Only where a 
right of publicity is first recognised is it necessary or possible to recognise a right of 
cultural communication dependent on use of persona.    
                                                 
116
 de Grandpre, “Understanding the market for celebrity”, at 106. 
117
 This also reflects the fifth ideal of copyright as identified by Chafee, being that copyright “should 
not stifle independent creation by others.”  Cited in Davies, Copyright and the Public Interest, para 9-
002. 
118
 F MacMillan, “Striking the copyright balance in the digital environment” 1999 ICCLR 350, at 351, 
footnote omitted.   
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Accordingly, the public interest in cultural communication will be examined through 
a series of permitted uses, most notably the public interest, which allow unauthorised 
use of persona to be defended on certain grounds.  Uses which are capable of 
accommodating the creative use of persona will be considered in the next section.   
 
6. PERMITTED USES  
 
Since publicity is not an absolute right, it is necessary to consider those uses of 
persona which will not infringe the individual’s publicity right:  in the words of 
copyright legislation, for example, these are the permitted uses. 
 
6.1. Private Use 
A straightforward example of a permitted use is one which is entirely private.  As 
discussed in Chapter 3 above, the focus of publicity rights is the public use of 
persona, and the definition of media information, promotion and merchandising uses 
reflects this element.  Where the use made of persona is private, then there will be no 
breach of the proposed right of publicity – although there may be other legal grounds 




6.2. Public Policy 
Public policy can operate to deny legal protection to a claimed private right, thus 
ensuring that there can be no infringement of the so-called right.  In the field of 
copyright, for example, public policy considerations may arise where it is determined 
that certain types of work “are undeserving of the protection of copyright”.
120
  Since 
                                                 
119
 Such as breach of the individual’s Article 8 right to private life, albeit not by dissemination.  See 
the discussion on this point in Chapter 5, section 3.3. 
120
 MacQueen et al, Contemporary Intellectual Property, para 5.47.  The authors give the examples of 
pornography and material published in breach of an obligation of secrecy.  See also A Sims, “The 
denial of copyright protection on public policy grounds” [2008] EIPR 189.   
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no protection is granted to them, there can be no infringement by unauthorised use.
121
  
However, this exception to the grant of copyright depends on the nature or content
122
 
of the work in each case, whereas a publicity right protects only one type of “work” – 
the persona.  It is therefore difficult to see how public policy could apply to deny 
protection of persona in some circumstances but not in others.  There is nothing 
inherent in any individual persona (that is name, image and reputation) which could 
in some cases give rise to a public policy objection over the grant of the right in the 
first place.  There may, however, be good reason why unauthorised use of a persona 
should be permitted, but it is submitted that the right of publicity should always be 
recognised in that persona, even if it is subsequently curtailed on one of the grounds 
considered below. 
 
6.3. Public Interest 
The notion of the public interest often provides a catch-all defence, by permitting the 
infringement of a private right where this would benefit or advance a “public 
interest”.  In the case of publicity, it is suggested that unauthorised use of persona 
should be permitted where it is in the public interest.   
 
Although there is no single definition of the public interest, it operates in a number of 
spheres:  in privacy actions, by informing the Article 10 right to freedom of 
expression;
123
 in cases concerning confidential information, by operating to justify 
the breach of confidence,
124
 with specific provision in cases of breach of confidence 
in medical circumstances
125
 and employment relationships;
126
 and in copyright where 
it exists in its own right and arguably underlies the permitted uses of copyright.
127
  
                                                 
121
 This is emphasised by Sims, where she also brings out the difference between public policy and 
public interest in copyright:  “The denial of copyright protection on public policy grounds” [2008] 
EIPR 189, at 190.   
122
 Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property, para 12-57. 
123
 See Chapter 5, section 2.4, regarding freedom of expression. 
124
 See for example Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property, paras 8-15 et seq; MacQueen et al, 
Contemporary Intellectual Property, paras 18.58-18.61. 
125
 See, for example, J Chalmers, Legal Responses to HIV and AIDS, 2008, at 64-65. 
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 The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 allows “whistleblowing” if this is in the public interest. 
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 See Davies, Copyright and the Public Interest. 
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The public interest therefore plays a broad and vital role in allowing exceptions to 
the grant or enforcement of certain private rights.   
 
While what qualifies as a matter in the public interest “must be capable of being 
tested by objectively recognised criteria”
128
 the precise nature of those criteria 
remains uncertain.
129
  Crime and wrongdoing appear to be two fairly straightforward 
grounds on which to engage the public interest,
130
 and Eady J refers to a number of 
elements in Mosley which may have justified (but on the facts did not) the 
publication of Mosley’s sexual activities by the News of the World.  These included 
the allegedly criminal nature of the activity,
131
 the alleged Nazi theme,
132
 and the 
depravity of Mosley’s actions and adultery.
133
  Criminal activity is also a ground for 
employee disclosure in the public interest under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 
1998, along with considerations such as whether a miscarriage of justice has 
occurred, whether the health or safety of any individual is endangered, whether the 
environment is being damaged, or indeed whether any of these events is likely to 
occur.
134
  Similar considerations relating to the health and safety of individuals apply 
to the disclosure of patient details by the medical profession.
135
   
 
Even in copyright cases, where there is not necessarily a relationship based on 
confidence, the public interest defence has arisen in respect of copyright-protected 
works.
136
  Section 171(3) of the CDPA 1988 states that nothing in the Act regarding 
copyright “affects any rule of law preventing or restricting the enforcement of 
copyright, on grounds of public interest or otherwise.”  With reference to Hyde Park 
Residence v Yelland, Davies suggests that this affords the courts discretion to refuse 
to uphold an action for copyright infringement “but such jurisdiction is limited to 
cases where enforcement of the copyright would offend against the policy of the law.  
                                                 
128
 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Limited [2008] EWHC 1777, para 138. 
129
 See for example, in copyright, MacQueen et al, Contemporary Intellectual Property, para 5.47. 
130
 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Limited [2008] EWHC 1777, para 234. 
131
 Ibid., paras 110-121. 
132
 Ibid., paras 122-123. 
133
 Ibid., paras 124-134. 
134
 The Employment Rights Act 1996, s43B, as inserted by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. 
135
 J Chalmers, Legal Responses to HIV and AIDS, 2008, para 61-68. 
136
 The public interest defence in copyright cases is complicated by the existence of specific statutory 
defences.  For an analysis of the interaction between these and the public interest, see Davies, 
Copyright and the Public Interest, paras 4-033 – 4-035. 
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The Press Complaints Commission’s Code of Practice provides a definition of the 
public interest as regards media publication, setting out when publication of 
otherwise unpublishable material will be justified:  
1. The public interest includes, but is not confined to:  
i) Detecting or exposing crime or serious impropriety.  
ii) Protecting public health and safety.  





While such interests are laudable, the courts have made clear in questions of media 
publication that catering to the public curiosity for gossip is not on a par with the 




The Press Complaints Commission’s guidance is particularly helpful since the role of 
the media in publishing matters in furtherance of “the public interest” is perhaps one 
of the most controversial elements of this defence.  In W v Edgell, the public interest 
was found to justify the disclosure by the doctor in question of a psychiatric report to 
the medical officer at the plaintiff’s secure hospital, but the judge suggested that 
disclosure to the press, especially for a price, would have breached the doctor’s duty 
of confidence to his patient, the plaintiff.
140
  Similarly, in the employment context, it 
has been observed of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 that “the stringency of 
these requirements [regarding disclosure to the media] is a clear signal that reporting 
to the media is intended to be a last resort”.
141
  This suggests that even where 
disclosure can be justified in the public interest, publication in the media may be 
                                                 
137
 Davies, Copyright and the Public Interest, para 4-034, citing Hyde Park Residence v Yelland 
[2001] Ch 143.  See also Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property, para 12-58; C Angelopoulos, 
“Freedom of expression and copyright:  the double balancing act” [2008] IPQ 328, at 335-336. 
138
 Available at http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/practice.html (accessed 12 October 2008).  The Code also 
notes that the interests of children under 16 are “paramount” and that there must be an “exceptional 
public interest” to override their private interests. 
139
 McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73, para 66.  See also Mosley v News Group Newspapers Limited 
[2008] EWHC 1777, para 114; Douglas v Hello! [2006] QB 125, para 254, where the public interest is 
contrasted with “public curiosity”.   
140
 [1990] Ch 359, as discussed by J Chalmers, Legal Responses to HIV and AIDS, 2008, at 65. 
141
 E Callahan, T Dworkin and D Lewis, “Whistleblowing:  Australian, UK and US approaches to 
disclosure in the public interest” (2003-2004) 44 Va J Int’l Law 879, at 894. 
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unjustified, if the public interest can be served by disclosing to the appropriate 
authority, such as the police, rather than to the world at large.
142
  In some cases, 
however, where there are large numbers of entitled recipients, disclosure in the press 




This distinction draws out one of the potential difficulties inherent in applying the 
public interest defence in publicity situations.  Since many of these cases focus on 
preventing criminal or wrongful conduct, it is difficult to see the precise role to be 
played by the public interest in publicity cases where, as Chapter 3 sought to show, 
most publicity is intended to promote goods or services or enable media publication 
of aspects of celebrities’ lives.  A further distinction between the public interest 
situations discussed above and the right of publicity is that many of the above public 
interest disclosures were made in breach of a duty of confidence – yet not all (or 
indeed many) publicity infringements will be made in breach of such a duty.  Where 
any use of persona breaches existing rights which recognise a defence of the public 
interest, then that defence will of course be available.   
 
The question for consideration here is whether there is any role for the public interest 
defence in a publicity right action, that is to say, separate from these existing grounds 
of action.  It is certainly true, as Beverley-Smith et al observe, that “[u]sing the 
portrait of a celebrity in advertising, however, usually only serves the advertiser’s 
interest.”
144
  Where use of persona is intended to benefit the interests of the party 
using it, rather than a wider public interest, then the defence should not be available. 
 
However, it is submitted that there is a specific ground of public interest which 
should be recognised in the context of publicity rights:  the cultural communication 
interest.  Where use of persona is necessary to communicate cultural meaning, as 
advanced by Madow, Coombe, Carty and de Grandpre, amongst others,
145
 then it 
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 Although note Ouseley J’s comment in Theakston v MGN Ltd that the “free press is not confined to 
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public to reach its own conclusion.”  [2002] EWHC 137 (QB), para 69. 
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should be permitted, on the basis of the public interest in allowing such use.  
Whereas the public interest is typically cited in the context of criminal behaviour or 
iniquity or public protection, this alternative ground would see it employed in a more 
creative and positive context.  It is reliant on a broader concept of the “public 
interest”, but it is one which is very relevant to the publicity debate, as Coombe and 
others demonstrate.  
 
Coombe gives an absorbing example of the extent of cultural communication through 
imagery – not all of it reliant on persona – in her depiction of a typical walk to work 
through downtown Toronto.
146
  Where individuals make use of persona to 
communicate a cultural or sub-cultural meaning, such as the use of Nancy Sinatra’s 
name by a lesbian band in Coombe’s example, this use should be permitted – subject 
to other existing (non-publicity) rights, such as defamation or privacy.  Thus, where 
the use of an individual’s persona would not breach existing legal protection and 
where it contributes to cultural (and typically non-commercial) communication of 
ideas or criticisms, it should not constitute an infringement of the individual’s 
publicity right, by virtue of being in the public interest. 
 
As with all public interest defences, the extent to which the use in question amounts 
to a genuine cultural communication will depend on the facts of each individual case, 
and it is, unfortunately, difficult to generalise.  It is also likely that there will be an 
overlap between this and the permitted uses of fair dealing and parody.  Nonetheless, 
it is submitted that a genuine cultural communicative use of persona is in the public 
interest and should be recognised as a permitted use.   
 
6.4. Fair Dealing 
The CDPA 1988
147
 provides for certain permitted uses to be made of copyright work 
where such uses constitute “fair dealing”.
148
  Sections 29 and 30 of the CDPA 1988 
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 Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties, at 1-6. 
147
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148
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allow fair dealing for the purposes of research and private study, criticism, review 
and news reporting, provided that the use is “accompanied by a sufficient 
acknowledgement and provided that the work has been made available to the 
public.”
149
  Where a use falls within one of these categories, has been acknowledged 
and is also “fair”,
150
 it will be an excepted use, and not constitute copyright 
infringement.  There is a great deal of merit in ensuring that similar permitted uses 
are available in cases of publicity rights.   
 
For example, section 31 of the CDPA 1988 provides an exception for “incidental 
inclusion” of the copyright work in an artistic work, sound recording, film or 
broadcast.  As the authors of Copinger and Skone James on Copyright note, the 
provisions on incidental inclusion “have a great deal of importance for 
photographers, advertisers, film makers and broadcasters”
151
 since they allow, for 
example, a report to be filmed in front of a work of art, play, or even a building, all 
of which would otherwise benefit from copyright protection as regards the film or 
broadcast.  Where a camera crew captures celebrities spectating at a sporting or 
charity event as part of a wider report on the event, for example, the dissemination of 
those images should be permitted as constituting incidental inclusion.
152
  Similarly, 
reference to individuals, their image and reputation for the purposes of private study 
or non-commercial research should be permitted, unless there is a breach of their 
Article 8 right to privacy.  Finally, individuals should accept that there is a legitimate 
need for criticism or review of their persona, whether that is academic, artistic or 
political.  Where the criticism or review is untrue, existing doctrines such as 
defamation are capable of supplying a remedy.       
 
                                                                                                                                          
Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, 15
th
 ed, 2005, (henceforth Copinger and Skone James on 
Copyright) paras 9-19 – 9-63; C Angelopoulos, “Freedom of expression and copyright:  the double 
balancing act” [2008] IPQ 328, at 336-341. 
149
 CDPA 1988, s30(1). 
150
 For details of the sort of considerations that are relevant to determining fairness, see Copinger and 
Skone James on Copyright, para 9-55. 
151
 Ibid., para 9-56. 
152
 A similar exemption exists in German law regarding privacy to allow photographs of assemblies 
and crowd scenes to be publicly exhibited:  A Vahrenwald, “Photographs and privacy in Germany” 
[1994] Ent LR 205, at 215. 
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Fair dealing as delineated in the CDPA 1988 therefore provides a useful, and 
carefully drawn, set of exceptions to copyright, which could usefully be replicated to 
act as defences to a claim for infringement of publicity rights.  As with fair dealing in 
copyright, the court should be able to consider the motives of the alleged infringer:  
“was the use merely dressed up in the guise of criticism or review?”
153
  Yet viewed 
against the concerns expressed in Chapter 4, fair dealing alone is too narrow:  the 
public interest in using persona extends further than these exceptions, to encompass 
the public interest in cultural communication, as discussed above, and arguably also 
parody.     
 
6.5. Parody  
A further possible acceptable use of persona is provided by parody.  Although there 
is no fixed definition of parody, a comprehensive overview is provided by Maniatis 
and Gredley.  For them, parody can be defined as follows: 
Unlike other forms such as satire, parody uses the preformed material of its 
source “as a constituent part of its own structure”.  It involves at first an 
imitation and then a change of the style, subject-matter or vocabulary of 
another work, achieving its effect through comic incongruity between the 




It is this comic incongruity which is at the heart of parody:  “the parodist relies on the 
audience’s awareness of the target work or genre; in turn, the complicity of the 
audience is the sine qua non of its enjoyment.”
155
  Critically, if “parody does not 
prickle it does not work”,
156
 but when it does work, it is “for the most part a form of 
healthy social and artistic criticism.”
157
   
 
The importance of parody is well recognised
158
 as it potentially impacts upon a range 
of intellectual property rights, including copyright, moral rights, passing off and 
                                                 
153
 Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, para 9-55. 
154
 S Maniatis and E Gredley, “Parody: A fatal attraction?  Part 1: The nature of parody and its 
treatment in copyright” [1997] EIPR 339, at 339, footnote omitted. 
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 Ibid., at 340. 
156
 Laugh it Off v SAB 2006 (1) SA 144, para 75. 
157
 C Rutz, “Parody: a missed opportunity?” [2004] IPQ 284, at 314, footnote omitted. 
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 Recent articles include: C Rutz, “Parody: a missed opportunity?” [2004] IPQ 284; M Spence, 
“Intellectual property and the problem of parody” (1998) 114 LQR 594; and S Maniatis and E 
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trade marks.  Opinion is divided, however, as to whether it ought to be afforded 
special treatment as a distinct genre or defence.
159
  This wider question can however 
be left aside in the present discussion, to focus instead on the role that could be 
played by parody as a defence to publicity rights infringement.  
 
Perhaps the leading judgment on parody in any jurisdiction is that of Justice Sachs in 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa, in the trade mark infringement case of 
Laugh it Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) 
BV
160
 when the appellant company printed t-shirts featuring parodies of well known 
trade marks.  In a comprehensive legal, social and political review of trade mark law 
and social commentary, he reflected on the vital role that parody can play in society.  
Specifically, branding can operate to level the playing field between the corporations 
on the one hand and the cultural communicators, such as those identified by 
Madow,
161
 on the other:  
[i]n our consumerist society where branding occupies a prominent space in 
public culture, one does not have to be a ‘cultural jammer’ to recognise that 
there is a legitimate place for criticism of a particular trademark, or of the 





This comment applies equally to publicity, whereby overzealous use of publicity 
rights could stifle public debate and criticism, in the way Madow feared.  Where the 
genuinely parodic use of a trade mark was prevented by the trade mark owner’s 
intellectual property rights, then the “result was inappropriately to allow what were 
                                                                                                                                          
Gredley, “Parody: A fatal attraction?  Part 1: The nature of parody and its treatment in copyright” 
[1997] EIPR 339 and “Parody: A fatal attraction?  Part 2: Trade mark parodies” [1997] EIPR 412; C 
Angelopoulos, “Freedom of expression and copyright:  the double balancing act” [2008] IPQ 328.  In 
particular, the distinction between weapon parody (where the original work is parodied to comment on 
other aspects of culture) and target parody (where the parody comments upon the original work), 
which is drawn in several of these commentaries, is not made here in relation to publicity, since both 
may be equally valid in a publicity context, especially in light of the “cultural communication” use of 
persona. 
159
 Contrast M Spence, “Intellectual property and the problem of parody” (1998) 114 LQR 594, at 601 
and 615–617, who does not think so, with S Maniatis and E Gredley, “Parody: A fatal attraction?  Part 
1: The nature of parody and its treatment in copyright” [1997] EIPR 339, at 344, who do. 
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 2006 (1) SA 144.   
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 See the discussion at Chapter 4, section 4.2. 
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tenuous property interests to outweigh substantial expression rights.”
163
  It is critical 
that the same cannot be said of publicity rights.
164
   
 
Parody is necessary to provide a vent for society and a method of enabling 
discussion:   
A society that takes itself too seriously risks bottling up its tensions and 
treating every example of irreverence as a threat to its existence.  Humour is 




Where there is genuine parody of an individual’s image or identity – “a take-off, not 
a rip-off”
166
 – then the right of the parody artist must outweigh that of the individual.  
It may be that the individual has a claim under defamation, for example, or through 
Article 8 privacy rights, but these are separate actions and do not affect the 
conclusion reached here:  parody should not be capable of being struck down through 
a sui generis publicity right.   
 
6.6. Other Possible Permitted Uses 
To finish this review of permitted uses of persona, it is necessary to touch upon two 
uses which are, it is submitted, largely protected by the foregoing exceptions to the 
right.   
 
The first is the need to use persona to “set the record straight” – a factor which 
played a key role in MGN’s defence in Campbell v MGN.
167
  Such a claim would 
allow use of an individual’s persona where it was necessary to correct a lie or 
hypocritical stance adopted by the individual in question.  In fact, insofar as such a 
use is necessary,
168
 this is likely to be covered by the general “public interest” 
ground, since disclosure of lies and the need to ensure the public knows the truth 
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164
 The brief and largely dismissive treatment of the parody defence by the Ninth Circuit in White v 
Samsung Electronic America Inc suggests that parody is given insufficient consideration in American 
courts: 971 F.2d 1395, at 1401. 
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 Laugh it Off v SAB 2006 (1) SA 144, para 109. 
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 Ibid., para 102.   
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 [2004] 2 AC 457. 
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of privacy, on the basis that hypocrisy is preferable to the disclosure of vice: Foundations of Private 
Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment, 2006, at 236. 
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certainly falls within this category.  Further, such use is likely to be protected by the 





The second possible use which could be permitted is where there is “fair comment”.  
This is one of the available defences to an action for defamation, and arises where 
the allegedly defamatory comment is in fact a statement of opinion.  Liability will 
not attach in defamation where the defender can demonstrate that his opinion was 
based upon true facts and concerned a matter of public interest, and that there was no 
intention to harm the pursuer.
170
  It is submitted that non-defamatory
171
 use of 
persona to express an opinion is likely to be protected, where necessary, by Article 
10 and should, to this extent, be permitted.  
  
 
PART B:  REMEDIES 
 
Now that the limitations of the right of publicity have been more thoroughly 
explored, one final element remains:  the remedies available for breach.  If an 
individual successfully establishes that his persona has been used for the media 
information, promotion or merchandising use without his consent and without the 
benefit of any of the countervailing rights or limits examined in Part A, then he will 
be entitled to a remedy for this infringement.   
 
 
7. REMEDIES FOR BREACH 
 
Remedies for unauthorised exploitation fall into two camps, being those directed at 
preventing the unauthorised use and those intended to provide redress for it.  Under 
                                                 
169
 See section 5.1 above and Chapter 5, section 2.4. 
170
 J Thomson, Delictual Liability, 3
rd
 ed, 2004, at 269-270. 
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the heading of prevention are interdict and interim interdict.  If an individual is able 
to prove a proposed use of his persona would breach his publicity right and cannot be 
defended, then there would seem to be no reason why he could not raise an action for 
an interim or permanent interdict.
172
  The test for these remedies in Scotland requires 
a prima facie case and satisfaction of a test of balance of convenience, in the case of 
the former, or proof of a continuing or apprehended wrong for the latter.   
 
Where the unauthorised use has already been made, the individual may wish to seek 
redress in court.  The following sections will examine the measure of damages and 
other disposals that might be appropriate in an action by the individual.  An 
authorised exploiter, whose rights under an exclusive licence have been breached, 
may also seek a remedy from the unauthorised exploiter, and this aspect of liability 
to licensees will be dealt with in the final section.   
 
It would be possible to make express provision for these remedies in a statutory right 




7.1.  Damages 
7.1.1. Introduction 
Infringements of rights in both Scotland and England are frequently remedied by the 
court with an award of damages
174
 and it is well established that damages are 
intended to compensate the pursuer for his loss, by putting him in the position he 
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 As Whitty notes, “There is (fortunately) no Scottish parallel to the technical English rule of Equity 
that an injunction will not be granted if damages would be an appropriate remedy; Lord Cairns’s Act 
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would have been in but for the breach, rather than to punish the defender for his 
wrongful action or breach.
175
   
 
In addition to this compensatory function, there may be an amount of damages 
awarded to vindicate the right infringed.  This is supported by evidence from a 
number of English tort law cases, most notably those which also protect human 
rights under the ECHR.  Lord Hope of Craighead, for example, explains that the 
“function of the law is to enable rights to be vindicated and to provide remedies 
when duties have been breached.  Unless this is done the duty [to warn in medical 
cases] is a hollow one, stripped of all practical force and devoid of all content.”
176
  
Eady J has applied this principle in a privacy case, by acknowledging that an award 
can be necessary “to mark the fact that either the state or a relevant individual has 
taken away or undermined the right of another – in this case taken away a person’s 
dignity and struck at the core of his personality.”
177
   
 
Where there is a dignitarian loss, compensation could be granted by an award of 
solatium to compensate for distress, anxiety and mental suffering of the pursuer 
resulting from the unauthorised use of his image or identity.
178
  Solatium recognises a 
personal loss rather than a patrimonial loss and, according to the Court of Session, 
should be calculated with reference to “such sum of money as will reasonably mark 
the jury’s (or the judge’s) sense of the seriousness of the suffering, or as a reasonable 
recognition of its seriousness.”
179
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 In the context of remedies for intellectual property rights, see MacQueen et al, Contemporary 
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Compensating the economic loss is likely to prove more troublesome, however, since 
it will require to be calculated according to some quantifiable loss.  Where the 
pursuer can show that he has lost some or all of his licence fee with an authorised 
exploiter as a result of the unauthorised use, as per examples given by Lord Brown 
in Douglas v Hello!,
180
 this lost fee could be recoverable from the unauthorised user.  
However, in some cases there may be no obvious financial loss, yet the defender will 
still have had the benefit of the pursuer’s publicity right, for which he would 
otherwise have had to pay.  In order to address this problem a remedy in unjustified 
enrichment may be appropriate. 
 
7.1.2. Unjustified Enrichment:  The Notional Licence Fee 
In Chapter 6, the lack of a clear prior right was identified as a hurdle to protecting 
publicity rights through unjustified enrichment.  A statutory monopoly right would 
create this prior right and thus any unauthorised use or “taking” of persona would 
fulfil the criteria for unjustified enrichment: (i) that there is an enrichment of the 
defender, which would arise from use of persona; (ii) at the expense of the pursuer, 
since his right to control (granted by the statutory right) would have been 
circumvented; and (iii) that the retention of the enrichment is unjustified, which 
would be the case where the right of publicity had been breached without 
justification.  The question then arises as to the measure of damages to be awarded. 
 
Unjustified enrichment looks to the gain made by the defender rather than the loss 
suffered by the pursuer, which can be calculated with reference to a “reasonable 
sum” for the use of the thing or right taken.
181
  A good example of such a measure is 
the “notional licence fee” award, known variously as the hypothetical release 
measure,
182
 the quid pro quo measure
183
 or, as a wider category, gain-based 
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  It is calculated according to the fee that the defender would have had to 
pay for the unauthorised use made, and has been the subject of much academic 
debate.
185
  The remedy has been pressed into service in a number of breach of 
contract cases
186
 where there has been no quantifiable loss suffered by the claimant 
as a result of the defendant’s breach of contract.  
 
The notional licence fee is often sought where the contract creates a monopoly in 
favour of the claimant, which is destroyed by the defendant’s action in breach of 
contract with no hope of restoring the status quo ante.  For example, where the 
breach arises from building additional houses
187
 or producing recordings
188
, it cannot 
be reversed, that is, the newly built houses cannot (for reasons of public policy) be 
torn down, nor can the records sold to the public be unsold.  This is equivalent to the 
position with publicity rights, where any breach of the right cannot easily be 
reversed: once Hello! had published the unauthorised wedding pictures of the 
Douglases, there was no way to undo the publication; once Talksport had circulated 
brochures featuring Irvine, there was no way to reverse the circulation.  In the words 
of Eady J, in cases such as these, the “dam has effectively burst.”
189
   
 
Although not a breach of contract, infringement of a statutory right of publicity 
would likely be, by its very nature, irreversible in this way.  The notional licence fee 
therefore has a role to play in providing financial compensation for breaches which 
cannot otherwise be undone (whether through unjustified enrichment or breach of 
restrictive covenant).  It allows the pursuer to recover compensation, calculated 
according to the notional fee that the defender would have had to pay to make 
authorised use of the persona, under licence.     
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The notional licence fee award has been recognised in personality cases in the 
Civilian jurisdictions of France and Germany.  French courts will award 
compensation “in the amount which would have been paid if the person concerned 
had asked for permission.”
190
  German law recognises this measure as a head of 
damages, where there has been fault,
191
 and under unjust enrichment.
192
   
 
It has also been the subject of judicial consideration in England, in the two leading 
cases, Irvine v Talksport and Douglas v Hello!.
193
  In fact, the award of damages to 
Irvine was exactly this measure.  The Court of Appeal overturned the amount of 
Laddie J’s original award, but endorsed the basis of it, which was stated to be the 
“fee which would have been arrived at as between a willing endorser and a willing 
endorsee”.
194
  Laddie J’s award of £2,000, calculated on the somewhat curious basis 
of £2 per brochure,
195
 was replaced with an award of £25,000 which was explicitly 
based on Irvine’s current fee for endorsing products at the time that Talksport used 
his image.
196
  Further, the Court of Appeal emphasised that the award should be 
based on what the defendant “would have had to pay… It is not the fee which 
[Talksport] could have afforded to pay”.
197
  The end result was that   
the unchallenged evidence leads ineluctably to the conclusion that [Talksport] 
would in all probability have had to pay at least £25,000 in order to enable it 
to do lawfully that which it did unlawfully, that is to say represent by means 





Although the Court of Appeal’s assessment of the amount of the notional licence fee 
differed from Laddie J’s, the underlying principles were approved.  Importantly, both 
courts noted the difficulties inherent in attempting to calculate a licence fee when 
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neither party would have reached agreement in reality.  It was acknowledged that 
Irvine would never have agreed to permit his image to be used in such a non-
prestigious context, compared with his existing portfolio of glamorous high-profile 
endorsements and deals.
199
  Talksport would equally have refused to enter into an 
agreement with Irvine based on his standard fee, when it could have achieved the 
same result by using a different photograph,
200
 such as one posed by a model.  
Despite these difficulties, both the High Court and the Court of Appeal adopted the 
reasonable endorsement fee approach.  The Court of Appeal affirmed that this was to 
be calculated according to the fee that the defendant would have had to pay, as 
demonstrated by the claimant’s evidence, for use of that image. 
 
The claim for a notional licence fee or reasonable royalty had considerably less 
success in Douglas.  This was partly because the Douglases had committed 
themselves to an exclusive licence with OK!.  Any grant of a licence by them to 
Hello! would therefore have left them in breach of contract as regards OK!.  
Accordingly, there was no notional licence fee to be calculated here:  the Douglases 
could not have granted rights to Hello! without breaching their prior contract with 
OK!.  It is therefore arguable that if the Douglases had chosen not to exploit their 
wedding photographs though OK!, they would have been able to claim a lost licence 
fee against Hello!.   
 
The Court of Appeal raised a second objection to the award of a notional licence fee 
to the Douglases, by observing that “the Douglases would never have agreed to any 
of the unauthorised photographs being published.  The licence fee approach will 
normally involve a fictional negotiation, but the unreality of the fictional negotiation 
in this case is palpable.”
201
  However, it is not obvious that the Douglases were any 
less likely to grant consent than Irvine was, or, perhaps more accurately, evidence 
from the case reports seems to indicate that both Irvine and the Douglases would 
have been equally adamant in refusing consent.  If the Court of Appeal was able to 
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deal with the fiction of a negotiation between Irvine and Talksport, it is not clear why 
it was unable to deal with it as between the Douglases and Hello!.   
 
A further obstacle identified by the Court of Appeal was that “while it is not a 
sufficient reason for rejecting the notional licence fee approach, there is the difficulty 
of assessing a fee.”
202
  The Court of Appeal arguably over-stated this difficulty.  
Again, evidence from Irvine, together with the commercial cases which endorse the 
notional licence fee approach, can be referred to in order to provide guidance as to 
this assessment.  As with Irvine, there was direct evidence available of the sort of 
fees that the Douglases would charge or that magazines such as Hello! and OK! 
would be prepared to pay for the exclusive right to publish celebrity wedding 
photographs.  The complicating factor here – that Hello! would have needed to 
negotiate a fee to publish unauthorised photographs – is not dissimilar from Irvine, 
where the Court of Appeal accepted that Irvine would never have agreed to endorse a 
company such as Talksport, yet was still able to assess a notional licence fee for the 
purposes of damages.  
 
The notional licence fee approach is fraught with obstacles if one takes it literally 
and looks at what the two warring parties would have tried to agree, pre-breach.  
However, if one treats it as a method of calculating damages where no other 
quantifiable financial loss is demonstrable, then it is a valuable tool for dealing with 
unauthorised use of intangibles, whether that unauthorised use breaches a contract or 
amounts to an unjustified taking of a monopoly right.  Attempting to quantify the 
licence fee is no more of a fiction than attributing a specific value to lost or damaged 
body parts, as the courts frequently do in personal injury actions.
203
  Criticisms of the 
approach as being too subjective can also be dismissed for this reason.  All breaches 
giving rise to litigation will have a subjective value for the pursuer, yet the courts are 
prepared to impose a “reasonable” or objective sum, determined by accepted rules on 
quantification.  There is no reason why the courts should be reticent about what is in 
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effect another exercise in calculating loss, based on a notional licence fee, using the 
best evidence available.   
 
It is submitted that this measure should, however, be subject to a defence where the 
individual could never have granted a licence to the unauthorised user because of a 
prior grant of an exclusive licence to an authorised user.  This was of course the 
outcome of Douglas v Hello!, where the Douglases’ claim against Hello! was limited 
to their dignitarian interest in the personal information, while the commercial claim 
was brought by OK!, to whom the Douglases had effectively licensed the economic 
value.  The Court of Appeal rejected the notional licence fee claim because  
having sold the exclusive right to publish photographs of the reception to 
OK!, the Douglases would not have been in a position to grant a licence to 
Hello!...  Accordingly, an award of a notional licence fee would involve the 
Douglases being unjustly enriched: they have already been paid £1m for the 
exclusive right to publish photographs of the reception. As was said in 




By exercising the positive power to exploit the information, via their contract with 
OK!, the Douglases had exploited, and exhausted, their commercial interest in the 
information.  Their claim against Hello! could only be for the loss sustained, and no 
loss of a licence fee was sustained, because OK! still paid the agreed fee for the 
exclusive.  Accordingly, in this situation, the claim against the unauthorised user for 
the economic interests will come from the exclusive licensee, as considered in 
section 7.3 below.  
 
7.1.3. Additional Damages 
There is a specific provision in the CDPA 1988 which entitles the court to take into 
account all the circumstances of the breach of copyright, particularly the flagrancy of 
the infringement, and to award additional damages for these circumstances “as the 
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upon “upset and affront at invasion of privacy, not loss of the opportunity to earn money” (para 246) 
and that the practicalities of assessing a notional licence fee would have involved an element of 
“unreality” (para 246).  The former difficulty has been acknowledged already in this thesis, not least 
in relation to the dangers of “shoehorning” a publicity foot into another boot, while the latter has been 
addressed and, it is submitted, overcome in this section. 
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justice of the case may require”.
205
  A non-statutory equivalent of this can be 
detected in Eady J’s decision in Mosley v News Group Newspapers Limited, where 
he referred to similar awards in defamation actions and stated “[i]t must be 
recognised that it may be appropriate to take into account any aggravating conduct in 
privacy cases on the part of the defendant which increases the hurt to the claimant's 
feelings or “rubs salt in the wound”.”
206
  It is submitted that the possibility of 
awarding additional damages should be recognised in publicity cases. 
 
7.1.4. Account of Profits 
English law recognises a further remedy which is particularly prevalent in 
intellectual property cases.  An account of profits is an equitable remedy “based on 
the principle that the infringer has carried out the infringing act on behalf of the right 
owner.”
207
  Cornish and Llewelyn note that this remedy “is not a notional 
computation as with damages, but an investigation of actual accounts”.
208
  Support 
for awarding an account of profits in publicity cases can be derived from the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in Douglas v Hello!.  The Court stated: 
If, however, Hello! had made a profit on the publication, we would have had 
no hesitation in accepting that the Douglases would have been entitled to seek 
an account of that profit.  Such an approach would not run into the difficulties 
of principle which their notional licence fee argument faces.  Such an 
approach may also serve to discourage any wrongful publication, at least 




An account of profits is likely to be particularly relevant in respect of the 
merchandising use, where there is frequently a direct correlation between the use of 
an individual’s image on t-shirts, for example, and the profits made from selling 
those t-shirts.  
 
                                                 
205
 CDPA 1988, s97(2).  See also MacQueen et al, Contemporary Intellectual Property, paras 21.100-
21.101. 
206
 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), para 222. 
207
 MacQueen et al, Contemporary Intellectual Property, para 21.102.  In Scots law, it is sometimes 
referred to as “count, reckoning and payment”: M Hogg, Obligations, 2
nd
 ed, 2006, para 6.16, and 
references therein. 
208
 Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property, para 2-43. 
209
 [2006] QB 125, para 249. 
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Where the claimant successfully establishes an infringement of intellectual property 
rights, English law requires that he must claim either damages (including, where 
appropriate, additional damages) or an account of profits, since he cannot seek to be 
reimbursed both through an account and compensated through damages for the same 
infringement.
210
   
 
It is submitted that any profit made by the defender should be taken into account in 





7.1.5. The Calculation of the Award 
One final point is the calculation of the award in individual cases, regardless of the 
basis on which the award is made.  Although the same right and remedy(ies) should 
be available to all, this does not lead to the conclusion that the calculation of the 
monetary award will be the same for all.  Whether compensatory damages or a 
notional licence fee is awarded, there can be a presumption that an individual with 
celebrity status is likely to suffer more economic loss than unknown claimants.  
Likewise, “A-list” celebrities may well be able to demonstrate a greater loss or a 
higher notional licence fee than “C-listers”.
212
  As McCarthy notes of publicity 
“[l]ike all other property, that value may be great or small, as the marketplace 
determines.”
213
  The value of persona, and the loss suffered, is likely to depend on 
the status of the individual – as determined by the marketplace. 
 
This is hardly a novel concept, nor is it restricted to publicity.  Anything which can 
be traded on the open market will typically have its price set by market conditions:  
supply and demand creates a price differential which is not reflective of the use value 
                                                 
210
 Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property, para 2-43. 
211
 Hogg supports the recognition of this as a head of damages under unjustified enrichment in the 
context of breach of confidence:  Obligations, 2
nd
 ed, 2006, para 6.17.  See also MacQueen et al, 
Contemporary Intellectual Property, at 903. 
212
 It should be noted that this would not apply where the award is an account of profits, since this 
looks to the profit made by the party in breach, and not the loss suffered by the pursuer.  However, it 
is likely that the profit in question would be greater in the case of a higher-profile individual. 
213
 McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, para 1:39. 
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of the thing or any value other than market value.
214
  Thus, although made in the 
context of publicity as property, Nimmer’s assessment of the situation applies to the 
calculation of the award here: 
the damages which a person may claim for infringement of the right will 
depend upon the value of the publicity appropriated which in turn will depend 
in great measure upon the degree of fame attained by the plaintiff.
215
     
 
7.1.6. Concluding Points 
Regardless of whether respondents to the 2006 Online Survey favoured a property 
approach or a personal rights approach, support for some measure of remedy was 
high:  92% of “property” respondents
216
 and 80% of “personal right” respondents
217
 
favoured a remedy for the individual in cases of unauthorised exploitation.  When 
asked to choose which remedies from a given list should be available,
218
 both sets of 
respondents were in favour of damages to compensate for financial loss and an 
account of profits.  Whereas the property respondents were clearly in favour of 
compensatory damages, reflecting their property classification of the right, those who 
saw persona as a personal right were less convinced.  This can be seen from the fact 
that 70.4% of property respondents favoured this measure,
219
 compared to only 
56.6% of the personal rights respondents.
220
  However, when they were both asked if 
an account of profits should be available, support dropped slightly amongst property 
respondents (down to 66.7%
221
) whereas it rose amongst personal rights respondents 
(up to 62.3%
222
).  This suggests that those who view persona primarily as a 
dignitarian or human right are more supportive of measures which strip unauthorised 
users of their gain, than measures which try to quantify the loss suffered by the 
                                                 
214
 See, for example, the discussion of the role of the market and persona in Armstrong, “The 
reification of celebrity”. 
215
 Nimmer, “The right of publicity”, at 217.  See also Chapter 4, section 6. 
216
 Graph 6, Appendix B.  
217
 Graph 7, Appendix B. 
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 The listed remedies were: (i) an interdict; (ii) damages to compensate for financial loss; (iii) an 
account of profits; (iv) some other sum of money calculated on another basis; (v) some other remedy; 
(vi) don’t know.  These options were cumulative and not exclusionary, thus respondents could opt for 
more than one remedy. 
219
 Graph 8, Appendix B. 
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 Graph 11, Appendix B. 
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individual from this unauthorised use.  That said, the percentages in all cases indicate 
strong support for financial compensation for unauthorised use.       
 
In summary, financial compensation should be available to individuals where there 
has been unauthorised use of their publicity rights.  This could take the form of an 
award to vindicate the right, an award of solatium to compensate for the damage to 
dignitarian interests, and/or a sum to compensate for the economic loss suffered.  
Where there is no quantifiable financial loss, the pursuer may choose to seek a 
measure based on the notional licence fee or, in cases where the defender has made a 
profit from his unauthorised use, an account of profits.   
 
7.2.  Other Disposals 
A practical response for a pursuer would be to seek an order ad factum praestandum 
to seek, for example, the delivery up or destruction of documents or merchandise 




Continental jurisdictions typically offer a wider range of remedies for infringement 
of personality rights, which reflect the greater emphasis placed on protection of 
dignitarian interests than economic interests.  Thus, in France, damages are not 
necessarily widely available but a range of other remedies are designed to restore the 
dignity of the individual.
224
 Such remedies include the award of the franc 
symbolique,
225
 designed to indicate the liability of the defendant and condemn his 
conduct, while recognising the lack of identifiable harm caused to the claimant.
226
  
Other remedies include destruction of the infringing material, undertakings not to 
                                                 
223
 Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, para 3.7.4. 
224
 Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 188.  The authors also observe that 
even where monetary remedies are awarded, the level of compensation tends to be lower than in 
Germany or England.   
225
 This is of course now a symbolic euro instead, and was awarded to French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy following an advert run by Ryanair which used a photograph of Sarkozy and his wife Carla 
Bruni.  Note that Bruni was awarded 60,000 euros, being a notional licence fee calculated according 
to what she would usually seek, as a model, for appearing in such an advert, albeit this was a 
considerable reduction from the 500,000 euros she claimed: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7228457.stm (accessed 25 May 2008). 
226
 Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality, at 187.  The authors cast doubt on its 
efficacy, since such a minimal award suggests that the harm itself was minimal or even of dubious 
standing, and there is not necessarily any public awareness of the award once made. 
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publish it, anonymisation of the individual’s features, and rectification of an 
untruthful passage or the addition of a statement to avoid public confusion.
227
  
Similar options are available under German law, including destruction, correction, 
the award of solatium, and the publication of a counter-statement by the 
individual.
228
   
 
A final remedy which is worth consideration, particularly to address dignitarian 
damage caused, is derived from the remedy of the palinode.
229
  As Whitty explains, 
this remedy “required a person who had defamed another to apologise and to retract 
the defamatory imputation.”
230
  Although it was never abolished in Scotland, Whitty 
notes that it had “withered away” by the middle of the nineteenth century,
231
 there is 
a statutory form of palinode in section 2 of the Defamation Act 1996, which provides 
for an “offer to make amends”.
232
  This could operate as a useful template for a 
similar remedy in publicity rights.  Further, published retractions have also been 
endorsed recently by the Council of Europe in Resolution 1165.  Paragraph 14 
obliges governments to ensure that a number of legal measures are in place, and that 
“when editors have published information that proves to be false, they should be 
required to publish equally prominent corrections at the request of those 
concerned.”
233
  The use of a published apology or retraction may help to address 
dignitarian concerns in publicity rights – although it may of course work to generate 
further publicity for the defender and keep the infringement fresh in the public eye, 
contrary to the individual’s wishes.  For this reason, any such retraction should be 
awarded, where appropriate, only at the request of the individual concerned.      
 
                                                 
227
 Ibid., at 181-185.  
228
 Ibid., at 138-146.  Solatium will be awarded in Germany where the court refuses to award the 
notional licence fee on the grounds that the individual would never have granted a licence because of 
the degrading use made of the individual, for example the use of someone in an advertisement for a 
sexual stimulant (at 145).  See also Whitty, “Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law”, para 
3.7.6, note 555. 
229
 This can be equated to remedies such as retraction and apology, which are often available:  see 
Waelde and Whitty, “A Rights of Personality Database”, para 11.6. 
230




 Section 2 of the Compensation Act 2006 enables an apology to be made by the defendant without 
this constituting an admission of liability. 
233
 Council of Europe Resolution 1165 of 1998, para 14(iii). 
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The advantage of these disposals is that they reflect the dignitarian or moral interests 
protected by such rights, which are a key part of the proposed publicity right.  While 
an award of damages may address the economic loss suffered, a sum of money may 
be less appropriate to resolve damage to the individual’s right to control use of 
persona.  It is not unreasonable to suppose that the Douglases, who spent £60,000 on 
the pre-wedding party alone,
234
 were more comforted by the vindication of their 
rights by the Court of Appeal than with the award of less than £15,000 in 
compensation.  In this situation, a non-monetary remedy may well be appropriate in 
reversing some of the harm caused to the claimant’s personal interests.  An order 
compelling the defendant to publish an apology or retraction may therefore serve the 
interests of the claimant more effectively than a financial award.  
 
7.3. Remedies for Authorised Users 
In brief, it is worth noting that an exclusive licensee, as authorised user, may have 
two different claims, against: (i) the individual, for breach of the licence terms; and 
(ii) an unauthorised user where that unauthorised use breaches the grant in the 
licence.  In the case of an action against the individual for breach of the licence, this 
will be a fairly straightforward action for breach of contract, and may be limited by 
the terms of the licence itself.   
 
A statutory right for authorised users against unauthorised users would allow the  
issues to be addressed directly, thus avoiding the rather dubious (if commercially 
sensible) decision of the House of Lords in Douglas v Hello!.
235
  In doing so, 
guidance can be drawn from the comparable rights of an exclusive licensee under the 
CDPA 1988.  This provides that the exclusive licensee shall have the same rights and 
remedies as if the licence had been an assignment,
236
 and that these rights and 
remedies are concurrent with the copyright owner’s rights.
237
  Any remedies 
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 Hello! Number 639, November 28, 2000, at 87-91. 
235
 For commentary on this see Michalos, “Douglas v Hello:  The final frontier”; G Black, “OK! for 
some:  Douglas v Hello! in the House of Lords” (2007) 11 Edin LR 402; and Carty, “The modern 
action for breach of commercial confidence”. 
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 Section 101(1). 
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exercisable by the defender against the copyright owner will also be applicable 
against the exclusive licensee.
238
  A statutory grant to an exclusive licensee, that is to 
say an authorised user, against an unauthorised user is therefore a natural 
consequence of the right to grant an exclusive licence. 
 
Further, there should be no danger of a double award against the unauthorised user.  
As Douglas v Hello! demonstrates,
239
 and as discussed above, it is not possible for 
both the individual and the authorised user to have the same claim against the 
unauthorised user in a privacy action, and it is submitted that the same should inhere 
for publicity.  Instead, the effect of an exclusive licence should be that the 
commercial element of the individual’s claim is transferred to the exclusive licensee.  
The net extent of the defender’s liability remains unchanged:  the grant of a remedy 
to the authorised user simply re-allocates the distribution of it. 
 
Thus, a statutory provision for exclusive licensees in publicity would provide some 
much-needed clarity and certainty in this area. 
 
8. CONCLUSION  
 
It is not necessary to draw any concise conclusions from a chapter of this nature, 
which has considered a number of areas which play an important role in shaping the 
right of publicity.  The primary aim of the Chapter has been to sketch out the scope 
of a statutory publicity right in order to reflect both the commercial practice and the 
legal consequences of classifying the right as a monopoly/ real right of exclusive 
privilege.   
 
The key features that have been identified are as follows: 
(i) the right should come into existence on the birth of the individual, with no 
prerequisite of registration or other formality; 
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(ii) the right should endure for the life of the individual; 
(iii) the right should be inalienable during life, such that it can be licensed but 
not assigned; 
(iv) post mortem transmission and subsequent transfer should however be 
possible, subject to a qualifying registration during life; 
(v) freedom of expression should operate to permit use which would 
otherwise be unauthorised; 
(vi) additional permitted uses should allow for private use, the public interest, 
fair dealing and parody, to ensure that the cultural communicative use of 
persona is not unnecessarily hampered;  
(vii) the available remedies for unauthorised use should look to prevent such 
use by way of interdict, as well as compensating for wrongful use; 
(viii) compensatory awards should reflect the dignitarian and economic 
interests that are relevant in publicity, through financial compensation and 
non-monetary remedies;  
(ix)   where no quantifiable financial loss can be shown, the courts should be 
able to look to unjustified enrichment, to award a notional licence fee; and 
(x)    authorised users should have remedies against either the individual for 
breach of licence or unauthorised users for breach of the right.  
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To draw the foregoing analysis together, it is helpful to consider a hypothetical 
scenario.  Imagine a future advertising campaign for a brand of malt whisky, 
featuring a paparazzo shot of Andy Murray holding a bottle of the whisky during a 
public celebration in his home town following his first title win at Wimbledon.  Sales 
of the whisky rocket on the back of this campaign, but Murray did not give his 
consent – and, in fact, it potentially conflicts with an existing endorsement deal with 
a rival brand.  What are the legal rights and wrongs arising? 
 
Scots law so far remains litigation- and legislation-free as regards publicity use.  In 
contrast, English law is edging towards a range of options, derived from the torts of 
passing off and breach of confidence, yet even those cases in English law which have 
tackled publicity-type use of name and image do not provide for every scenario.  
This thesis has sought to show that, as the law stands, there is very little that Murray 
could do to contest unauthorised use of his persona in an advertising campaign such 
as this.  There is no evidence of misrepresentation, in contrast with Irvine v 
Talksport, and thus no likelihood of success in a passing off action.  There is nothing 
defamatory about the use of the photograph and, in any event, the defence of veritas 
would permit the use.  And his public celebration does not give rise to any breach of 
confidence or reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
Despite the legal lacuna, Murray would arguably have suffered through (i) loss to his 
dignitarian and economic interests, resulting from the unauthorised use and (ii) lack 
of certainty as to the scope of the licence for authorised exploitation with the rival 
brand.  In the first place, he has lost control over his name and image, which was 
used publicly and prominently, without his consent.  This infringement of his 
autonomy cannot be justified by reference to freedom of expression (the advertising 
message could be conveyed by other means and no other message is apparently 
conveyed), nor by reference to any cultural communication (since there is no 
evidence of an attempt to pass comment or of parody).  Murray may also have 
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suffered economic harm if, for example, his existing whisky endorsement was not 
renewed.  The risk to his existing authorised deal also draws attention to the 
uncertainty surrounding such arrangements:  what is being licensed and what rights 
does this convey to the authorised exploiter?    
 
This thesis has addressed how Scots law might best accommodate this scenario and 
similar publicity-type uses – and to show why a response is necessary and justified.  
Importantly, by looking to practice as well as theory, I have tried to ensure that the 
new right proposed is grounded in commercial reality as well as being doctrinally 
appropriate.  The taxonomy sought for the proposed right of publicity in Scots law is 
thus one which fits within the Scots classification of rights, while also reflecting the 
reality of publicity practice.   
 
The route to this proposed right has been by way of addressing the three questions 
posed in the Introduction.  These were: 
1. What should be the subject matter of a right of publicity? 
2. Is there a need for such a right?  Is its creation or recognition justified? 
3. What should be the legal taxonomy of this right?  And what should be its 
scope, its limits and its associated remedies? 
By addressing these questions, a much clearer idea of the problem, and the most 
satisfactory solution, has emerged.  
 
The three questions can be mapped on to Parts I, II and III of this thesis.  Part I 
addressed the first question, in Chapters 2 and 3, by exploring the concept of 
publicity practice and the responses to this practice in a number of jurisdictions.  As 
Chapter 3 demonstrated, this exploitation can arise through use of persona – the 
individual’s name, identifying indicia, and reputation – in the media information, 
promotion and merchandising uses.  Importantly, the definition of publicity itself is 
neutral as regards the nature of the exploitation in each case, thereby accommodating 
both authorised and unauthorised exploitation. 
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Part II tackled the second question: Chapter 4 assessed justifications for a right of 
publicity.  By recognising the dignitarian and economic interests that are inherent in 
the use of persona, it is possible to identify rationales for protecting its use, since any 
interference with persona potentially impacts on autonomy and dignity and on 
economic interests.  Yet while there is a case to be made in favour of publicity rights, 
arising from these interests, there are also concerns on the other side of the debate 
which must be addressed.  Chapter 4 concluded that any grant of publicity rights 
must not be overbroad.  There must be scope for the legitimate use of one’s persona 
by others, through the right to freedom of expression and in the cultural creation of 
meaning and the communication of that meaning.  These interests must be 
recognised through limitations on the right of publicity.   
 
Part III addressed the third question, concerning the legal taxonomy and scope of a 
publicity right in Scots law.  Rather than starting with existing doctrines and 
measuring publicity against each to identify the “best fit” solution, this review tried 
to map the characteristics of publicity onto the general scheme of rights in Scots law.  
In doing so, I concluded in Chapter 5 that the right of privacy, as currently 
developing through Article 8 ECHR, did not provide a best fit with publicity.  While 
the possibility of pragmatic ad hoc use was certainly viable in some cases, the 
theoretical bases of the two rights remain distinct.  The analysis in Chapter 6 moved 
on to real and personal rights.  This revealed that the tension inherent in publicity, 
resulting from its dual economic and dignitarian aspects, meant that a publicity right 
could not exclusively be either a real right or a personal right.  The key element in 
publicity was the individual’s need to control the use of the intangible “asset” of 
persona, to protect and promote his economic and dignitarian interests.  This control 
could be achieved through a right of exclusive privilege, categorised in Scots law as 
a real right but which does not exist over a “thing” and which focuses very much on 
the control that monopoly provides.  This monopoly control allows for authorised use 
by the individual and for his prevention of unauthorised use – thereby recognising 
the positive and negative classification identified in Chapter 2.  Further, the right 
proposed is designed to ensure that all individuals are able to control the use and 
exploitation of their persona: it is not a “celebrities charter”.    
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Having concluded that publicity practice can best be protected in Scots law as a right 
of exclusive privilege, the final element of this thesis was to flesh out the details of 
the right.  Chapter 7 considered the boundaries of the right, including its duration, 
post mortem rights, transfer, and permitted uses, together with the remedies that 
should be available for individuals and licensees where the right is infringed.  In 
assessing these limits and remedies, reference was made to the empirical data 
generated by the 2006 Online Survey.      
 
This analysis has sought to recognise and reconcile the tensions inherent in publicity 
– tensions which are apparent from the study of publicity in other jurisdictions.  The 
American literature reveals a decided emphasis on property concerns, which 
accommodates the commercial exploitation and transfer of persona, but which tends 
to overlook the dignitarian elements of control and autonomy which underlie the 
right.  The property focus is reflected in typical justifications sought which, in 
common with intellectual property justifications, look to labour, desert and incentive 
principles.  Yet these do not sit comfortably with the highly personal subject matter 
of publicity and have been the subject of comprehensive challenges, as was seen in 
Chapter 4.  On the other hand, Civilian jurisdictions place a greater emphasis on the 
extra-patrimonial elements of publicity, arising from the inherently personal nature 
of name, image and identity.  While justifications derived from these dignitarian 
concerns are convincing, this focus tends to obscure the commercial practice in 
exploiting persona as a patrimonial right.  This results in rather pragmatic responses 
to enable the exploitation of persona, despite its classification as an inalienable 
personal right.   
 
Although the creation of a statutory right of publicity would be a novel development 
in Scots law, I believe the foregoing analysis has shown that such a right would 
allow for the development of the right in accordance with established principles.  
While the content of the right may be new, the form would not be a departure from 
the existing doctrine of exclusive privilege.   
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Thus, the publicity right proposed for Scots law is a statutory right of exclusive 
privilege, which reflects the economic and dignitarian interests of each individual 
through the right to control the use of persona, and recognises the legitimate interests 
of other parties in using that persona to communicate and to share cultural meaning.  
This right would be balanced and coherent, thereby protecting the interests of all 
parties involved and providing much needed clarity and certainty in the field of 
publicity. 














1. Cover Email 
 
2. Initial Text box  
 
3. Introductory Questions 
 




David Beckham is famous for advertising Police sunglasses.  Jamie Oliver is the face of 
Sainsbury’s.   
 
Celebrities can earn significant sums of money from allowing third parties to use their name, 
reputation and image – and the third parties benefit from the support and endorsement of the 
celebrity.   
 
When individuals treat their persona – their name, reputation and image – as a commercial 
asset we can think of it as their commercial persona.  So commercial persona can be used 
to describe the aspects of an individual’s personality that can be exploited for commercial 
benefit.   
 
I am a Lecturer in Commercial Law at Edinburgh University and I am investigating the 
current importance of commercial persona for individuals, for the companies that seek 
endorsement deals, and for the press.  I would therefore be very grateful if you could click on 
this link and complete the short online questionnaire about commercial persona.  It should 
take about 10 minutes to complete. 
 
The results of this questionnaire will be used solely for academic research purposes, and not 
by or for any commercial organisation. 
 
This questionnaire has been sent to you because of your experience in this field – your email 
address was obtained from your employer’s website or from the website of your regulatory 
body, where you are listed as a specialist in this area or as having a professional 
involvement in it.   
 
All information provided will be used solely for the purpose of informing this academic 
research project and any subsequent publications arising from it.  Neither the individual 
answers provided nor the identities of respondents (if provided) will be disclosed in 
publications or to third parties.  Strict ethical guidelines will be adhered to in using the 
information provided and all reasonable measures will be taken to protect it.   
 
The questionnaire will close on MONDAY 18 SEPTEMBER 2006, at 11.59pm BST.  Please 
submit your answers before then. 
 
If you have any queries about the questions or about this research project please feel free to 
contact me via email on gillian.black@ed.ac.uk or by phone: 0131 650 9541. 
Many thanks, 
Gillian Black 









Initial Text box  
 
This questionnaire should take no longer than 10 minutes to complete. 
 
Each section starts with a short introduction.  Instructions on answering each question – for 
example, how many boxes to tick, or which question or Section to answer next – are 
provided throughout the questionnaire, as appropriate.  Some of the questions are asked 
twice:  firstly in relation to the current legal position and secondly to ask what you believe 
the law should be. 
 
In many cases, there are no right answers – the questionnaire is intended to find out about 
the commercial beliefs of people involved in this area. 
 
Although your participation in this survey is greatly valued, you are not required to 












1 What is your job/ in which of the following industries do you work?  (please tick one) 
 
1. celebrity  
2. celebrity manager/ agent 
3. brand manager/ sponsor 
4. solicitor 
5. advocate / barrister 
6. academic  
7. media/publishing 






2.  Approximately how many years have you been in your current industry or profession?   
 
 
I year or less 
1 – 2 years 
2 – 5 years 
5 – 10 years 




3.  Where do you work?  






2. England or Wales 
3. Northern Ireland  
4. Throughout the UK 












Section A – An Individual’s Commercial Persona   
 
When individuals treat their name, reputation and/or image as a commercial asset, they are 
exploiting an aspect of their persona, and we can call this their “commercial persona”.    
 
So, commercial persona is the attractive element of fame or reputation that certain 
individuals have, and which they can commercially exploit, as an asset – third parties are 
willing to pay in order to associate the individual’s name and reputation and image with their 
goods or services.   
 
This section considers what constitutes an individual’s identity or image, and whether 




A1.  Do you think the law currently protects any aspects of an individual’s identity or image 
as their commercial persona, i.e. as a commercial asset?   
 
 
Yes  go to A2 
 
No  go to A4 
 






A2  Which of the following aspects of an individual’s identity or image do you think the law 








5. Attitude or behaviour in public (for example, the difference between cultivating a 
“bad guy” or a “Mr Nice Guy” persona.) 
6. “Trade mark” gesture (for example, Winston Churchill’s famous V salute) 
7. Catchphrase  
8. An identifiable style of dress 























A.4   Do you think the law should protect any aspects of an individual’s identity or image as 
their commercial persona, i.e. as a commercial asset?   
 
 
Yes  go to A5 
 
No  go to A6 
 






A5  Which of the following aspects of an individual’s identity or image do you think the law 
should protect?   
 
The individual’s… 




5. Attitude or behaviour in public (for example, the difference between cultivating a 
“bad guy” or a “Mr Nice Guy” persona.) 
6. “Trade mark” gesture (for example, Winston Churchill’s famous V salute) 
7. Catchphrase  
8. An identifiable style of dress 









A.6  Why do you think there should be no legal protection for an individual’s commercial 
persona? 
 
1.  anyone should be entitled to use an individual’s commercial persona – it should not be 
removed from the public domain 
 
2.  it is not possible to define an individual’s commercial persona 
 
3.  don’t know 
 













A.7.  Which of the following statements do you most agree with?  Please tick one only: 
 
(a)  Individuals who are famous invest time and effort in that activity, and they are 
rewarded for it.  They do not invest time and effort in their image or reputation, and 
therefore any value in their image or reputation is accidental.  It should be treated as 




(b) In addition to working at the activity that makes them famous, individuals also 
work to cultivate their image and reputation.  The image and reputation they achieve 













A.8  Who do you think should have a commercial persona?  Please tick one only. 
 
1. Everyone  A8A 
 
2. Only celebrities/ famous people  A8A 
 
3. No-one  A8A 
 




A.8A  Do you think that commercial persona should only arise where the individual cultivates 
their name, image and reputation? 
 
For example, David Beckham actively manages his persona and image, and has been in the 
public eye for over a decade.  In contrast, Guy Coma found 15 minutes of fame after 
accidentally appearing on BBC News 24, instead of attending an interview in the same 
building.    
 
Does this make a difference? 
 
1. Yes – an individual has to actively cultivate their name/image/reputation to deserve 
legal protection. 
 
2. No – legal protection should be available to everyone, even where the reputation 
arises from an event beyond their control, e.g. being involved in a current 
affairs/news event. 
 



















A.10   An individual’s right to exploit their commercial persona could be recognised in law in 
different ways.  Which of the following do you think is currently the legal status of 
commercial persona? 
 
Please tick one only 
 
1. A property right, capable of being owned in the same way as a piece of jewellery or 
copyright in a poem.  A11 
 
2. A right to prevent harm or interference by others, like right to prevent defamation or 
trespass – a personal right of action  A11 
 
3. A right that everyone has, like to the right to privacy or the right to freedom of speech 
– a human right  A11 
 
4. A combination of some or all of the above, i.e. in part a property and/or a personal 
and/or a human right.  A11 
 
5. It does not currently have any legal status.  A11 
 










Please tick one only 
 
1. A property right, capable of being owned in the same way as a piece of jewellery or 
copyright in a poem.  Section B 
 
2. A right to prevent harm or interference by others, like right to prevent defamation or 
trespass – a personal right of action  Section C 
 
3. A right that everyone has, like to the right to privacy or the right to freedom of speech 
– a human right  Section C 
 
4. A combination of some or all of the above, i.e. in part a property and/or a personal 
and/or a human right.  A13 
 
5. It should not currently have any legal status.  Section D 
 









A13  If an individual’s commercial persona should be protected by more than one type of 
legal right, do you support… 
 
1. … the primary right being a property right, and the secondary right being a 




2. … the primary right being a personal and/or human right, and the secondary right 
being a property right?  Section C 
 
 
NB You may favour a 50/50 split, or believe that it is not possible to answer this question 
in the abstract, but it is important for the purposes of this survey to choose one or the 









Section B – A Property Right 
 
[Text box:  The questions in this section ask what you think the law should be, rather than 
what the law is.] 
 
 
B1.  If an individual’s commercial persona should be treated like any item of property, then 
who do you think should own it? 
 
Please tick one only 
 
1. The individual 
2. His/her manager 
3. His/her agent 
4. His/her sponsor 
5. His/her club or team, if applicable (for example, in the case of a sportsman or 
woman) 
6. The press 
7. No-one 
8. Other (please state) ___________________________ 
9. More than one person – if so, who and what % share should they each have? 
______________________________________ 










B2.  Ownership of property usually entitles the owner to sell it on:  for example, you can sell 
a house or assign a patent, and transfer the house or patent to a third party.   
 
Should an individual be entitled to transfer or sell his commercial persona to a third party? 
 













B3.  Ownership of property frequently entitles the owner to rent or hire it out, either 
gratuitously or for a fee.  For example, you can rent a house or license a patent, and this 
entitles you to use the house or the patent for a certain period of time. 
 
Should the owner of commercial persona be legally allowed to permit others to use 
the commercial persona?   
 




To give an example, this would allow a cereal manufacturer to enter into a licence to use a 
celebrity’s name and image on its cereal boxes, to advertise and promote the cereal. 
 
Please tick one only 
 
1. Yes – and should be able to charge for this use 
 
2. Yes – but should not be able to charge for this use 
 
3. No.   
 











B4.  Do you think the individual should be legally entitled to prevent other people from using 
his commercial persona?   
 
For example, if an individual is photographed in public drinking a brand of soft drink could 
this photo be used in an advertising campaign for that brand of soft drink, without the 
individual’s consent?  Or should the individual be entitled to stop this use? 
 
Please tick one only 
 
1. Yes – stop the use in all cases. 
 
2. Yes – stop the use but only where the third party is making a profit from their use of 
it. 
 
3. Yes  – stop the use except for purposes of news reporting. 
 
4. No – other people should have free use of other people’s commercial persona 
 













B5.    If there is unauthorised use of an individual’s commercial persona by a third party, 
should the individual be entitled to any legal remedy for this unauthorised use?  Please tick 
one only. 
 
1. Yes  B6 





2. No  B7 
 









B6.  Which of the following legal remedies do you think the owner should be able to obtain in 
court?  Tick all that apply. 
 
1. An order to stop the third party using the commercial persona (known as an 
injunction or interdict) 
2. Damages to compensate for any financial loss  
3. An award of the sum of money that the third party has made through its 
unauthorised use of the commercial persona, e.g. increased profits 
4. Some other sum of money calculated on a different basis from options 2 or 3 above 
5. Some other remedy 






B7.   Do you think the legal right of ownership of commercial persona should continue after 
the death of the individual?  Please tick one only. 
 
1. Yes  B8 
 
2. No  Section D  
 




B8. Who do you think should own the right to an individual’s commercial persona after the 
death of the individual? Please tick one only. 
 
1. The individual’s family or relatives/ next of kin  
2. The individual should be able to specify someone in his/her will (a testamentary 
beneficiary) 
3. The individual’s manager 
4. The individual’s sponsor 
5. The individual’s club or team, if applicable (for example, in the case of a sportsman 
or woman) 
6. The owner, if the owner is a different person from the individual  
7. The press 
8. No-one 
9. Other (please state) ___________________________ 
10. Don’t know 
 
 
 Section D 
 




Section C – An Enforceable Right 
 
[Text box:  The questions in this section ask what you think the law should be, rather than 
what the law is.] 
 
 
C1.  If there should be a right to stop unauthorised use of an individual’s commercial 
persona, who do you think should be able to enforce the right?  Please tick one only. 
 
1. The individual  C5 
 
2. Someone else  C3 
  




























C5 If a third party does infringe an individual’s commercial persona by using it without 
consent, should the individual or enforcer be entitled to stop this use?   
 
For example, if an individual is photographed in public drinking a brand of soft drink could 
this photo be used in an advertising campaign for that brand of soft drink, without the 
individual’s consent?  Or should the individual be entitled to stop this use? 
 
 
1. Yes – stop the use  C5A 
 
2. No – no right to stop the use   C7 
 
3. Don’t know  C7 
 
   
 




C5A  In addition to stopping this use, should the individual/enforcer be entitled to a legal 
remedy for the unauthorised use? 
1. Yes  C6 
 
2. No  C7 
 




C6  Which of the following legal remedies do you think the individual/enforcer should be able 
to obtain in court?  Tick all that apply. 
 
1. An order to stop the third party using the commercial persona (known as an 
injunction or interdict) 
2. Damages to compensate for any financial loss  
3. An award equal to the sum of money that the third party has made through its 
unauthorised use of the commercial persona, e.g. increased profits  
4. Some other sum of money calculated on a different basis from options 2 or 3 above 
5. Some other remedy 







C7  Should the individual/enforcer of the right of commercial persona be entitled to waive 
their right to enforce?  And should there be a right to charge a fee for granting a waiver? 
 
For example, a soft drinks manufacturer could not use a photo of an individual drinking their 
product as part of an advert, unless the individual waived their right to stop such use, 
i.e. the individual gave consent to such use.  In this case, would the soft drinks manufacturer 
have to pay for the consent? 
 
Please tick one only. 
 
1. Yes – should be able to waive the right to enforce AND be able to charge a fee for 
this waiver  C8 
 
2. Yes – should be able to waive the right to enforce BUT not be able to charge a fee 
for this waiver  C8 
 
3. No – should never be able to waive the right to enforce.  C8  
 
4. Neither – there should not be an enforceable right at all  Section D 
 








C8  Do you think the right to enforce protection of commercial persona should continue after 
the death of the individual?  Please tick one only 
 




1. Yes  C9 
 
2. No  Section D 
 





C9  Who do you think should be able to enforce protection of commercial persona after the 
death of the individual? Please tick one only. 
 
1. The individual’s family or relatives/ next of kin 
2. The individual should be able to specify someone in his/her will (a testamentary 
beneficiary) 
3. The individual’s manager 
4. The individual’s sponsor 
5. The individual’s club or team, if applicable (for example, in the case of a sportsman 
or woman) 
6. The enforcer, if the enforcer is a different person from the individual  
7. The press 
8. No-one 
9. Other (please state) ___________________________ 
10. Don’t know 
 
 
 Section D 




Section D – Exploitation of Commercial Persona in Practice 
 
[Text box:]  [This section is designed to find out more about the current practice in relation to 




D1.  Have you ever been a party to, or negotiated or drafted, a contract or licence 
concerning the commercial exploitation of an individual’s commercial persona? 
 
1. Yes  D2 
 










1. The publisher who paid for the right to use an element of an individual’s commercial 
persona in a publication 
 
2. A representative of the company/ sports club/ organisation who paid for the right to 
use an element of an individual’s commercial persona in a sponsorship or 
endorsement deal 
 
3. The celebrity manager/agent involved in negotiating or drafting such an agreement 
for my client, but not a party to the agreement  
 
4. The solicitor involved in negotiating or drafting such an agreement, but not a party to 
the agreement 
 










2. 2-5  
3. 6-10  
4. 11-15 
5. 16-20 
6. 20+  







D4  What was the approximate value of the most recent of these contracts or licences? 






1. No financial value – it was a charitable arrangement 
2. No quantifiable financial value 
3. Up to £10,000 
4. £10,000 - £25,000 
5. £25,000 - £50,000 
6. £50,000 - £100,000 
7. £100,000 - £250,000 
8. £250,000 - £500,000 
9. £500,000 - £1,000,000 
10. More than £1,000,000 










D5   What was the approximate duration of this contract or licence?   
 
1. A one-off event 
2. 1 month 
3. 2-6 months 
4. 7-12 months 
5. More than 12 months 
6. The duration was connected to a contract of employment or similar 

















D7  Have you ever had any personal experience of unauthorised exploitation of commercial 
persona?   
 
For example, has a third party used an aspect of your commercial persona without your 
consent?  Or have you/ your company used an individual’s commercial persona without their 
consent?   
 
1. Yes D8 
 
2. No  D2A  
 














D2A.  Have you ever represented a client in litigation concerning an individual’s commercial 
persona? 
 
1.  Yes  D9 
 
2.  No  Section E/ END 
 
D9.  Approximately how many such cases have you been involved in (either advising on at a 















D10  What was the approximate value of the most recent dispute? 
 
 
1. No quantifiable financial value 
2. Up to £10,000 
3. £10,000 - £25,000 
4. £25,000 - £50,000 
5. £50,000 - £100,000 
6. £100,000 - £250,000 
7. £250,000 - £500,000 
8. £500,000 - £1,000,000 
9. More than £1,000,000 




Were you representing… 
 
1. … an individual? 
2. … a commercial organisation? 









Who were the litigants? 
 
1. Two parties to an existing contract for endorsement/ sponsorship  
2. An individual and a third party infringer 
3. A commercial organisation and a third party infringer 
4. An individual and the media 
5. A commercial organisation and the media 
6. Other – please specify _______________________ 
 
 






D.14  Is there anything further you are able to add about this dispute? 
[text box] 
 
 Section E/ End 
 




E –  End 
 
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire.   
 
Although this questionnaire is anonymous, if you would be willing to be contacted by Gillian 
Black to answer further questions by email or over the phone, please provide your name and 
contact details here: [text box].  Gillian may not be able to contact everyone who does 
provide contact details. 
 
Please hit the submit button now to submit your answers.  You will then be automatically 
redirected to the homepage of the School of Law. 
 
















This appendix contains the graphs referred to in Chapter 7, showing the data 
collected in the 2006 Online Survey. 
 
For each point illustrated, the same information is represented in two different ways:  
1. the first graph shows the number of respondents as a percentage of the total 
answers to that question;  
2. the second graph shows the number of respondents who selected that answer 
as a whole number. 
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The text above the photograph of Miss Shaw (a “Picture of Health”) reads:  “Photo 
of Miss SHAW, nourished to complete health on MACLEANS’ REVALENTA 
FOOD, although suffering from intense weakness of digestive organs.” 
 
 
Photograph © Callum Black, September 2008 
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